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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the political thought of Achille Mbembe. It deploys decolonial 
critical analysis to unmask traces of coloniality with regard to the African existential 
conditions foregrounded in the conception of the African subject, its subjection, and 
subjectivity. The theoretical foundation of this thesis is decolonial epistemic 
perspective—the epistemic intervention that serves as a lens to understand 
Mbembe’s work and—that is the theoretical foundation outside the Euro-North 
American “mainstream” canon foregrounded in coloniality. Decolonial epistemic 
perspective in this thesis is deployed to expose three kinds of coloniality in 
Mbembe’s work, namely: coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and 
coloniality of being. The thrust of this thesis is that Mbembe’s political thought is 
inadequate for the understanding of the African existential condition in that it does 
not fully take coloniality into account. In order to acknowledge the existence of 
coloniality through decolonial critical analysis, the political thought of Mbembe is 
examined in relation to modes of self-writing, power in the postcolony, the politics 
of violence in Africa, Frantz Fanon’s political thought, and the idea of South Africa 
as major themes undertaken in this thesis. Decolonial critical analysis deals with 
foundational questions that have relevance to the existential condition of the African 
subject and the manner in which such an existential crisis can be brought to an end. 
These foundational questions confront issues like—who is speaking or writing, from 
where, for whom and why? This thesis reveals that Mbembe is writing and thinking 
Africa from outside the problematic ontology of the African subject and, as such, 
Mbembe precludes any form of African subjectivity that challenges the Euro-North 
American canon. This then reveals that Mbembe is not critical of coloniality and this 
has the implications in that subjection is left on the wayside and not accounted for. 
Having explored the genealogy, trajectory and horisons of decolonial critical 
analysis to understand the political thought of Mbembe, this thesis highlights that it 
is essential to take a detour through the shifting of the geography of reason. Herein 
lies the originality of this thesis, and it is here that Africa is thought from within a 
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standpoint of decolonial critical analysis and not Africa that is thought from the 
Euro-North American canon. Therefore, the shifting of the geography of reason is 
necessary for the authorisation of the subjectivity of the African subject in order to 
combat subjection.    
Key terms: Africanity, colonialism, coloniality, decoloniality, empire, Fanon, 
fetishism, locus of enunciation, necropower, populism, racism, subject, subjection, 
subjectivity, war machines, violence 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Africanity: is the way of thinking and writing from the standpoint that privileges Africa as a 
starting point of subjectivity and analysis thereof. As a form of African subjectivity, 
Africanity is combative towards the Euro-North American empire’s ways of thinking and 
writing African subjectivity, and it should not be mistaken as a either a reactive or corrective 
discourse, but the affirmation of African subjectivity where African subjects are writing from 
their own existential conditions.  
Coloniality: coloniality denotes the long standing power patterns that originate from 
colonialism and that are now exercised in the absence of the colonial administration 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007). Coloniality is not colonialism, and it can be traced long before 
colonialism. It mutates itself with the nature of the regime and it is now exercising 
oppression covertly as opposed to overtly as in the advent of colonialism. The forms of 
coloniality engaged in this thesis are colonialty of power, coloniality of knowledge and 
coloniality of being.  
Deathscapes: this denotes spaces where death occurs and where the law has been suspended 
through what Agamben (2005) refers to as the state of exception. It is spaces where the life 
of those who are killed is meaningless and their death cannot be accounted for. Deathscapes 
are not only war zones (Palestine, Iraq, Iran, and Democratic Republic of Congo just to 
highlight a few) but the very existential locations where the everyday life is prone to death as 
a result of structural violence against those who have their humanity questioned.  
Decolonial epistemic perspective: this means the political intervention that seeks to 
challenge injustices and inhumanity brought by coloniality, thereby placing African subjects 
at the centre, to understand their subjectivity as ways to counter subjection and imagine 
possible worlds and knowledges. It is the epistemic system that privileges epistemologies that 
have been distorted, bastardised, ignored, and rendered irrelevant by the Euro-North 
American episteme. It privileges the subjectivity of the subject from its own existential 
locale and it is foregrounded outside modernity emphasising the fact that there is no 
monolithic knowledge, but what (Santos 2007) refers to as ecologies of knowledges. In this 
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thesis is deployed as the epistemic lens to expose three kinds of coloniality in Mbembe’s 
work, namely: coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, and coloniality of being. 
Empire: in this thesis the concept empire is means the political formation of the 
asymmetrical power and geographic location that resides in Euro-North America. It is, as 
Hard and Negri (2000) state, the political configuration that controls global exchanges, and it 
is a sovereign subject that governs the world. 
Fetishism: in this thesis the concept denotes the manner in which power through coercion 
and violence is exercised through fear but while masking that fear by the oppressive regime. 
Power is projected, though its performativity (see performativity of power below) and it is 
done so in a form of excess. However, this form of excess exposes the fact that there is 
absence of power in the real sense of the term because those who oppress rule by fear and 
paranoia that they might lose power. So, their power is impotent in that it lacks any form of 
security and for it to survive it must unleash violence.   
Mutual zombification: this concept was coined by Mbembe (1992; 2001a) to refer to is the 
impotence or the state of powerlessness of the ruler and the ruled as each having robbed the 
other of vitality and the leaving both impotent. In this thesis, it is used to understand power 
relations in the postcolony between the ruler and the ruled, and the response and articulation 
of that powerfrom both sides.   
Necropower: is the logic of conferring life and taking it at free will in the form of killing 
resulting to death (Mbembe 2003). This concept has the same connotation with the notion of 
what Agamben (1998) refers to as bare life. Both necropower and bare life have their 
genealogical roots from Foucaldian notion of biopolitics. It is in this thesis that necropower 
is used to refer to the politics of death.   
Perfomativity of power: this concept means how power is exercised in a political regime. In 
this thesis, the concept is foregrounded in the postcolony to mean that the way power is 
exercised through the means of subjection by most of the postcolonial rulers, it takes 
dramaturgical forms in that it visibilises its authority. In such a way, this power is not only 
exercised but performed.   
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Politics of eatery: this concept refers to the the manner in which those who are in the helms 
of power live in the politics of excessive consumption at the expense of those who live in 
penury. This is the signification of the form of eating which is pervasive in the postcolony 
and which borders on excess and waste. The nature and character of this eating can be 
understood in terms of bribery, theft, looting, extortion, expropriation, rent-seeking, 
cronyism, patronage, graft and embezzlement among many other forms.  
Populism:  in this thesis populism is not understood from the liberal conception that reduces 
it to being archaic, primitive, dangerous, and exotic. Instead, populism is understood from 
Laclau’s (2005) conception way of constructing the political subject and in particular, 
African subjectivity.  
Postcolony: this concept has been coined by Mbembe (1992; 2001a) to refer to the 
interpenetration of epochs—that is, pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africa in one 
historical juncture. The postcolony is not after colonialism and it is not also synonymous 
with postcolonial or postcoloniality which means the epoch resulting from the colonial 
aftermath.  
Structural violence: is a form of violence that is not in a physical form but mechanistically 
inherent in social forces raging from poverty, disease, racism, and mortality (Farmer 2002). 
Structural violence is the violence that is not visible and it is hidden in structures. It makes 
those who are affected by it to be incapacitated to see, name, describe and explain it as it 
institutionalised, naturalised and normalised in everyday existence. 
Subject: in this thesis, the term is used in the ontological sense to mean the totality of 
elements constitutive of a human being. The subject is therefore used in two senses—that is, 
the African subject and the black subject, and these two senses are here used 
interchangeably.  
Subjection: the position of power and also the uses of power that create conditions of life 
that are informed by and reproduce oppression, subordination, injustice, and dehumanisation 
to name just a few. In most cases it is informed by the idea of race and its logic of 
operationalisation—racism.  
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Subjectivity: denotes the way in that knowledge practices are informed by conditioned ways 
of knowing and consciousness as the way of understanding the self, the lived experience and 
the world that the self inhabits. It also denotes the formation of the African subject in the 
political act of resisting and combating subjection.  
War machines: this concept is an overall inclusive terms to refer to rebels, insurgents, 
privatees, ex-combatants, private security firms to name but a few. It is the concept that was 
coined by Deleuze and Gauttari (1987) to refer to political units external to the state 
apparatus which have means of violence. War machines are amoebic in nature, and they are 
most often referred to as “soldiers for rent” in that they are not aligiant to any nation state, 
but are loyal to the contractors they serve and the highest bidder. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCING THE SELF: MBEMBE’S SUBJECT FORMATION 
 
Introduction 
This thesis is inspired by the current epistemic break. It is breaking from the 
knowledge that has been dominant for the past 500 years. This thesis argues that 
this knowledge was uselful but it is now exhausted in accounting for the lived 
experience of those who are at the underside of Euro-North American episteme. 
This thesis is written from the decolonial epistemic perspective—a political, 
philosophical and critical theoretical approach—which inaugurates the  epistemic 
break from Euro-North American centric episteme which is more about crisis 
rather than solutions to the human condition. This thesis privileges the existential 
and experiential sites of humanity of those who have been oppressed, 
inferiorised, excluded, racialised, and dehumanised. This then speaks to the 
exhaustive and limits of Euro-North American centric epistemologies and 
methodologies. Therefore, this thesis is not a descriptive study and it is not about 
procedures and methods. Rather, it is a political intervention where decolonial 
critical analysis is deployed as a methodological point of departure as opposed to 
conventional and dominant methodologies of the Euro-North American centric 
episteme. 
In specific terms, the subject of this thesis is the expostulation of Achille 
Mbembe as a subject and his subjectivity. While the study is on his subject 
formation it also reflects on his contribution to African politics. The starting 
point of this thesis is not a biographical account, but the location of the subject 
qua persona—that is, understanding Mbembe’s subjectivity and how his 
positionality enhanced and shaped his contribution to African politics. But 
central to this study is the subjectivity of Mbembe as an African subject and how 
in turn he articulated the African subject’s subjection, and subjectivity. In short, 
the originality of this contribution hinges on the understanding of subjectivity, 
more so that of the African subject as articulated by Mbembe.   
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Theoretically, this thesis is specifically informed by decolonial epistemic 
perspective. This epistemic perspective is deployed as the epistemological 
foundation underpinning this thesis. Through this epistemological foundation, 
Mbembe’s thinking and ideas are closely examined as they have a bearing on his 
understanding of the African subject, its subjection, and subjectivity in the 
postcolony. Pertinent themes that feature in Mbembe’s varied work include 
modes of self-writing, power in the postcolony, politics of violence in Africa, 
Frantz Fanon’s political thought, and the idea of South Africa. These 
aforementioned aspects feature in the chapters that constitute this thesis and they 
are examined in detail to bring to the fore the evidence that could advance the 
frontiers of knowledge. The foundational question of this study is: What is 
Mbembe’s subjectivity, and in which ways does he engage the ontological and 
epistemological conceptions of the African subject in relation to subjection?  
This chapter seeks to understand the political thought of Mbembe, and this is 
framed not in biographical terms, but in a form of a political critique. This is 
done by asking who Mbembe is as a theorist and African scholar, and this is 
framed along the lines of the emergence of the subject. To gain a nuanced 
understanding of Mbembe, it is important to understand his educational voyage 
and some of the conical texts that influenced him, and how influential are they to 
the development of his political thought. In addition, the movement of Mbembe 
from Cameroon, to France, to the United States and back to Africa—the tri-
continental move—is important to examine. Decolonial critical analysis as a 
method is introduced as the intervention in researching the African subject, its 
subjection, and subjectivity.  
Locating the subject 
Achille Mbembe is a social and political theorist, a philosopher and public 
intellectual. He originates, by birth and nationality, from Cameroon where he 
acquired elementary education, then proceeded to Paris as a student and moved 
to New York as a young scholar and then back to Africa in Senegal (Oboe 2010). 
In Senegal he was the Executive Director of Council for the Development of 
Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and is now a research professor of 
history and politics as the University of the Witwatersrand’s Institute of Social 
3 
 
and Economic Research at University of the Witwatersrand (WISER) in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. Mbembe is also a visiting professor at Duke 
University and also Harvard University. Mbembe’s contribution as an African 
scholar to African politics is well known and his seminal and controversial 
essays among many others ‘Provisional Notes on the Postcolony’, ‘African 
Modes of Self-Writing’ and his book On the Postcolony have made a distinct 
contribution to African politics. To answer the question of who is Mbembe, the 
answer is—‘one of the most original voices in contemporary culture and thought’ 
(Oboe 2010: 1). Gordon (2008: 238) states that ‘Mbembe is perhaps one of the 
greatest living prose-writers in contemporary African thought’. On that note, the 
persona of Mbembe is that which is linked to intellectual roots. 
The intellectual location of Mbembe, his intellectual positionality is important 
for an understanding of Mbembe’s take on various aspects of the African 
condition.  This is because he is the public persona; for that reason the private 
will not be essential since this is not a biographical account, but Mbembe’s 
thought on the African subject, its subjectivity and subjection. Mbembe has made 
a huge contribution to African politics to set the agenda and also to pace debates 
and discourses. However, his locus of enunciation is rooted in the French archive 
and also the colonial library that constrain his understanding of the African 
condition and subjectivity. Mudimbe’s (1994) conception of the colonial library 
denotes the capture of Africa in the Euro-North American literature and 
epistemic practices in general. Mbembe’s interventions are not free from the 
Euro-North American dominant archive. Mbembe is not reading and reaching 
Africa from inside as he deliberately locates himself in the colonial metropolis 
rather than in Africa as the locus of enunciation. The African archive is relegated 
to footnotes in his analysis of the African condition and he adopts the Hegelian 
approach that lends authority and priority to modernity, imperiality and 
coloniality as taken-for-granted universalisms.  
It is essential then to provide a brief exposition of the concept of the subject both 
ontologically and epistemologically. The self in the form of the figure of the 
Western subject is in the imaginaire of the power structure that created it, its face 
and physicality, and to think and act in that image. In this form, this creates the 
basis of subjection in multitudinal terms. It is essential to discover the subject 
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position of Mbembe within this context of the subject, to ascertain the direction 
of subjectivity preoccupying his political thought, hence the problematic of 
Mbembe’s interventions on Africa. The reason behind this is that Mbembe 
(2002a) has stated his stance of marginality, the figure of the subject who is the 
subject of free choice—the self-defining subject at the level of identity assumed 
by the African subject. It is important to point out then how possible is it for 
Mbembe to be alien to Africa and theorise it from outside. Mbembe can hold, it 
seems, on to the assertion that ‘subjectivity begins only with separation’ (Layton 
2008: 62). The figure of the subject exists in particular material and existential 
conditions—that is, the subject position predicated on the politics of identity as 
fluid and not fixed. 
Identity can be understood in at least three aspects for the purpose of this study. 
The first is identity in the form the self that has free choice, that is, the self that 
makes itself a subject. Secondly, identity can be understood in the form of 
imposition, the very thing of creating the “Other” who constitutes exteriority. 
And thirdly, identity can be understood in the form of social engagement rules. 
These aspects of identity are essential when it comes to the African subject and 
also when it comes to the understanding of Mbembe as the self-defining subject. 
The self-defining subject is that of self-creation and subject-in-the-making. These 
aspects mean different things to the Western subject, the self-defining subject 
and the African subject. The African subject is in the worst condition when it 
comes to the level of identity, and as such an identity is imposed because the 
African subject is the product of the Western subject’s construction and 
definition.  
The self that views itself has a sharp awareness of the fact that what it sees beyond 
the material screen is indeed itself or, in any case, a reflection of itself. This power 
can be called the power of reflection. The same self can, after the act of looking at 
itself, remember more or less clearly its own reflection or shadow (Mbembe 2003b: 
4; emphasis original). 
Mbembe’s identity of the self as self-defined subject seems to suggest that he has 
the power, just like the Western subject, to define and to assert himself in the 
world in general, and the world of the Western subject in particular. The Western 
subject transforms itself into a master subject. It completes itself by imposing the 
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lack and void to the ‘Other’, the very basis that explains subject and the 
subjectivity that emerges through imposing subjection on the ‘Other’. In 
Lacanian terms, the Western subject develops fantasy, it develops the imaginary, 
it develops symbolism and it develops the figure of the ‘real’ (Neill 2008). This 
is at the hub of operationalising a high proportion of signification to the Western 
subject. 
In relation to the above, it is clear that the colonial encounter is important in 
understanding the structural positionality and the emergence of the African 
subject. The colonial encounter is also related to the process of self-mastery by 
the Western subject-as-Master reference. Mbembe’s political thought is therefore 
central to understand the notion of the subject, from the theory of the African 
subject. This justifies the political project that Mbembe advances in the field of 
African politics. This, by and large, is through the means of textuality. Mbembe 
as a subject cannot be understood in a vacuum but is essential to state the subject 
formation of the African subject. This does not, however, suggests that Mbembe 
is the African subject for that this is what he rejects, even though not outrightly, 
as he locates himself in the Atlantic sense of the self. The aspect of the political 
is the subject and its subjectivity. For Dunst and Edwards (2011) though, the 
subject is the political. The act of the subject is the political act. The political act 
means the emergence of the subject. Though this has been the total domain of the 
Western subject, it is essential to engage Mbembe’s intervention that puts to the 
fore the subject that Layton (2008) regards as the divided subject, the subject 
divided against itself.  
Mbembe (2001a) advocates for, at least, what can be understood to be the 
‘subject of free choice’, the self-defining subject. This subject, as Mbembe 
(2001a) states, chooses and asserts itself in the world, the world of good 
neighbourliness. This subject constitutes what Layton (2008: 62) calls the ‘signs 
of a separate subjectivity from the outset’. The self finds itself in multiplicity of 
locales and re-connected, not as the part of the local but part of the global shaped 
by the unstable lived experiences (Housley 2009). Indeed, there will be a 
challenge to ask Mbembe if he is an African subject, without necessarily 
imputing essentialism.  
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The Western subject and the construction of the African subject 
In the dawn of Western modernity that, by and large, is the rapture moment of 
the colonial encounter, there came the Western subject. According to Neill 
(2008), the notion of the Western subject is cogito grounded on the canonical 
reading of René Descartes. This is the self as searching, and in a moment of 
constant skepticism. Descartes with the notion of ‘cogito ergo sum’—that is, ‘I 
think; therefore I am’ constitutes the basis of the Western subject, the ‘Other’ 
who is the lacking subject. As Mudimbe (2013: 245) notes, ‘[t]he cogito is a 
machine, quasi-literally, that is very Cartersian’. According to Neill (2008: 326), 
‘[t]he cogito advances a notion of the self as located in thought’. This then brings 
the question of what features in is thought—more so, about the African subject. 
The ontology of the Western subject comes into being simply because it is the 
ontology of the rational being, the being that engages in the continuum of 
thought through self-doubt, it seems though, indefinitely. In short, the Western 
subject is defined by rationality and is the master of reason.  
The entry point therefore, is that of the positionality of the Western subject. It is 
important to understand the Western subject and not to reject such a subject and 
its subjectivity outright, since this will not permit the understanding of the 
African subject in the point of its existence and its emergence. So, the 
construction of the African subject at the level of subjectivity is key to 
understanding its positionality. So then, the subject position of both the Western 
and African subjects can provide a conflicting interpretation of material and 
existential conditions that exists. The Western subject assumes the ego ideal of 
the ‘I’—the autonomous self, the hybrid self in contrast with the primitive, static, 
backward, deviant, sexually licentious and so forth—the Other self that is not the 
self in full essence since it constitutes lack and/or the incomplete subject so to 
say. All these create the African subject and such a subject should be understood 
in relation to the Western subject in the point of emergence.  
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For, Mbembe emphasises the individualist concepotion of the self as opposed to 
the self as a collective entity, it then means that his meditations of the self are 
within the conception of the Western subject. Of course, it is not explicit on how 
the conception of the ‘Other’ in Mbembe’s meditations of the conception of the 
self is framed. For Lacan (1978: 37), the concern is ‘the correlative of the subject 
is no longer the deceiving Other, but the deceived Other’. The Lacanian 
intervention is not cogito but thought as the self and social (Neill 2008). The 
thinking transcends Descartes for that the Western subject thinks with the 
‘Other’. It is asserted by Neill that Lacan had the colonial encounter in mind, 
though not of the Western subject and the African subject—but the class 
antagonism of the Western subjects. As Hudson (2006: 303) explains, 
‘[a]ntagonism, qualifies the coefficient of self-identity of subject-positions, but 
doesn’t erase the need for the subject—subject position distinction itself’. So, the 
antagonism of the African subject should be understood within the realm of a 
fully identical subject—to itself. But then, Hudson’s explanation is not sufficient 
when the African subject which is said to constitute lack and void existence, 
when the element of incomplete existence is introduced. These even latches on to 
Lacan’s ego identification, though it can be stretched to suggest the 
misrecognition of the ‘Other’—that is, the African subject at the receiving end of 
degrading comparison: nothing compensates the subject position of the African 
subject.  
The state of comparison is ego-identification—the Western subject inferiorising 
the African subject to fill its incompleteness and void—that is, the construction 
of its completeness. Neill (2008) argues that in Lacanian terms, the subject 
constitutes lack and void. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a), subjection 
creates a kind of African subjectivity that is enclaved with the colonial stereotype 
of being characterised by lack and deficit. As these are constitutive features of 
the Western subject, they get transposed to the African subject to negate its 
subjecthood and rendering such a subject that constitutes lack and void, to the 
point of course, of its subjetion. Subjection, as Butler (1997: 2) defines it, 
‘signifies the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process 
of becoming a subject’. As Butler further notes, subjection constitutes the 
paradox of referentiality in that it must refer to what does not exist—that is, the 
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African subject. Subjection when it comes to the African subject involves 
ontological suspension (Butler 1997). 
The Western subject is the subject of self-mastery, discovery of the worlds and 
mastering the ‘Other’—that is, the subject that differs from the Western subject. 
The Western subject stands in the positionality of mastery qua broader terrains of 
ontology and epistemology that together constitute the grounds for constructing 
the African subject outside the realm of its own existence. According to Said 
(1989), the Western subject masters the world through colonising and changing 
the terms of engagement by having the arbitrary fashion of defining, naming, 
categorising, labeling, identifying and mapping. This is because the Western 
subject has its own laws that are imposed through subjection in various degrees 
of being—direct and indirect. The idea of the Western subject means the 
sovereign subject who invades in arbitrary fashion, hence the Westen subject’s 
privilege to construct the African subject.  
What then, is the relevance of the African subject in this colonial ontological and 
epistemological schema of the Western subject? Three answers are essential in 
explaining this phenomenon that is essentially that of subjection. Firstly, it is the 
filling of the void and lack to the ‘Other’, the African subject. The representative 
and conceptions of the African subject as the lacking subject continue to 
stigmatise it is as such. Dunst and Edwards (2011) call for the 
reconceptualisation of the subject to say that the constitutiveness and contestation 
of the subject explains how the subject formation takes place. This of course, is 
different when taking the African subject into account, hence the concern of the 
study to understand the emergence of the African subject. This is how Said 
echoes this point: 
Thus the status of coloni[s]ed people has been fixed in zones of dependency and 
peripherality, stigmati[s]ed in the designation of underdeveloped, less developed, 
developing state, ruled by a superior, developed, or metropolitan coloni[s]er who 
was theoretically posited as a categorically antithetical overlord (Said 1989: 207). 
The notion of lack, void and deficiency of the African subject means the category 
of lesser beings, inferior things in many different places and in different times. 
The conception of the world is that of the Western subject as a complete subject 
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and the African subject as incomplete. The Western subject, according to 
Mbembe (2001a) requires itself as the marker of difference, and it is the self that 
is endwed with reason and aspiring for transcendence. For Mbembe, the Western 
subject regards itself as a living being, and it is obvious through this constant 
comparison with the African subject that the latter will be the figure of the 
negative. What the African subject is said to lack among other things are morals, 
civilisation, epistemologies, peace, cognitive strength, Christianity, 
industrialisation, sexual mores, democracy, and human rights, to name but a few. 
This laid the justification of colonialism, to absolve it and to humanise it to say 
that its purpose was to transform and bring salvation to the African subject who 
was in the brink of self-mutilation, auto-destruction and therefore depletion. The 
African subject ‘belongs to the universe of immediate things—useful things when 
needed, things that can be molded and mortal, futile and superfluous things, if 
need be’ (Mbembe 2001a:  187 emphasis original). In short, the purported 
intention of the Western subject was to transform the African subject from the 
barbarian to a citizen that would then make the African subject to be a complete 
subject. Yet it is known that this is an illusion since the African subject was and 
is prevented from becoming a complete subject, a human being.  
Secondly, the Western subject creates a split consciousness in the process of 
subjection directed to the African subject. In this instance, there is a total 
rejection of the self and embrace of the Western subject. This becomes useful in 
understanding the discourse of alterity. This is where the African subject rejects 
itself and aims to collapse itself in to the totality of being of the Western subject. 
If the African subject experiences the lack and void as imposed by the Western 
subject, the African subject fails to recognise the fact that the Western subject is 
incomplete itself. Thirdly and finally, the African subject responds to subjection 
by resisting the discourses of extroversion and alterity. The romanticist idea that 
is rejectionist and nostalgic becomes nonsensical. With these discourses, the void 
still cannot be closed and the lack cannot be filled. What is common though, 
between the Western subject and the African subject is that they both constitute 
lack and void. The predicament in this commonality though is that power 
relations are not the same, but asymmetrical. The Western subject innovates to 
try and close the void and fill the lack in order to realise completeness. On the 
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other hand, the African subject is told by the Western subject what is its lack and 
void and how impossible they are to close and fill, thus rendering immutable the 
subjection.  
According to Housely (2009), the subject position is constituted, shaped, and 
positioned in relation to the lived experience of subject. If this intervention was 
to be located in the lived experience the explanation would have been different as 
the subject position of the African subject is determined from without (Fanon 
[1952] 2008). The subject position of the African subject is that of structural 
positionality where the African subject is at the receiving end of the self that is 
given and determined for it. It is this self that is under constant surveillance at the 
level of the body. As Layton (2008) argues, subjects comply with demands 
defined and imposed by subjectivity of creating the world. These demands are 
results of oppressive socio-political norms embedded in structure—that is, 
subjection. It seems that the notion of the self should comply with the demands 
of such a world to fit into the notion of ‘ideal proper’. The ideal proper can be 
seen, at the level of the African subject as the starting point of subjection as it 
works through the logic of imposition.  
The self in this process is part of political activity, and the subject position, by 
and large, is a political project and the one that is intrinsically linked to the 
identity of the subject. This is connoted in terms of identity, the very basis of 
subject formation—subjectivity (Pitcher 2011). The identity that Mbembe 
advocates is that which is in the making and transcends identity markers imposed 
on the subject. As the self-defined subject, Mbembe (2011) subscribes his 
identity to a kind of ‘worldliness’. As the self-defined subject he claims to 
challenge identity formation in the politics of belonging. The notion of the self-
defined subject, when that subject is not the Western subject presents some 
problems that will be highlighted. Mbembe’s notion of the self-defining subject 
who is the self as a subject is engaged in multiple and complex existential 
conditions—that is, the subjectivity in continuum supposes the reclaiming of the 
subject in full essence. This is amplified by Housely (2009) who argues for the 
active subject who explains the structural positionality of subjectivity and its 
relational aspects. If the African subject was be to such a subject—that is, the 
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active subject perhaps, the predicament still remains on why such a subject 
cannot disentangle itself from subjection.  
That being said, it is essential therefore, to locate the figure of the Western 
subject in the vortex of power relations that have colonial routes starting from the 
colonial encounter. So, what should be understood, at least in sketchy terms 
pointed to above and for the purpose of this study is the Western subject and the 
construction of the Western subject. The self of the Western subject and the way 
it has been thought, conceptually and historically is that of the thinking self. This 
is done in sketchy terms by Van Zyl (2012: 1) who puts it in four senses, that in a 
way, resonates with the self that is akin to Mbembe. The first is the 
differentiation of the self that is the individual self, that is, the self that differ 
from each other. The second is the self at liberty where in that the self is free to 
choose and also to think. The third includes the self as a citizen who is free to act 
and the self that has or bears rights. The fourth is the self as self-conscious, the 
self that has a sense of self-awareness, self-understanding and autonomous. 
These four senses that Van Zyl mapped out are indeed constitutive and part of 
the Western subject. They have a sense of interconnectedness.  
The Western subject, its subject position assumes the universal self, which is 
autonomous and rational and, of course, equally free. The Western subject, 
having this sense of the self, means that the subjectivity of such a subject is 
indeed that of emergence, existence and authority. The values conferred upon the 
Western subject are not that of the African subject, to the latter they take the 
opposite turn, the one that is excessive in terms. So, the self of the Western 
subject is what creates the ideal of the universal, and its values of enlightenment, 
democracy and universal human rights (Van Zyl 2012). These are seen as good 
for any form of a subject, and for that matter, the ones that the African subject 
should gravitate towards. But then, such subjects having to subscribe to such 
values cannot in any way attain the full subjectivity of the Western subject, no 
matter how hard enough they try to fit in the ideal of the universal, or 
gravitatively imposing themselves towards it.   
Žižek (2005) maps three assumptions of the Western subject with its propaganda 
tool called liberal-capitalist human rights. The first assumption is said to be the 
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opposition to modes of fundamentalism; second, the propaganda of freedom of 
choice and the allied freedom to operate in the pursuit of one’s pleasure; and 
lastly, serving as a defense to the excess of power. Žižek warns of these three 
assumptions in the following account. He states that those who are fighting 
against fundamentalism, that is regarded as the one thing that trumps human 
rights, are in fact, those who advocate their own form of fundamentalism. This 
therefore, means that fundamentalism is a form of elimination of the ‘Other’, the 
very thing that constitutes the Western subject in its execution of subjection. 
Žižek also points out that freedom of choice equates to pseudo choice, so this 
means that freedom of choice is a limited choice, or a choiceless choice. The 
African subject’s assertion of the self is that which is only allowed if it does not 
threaten the subjectivity of the Western subject. The choiceless choice as put 
forth by Žižek (2005) is the psychological subject; perhaps this also applies to 
the notion of the cogito. Žižek further remarks that just like the notion of choice, 
the pursuit of pleasure is different for both the Western subject and the African 
subject.   
The African subject is excluded and also harassed not to tamper with pleasure 
that is pursued by the Western subject. According to Žižek (2005), to strive for 
pleasure is to engage in the pathological, so the super-ego of pleasure, its surplus, 
goes hand in hand with the cult of self-sacrifice. As Žižek (2005: 121) remarks, 
‘duty is my pleasure, and doing my duty, is located in the formal space of the 
“pathological satisfactions”’. This means as Said (1989) aptly states, the 
‘othering’ of the African and for that matter, the African subject. It is the 
externalisation that leads to the ruination of subjectivity of the African subject, or 
what Fanon ([1961] 1990) captivatingly refers to as ‘the damned of the earth’.  
Political (re)presentation is done by the Western subject on behalf of, and despite 
its ‘Other’. The African subject is left on the predicament of incompleteness, the 
subject that constitutes lack, deficit, and void. It is the ontologically obsolete 
subject as it is rooted out of the logic of the subject. The very definitive 
conditions of existence assume the differences of existential conditions for both 
the Western subject and the African subject. Žižek (2005: 123) notes that ‘[a]t 
the level of the law, the state power merely represents the interests of its subjects; 
it serves them, is responsive to them, and is itself subject to their control’. Even if 
13 
 
this proposition would be true and valid in a political community, it is entirely 
different when it comes to the African subject. Mouffe (1993) points out that the 
political is inherent in any human society and part of the ontological condition. 
Even though the gains of democratic revolution are hard won and must be 
defended as Mouffe states, they apply to the Western subject more than they are 
relevant to the African subject.  
The relationality of the Western subject towards the African subject is what 
Žižek (2005) refers to as ‘obscene excess’. The obscene excess symbolises and 
actualises the structural asymmetry between the Western subject and the African 
subject. It suggests, as Žižek (2005: 123) notes, ‘a series of catastrophies that 
precipitated disastrous violence on an unprecedented scale’. Taking the 
distinction of ‘enemy’ and ‘adversary’, as espoused by Mouffe (1993), the 
opponent should not be regarded as the enemy to be destroyed, but the adversary. 
According to Mouffe (1993: 4), the adversary is of good importance ‘whose 
existence is legitimate and must be tolerated’. This is problematic in two senses 
as far as the African subject is concerned. In the first sense, the African subject in 
the sense of ontology is non-existent. So, therefore, that which is non-existent 
cannot be tolerated, hence the subjection of the African subject. In the second, 
and at least the final sense, if the African subject engages in the act of 
emergence, this suggests subjection—the enemy to be destroyed. Therefore, it is 
clear that the African subject is not the amenable adversary, but the enemy 
proper. The idea of political community is not applicable in both the colony and 
the postcolony. The African subject does not even fit in the politity of what 
Anderson (1991) refers to as ‘imagined communities’. Mouffe’s remarks are 
revealing thus: 
When there is a lack of democratic political struggle with that to identify, their place 
is taken by other forms of identification, of ethnic, nationalist or religious nature, and 
the opponent is defined in those terms too. In such conditions, the opponent cannot 
be perceived as an adversary to content with, but only the enemy to be destroyed. 
This is what pluralist democracy should avoid; yet it can only protect itself against 
such a situation by recogni[s]ing the nature of the political instead of denying its 
existence (Mouffe 1993: 6). 
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Even if the idea of the political is acknowledged in its complexity as Mouffe 
suggests, the African subject, however, is not part of the political for that this 
subject is in the space of subjection that makes it the enemy to be destroyed. This 
is largely based on the fact that it is a subject that constitutes lack and void—the 
object. When it comes to the African subject there is not what Mouffe (1993) 
calls ‘the ethical nature of the political association’. The political is the absence 
of ethics, the very nature of subjection. So, the self that Mbembe subscribes to is 
the subject figure of Western self, even though Mbembe can claim to not 
associate with it. It is the self that views the African subject non-existent qua 
subjectivity. It is, therefore, clear that African subject unlike the Western subject 
is problematic in relation to subject constitution. It is the marauding self paraded 
as an ‘Other’ that is deviant from itself and in need for creation and paternalism 
from the Western subject, the self! The identity in racial form, the very criteria 
used for subjection makes the self-defining subject and the African subject to be 
reducible to sameness. This sameness leads to incongruence for the fact that the 
African subject is the one that the self-defining subject often claims to be 
different from, hence begging to be included in the structures of subjection.  
Furthermore, the mere fact of being racialised means that the self-defining 
subject and the African subject are the same. But then, the self-defining subject 
survives subjection by explaining and defining itself as being distinct from the 
African subject. According to Mouffe (1993: 66), ‘[t]o belong to the political 
community what is required is that we accept a specific language of civil 
intercourse, the respublica’. Again, this points to the irreconcilable differences 
between the Western subject and the African subject. This language that Mouffe 
proposes seems to suggest the idea of the universal; it borders on the vertical 
movement from the colonial to the colony, that is, from the Western subject to 
the African subject. This is subjection in the form of imposition of the universal. 
As Mouffe (1993: 67) justifies, the respublica is ‘a community without a 
definitive shape or a definite identity and in continuous re-enactment’.  
The self-defining subject cannot be or reach the state of completeness. This 
amplifies the fact that the identity is imposed by the Western subject. This is the 
subject that possesses the power to define, create and to master the African 
subject. The African subject, if it dares to emerge by means of (re)formation of 
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the self in its own terms, is ontologically and epistemologically denied. The race 
of Mbembe, the black race for that matter, suggests that he is a racialised subject. 
Even though race might be minimised, denied or trivialised—or least to say, the 
call for it to be rendered impotent through the propaganda of post-racialism, non-
racialism and race transcendence, but then, the subject of free choice has 
limitations as subjection is both material and existential. The sameness that the 
subject of free choice can claim cannot be in the full essence that can be like that 
of the Western subject. The origin of the subject of free choice is from the 
criminalised world, the world that is at the receiving end of subjection. The 
radicalism of the self-defining subject has minimal impact if it intends calling for 
reinvention of identity since this is done by the Western subject. The self-
defining subject is racialised just like the African subject.  
Subjectivity has to do with the mode of identification. The identity of the African 
subject is in broader terms that of aberration and negativity. As Said (1989: 213) 
points out, ‘[t]he fetishi[s]ation and relentless celebration of “difference” and 
“otherness” can therefore be seen as an ominous trend’. This stems from the 
stance of being judged from the act of reasoning of the Western subject, its 
subjectivity that possesses the power to judge. Therefore, this makes the African 
subject to be caught in the state of permanent injury and pain because the 
judgment coming to its direction is the wrath of the reasoning of the Western 
subject. Thus, this assumes the form of identity of being wrong, hence the 
judgment of the Western subject by mean of subjection. Said (1989) argues that 
the colonial interculator, the compliant African subject is the apolitical subject in 
absence of the agency to confront subjection and liberate itself. Power relations 
regulate subjectivity. They stand in the industrial complex of confrontation, 
antagonism, complicity and co-optation. The African subject in that form is what 
Said (1989: 206) refers to as that which ‘presents its own brand of votality’.    
It is in this instance that the emergence of the African subject, or at worst, its 
problematic existence suggests the state of negation as Mbembe (2001a) 
correctly notes. That is, there cannot be any sense of emergence to counter lack 
and void, for that the African subject exists in the existential plain full of 
restrictions and prohibitions. Therefore, reprociticity, recognition, mutualism and 
status fall on the wayside. The civic definition of the African subject means the 
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standard measure through which such a subject must be recognised by the 
Western subject. Though these codes still exist as a form of subjectivity 
necessary for every subject, they hide in them guises of subjection that 
disadvantage the African subject. The Western subject, by the mere fact of 
existence confers life to the African subject and determines what can be done and 
not. This is the exteriority of the African subject—the “Other”, a lacking and a 
void subject. The ‘I’—in the form of cogito shall still form the ontological base 
of the Western subject, and it relating to the “Other”. The question of the subject 
is the colonial invention and this is not only ontological, but epistemological.  
On subjectivity: the voyage and canon formation 
The education system that Mbembe received is the French education system. Due 
to the colonial system, even in the period of independence that has been the 
everlasting legacy of France in Cameroon. The education of France, the very 
nervous system of colonialism, was such that the idea of ‘France the Great’ was a 
propaganda form that paved way for many in the colony to migrate from the 
colony to the metropolis, Paris. As Bjornson (1992) notes, African subjects 
undergo double alienation wherein the French doctrine of assimilation is 
implemented in them and at the same time they are rejected as fully French.   
The idea of France the Great was such that school children romanticise France 
and demonise Africa and, as Thomas (2007: 47) states, they ‘were motivated 
toward a forced complicity in the dissemination of colonial propaganda 
ideology’. The whole idea of this propaganda is that the African subject should 
see the idea of France as the standard of civilisation—the very essence of 
modernity and to entrench the colonial practice in that those of the colony needs 
to accept, if not complicit to it. This then forms part of, and also becomes 
constitutive of, the forms of thinking and living. This form of thinking and living 
takes place in the colony, hence Cameroon is still a French colony, even though 
there was flag of independence in the name of decolonisation. It is in Cameroon 
that the idea of France the Great was propagated to the point that it becomes 
embedded in the psyche of the colonial pedagogy and school curricular (Thomas 
2007). The psyche of colonial pedagogy and its curriculum creates the condition 
of centering of the metropolis and decentering the colony. Such condition simply 
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means ‘the prevailing dictates and imperatives of assimilation and integration’ 
(Thomas 2007: 43). That is, through the process of assimilation and integration, 
the idea of France the Great is the epicenter of the political life and thinking of 
the African subject.   
Colonial education and the dissemination of the myth of French universalism and 
cultural superiority created a logical desire among colonial subjects to travel to the 
metropole, the result of an acquired francocentrism that in turn contained the promise 
of the cultural capital. (Thomas 2007: 51) 
The discourses of justice, equality and liberty, the very ideals of the universal, 
fall in the wayside as soon as the African subject emerges. This is simply 
because what inform the subjectivity of the metropolis is its relation to the 
African subject, hence subjection through the idea of racial superiority that 
stamps in colonial practice of racism. As Thomas (2007: 42) states, ‘[t]he 
voluntary or forced displacement of the African subjects has a long history’. The 
project of colonising the African subject was also featured with the civilising 
mission, to make the African subject the extension of France. This however, is 
something that is even pervasive in the postcolonial period. The idea of being 
located in the metropolis assumes authority from the colony, of disassociating 
from it and not being part of it. The colony is the other space, the other life that 
the African subject who is located at the metropolis is seen as the hope for 
Africa. For the fact that the African subject is located in the metropolis, it means 
that the ideas of that subject are authoritative in that they can deride the colony 
from the vantage point of the metropolis. The location being in the metropolis 
even to the fact of having accomplished the French imperial ambition—that of 
being superior to other African subjects.    
Mbembe describes how he got to Paris from Cameroon as ‘very much of a self-
confident and optimistic character’ (Oboe 2010: 1). It is in this encounter where 
Mbembe points out of not having experienced any form any form of upheaval. 
This means, Mbembe did not encounter what Thomas (2007: 51) refers to as 
‘experiences of alienation, disillusionment, and exile that are intrinsic to the 
broader experience of transnational mobility’. It is not clear that Mbembe heeded 
the call that Du Bois ([1919] 1998: 159) makes when he writes ‘I have seen the 
18 
 
wounds of France’. Thomas (2007: 24) notes that ‘Paris is the key topographic 
site to which protagonists travel, but also operates as an interchangeable 
metaphor for France itself’. It is in Paris where Mbembe obtained his doctoral 
education. Having gone to New York, Mbembe taught at Columbia University 
and Pennsylvania and also The Brooklyn Institute. 
It would seem that it is in Paris where the educational voyage of Mbembe had a 
profound impact. Taking into account the idea of the universal, in a provincial 
sense that France has to be understood, is to say that which informs the idea of 
the universal, France the Great is the perpetual myth that it is the centre of 
humanity. Perhaps it is to those who are not in the margins, or in the colony 
where humanity is denied. The ideal of liberty, equality and freedom are as 
cosmetic as France is the principal colonial power (Thomas 2007). Paris, the 
metropolis the most dreamed of from those in the colony as the centre of the 
universe, is indeed a particular local specificity. This is partly because the idea of 
the universal, the idea of France the Great is a mere scandal of locality—the very 
crude form of imperial nativism.  
The idea of having to be located in the metropole while originating from the 
colony is an interesting move as far as subjectivity is concerned. According to 
Housely (2009), the complexity of the socio-political is explained where there is 
a call to deepen subjectivity, but then, it is essential to ask where is the African 
subject and how is it deepening its subjectivity, and to what end. This means the 
preoccupation with the subject to explain the industrial complex that entangles 
the African subject. This explanation ‘represents a complex site, open to 
interpretation and scrutiny through the relation of the world of discourse, power 
and politics to the interior expanse of the unconscious and desire’ (Housley 2009: 
70).   
The industrial complex of subjection in this sophisticated form, it is the manner 
in which power reproduces itself to elude and mask asymmetrical lines of 
subjection. Subjectivity becomes interesting if it is reconnected along 
asymmetric lines, it still reveals that subjection still continues.   
One of the decision features of individuali[s]ation process, then, is that they not only 
permit, but demand, an active contribution to individuals. As the range of options 
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widens and the necessity of deciding between their groups, so too does the need for 
individually performed actions, for adjustment, co-ordination, integration. If they are 
not to fail, individuals must be able to plan for the long terms and adapt to change, 
recogni[s]e and improvise, set goals, recognise obstacles, accept defeat and attempt 
new starts. They need initiative, tenacity, flexibility and tolerance of frustration. 
(Heelas 1996:27) 
According to Dunst and Edwards (2011), subjectivity exists in a universe and it 
is necessary to reflect on the fact that the universe is an exclusive domain 
couched as inclusive, the African subject’s exclusion withstanding. The 
subjectivity of Mbembe in his attitude towards Africa betrays the fact that the 
African subject and subjectivity is indeed profound. What then is of importance 
is to trace the routes and genealogies, the very root of Mbembe’s positionality. 
This also involves the understanding of his subjectivity, the conical textual that 
he imbibed to inform his intellectual standing and also the theoretical tradition. 
The subject for this study is Mbembe, but to understand Mbembe the study 
undertakes to engage his subjectivity—and, that can give effect to the theoretical 
tradition. It is this tradition that will, in some way, explain how Mbembe (the 
subject) uses his own influence and influence upon him (subjectivity) to 
understand the African subject who is entangled in subjection.  
Mbembe in response to the question of posed to him about the criticism of being 
an Afropessimist is simply that of responding that his work is poorly misread and 
then misunderstood. Mbembe argues that his theoretical tradition is that which 
forces us to think, weigh and expose (Oboe 2010). Mbembe also adds that: 
To think critically is to work with faultiness, to get in touch with the chaotic touch of 
the world, to bring it to language, to write its singular plurality. In any case, the 
relationship between critique and pessimism is very complex and critical pessimism 
is not capitulation. (Oboe 2010: 3) 
Mbembe is asked on his intellectual culture and the sense of influence and 
contribution to his work (Oboe 2010). Mbembe responded by stating that the 
conical images are actual places and cities. This means that their narratives and 
texts are embedded and influential to Mbembe. The major influence that 
Mbembe highlights is the one that he coins thus: ‘I have been influenced by post 
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war French thought and culture—Merleau-Ponty, Blanchot, Klossowski, all of 
whom I read by myself’ (Oboe 2010: 4). Though having a huge breadth of 
theoretical canonism and textuality, the ones that Mbembe seems to have 
highlighted have had a profound influence on him. It is against this backdrop that 
it can be stated that his thought is rooted in the French political tradition. Badiou 
(2005) argues that the philosophical underpinnings of French political tradition—
or French philosophy to be specific—its style, operations and origin are rooted in 
literature. It is the political philosophy at the level of the literature and also the 
lived experiences—that is, philosophy that is engaged in-depth with political 
questions.  
According to Badiou (2005:71), ‘philosophy was seeking a new relation between 
the concept and the production of forms—artistic, social, or forms of life’. It is 
clear that French philosophy that had the major influence in Mbembe is deeply 
rooted in the literary style and as such, African existential conditions are reduced 
to a style. Therefore, style is considered more important and that is why Mbembe 
fashions himself differently in the way he engages Africa. That is to say, 
Mbembe engages Africa’s existential conditions in literary, aesthetic and poetic 
terms. Such engagement reduces Africa’s existential conditions to mere 
abstractions, and this partly explains why Mbembe is somewhat hostile and 
indifferent to Africa’s subjectivity. Mbembe writes: 
But if in Paris I had been introduced to French tradition of abstract universalism, it is 
in New York that I was able, for the first time, to enter into contact with the global 
world. For instance, New York allowed me to reali[s]e how the French version of 
universalism expressed itself in a language that was, in the end, quite narcissistic, 
monocolo[u]red and provincial... Here I encountered far more than in Paris an 
African counterpart in the African-American (Oboe 2010: 4). 
It is clear that for Mbembe, subjectivity in Africa is largely that of exteriority in 
the marginal sense. In no way is Mbembe’s canon rooted in or made reference to 
Africa. The idea of the universal is rooted in the Euro-North American canon, 
from the provincialised French to the ‘global’ universal of North America. The 
latter has left the impression mark on Mbembe, and in particular, New York. 
This is what Mbembe has to say: ‘[a]s a city and as a movement of the mind, I 
was literally seduced by New York’ (Oboe 2010: 4). It is profoundly telling that 
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the idea of the universal is very much that of exteriority even if the African-
American who inhabits New York is seen in the terms of what Gilroy (1993) 
refers to as the ‘Black Atlantic’. Mbembe identifies with the idea of the Black 
Atlantic with the blend of French political thought of course. Mbembe and Oboe 
(2010: 1) state that ‘Mbembe’s work is a sustained and at times critical dialogue 
with the French philosophical tradition, with the postcolonial theory of Anglo-
Saxon origin, and with black diaspora though in the United States.’          
The engagement with black radical literature, black music, black art and black 
theatre to name just a few are an addition—or so to say, an appendage to 
Mbembe’s French political thought.  It is clear that the centre of Africa is 
nowhere to Mbembe in the account of worldliness he gives. Africa is not only 
marginal to this worldliness; it does not exist. Its subjection even though 
challenged by those in the centre of the metropole pointing the need for 
radicalisation of social and institutional practices will have little effect. This is 
largely because, they will have no effect so long as they do not call for the 
African subject that the intent of dismantling the structures hidden in the physics 
of power that subjugate it.  
Mbembe responds thus to his familiarity with the black canon of intellectual 
thought: ‘[t]his is a very complex archive and I cannot pretend to have mastered 
it in any comprehensive manner’ (Oboe 2010: 4). The black canon, it seems to 
Mbembe, is not available in Africa as he states that it ‘has been and is still, 
dominated by “Western blacks”—the descendants of the African slave in the 
New World’ (Oboe 2010: 4). What then also emerges from Mbembe’s 
subjectivity is that it is in the ‘New World’ where there was the black canon. 
This, therefore, means that Africa—the ‘Old World’—had nothing to in terms of 
the black canon. Subjectivity in its formation, through the coalition of many lived 
experiences is that which is still trapped in the idea of the universal, with the 
New World as its shrine. To call for the universal emancipation and systematic 
change is something that reflects the locale of this New World, the one that casts 
Africa to barbaric and exotic margins.  
Mbembe’s political tradition is rooted in French political thought with other 
political thought traditions—and that of the North-America also taking a 
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profound shape. This then gives Mbembe much arsenal to project, represent and 
articulate Africa in the manner that is external to its locale. Such externality is 
that which supposes speaking with authority on and about Africa from the Euro-
North American metropolis. This is like the manner that is colonialist as it is that 
of “Othering”. Though Mbembe might claim to be exceptional due to his ‘critical 
pessimism’—that still counts against him that Africa is decentred, the African 
subject is made impotent due to constituting the form of lack from the point of 
Euro-North American canonicality. The mode of theorising that emerges is that 
the subject that constitutes lack cannot theorise, hence the absence of the black 
canon in Africa—the place where subjection is rife.  
It is of interest to note however that a gesture is made to suggest that there has 
been a contribution from the ‘black canon’. Mbembe names the likes of V.Y. 
Mudimbe, Kwame A. Appiah, Paul Gilroy and Ntongela Masilela. Those who 
come from the nationalist front who confront the colonial enterprise head-on are 
non-existent. This is known, as it will be explored later in the study that the 
nationalist black conical tradition is engaged in what Mbembe (2002a) famously 
labelled as faked philosophies that are flogging a dead horse. This is made clear 
in his essay ‘African Modes of Self-Writing’, that he is in opposition to them; 
hence Mbembe labels them as nativist, Afro-radicalist and Afro-Marxist. 
What seems to emerge is that the black canon that Mbembe is concerned with is 
the one that is located in the ‘new world’, hence the Black Atlantic. Going 
further, Mbembe’s theoretical tradition is indebted to Christianity and also 
Jewish thought, the latter that he claims to be personally attached to (Oboe 
2010). Mbembe also mentions the works of Frantz Rosenzweigh, Walter 
Benjamin, Ernst Bloch and Jacques Derrida. What is absent in Mbembe’s canon 
is the Africanist black political thought, that he nevertheless dismisses outrightly. 
‘Mbembe does indeed acknowledge his debt to Western social and critical 
theory’ (Ralphs 2007: 21). Mbembe in subjectivity in Africa is to extrapolate its 
subjectivity using a variety and combination of analytical tools, across 
disciplines and theoretical approaches. What remains then is that such are drawn 
from the Euro-North American canon, the very act of exteriosiring the African 
subject and subjectivity—the very condition that creates and normalises 
subjection. Such subjection in a theoretical sense assumes the superiority of the 
23 
 
Euro-North American canon and suggests that there is no canon in Africa. This 
means that the African subject cannot emerge.  
The Euro-North American canon is about the centredness of the Western subject 
that by the very sense of its existence means the non-existence of the African 
subject. It follows that what does not exist cannot emerge. The Euro-North 
American subject canon with its tool of ‘objectivity’ is something that Mbembe 
even admits that it has failed to capture the sensory experience of the African life 
(Oboe 2010). But then, the sensory experience mean nothing as long as it is a 
sense that does not allow the emergence of the African subject. The sensory 
experience that Mbembe refers to, seem not to explain the existentialist condition 
of the African subject under the subjection of the Western canon and also the 
erasure then of the African subjectivity by the Euro-North American canon.  
The tri-continental move: still in search for the Black Atlantic ‘self’? 
What is Mbembe’s thought in relation to Africa, and in particular, how has the 
tri-continental move impact on his thought? The tri-continental move is what 
Zeleza (2005: 36) refers to as ‘the triangual systems of Africa, the Americas, and 
Europe that make up the Atlantic world’. The tri-continental move in this case, 
with reference to Mbembe of course, is the move from Cameroon to Paris, then 
New York to Dakar, then Cape Town to Johannesburg—the latter which 
Mbembe regards as his centre of gravity, the watchtower, also including New 
York through that he looks at the world. The tri-continental move is not just a 
move, but the move that constitutes the intellectual agenda, the subjectivity of the 
subject in mobility. In this move, the subject assumes the identity of the 
wandering subject, the subject that has no unique form or content, but that wich 
change constantly depending on life events (Mbembe 2003b). As Gilroy (1993: 
2) states, ‘modern subjectivities and the movements they articulated have been 
left behind’. This is simply because the power of such a move in the world as 
powerfully grown, with the African subject at the centre of this move.  
According to Gilroy (1993), the tri-continental move—Black Atlantic—is the 
politics of global coalitions that make an intellectual journey across the Atlantic. 
Indeed, this movement must have had and still has the ways in that it has a 
profound influence on Mbembe’s thought in relation to Africa in general and the 
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African subject in particular. But then, having seen the perversity of the 
postcolonial period in Cameroon, this should tell more about the reasons of 
moving to Paris, with Cameroon having been the colony and Paris been the 
metropolis is still the centre of French political thought. It is in this thought that 
Africa has and still locates the negative—the African subject as the lacking 
subject.  The tri-continental move seems to be some fulfilling a task of 
completing the subject, the African subject that constitutes a lack and a void. 
Mbembe writes that: 
I arrived in South Africa after having travelled the distance of the Atlantic 
Triangle—from Africa  to Europe, from Europe to the New World, and from the  
New World to West Africa initially and then to the southern hemisphere (Mbembe 
2007a: 144). 
Mbembe sees his movement as unique for that he saw the idea of the universal—
the New World. This new world is indeed to the Americas, for the city of New 
York Mbembe holds in his esteem for that he saw in it the idea of the universal 
contrary to that which he has been cultured to the ideal of provincial 
universalism of France. Seeing such a ‘new world’ suggests a moment of rapture 
and intellectual stimulation as ‘[m]any African intellectuals dream about the Old 
World’ (Mbembe 2007a: 144). What is interesting about Mbembe’s tri-
continental move is that its contact point seems to fail to meet the exact contact 
points, particularly in Africa. To point out, after having left Cameroon to Paris 
and then crossing the Atlantic, to make Cameroon a contact point has not been 
part of this tri-continental move. Coming back to Africa has been not to make 
contact with Cameroon. Mbembe provides an account in an interview to say that: 
I should nevertheless confess that of late, I have only been able to speak about it 
(Cameroon) by stammering—in the manner of forced speech. Because of the 
emotive distance that now separates me from my birthplace, I no longer find its name 
and address easy to grasp. I find it harder and harder to come to grips with the place 
where I was born (Oboe 2010: 1). 
This might sound polemic and fall on the way side. If read closely, the statement 
suggest the sense of nostalgia, and by extension, the moment of grief in the face 
of stoicism. Or perhaps, as Pettinger (1998: xvi) notes, ‘the anscestral bond has 
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become almost meaningless’. The locatedess of the subject, as Dixon and 
Durrheim (2000) posit, relates to its subjectivity and that in a way relates to the 
agency and the identity of the place. They assert that place identity is a mental 
identity and its nature and intensity vary from one individual to the other. The 
moment of breakage has been that of ‘exile’—whether imposed or self-imposed. 
But then, Mbembe (2003b) still insists to say that the subject lives life in a 
fleeting mode, with no bonds to any other context. For Mbembe, the subject can 
be reproduced, splitted, and retrieved if necessary. The idea of permanent exile 
has been problematic aspect of the self, the self in the sense of wonder, even 
though Mbembe justifies it by saying: 
But there is no body except in and through movement. That is why there is no 
subject but a wondering one. The wandering subject moves from one place to 
another. Journey as such does not need a precise destination: the wanderer can go 
about as he pleases. There can be predetermined stages for the journey. But the path 
does not always lead to the desired destination (Mbembe 2003b: 17).  
Beck and Beck-Gernshein (1996) point out to the issues of being confronted with 
complexity of social interconnection, which by and large, makes it the onus of 
the subject, in its individual sense, to choose his or her own interests, morals and 
new making of the self. The making of the self in this instance is a deliberate 
choice outside constrains imposed from the externality of the self as a subject, 
the social. Beck and Beck-Gernshein further assert that the social becomes the 
instinct substitute, as the self as a self-defining subject is caught in ambivalence, 
hybridity, conviviality, complexity and multiplicity to name just a few. The tri-
continental move should have been Cameroon as the point of link for it to be a 
‘proper knot’. It can maybe be justified by Beck and Beck-Genshein’s idea of the 
self as a deliberate choice outside constraints. Indeed, the tri-continental move in 
Africa is that of complexity.  It lacks the sense of the real, unless if it is looked in 
the broader geographic sense of the moving. 
Behind the celebration of ‘nomadic’ identities often lurks a rather patroni[s]ing, even 
contemptuous, attitude towards those ‘still’ in the grip of nationalist loyalties—
replacing the assertion of the superiority of one country over another with a similar 
assertion of the superiority of cosmopolitans over nationalists. Yet such an attitude is 
not very helpful for someone fighting a deportation order (Pettinger 1998: xvi-xvii).   
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 It is then sufficient to quote Mbembe again in some brief length when he says, 
‘[m]any African intellectuals dream about the Old World. I made the opposite 
choice’ (Mbembe 2007: 144). The opposite choice would then mean that 
Mbembe dreamed and still dreams, in the search for the self—the ‘New World’. 
It is not clear in what sense, is the Americas and New York to be exact, the New 
World. To take note from Pettinger (1998), the idea of the New World, the one 
that opens the possibility of world citizenship is romanticist. The modes of the 
self and belonging are mobilised in order to fit in the universe, the New World so 
to speak. No attempt is made by Mbembe to break the structures or disentangle 
the industrial complex of subjection to create space for the emergence of the 
African subject. This can be largely attributed to the idea of the self-defining 
subject since the subjectivity of such a subject ratifies the industrial complex of 
subjection. 
Against this backdrop, the tri-continental move should not therefore, be 
romanticised. The self-defining subject, peddling the idea of the tri-continental 
move as if it is a project of liberation, will not change anything but being the 
African subject at the receiving end of subjection. According to Housley (2009), 
self-defining subjects are not of importance as they are evasive, while subjection 
continues. Beck and Beck-Gernshein (1996) introduce the idea of a non-social 
sphere that is the condition of labyrinthic complexity where the subject exists in 
the sense of individuality. Subjectivity here is the attitude that refuses to see the 
under-sufficience of life. The state of the subject is that of permanent continuity.  
As the range of options widens and the necessity of deciding between the groups, so 
too does the need for individually performed actions, for adjustment, co-ordination, 
integration. If they are not to fail, individuals must be able to plan for the long term 
and adapt to change; they must organi[s]e and improvise, set goals, recogni[s]e 
obstacles, accept deafeats and attempt new starts. They need initiative, tenacity, 
flexibility and tolerance of frustration (Beck and Beck-Gernshein 1996: 27). 
What is not clear in Mbembe’s account is how he manages to deal with the 
hostilities that the New World directs at those whom it peripheralises. The New 
World is the world of intensification of racist infrastructure and the surveillance 
of the bodies that it ‘Otherises’. Taking the context of the tri-continental move 
into account, Mbembe did not go back home—that is, Cameroon like some of the 
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exiles who disjoined themselves from home. He went to Dakar, Senegal instead 
of Cameroon. Mbembe (2007a: 153) states that ‘[a]nd yet I left my country early 
on, and I have never returned—at least not to live and work’. It is not clear 
whether it was by choice or circumstance. To say that was by opposite choice 
would be also debatable. With regards to being born in Cameroon and having to 
disconnect from it Mbembe says: ‘[o]f my country of birth, I should say that I 
have not been living here for more than a quarter of a century. But I still 
remember its name and care about its fate’. (Oboe 2010: 1)  
 It is clear that the move to Dakar was a job to be the Executive Director of 
CODESRIA. This can be said, by the means of choice the decision to take on a 
job and not having gone to Cameroon.  
For four years I served, in Dakar, Senegal, as the executive director of an 
organisation whose official mission was to promote social science research on the 
continent. It was the most frustrating experience of my entire life. Perhaps that is 
why this city at the crossroads, bordering the Sahel and the Atlantic, and steps away 
from the Old Continent and the New World, remained mute in my soul (Mbembe 
2007: 159).   
After Dakar, then he moved to South Africa—that Mbembe (2007a: 144) claims 
to be his ‘centre of gravity’. 
I left Dakar knowing that, when Africa was concerned, it was better to plunge in with 
eyes wide open. I could have returned to France and the United States and pursued 
the experiences of universality that Paris and New York hinted out. Instead I found 
myself in one of the strangest cities in Africa, Cape Town (Mbembe 2007a: 160). 
Cape Town was strange for its the margins. It has claimed its Africanness while 
excluding African subjects. The tri-continental move is the move that in the 
sense of Mbembe creates a form of citizenship. This citizenship is what Mbembe 
coins as Afropolitanism, meaning that having travelled in the tri-continental 
form, Mbembe is the Afropolitan citizen. According to Mbembe (2007a: 144), 
the Afropolitan is the citizen ‘keeping the centre of gravity in Africa (and not 
necessarily where one was born), retains the possibility of circulating through the 
world, in the context of his profession’. It seems that geographic attachment is 
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not a priori. But what is problematic is the centre of gravity in Africa whereas 
that to Mbembe is some form of exteriority.  
What about the passport then? The passport has the power to determine the status 
of citizenship in terms of inclusion and exclusion, and also equality and 
inequality. As Gilroy (2005: 49) notes, ‘[t]he passbook and the identification 
card were the innovations that characteri[s]ed the new order’. It depends on what 
kind of identity the subject possesses and this will also determine how the power 
of the passport as a technology is used. The identity of the African subject is 
attached to criminalisation, the very basis of its subjection. This creates a 
situation where the African subject must always explain itself. The possession of 
the valid passport and visa does not mean that the African subject is immune 
from subjection. The racist practices by security personal at international airports 
serve as testimony to this. This also includes the process of visa application 
which also racist in its practices. So, the self-defining subject can experience 
subjection even as it embraces worldliness, its mutuality, interconnectedness, 
hybridity and hospitality.  
This means that the self-defining subject with its sense of exceptionalism and 
being in the position of claiming co-presence and co-existence with the Western 
subject has to, by all means explain itself to be accepted in the universe of the 
Western subject. The sense of having to explain and to define itself has to do 
with the fact of not wanting to be excluded. This suggests that the self-defining 
subject that claims to be the free agent is stigmatised like the African subject. 
The failure of the self-defining subject to explain and define itself can lead to 
subjection in the form of being relegated to the margins just like the African 
subject.  
What renders the tri-continental move problematic is that even if the African 
subject can claim worldliness to the world that rejects such a subject, it will 
always try to fit into it. The means fought for is not creating another world, but to 
be recognised by the forces of subjection, and to be an exceptional subject. It is 
in this tri-continental move that the subject is still ‘mobili[s]ed, managed and 
constituted’ (Thompson 1996: 76). It is in these constrictions that the African 
subject while in pursuit of the tri-continental move wants to be recognised. 
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Mbembe calls for ‘a form of subject-subject relating in that each subject is able 
to both assert its own subjectivity and recognise the subjectivity of the other’ 
(Layton 2008: 63). This is problematic when it comes to the African subject 
since it does not materialise into reality. Layton articulates this conundrum that 
bears relevance to Mbembe thus: 
For, I believe that we weave our subjectivity—in complex and non-linear ways, to be 
sure—from our conscious and unconscious responses to the two kinds of relational 
experience that most of us have: one in that we are treated as objects by the 
significant figures in our lives and one in that we are treated as subjects (Layton 
2008: 65). 
This dual complex, to say the least, is aggravating when it comes to the African 
subject and no amount of mobility and creolisation can remedy this complex. 
The need for recognition by the African subject proposes being part of the tri-
continental self, the complex and overchanging one, should reject negative labels 
imposed upon them, and this should be made through asserting themselves in the 
world (Mbembe 2001b). They should be, as Layton (2008: 110) argues, ‘in 
favour of new self-representation of their own making, jettisoning internali[s]ed, 
negative identities and joining collectively to produce a self-affirming culture of 
their own’. What is said to emerge out of this is that recognition will emerge in 
this worldliness that is the constitutive part of the tri-continental move. This 
cannot be left untouched since it is pertinent to ask in what terms will worldliness 
yield recognition of the African subject and by who? The answer is less 
affirmative in the sense that the roots of injustice are traceable in this tri-
continental move—the route of commoditisation of African bodies, the Atlantic 
slave route. The idea of the new self, the complete African subject in this means 
that even if the African subject asserts itself it is not in its terms, hence the terms 
are accommodationist in nature and wanting recognition from the ‘Other’.  
Recognition for it to be relevant to the African subject should be in the terms of 
the African subject, one that recognises the African subject in its own 
subjectivity and not malleable to the industrial complex of subjection that 
features in the tri-continental move. The African subject should root out in the 
tri-continental move, injustices in the form of modes of misrecognition mutating 
in forms that are invisible and undetectable. As Layton (2008: 115) states, 
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‘[r]edressing injustices requires de-institutionali[s]ing that value pattern and 
replacing it with an alternative that promotes parity’. 
Mbembe states that he is not a South African citizen but saying that ‘[b]ut now 
South Africa is my centre of gravity’ (Mbembe 2007a: 144). It is not clear 
whether Africa is the centre, or there is something exceptional about South 
Africa, which is just an ordinary country in the postcolonial African condition. 
That been said, the idea of Afropolitanism connotes that South Africa is the 
hegemon of the whole continent because it is the watchtower of looking at the 
‘world’. But again, this also points to the fact that Afropolitanism is at stake. The 
passport is a colonising tool in that it regulates, controls and restricts the 
movement of the people. It is in the geographic sense that the idea of circulation 
of the people is something that exists within the strictures conferred by the 
passport.  
It is in Africa that the circulation of the people, more especially Africans is very 
much difficult and on the contrary very simple from those from the colonial 
metropolis to move. This is very much so if they are holding the European Union 
passport or American ones. This is to say that the requirements are different and 
yet difficult for Africans to circulate. The tri-continental might be presented as 
the easier and more convenient move, more especially when the idea of 
Afropolitanism is put in the picture. Afropolitanism is an illusion if it is 
constrained by and confined to the belly of the passport. It symptomises colonial 
Africa in the sense of the passport and this must have an impact on the 
‘Afropolitan citizen’ to say to such a citizen is an oxymoron. What passport is 
Mbembe holding? If it is the European Union passport then mobility is viable for 
him since this is the passport that signifies privilege and freedom of movement.  
Mbembe states of not being permanent resident in South Africa. This is how 
Mbembe (2007a: 144) puts it, ‘[h]aving kept my birth nationality—I am 
Cameroonian—I am required every three years to renew my residency permit’. 
Though Mbembe advocates the idea of the Afropolitan citizen the passport is still 
the technology of subjection. For the mere fact of stating that by birth and 
nationality, this boxes him into being Cameroonian. As a result, he is subjugated 
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to constraints of the passport. This is the very thing that makes it difficult for free 
circulation due to the visa requirement.  
I did not hate my country. But I always had an uncomfortable relationship with the 
country where I was born. For instance, I did not know how to speak the street 
language without that one could not gain full membership into one’s age group 
(Mbembe 2007a: 153). 
This cannot be a sole reason, there are, maybe, ones that Mbembe could have 
elaborated on to be justifiable. As it stands, this is not justifiable—the inability of 
speaking of street language to make one to turn this back on the native land. In 
the other side of the Atlantic, Mbembe (2007a: 157) notes, ‘[i]n New York, for 
the first time I discovered a metropolis founded on a simple idea—the idea of 
hospitality—and a contradiction—segregation along the ‘colour line”. Though 
this encounter was a contradiction—it was also a fascination and charm to 
Mbembe. The city and New York is only hospitalible in terms of privilege and 
race. Mbembe’s experience of hospitality has been removed from the lived 
experience of the city and also the wretched of the city. It could be said the only 
fascination was indeed—non-provincialism and another understanding of the 
universal. The idea of the universal in this sense is the antithesis to Africa.   
Through close contact that people, travel and, above all, reading, I discovered 
France, an old country that was so aware of its history—which it tended to glorify 
constantly—and so jealous of its traditions. My Parisian years also allowed me to see 
that behind every established culture—and especially the established colonial 
cultures—there is always a nocturnal, side hiding behind a mask of reason and 
civility (Mbembe 2007a: 156). 
This, strangely, does not permit Mbembe to see the noctural in terms of the cause 
behind the problematic positionality of the African subject that he sees from the 
colonial gaze.  
Where Paris and France were concerned, I thus considered myself a foreigner, or to 
be precise, someone on the way to some people place else, a passer-by.  But at the 
same time, by virtue of acculturation into the country’s language, tastes and mores, 
and by socialisation into major aspects of its literary and academic culture I ended up 
becoming an inhabitant—an heir (Mbembe 2007a: 156). 
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Johannesburg for Mbembe ferments the politics of hope. ‘It was then that I 
discovered an African country the very Africanness of that followed from its 
transitionality’ (Mbembe 2007a: 167). Appadurai (1990) points to many worlds 
that are imagined that can be contested and subverted. It is not clear if the notion 
of the ‘worlds’ is that which centres the African subject. The subject positionality 
of the African subject is said to be the deteritorialised self. Mbembe, like 
Appadurai’s notion of the deterritorialised subject is that which opposes 
homogeneity and in favour of heterogeneity. Appadurai notes that there is a fear 
of experiencing absorption by larger polities in the metropole since this will lead 
to subjects indigenised anyway. It seems that the route to be followed is that of 
the tri-continental move, the permanent state of adapting, mimicking and 
stylising with the dictates alien to the subjectivity of the subject. Mbembe 
(2007a: 167) regards South Africa as a ‘diasporic nation’ and articulates it thus:  
For me the place that stands for South Africa’s deepest potential, in the eyes of the 
world at any rate, is first and foremost Johannesburg. Just as Paris was my window 
onto a way of thinking, and New York my watchtower onto the global world, so the 
South Africa of my political and intellectual reflection is, above all, Johannesburg 
(Mbembe 2007: 168). 
It is essential therefore, to take Zeleza’s point into account when he suggests that: 
Diaspora is simultaneously a state of being and a process of becoming, a kind of 
voyage that encompasses the possibility of never arriving or returning, a navigation 
of multiple belongings. It is a mode of naming, remembering, living and feeling 
group identity moulded out of experiences, positioning, struggles and imaginings of 
the past and the present, and at times the unpredictable future, that are shared across 
the boundaries of time and space that frame ‘indigenous’ identities in the contested 
and constructuted location of ‘there’ and ‘here’ and the passages and points in 
between (Zeleza 2005: 41). 
Mbembe is fond of South Africa for that it has the potential of being like the 
Western metropolis. ‘It is here that I started, for the first time, to seriously think 
about what the African modern, or African forms of wordliness could actually 
look like’ (Oboe 2010: 6). The notion of the wordliness suggests that the African 
subject participates in the process making the world in the form of hospitality. 
However, what is clear is that the positionality of the African subject is at the 
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receiving end of the world it inhabits—the very world that confers life and death 
to it. In other words, it is the world that is the creation of the Western subject—
the subject position that has the right to live. What needs to be pointed out is that 
Mbembe’s advocacy for worldliness is not the creation of many worlds, but the 
universal in the Western subject sense of the term that needs to accommodate 
subjects marginal to it, the African subject notwithstanding. The idea of self-
making as advocated by Mbembe (2011) is supported by Fraser (2000) who 
points out that there is a need for the struggles that assert denied identities for the 
purpose of recognition.  
It seems this is the centre of  making the marginalised to be recognised is to 
engage in the accommodationist project of wanting to be included in the 
metropole, posturing the world as if it cares for ‘all’. Recognition seems to be a 
matter of irrelevance to the African subject, the idea of the worldliness 
withstanding. The tri-continental move ratifies the world where the many world 
do not exist, but what exists is the super-ego ideal of the Western subject and its 
subjectivity being the sense of reason that makes the political. The tri-continental 
move does not, in the first, imagine the unmaking and remaking of the world to 
have plural worlds. Secondly, it affirms the idea of wanting to ratify the universal 
and denying the existence of the African subject. And thirdly, it propagates the 
idea of modernity—the one benchmarked on the basis of the African subject 
being the appendage of the universal.  
Mbembe’s conception of the Old World and the New World suggests that he sees 
the world from the metropolis, New York—but this cannot in any way be 
equivalent to the subjectivity of the Western subject. The act of seeing the world 
is to see the world of the Western subject, not the worlds of the African subject. 
Being located in the metropolis—his identity is still imposed from, contrived 
within and inagurated through the canon of the Western subject. Such imposition 
therefore suggests that the African subject, by the mere inferred essentialisation 
of lack, is an aberration. It is clear that the tri-continental move, the act of subject 
making, subjectivity so to speak, is indeed subjection. This move is subjection 
for the mere fact that it means the absence of the African subject—that is, there is 
no subjectivity from that which is inferiorised.  Even if the tri-continental move 
can be linked to the idea of the Black Atlantic as espoused by Gilroy (1993), this 
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means a mere subjectivity not in the sense of its own emergence, but the one 
created by the Western subject wherein the African subject must collapse itself 
and get creolised.  
As Gilroy (1993: 15) notes, ‘the idea of the black Atlantic can be used to show 
that there are other claims to that can be based the structure of the African 
diaspora into the western hemisphere’. The black Atlantic, that is more or less 
identical to the tri-continental move owes its genealogy from the Atlantic slave 
route, the commoditisation of the African subject due to its racialised body that 
was a mere aberration suitable for building the world of the Western subject. The 
African subject cannot be proud of the route, and even go to the extent of 
romanticising it. To the contrary, Masilela (1996) persistently argues that there 
has been a contribution by Africa to the black Atlantic, the contribution that he 
implicates Gilroy of erasing and also decentering. Mbembe’s tri-continental 
move is akin to the Atlantic Triangle—the mere movement of slaves, the paradox 
being the issue of non-return. The return to Africa does not, however, account for 
the making of the African subject.  
Brief notes on the difference: postcoloniality is not decoloniality 
It is important to highlight that there is often confusion between postcoloniality 
and decoloniality. Also because Mbembe is a postcolonial theorist not a 
decolonial one. Though both critique the colonial condition, this is done 
differently and both do not share the same genealogy, trajectory and horison—
and thus, they do not have the same understanding of the colonial condition. 
Mignolo (2011a: xxiii) amplifies thus: ‘[A]lthough both projects drink from the 
same fountain they are grounded in a different genealogy of thoughts and 
different existentia’. The distinction will be done briefly on three accounts of 
genealogy, trajectory and horison. The genealogy of postcoloniality can be traced 
from the canonical works of Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak 
who still remain prominent even though the trajectory of postcoloniality varies 
(Ashcroft et al. 2006). In elucidating this point, De la Campa (2008: 438-439) 
states that ‘Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak, though widely 
different in theory approaches, fashioned a long-award deconstruction of Anglo-
American hegemony in their own terms’.  
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The contours that shape the landscape of decoloniality can be traced from Steve 
Biko, Bernard Magubane, WEB Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Ihechukwu Madubuike, 
V-Y Mudimbe, Paul Zeleza, Anìbal Quijano, Linda Alcoff, Archie Mafeje, 
Walter Rodney, Kwame Nrumah, Cheikh Anta Diop, Aimé Cesairé, Ramon 
Grosfoguel, Ngũgĩ wa Thingo’o, Chinweizu, Walter Mignolo, Enrique Dussel, 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and Lewis R Gordon to name but a few. The 
aforementioned thinkers come from different thought traditions and different 
geographies but they pursue one mission that is intentional in their work—
decoloniality.  
According to Hume (2008), postcoloniality is the body of work that attempts to 
break with colonial assumptions of Euro-North American political and cultural 
criticism—that is, the resistance of the imperial power by the subjects who are 
wronged by that power. Postcoloniality is caught within the Euro-North 
American matrix, while decoloniality is operating outside that matrix by 
emphasising the locus of enunciation (De la Campa 2008). Postcoloniality 
originates from the Euro-North American English academic departments and its 
epistemic locus is counter-hegemonic by form and content. It is the Third World 
voice inside the Euro-North American empire. Postcoloniality has been 
concerned with ‘identifying the locatedness of European theoretical vocabulary 
as a way of challenging the easy and false universal claims made by that theory’ 
(Hume 2008: 395). Though postcoloniality advocates for the ‘marginal subject’ 
or ‘the subaltern’ from what it refers to the epistemic location of the Third 
World, decoloniality stands outside the Euro-North American empire through 
border-gnosis.  
While postcoloniality privileges culture and discursive practices in a form of a 
text, decoloniality privileges power, knowledge, and being as tools that maintain 
coloniality that creates humanity that lacks of ontological density. Decoloniality, 
as Mignolo (2011a) states, privileges people as subjects of history and their 
existential conditions rather than privileging cultures and texts as postcoloniality 
does. The question of being, that might be understood as the ‘Other’ in 
postcoloniality is reduced to the processes of dislocation, exile and identity. In 
opposite to this conception, decoloniality takes the ontology of the subject as the 
starting point in order to question the mode of existence and how knowledge and 
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power practices create the being whose humanity is always questioned. The 
being is not only the ‘Other’ in decoloniality as it is the case with postcoloniality, 
but a subject that must constantly liberate itself through decolonial practices. 
While postcoloniality calls for the transformation of the structure to solve 
problems, decololoniality calls for the structure to be destroyed to create new 
forms of lives. Decoloniality as Mignolo (2011a: xxv) aptly points out ‘became 
an epistemic and political project’.  
According to Maldonado-Torres (2008b: 382), postcoloniality ‘has left one of the 
stronger expressions of modernity/coloniality untouched’. Postcoloniality 
constitutes some efficiency of radical critique and tends to maintain the 
superiority of the Euro-North American epistemology intact. Postcoloniality does 
not see modernity from its darker side whereas decoloniality does not take 
modernity for granted and understands modernity as coloniality—that is, the 
darker side of modernity. Decoloniality as opposed to postcoloniality does not in 
anyway, rehabilitate modernity. Its modes of criticism are not within modernity 
as in the case of posctoloniality, but outside modernity. As Ashcroft et al. (2006: 
1) state that postcoloniality constitutes ‘different indigenous local and hybrid 
processes of self-determination to defy, erode and sometimes supplant the 
prodigious power of imperial cultural knowledge’. Though for postcolonialism 
colonialism is something that is transcended; to decoloniality colonialism is 
something that is still informing the present and existing in the form of 
coloniality that is the constitutive part of modernity.  Scott (2009) argues that 
postcoloniality assumes the anticolonial posture and it is being concerned about 
exposing the negative picture of colonialism.  
According to Maldonado-Torres (2008b: 382), decoloniality ‘positions some of 
the imperial underpinnings of modernity’. Decoloniality is attentive to the 
colonial structures, its expressions and effects that are in the form of coloniality 
and that are combated consistently. Simply put, decoloniality is a constant 
critique of modernity/coloniality and it continues to do so, to the extent of being 
labelled as ‘preoccupied’ or ‘obsessed’ with coloniality. Decoloniality unmasks 
coloniality wherever it seeks to hide itself. The major aims of decoloniality are to 
render coloniality visible by exposing both its rhetoric and reality. Decoloniality 
as a standpoint does not hide its geography and biography of where the critique 
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emerges from (Mignolo 2011a). Decoloniality is not fiction but legitimate in a 
sense that it authorises the lived experience of those who are at the receiving end 
of subjection and commands such subjects to declare their locus of enunciation. 
Decoloniality moves away from the deceit of coloniality that hides behind 
objectivity, neutrality and free-bias and argues that these are the devices alien to 
the lived experience of the subject more especially the one who suffers from 
subjection.  
Decoloniality emphasis the need to work towards decolonial futures. 
Decoloniaity pursues decolonial futures and not the preoccupation of colonialism 
as a problem to produce postcolonial futures (Mignolo 2011a). It means that the 
task of decoloniality does not end and it is indefinite in so far as coloniality 
perpetually exists. It calls for the end of the universal as it is in favour of many 
worlds—that is, the world into that many worlds fit—pluriversality. This is 
articulated by Mignolo as pluriversal worlds and where the idea of the universal 
does not feature in that it reifies the conception of the world informed by 
coloniality. To hasten the distinction between decoloniaity and postcoloniality, 
Mignolo (2011a) insists that each approach carries with it a way of in the world 
and not just a way of operating with concepts or telling stories about colonialism.  
Notes on methodology: decolonial critical analysis  
Decolonial critical analysis will be deployed as foreground methodological 
interventions of this study. This intervention will then be applied to explain, 
examine and contrast concepts and main arguments in this thesis. Decolonial 
critical analysis is relevant to this thesis as it is thematically structured to engage 
Mbembe’s political thought. The themes of this thesis, namely modes of self-
writing, power in the postcolony, the politics of violence in Africa, the political 
thought of Frantz Fanon and the idea of South Africa will be analysed through 
decolonial critical analysis which is is rooted in decolonial epistemic perspective 
and it is intended to confront and grapple with power issues in their sense of 
complexity. Its key concepts are coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge 
and coloniality of being—also to include the synthetic de-colonial turn—which 
will be weaved in the relevant parts of the aforementioned themes in order to 
enable a closer reading of Mbembe’s ouvre. 
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At the nerve centre of decolonial critical analysis, it is the concerted effort to 
engage in the process of liberating the African subject and of course, the study of 
the African subject being the one that opens the possibility of liberation since the 
African subject is at the receiving end of subjection. It is, therefore, important to 
point out that decolonial critical analysis is informed by the continued pursuit of 
liberation. Santos (2014: 53) correctly points out that ‘ideas must be rooted in the 
aspirations of oppressed peoples’. In articulating the necessity of decolonial 
critical analysis, Santos (2014), a method that emphasies the knowledge that is 
existential and experiential and also both resilient and flexible.  In its application, 
it aims to disrupt, question, displace, rattle and unsettle the guardian of the status 
quo—that is, qualitative, quantitative and triangulation methodologies. This 
thesis will not deploy any of the popular methodological interventions that are 
conventional in the Euro-North American simply because they are alien to the 
lived experience of the African subject, its subjectivity and they ratify subjection. 
It is in these methodologies that the African subject becomes the object of study.  
This thesis is not foregrounded on the old ways of thinking, and taken-for-
granted epistemological foundations of the Euro-North American episteme are 
confronted through a critique of method. The latter inaugurates the epistemic 
break from the static methodological mould of Euro-North American episteme. 
This is necessary is necessary as the thesis is informed by the necessity to shift 
the geography of reason—that is, the methodological choices being done from 
the standpoint of the African subject. Decolonial critical analysis is 
methodologically unique in that it gives primacy to the lived experience of the 
African subject. As a methodological intervention, it ‘it questions the truth of 
authority, techniques to reveal the figures of power that operate in dominant 
discourse or ideologies of Euro-North American episteme (Hardt 2011: 19 
emphasis mine)’. The figures of power that are engaged upon are specifically 
those that ratify subjection and which negatively affect those who are in the lived 
experience whose knowledges have experienced epistemicide. It does not borrow 
methodological tools from the Euro-North Ameriacan episteme to blindly apply 
them to the lived experience of the African subject. Decolonial critical analysis 
inaugurates the subjectivity of the African subject as a necessary condition to 
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combat subjection. It is through this subjectivity that the political thought of 
Mbembe will be approached.  
It is pertinent for an elaborate account of decolonial critical analysis as a critique 
as method to be undertaken. It is not a critique for its own sake, but a critique 
that lends the possibility of the African subject to make a political intervention to 
the methodological domains that ratify the status quo. As Ake (1982: 125) posits, 
these methodologies are contaminated with ‘ideological bias of the mainstream 
Western social science’. These are known methodologies that constitute part of 
the project of modernity—the latter being even tired due to its inability to deal 
with socio-political phenomena pertaining to the African subject and the 
problems that feature in the contemporary. Out of their resilience and their 
paranoia of censure, they engage in what Ake refers to as sciences of 
equilibrium, that shows that they are in opposition to change. According to Ake 
(1982), sciences of equilibrium negatively refer to other methodologies as 
inferior, deviance, unscientific, myth and crisis to name a few. This is the 
methodological and ideological bias loaded with negative connotations that 
justifies the status quo. Decolonial critical analysis runs the risk of being admired 
or disqualified, if only to be celebrated while liquidated or at worst mutilated.   
Decolonial critical analysis emphasises the decolonisation of research 
methodologies, but such decolonisation does not suggest they must be reformed, 
but wholly changed if they are used to study the African subject. Decolonial 
critical analysis also emphasis new ways of researching the African subject, and 
this is only possible if the African subject is studied from within, and of course, 
as a subject and not an object to be ethnographically extracted and hypothetically 
tested. This has been perversely done and even still done by the route of 
methodology that partakes of an a priori by means of that the African subject is 
studied as mute and, as such, remains an object. According to Brun and Lund 
(2010), decolonising research methodologies is linked to research agendas of, 
about, and by the African subject. Brun and Lund call linking theory and 
practice—praxis. According to Brun and Lund (2010: 825) ‘[l]inking theory and 
practice means getting closer to the society that independent research is supposed 
to critically explore’. But then, this does not account for that getting closer to the 
communities can indeed not yield the desired result of decolonising 
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methodologies. Sklar (1993: 85) is correct to say: ‘[t]he quest for new agenda-
setting propositions may have to transcend research hori[s]ons that are familiar to 
political scientists in most, if not all, parts of the world’.    
Decolonial critical analysis has to be engaged seriously at the moment of rupture 
and emergence. As Mignolo (2011a) posits, all thinking is located and it is 
important to understand the African subject in its location and the location of the 
articulation of subjectivity and the location that points to the direction that 
subjection comes from. The African subject has to struggle to (re)present the 
hitherto ‘Othered’ self. The subjectivity of the African subject has been that of 
double-consciousness and bad faith (Gordon 2010). The African subject has 
always attempted to emerge in his or her own terms, but for this emergence to 
emerge there must be some paternalism of within that the African subject is the 
appendage of the Euro-North American canon. The subjection of the African 
subject has been that of power relations where the Euro-North American power 
has the epistemological upper hand.  
Decolonial critical analysis is necessary as it offers other modalities of 
understanding the African subject and its subjectivity. It is informed by what 
Mignolo (2011a: 55) refers to as ‘a constant and coherent ethical-political 
critique’. This is because it confronts the Euro-North American epistemology 
that stands negative to the African subject. As Mignolo (2011a: 56) argues, ‘the 
starting point of epistemology founds and sustains imperial reasons (theo- and 
geo-politically)’. This is the fertile ground that enables the ‘othering’ the African 
subject to the point of objecthood.  
Comaroff and Comaroff (2006b: 92-93) introduce three decolonial critical 
analysis operations. The first is the mapping of the substance of the phenomenal 
landscape that grounds any discursive flows and following the traces of that flow 
to whatever direction they might lead. The second involves the extensions of the 
phenomenological landscape through geographical dimensions where the 
discursive flow constitutes itself. Such mapping is multi-sided or multi-
dimensional. The third and final methodological operation involves tracing the 
passage of the discursive flow in terms of its nature, rapture and continuity to 
ascertain local genealogy and comparative archaeology of its locality within a 
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wider phenomenon. Smith (1999: 140) states that ‘[n]egotiating and transforming 
institutional practices and research frameworks is as significant as the carrying 
out of actual research programmes’. 
The Euro-North American canon methodologies—that is, qualitative, 
quantitative and triangulation ran out of steam in terms of understanding the 
African subject, and as such have become constrictions rather than sites that are 
open multiplicity, even though combined by means of triangulation. They are 
often rigidly followed for the basis of scientific merit, research validity and 
realiability; but little is considered in terms of their suitability in studying the 
African subject. The contention is that the African subject should be interrogated 
also from the location of decolonial critical analysis to take the question of the 
existence of the African subject seriously. The Euro-North American canon 
methodologies have not yet given the African subject subjectivity but instead a 
kind of subjection that makes the objecthood out of the African subject.    
There is no need to actually outwardly dismiss the Euro-North American canon 
methodologies. Rather, it should suffice to challenge them as being ineffective in 
revealing the power structures that tamper with the contribution to the body of 
knowledge by the African subject in own terms. Adding to this, Louis (2007) 
asserts that research on the African subject is a contribution to the body of 
knowledge for that it is a research different from the one originating from the 
Euro-North American canon. The dominant methodologies serve as testimony to 
the fact that research in Africa and about Africa is need for liberation from the 
domination of the Euro-North American canon. Even though there has been 
some research that is Africanist in the process while being entangled in the Euro-
North American methodology with its own modes of judgments and devaluing 
others, the one foregrounded in the locus of enunciation of African subjectivity is 
necessary.   
Bates et al. (1993: xxi) write: ‘[w]e seek to create such tensions in order that the 
contribution of African scholarship be valued, recorded and institutionali[s]ed by 
the African subjects and through their own modes of methodological subjectivity 
(emphasis added)’. As a methodology of the alternatives knowledges, in 
confrontation with epistemicide permitted and perpetuated by the mainstream 
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methodologies in studying the socio-political phenomena of the African subject, 
combative methodology is by its very nature disobedient. As such, it is what the 
status quo does not want and exposes what is hidden in modernity, hence the 
quick dismissal without understanding it. As Moore (1993) points out, the 
African subject has suffered the bane of ahistorical and selective constructions. 
Moore adds that the African subject has been the ‘exotic Other’—the figure of 
attraction and fascination. It is not enough for Moore to state that the African 
subject is transforming and should be studied in the dynamic of the transformed 
nature. This is because it is not clear on whose interests that transformation is.   
According to Gordon (2010: 202), method against method is a ‘position of 
embodied interrogatives, of human being re-entering a relationship of 
questioning’. This should expose the hidden within method, and that creates the 
justification of subjection and the hellish existential conditions for the African 
subject. As Smith (1999) notes, exclusionary devices are used such as not 
vigorous, not theorised, not valid, not reliable, not real are deployed as a template 
of judgment. To amplify this, Porsanger (2004) argues that the mode of knowing 
is alternative since the methods call for decolonisation that is often rejected as 
irrelevant, primitive, subjective, essentialist and unscientific to name but a few. 
Vaughan (1994) asserts that African politics has been dominated by imported 
methodological tools ranging from normative, neo-liberal, neo-Marxist, 
postmodernist and poststructuralist paradigms. What is needed are methods that 
can explicate hidden and complex phenomena in a profound manner and that in a 
way provide understanding of power relations—that is, the industrial complex of 
epistemic power hidden in dominant methodologies. Necessary methodological 
tools are needed for creating and recreating decolonised methodologies. Thus, 
this will minimise what Vaughan (1994: 149) refers to as ‘the cult of scientific 
prediction’ that pervades the study of the African subject. It is this cult as 
Vaughan argues that limits the understanding of the complex African social 
world and the Africa subject.           
When confronted with methodological tools questioning and challenging 
convention, fierce opposition from the status quo emerges and to the point of 
calling to halt that which is seen as a threat. ‘Research contributed to, and draw 
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from, these systems of classification, representation and evaluation’ (Smith 1999: 
43). To add on this, this is what Porsanger has to say: 
In the Western understanding, research in general may be defined as an investigation 
or experiment aimed at the discovery and interpretation of facts. Research includes 
collecting information about a particular subject, revising accepted theories or laws 
in the light of new facts, and the practical application of such new or revised theories 
or laws (Porsanger 2004: 2). 
The African subject has been static and dynamic at the same time. The dynamism 
has, however, been caught and paradoxically resulted in bondage discourses. 
Louis (2007) in in reference to African subjects notes that ‘[o]ur voices may have 
started out as a low murmur from the margin but it has now become a distinct 
and unified  cacophony of resistance and distrust’. This affirms that 
decolonisation is reaching a higher pitch. Comaroff and Comaroff (2006b: 79) 
evoke what they call ‘an endemically coloni[s]ing enterprise’ that entails ‘a pre-
emptive seizure of authority, of voice, of the right to represent and, incidentality, 
to profit—or, worse yet, an activity, founded, voyeuristically, on the violation of 
“the” other’. The subject position of the African subject, subjectivity and 
subjection can be understood in terms of this colonising enterprise that Comaroff 
and Comaroff alluded to. The African subject, they contend, does not inhibit 
social contexts and it can be extended to the pain that relates to livelihoods that 
justify subjection that make the African subject an object.    
The methodological issues been rigid and instruments that the African subject be 
understood is that which needs not only to be rethought, but unthought. The 
positionality of the unthought exposes the scandal of subjection hidden in Euro-
North American methodological canon. According to Sexton and Copeland 
(2003: 53), ‘the positionality of the unthought can only be imagined through its 
affective dimension[s]’ by those who are at the receiving end of subjection. It is 
against the notion of politics of consensus propagated by the canon of 
methodology that such positionality can be imagined. Since the existential 
questions pertaining to African subjects are not in the register of these politics as 
being but objects, then the whole applicability is a collapsible scandal. In 
adopting this form of subjectivity, that is, the positionality of the unthought 
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enabled through decolonial critical analysis; the African subject is charting a new 
terrain of struggle for liberation. 
What is essential in researching the African subject is the emphasis of the locus 
of enunciation, that Mignolo (2011a), coins as I think from where I am. This is 
the location of the subject in terms of being, power and knowledge, and so to say, 
from the limits of such since the African subject is located in the zone of non-
being. Being located in the zone of non-being, the African subject should, in 
relation to the locus of enunciation, shift the geography of reason. The need for 
the shift of the geography of reason stems from the fact that even if people 
occupy the same space, they will not necessarily occupy the same life. The canon 
of methodology as we know it hides its locus of enunciation by claiming to be 
objective, totalising and universal.  
The locus of enunciation positions the African subject to oppose fundamentalist 
position of comparing, measuring, evaluating and judging human experiences 
(Mignolo 2007). This opens the possibility to ‘search for other possible 
knowledges and worlds’ (Walsh 2007: 234). This search by the African subject is 
the one that informs subjectivity to counter subjection as it is directed to the 
African subject. The world inhabited by the African subject is a place that is in 
the receiving end of the darker side of modernity. It is then important to explore 
what this system called modernity produces in terms of its darker side. It 
produces weaker governments that produce corruption, authoritarianism and 
disabled history. The shift of geography of reason is necessary for the African 
subject who is denied of ontology to think from the limits of being in order to 
allow the emergence of the being, the full subject in its own making.  
The self-defining subject is that of self-creation and subject in the making. These 
aspects mean different things to the Western subject, the self-defining subject 
and the African subject. The African subject is in the worst condition when it 
comes to the level of identity as such an identity is imposed, because the African 
subject is the product of the Western subject’s construction and definition. The 
subjectivity of the African subject is important in understanding coloniality of 
knowledge. Mignolo (2009) suggests that the subject position is important in 
terms of understanding subjection. Mignolo further suggest that the knower 
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should be questioned rather than the known to understand the very epistemic 
foundation of subjection. This means questioning the very apparatus and the 
locus of enunciation of the knower in relation to the known.  
The subject is the very basis of maintaining the locus of enunciation (Mignolo 
2009). This unveils the concealment of the Western epistemology that suggests 
the knower in contrast with the unknower who happens to be the African subject. 
For Mignolo, the subject controls and dictates the rules of knowledge—so be it 
such figure is implicated and there is no objective or detached being from 
epistemology. Adding the African subject in this explanation suggests the 
problematic of the subject that constitutes lack and bears no any form of 
epistemic privilege. Knowledge is always situated, and Grosfoguel (2007) 
articulates the notion of the locus of enunciation in terms of that what matters is 
the enunciation, not the enunciated. The African subject’s vantage point it is 
enunciated to understand its subjectivity in relation to subjection that comes into 
effect through the manner in which knowledge is used as an instrument of 
subjection. For this to be framed properly, it is important to state that the locus of 
enunciation of the African subject can be problematic if the subject is 
geographically located in Africa but engages Africa from the loci of the empire. 
The empire here means, the political subject that controls global exchanges, and 
it is a sovereign subject that governs the world (Hardt and Negri 2000). This is 
what strengthens coloniality of knowledge that often hides its locus of 
enunciation to normalise subjection.  
The locus of enunciation of the African subject thinks with the African subject 
and from the African subject’s subjectivity. It is not thinking for the African 
where ‘theory was still located in the North while the subject [or object] are 
located in the South’ (Grosfoguel 2007: 211). The locus of enunciation, as Walsh 
(2002) articulates, is about thinking and speaking from the geopolitical and 
historical location. This affirms the importance of subjectivity of the African 
subject, being at the centre of the modes of self-undertsanding. This is informed 
by colonial difference that guides the reflection and offers a lens through that to 
view the world. The locus of enunciation as Walsh (2007) articulates, is also 
‘epistemologically diagrammed spaces’ that offer a possibility where other 
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knowledges exists—pluriversality and regimes of truth. In amplification of this 
Mignolo states: 
The enunciator does not name an existing entity but invents it. The enunciation needs 
an enunciator (agent), an institution, for not everyone can invent the anthropos; but 
in order to impose the anthropos as the other in the collective imaginary it is 
necessary to be in a position to manage the discourse (verbal, visual, sound) by that 
you name and describe an entity (the anthropos or the other) and succeed in making 
believe that it exists (Mignolo 2011b: 275). 
In addition to this, Grosfoguel also observes that: 
The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations, does not 
automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from the subaltern epistemic 
location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial world-system consists in 
making subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial 
difference, to think epistemically like the one on the dominant position. Subaltern 
epistemic perspective are knowledges coming from below that produce a critical 
perspective of hegemonic knowledge in the power relations involved (Grosfoguel 
2007: 213). 
This clearly demonstrates the fact that there is no such thing as objectivity, 
neutrality and truth. The Western myth that knowledge is divorced from its 
subject that aims to gain truthful knowledge as a forms of epistemic virtue is 
deception. Everything is situational and embedded, and the locus of enunciation 
determines from that side of the global system or formation is the knowledge 
situated. The Euro-North American global design strategy is informed by 
binarism and hierachisation that keeps the imbalances of power and the colonial 
legacy intact. These are the very forms of epistemic violence that excludes, 
marginalises, demonises and even eliminates forms of episteme that differ from 
modernity (Grosfoguel 2007). Knowledge distinction has been that global history 
has an unchanging and always in favour of modernity and keeping silence on its 
darker side.  
The strength of decolonial critical analysis is the exposure of what Euro-North 
American canonical methodologies seeks to hide—that is, the processes of 
subjection within these methodologies. It is in this study that the emphasis is 
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placed on understanding the African subject on the basis of locating its beginning 
to the colonial encounter and also in the postcolony. Even in these time lines, 
things have not fundamentally changed since hegemonies continue the act of 
subjection. What decolonial critical analysis brings to the forefront is the opening 
of silent epistemes and unthought thinking—that is, the politics of knowledge 
infused with the emergence of the African subject. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a) 
emphasises an agenda of decoloniality which is rethinking the very constitution 
of the present and the construction and reconstruction of African subjectivity as 
an important project today than ever before. This means that this is the time 
where in that African subjectivity needs to be taken seriously. Decolonial critical 
analysis constitute the application of decolonial options as the liberation tool. It 
resonates well with the study of the African subject, the subject that is under the 
yolke of being ‘Othered’ and being under the tentacles of technologies of 
subjection. According to Sklar (1993: 103), research themes in African political 
thought ‘refer to an aspect of intellectual, political, or social life in Africa’. The 
African subject should be studied through methodologies that are decolonised in 
themselves. This study aims to articulate liberation issues that are fundamental to 
this research. They should contribute to a different understanding of the world in 
general and the African world in particular.  
Since this research is about the centredness and emergence of the African 
subject, the manner in which the African subject is studied has to change 
definitely, that then, necessitates the relevance of the African subject. The 
importance is that of articulating research outside the Euro-North American 
canon. This canon is suitable for understanding the Euro-North American 
subject. It is therefore necessary to bring the African subject at the centre of 
ontology and epistemology for that they are empowering and liberating 
initiatives towards the study of the African subject. All these initiatives form part 
of decolonial critical analysis, and they are centred on the emergence of the 
African subject, subjectivity and are antagonistic to subjection of the African 
subject. Decolonial critical analysis confronts the subject matter of the Euro-
North American episteme, and advocates the centredness and emergence of the 
African subject. Decolonial critical analysis constitutes oppositionality to 
48 
 
subjection and, it opens options and advances the turn of decoloniality—
decolonial moves.  
Relevance and contribution of the study 
The contribution of this study is three fold and—that is, methodological, 
theoretical and empirical. Firstly, in terms of methodological contribution the 
study carries with it the element of innovation by introducing decolonial critical 
analysis to explain the socio-political phenomena of, or that is relevant to the 
African subject, its subjection, and subjection that entangles it. The research is 
about the contribution to the body of knowledge in African politics. The nature 
and boundaries of the existing methodologies discussed above were challenged 
and contributed to open ways of possibility and that of centredness of the African 
subject. The relevance and contribution of methodological innovation by the 
means of combative methodology is timely in the era where there is crisis of ‘the 
political’ and the crisis of ideology, by and large, as pertaining to the African 
subject.  
Decolonial critical analysis allows the unravelling of physics of power that 
makes power to be this complex network in the form of the unrecognisable 
feature—the normal state of affairs. It seeks to disentangle the nerve centre of 
power that is constitutive part of the mainstream methodologies, the power that 
has made them to have universal applicability. The physics of power are what are 
hidden in qualitative, quantitative and triangulation methodologies, hence their 
irrelevance in understanding the African subject in its point of emergence, 
emergence in its own terms in the postcolony. This is simply because they are 
transplanted from the Euro-North American epistemic centre to the African 
subject and African socio-political phenomena regarded as epistemologically 
inferior—or, at worse, epistemologically void.  
The emergence of the African subject cannot be understood through 
methodologies that are constrictive since this constriction is the condition of 
epistemicide of alternative methodologies that open possibilities for alternative 
methodologies centrering the African subject. Decolonial critical analysis is the 
nodal point as well as a contribution and relevance of this study will allow the 
new understanding of the African subject, through its own subjectivity and also 
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combat the subjection of the mainstream methodologies. So this means the edge 
of contribution is new in that the new understanding of the African subject, its 
subjectivity and subjection that entangles it through its many guises and 
mutations in the postcolony will emerge.   
Secondly, in terms of theoretical contribution the study is rooted in decolonial 
epistemic perspective that is the scholarship that is centred on the new ways of 
knowing and thinking—and also, unthinking the world as it is. The unthinking of 
the world is that which means the world that is not created by so-called cogito, 
but the one created by the human beings. Decolonial epistemic perspective is 
derived from the long history of African resistence to colonial subjection and 
Latin American thought that is applied in African politics, and it is important to 
highlight that decolonial struggles in Latin America and African or any other part 
of the world are different. Suffice is to say that decolonial epistemic perspective 
has been the central feature in the African political scene that has been 
preoccupied by resistance where subjection exists and intensifies.  
The central question will then be: how relevant is decolonial epistemic 
perspective to Africa, and how helpful it is in understanding the African subject, 
its subjection, and subjectivity? Key responses to this will be made by 
highlighting that Africa has a different experience of colonialism. Linked to that, 
Africa is the last continent to be colonised and also the last to be decolonised—
its weaknesses withstanding. Therefore, Africa in its living conditions and that of 
the African subject suggest that colonialism and, by extension, coloniality, is the 
lived reality in the postcolony. Sklar (1993) warns that the African political 
experience should not be ignored, for it is important to understand the 
marginality of the African experience and Africa itself.  
Moreover, this perspective is flexible enough to accommodate new and 
innovative approaches seldom adopted by political scientists. Like scholars in 
other disciplines, the time has come for political scientists of Africa to ask the 
question whether there are aspects of indigenous African socio-cultural 
expression that can assist in strengthening our understanding of the complex 
realities of these African countries (Vaughan 1994: 148).   
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Furthermore, the contribution of this study at the theoretical level is to borrow 
the three conceptual pillars from decolonial epistemic perspective, namely 
coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, and coloniality being to 
understand the African subject, its subjection, and subjectivity. This affirms the 
new contribution to the body of knowledge that borrows from the decolonial 
models to engage in further decolonisation of the African subject. The 
contribution of this study is essentially to engage in the shift of geography of 
reason from Euro-North American content to the decolonial content with the 
strong emphasis of the Africanist perspective in relation to the emergence of the 
African subject, its subjectivity and the technologies of subjection that confronts 
and haunts this subject. The African subject point of emergence in the form of 
decolonial epistemic perspective is visibly dealt with strongly in the epistemic 
interventions that emerged from the lived experiences and struggles from slavery 
to colonialism to imperialism and today’s coloniality in the postcolony.  
Decolonial epistemic perspective has a rich history in African political context 
and decolonial struggles like pan-Africanism, Negritude, African Personality, 
Ethopianism, Black Theology, African Humanism, Black Consciousness, 
Afrocentricity, African Renaissance and Africana existentialism just to name a 
few. These have also been paradigms that informed the key role players in those 
struggles. These struggles took place in different contexts and spaces in Africa, 
and they constitute differences and also different degrees of the modes and 
methods of being decolonial. They have different histories, genealogies, 
narratives and philosophies. This is to highlight the fact that decolonial epistemic 
perspective is and has been relevant to Africa. The contribution of this study is to 
understand coloniality of the African subject in the postcolony and the paradigm 
shift from Euro-North American content as highlighted is therefore essential. The 
contribution of this study rests on engaging a critical theory of Africanist 
scholarship content with the decolonial bend. The relevance and contribution of 
this study is to put a case that Africanist thought is not a fundamentalist and 
essentialist political intervention, but the intention fused with liberation intent. 
But then, that which is informed by alternative of critical theory with 
decolonising the African subject is the nerve centre.    
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Thirdly and lastly, the empirical contribution of the study examines Mbembe’s 
political thought. This is not a biographical study, but the study of certain 
elements constituted in Mbembe’s political thought. This is done by 
problematising three things—the African subject, its subjectivity and subjection 
antagonistic to it. The contribution of this study is to ascertain the ways in terms 
of that there is a discernible advancement of the frontiers of knowledge in Africa 
by unravelling the intellectual location of Mbembe’s thought. In patricular, an 
effort is made to dissect how he understands the African subject and, therefore, 
his unique contribution to the theorisation of and about Africa. Since the study is 
informed by other modes of knowing it engages in the empirical to explain the 
socio-political phenomena as pertains to the African subject.  
The empirical nature of this study rests on weighing Mbembe on what he has 
written with regards to Africa, in prompting an understanding the African 
subject, its subjection, and subjectivity in the postcolony. There are many themes 
in African politics and the ones relevant for this study, and to Mbembe’s political 
thought in particular are the African intellectuals in the postcolony, power in the 
postcolony, violence in the postcolony, black political thought in the postcolony 
and the politics of hope in the postcolony. The themes are not exhaustive and a 
capita selecta is made on the basis of distilling the thought of Mbembe with 
regards to the African subject, subjectivity and subjection in the postcolony. The 
empirical nature of this study affirms the unique contribution in the sense that the 
thought of Mbembe was written on the African subject in different discursive 
levels and contexts. Decolonial epistemic perspective is deployed to unravel 
Mbembe’s political thought on the African subject, its subjection, and 
subjectivity weaving them with the capita selecta of themes pertinent to this 
study.     
Limitations of the study 
The limitations for this study are as follows: in the first, and the pertinent one, 
Mbembe mostly writes and publishes in French. This study has chosen to focus 
on the works that Mbembe published in English. Even though Mbembe writes in 
French, he makes the corpus of his works translated by using translators. And 
also, there are many that he writes in English without using translators. This then 
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overcomes the limitation of this study in that there is a sufficient body of work 
by Mbembe in English.   The second limitation is that this study is not a 
biographical political engagement, but the examination of Mbembe’s works 
resonating or relevant to the themes pertinent with the study, namely, modes of 
self-writing, power in the postcolony, the politics of violence in Africa, the 
political thought of Frantz Fanon and the idea of South Africa. Since Mbembe is 
the eclectic and prolific thinker, it would be difficult to capture his whole thought 
in a signle study as he vascillates between various disciplines and topics. To 
overcome this limitation, the study will only focus on the aforementioned 
themes. The third and last limitation is that Mbembe is still continuing to write 
and publish, and his thought might even change. This means that the continuity 
of his work might affirm and contradict the points of critique of this study. To 
overcome this limitation, this study focuses on themes that are related to 
Mbembe’s works and it will be feasible to identify how these themes still evolve 
as part of his political thought.  
Chapter organisation 
The thesis is constituted by eight chapters. The second chapter is the theoretical 
framework and decolonial epistemic perspective is applied to serve as a 
torchlight for this study. Chapter three engages Mbembe on the modes of self-
writing, with specific reference to coloniality of knowledge. Chapter four seeks 
to examine Mbembe on the notion of the power in the postcolony and this will be 
explored through the notion of coloniality of power. Chapter five examines 
Mbembe’s notion of violence through the notion of coloniality of being. Chapter 
six unpacks Mbembe’s reading of Fanon and this is done through de-colonial 
turn. Chapter seven then examines Mbembe’s idea of South Africa and also 
through de-colonial turn. Chapter eight then is the conclusion for this study and 
maps further trends of research to be pursued.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
DECOLONIAL EPISTEMIC PERSPECTIVE: A THEORETICAL 
INTERVENTION 
 
Introduction  
This chapter seeks to map out decolonial epistemic perspective as a theoretical 
intervention. By mapping the theoretical basis of this study, this chapter 
foregriunds this as the intervention to examine Mbembe’s political thought, 
which is the node of this study. Decolonial epistemic perspective is essential as a 
theoretical intervention in that it analyses and investigates hidden power 
structures and articulations that affect the lived reality of the African subject as a 
result of coloniality. The aim of this chapter is to understand how coloniality 
works and to deploy and reflect on the structural positionality of the African 
subject, its subjectivity and its subjection in the postcolony. Decolonial epistemic 
perspective cannot be fully understood without a clear distillation of its 
conceptual pillars, and the ones relevant for this study include coloniality of 
power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being. In addition to these 
three, the synthetic conceptual pillar of de-colonial turn will be applied. 
The first conceptual pillar of decolonial epistemic perspective is coloniality of 
power. It addresses the manner in which power is articulated to characterise, 
label, classify and organise the world according to the racialised Euro-North 
American perceptions of the African subject. The second conceptual pillar is 
coloniality of knowledge. It refers to the manner in which knowledge systems 
were formulated and totalised by the Euro-North American empire and how 
African subject were silenced and excluded. The third is conceptual pillar is 
coloniality of being. This one speaks to how being of the African subject was re-
articulated according to the racialised stereotypes of Otherness that enabled and 
legitimised violence directed to the African subject because of its supposed and 
externally imposed inferiority. Lastly, the chapter deploys the concept of de-
colonial turn to further explore how coloniality opens new vistas of thought to 
understand the possibilities of another world outside coloniality. Decolonial 
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epistemic perspective is used as a barometer for this study to understand 
Mbembe’s positionality on the African subject, its subjectivity and subjection in 
the postcolony. 
Charting the terrain of decolonial epistemic perspective  
As a theoretical intervention, decolonial epistemic perspective is relevant for this 
study as it is deeply situated in the broad framework of modernity that in its 
broader discursive constitutes two faces—the one face is the one that promises to 
civilise the African subject and the other face is that of subjection. These faces of 
modernity operate in tandem, and this strengthens the relevance of decolonial 
epistemic perspective to say that it is deeply situated in the underside of 
modernity called coloniality. The latter is the concept that interrogates the darker 
side of modernity to understand the whole technology of subjection. To 
understand colonial matrices of power it is important to interrogate the notion of 
subjection which is the constitutive part of modernity. This chapter engages 
coloniality in at least three forms of its conceptual pillars—namely, coloniality of 
power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being. These conceptual 
pillars are vital in providing a deeper understanding of how the subject—the 
political, is made and unmade. So, the subject in general and the African subject 
in particular cannot be understood outside these conceptual pillars. This by 
extension will provide the understanding of the subjectivity and subjection of the 
African subject.  
Coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being are 
essential in understanding Mbembe’s subject positionality—that is, his political 
thought with reference to the African subject, its subjectivity and subjection in 
the postcolony. Firstly, Mbembe breathes coloniality. This means that Mbembe 
is the modern subject who propagates coloniality without being aware of it. 
Secondly, linked to the first is that Mbembe is not critical of the matrices of 
power embedded in coloniality—that in this 21st Century, still target the African 
subject to the point of eternal subjection. Thirdly and finally, Mbembe seems to 
be critical of Africanist resisters and in favour of conformists. All this is because 
Mbembe is not combative, while Africanist scholars he volarises are indeed 
combative towards subjection. Decolonial epistemic perspective is deployed in 
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this study to understand terms used by Mbembe to engage the African subject, its 
subjectivity and subjection. The strength of decolonial epistemic perspective lies 
in the ability to explain the socio-political phenoma of subjection, and what kind 
of subjectivity it produces.   
Furthermore, decolonial epistemic perspective’s strength lies in its relevance to 
capture the crises of the 21
st
 century and this will even help to understand 
Mbembe’s positionality. These criss serve as testimony to the fact that the 
century inaugurated the crisis of ideology, the crisis of identity, the crisis of 
epistemology and crisis of the political just to name a few. It can be broadly 
stated that Euro-North American thought and knowledge is in crisis today. It has 
even been felt from its body, the empire itself. As such, there is a need for new 
ways of knowing and thinking. Quijano (2007) declares that the critique of 
European modernity is now more urgent than ever. The important question 
pertinent in this era of political existence is whether there are other knowledges 
that can serve humanity better. For Africanists and African intellectuals the 
concern is about how to recover those knowledges that were displaced by means 
of epistemicides of various kinds predated by Euro-North American 
epistemology during its heyday of claiming to be the only universal way of 
knowing. This necessary step is essential to critique Euro-North American 
epistemological imperial superiority in the 21
st
 Century. Decolonial epistemic 
perspective as a form of critical socio-political theory is not fundamentalist. It is 
mobilised to revisit the silences and epistemological violence, epistemicide that 
resulted in the globalisation of Euro-North American knowledge while 
displacing other knowledges.   
Decolonial epistemic perspective suggests that global imperialist designs did not 
dismantle other alternative meeting points and sites of resistance. That is why 
Mignolo (2007a: 155) defines decolonial epistemic perspective as ‘critical 
thoughts emerging in the colonies and ex-colonies’. Decolonial epistemic 
perspective visibilises the underside of modernity—it is the critique of criticism. 
Meaning it criticises the theories that are also critical of modernity, but that are 
within the bounds of modernity like poststructuralism, postmodernism and 
postcolonialism. This is the thought that responds and critiques modernity in its 
mutating form—that is, coloniality as it hides its locus of enunciation by 
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claiming to be objective, totalising and universal. As a particular kind of critical 
thought, it unpacks critical theory and its genealogy of thought and opposes 
fundamentalist position of comparing, measuring, evaluating and judging human 
experiences (Mignolo 2007a). Decolonial epistemic perspective is not a 
theoretical dead-end but the ‘search for other possible knowledges and worlds’ 
(Walsh 2007: 234). This search by the African subject is the one that informs 
subjectivity to counter subjection as it is directed to the African subject. The 
world inhabited by the African subject is a place that is in the receiving end of 
the darker side of modernity. It is then important to explore what this system 
called modernity produces in terms of its darker side. So far, it continues to 
produce weaker governments that produce corruption, authoritarianism and 
disabled history.  
Decolonial epistemic perspective gives account to the lived experiences, and that 
of the African subject. Subjection makes the African subject to be oppressed, 
excluded, marginalised and to be at the receiving end of injustice. According to 
Mignolo (2011b), decolonial epistemic perspective originates from the Third 
World, and it diagnoses and searches for a project of political imagination to give 
new forms of life denied to the African subject that is in the belly of oppression. 
Decolonial epistemic perspective constitutes a different agenda that places itself 
in the darker side of modernity and exposes what modernity hides (Mignolo 
2007a). If modernity is salvation why is it that it creates inequality, injustice, and 
exploitation—the very basis of the ex-colonised death? It is the role of decolonial 
epistemic perspective to reveal a lie embedded in modernity project. Modernity 
creates evils that shackle the African subject, and there is a problem in such a 
world with its postcolonial condition to re-appropriate and reproduce the colonial 
structural tendencies that are embedded in modernity. 
According to Walsh (2007), there is a need for new communities of thought 
embedded in the structural positionality of the African subject—that is, the 
subject that should be understood in terms of its structural positionality being 
oppressed, marginalised and subjugated as it is in the periphery of the Euro-
North American empire. So, decolonial epistemic perspective informs the 
continuous struggles that claim and practice their affinity with the African 
subject, with its existential conditions as a lens. It is a form of a political project 
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that aims to raise the possibility of new and other worlds. Such are those that are 
informed by a form of thought and existence that is decolonial in orientation 
(Walsh 2007).   
Decolonial epistemic perspective is deeply rooted in genealogies of 
understanding coloniality that is the long-standing patterns of power that 
emerged as a result of colonialism and that define social, economic and cultural 
conditions in absence of the colonial administration (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). 
This means coloniality is the result, survival, metamorphosis, continuity and 
maintenance of subjection. So, this makes it necessary for decolonial epistemic 
perspective to be grounded in histories and lived experiences created by 
colonialism and sustained by coloniality and as such, it aims at breaking away 
from coloniality that ratifies subjection. For this to be possible, decolonial 
epistemic perspective in its totality is informed by and entails praxis of a 
different kind: a confrontation of the hidden and cobwebbed deceptions of 
coloniality found in power, knowledge and being. 
Coloniality should not be seen as colonialism, but rather the epoch that survives 
colonialism (Mignolo 2000, 2007a; Escobar 2007; Maldonado-Torres 2007, 
2008a). Coloniality emerges from the contact points or the colonial encounter 
that articulates the modes of operation and appropriation of restructuring the 
world to give the same effect as colonialism did, and make way for subjection to 
be strengthened. Walsh (2007: 229) amplifies this thus, ‘[w]hile colonialism 
ended with independence, coloniality is a model of power that continues’. This 
means it is the encounter and this is seen through its indefinite continuity and 
metamorphosis. For Walsh (2007), coloniality is both a concept and a lived 
reality. Similar to Walsh, Maldonado-Torres (2007) has it that coloniality should 
be understood within the realm of war, conquest, and violence—the conditions of 
misery that always see the ex-colonised at the receiving end. It means that 
coloniality still carries with it the baggage of colonialism, but it seeks to modify 
itself by hiding what it is. This is done by means of naturalising, normalising and 
institutionalising injustices to the subaltern. In other words, it hides its true 
essence, leaving the status quo intact.  According to Maldonado-Torres (2008a) 
coloniality, just like colonialism through the pretension of modernity, radicalises 
and naturalises the ethics of war. 
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Coloniality produced the very antithesis of life with regards to the African 
subject. The form of life lived by the African subject is inherited from the 
technology of subjection that maintains the structures that reproduces it. This 
technology can be the forces that do shape the psychic—that is, the subjectivity 
of the African subject, a particular kind that perpetuates subjection. The African 
subject cannot shape the structures that it did not create. In most cases, the 
African subject emerges from existential structure of being marginalised and 
excluded. The purpose of this is to make the African subject to be incomplete 
and to gravitate towards adaptive existence to the structures keeping the status 
quo of subjection intact. In relation to these structures, there are two options the 
first being to destroy or create the new ones, while the other one that is pervasive 
is to adapt and transform these structures. With regards to the second option, it 
clearly indicates that the African subject cannot imagine the re-making of the 
world outside the structures of subjection.   
There is a need to rethink and even to go beyond thinking not to repeat even to 
the point of exhaustion. There is a dire need to deploy the other ways of seeing. 
Decolonial epistemic perspective ‘provides a framework for debates on 
modernity, globali[s]ation and development; it is not a change in the description 
of events, it is an epistemic change of perspective’ (Escobar 2007). 
Cartographically, Africa is a place for the African subject who suffers from the 
ethic of war of the empire both directly and indirectly; visibly and invisibly; 
overt and covert, and this makes it a place where human beings are dehumanised. 
Africa does not possess a life, but it is landscape of a hellish condition. The 
world in such a situation needs to be understood as a social formation. Ideas and 
people have led to the historical formation and elaboration of the world. The 
social formation of the world should be understood on the basis of a global 
imperialist design that makes coloniality possible today. In other words it should 
be understood in terms of colonial encounters, where ‘othering’ emerges to 
create disorder as if its order—the very basis of modernity. Decolonial epistemic 
perspective highlights the fact that every problem has a cause. It is the very same 
cause that makes this perspective not to get caught in competing imperialisms. 
Africa has been and continues to be a pawn in global systems of power—that is, 
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Africa is still in the belly of coloniality. It is within coloniality that Africa did not 
turn colonialism upside down, but only focused on civil political rights only.  
Firstly, decolonial epistemic perspective is known to be a genealogy of 
resistance. The case of anti-colonial resistance can best understood when 
applying decolonial epistemic perspective to the African experiences. This 
resistance is rooted in the lived experiences of slavery, mercantilism, 
colonialism, apartheid and neoliberalism. Secondly, decolonial epistemic 
perspective refuses to be apologetic to modernity and it works to take full 
account of the darker side of modernity and physics of power embedded in 
coloniality. The European struggles happened outside Africa and in the side of 
modernity not revealing its darker side. The victims who are at the receiving end 
of the darker side of modernity are often blamed for this darker side. This is the 
problem that modernity seeks to hide. What decolonial epistemic perspective 
reveals is what modernity seeks to hide. Finally, the tools of decolonial epistemic 
perspective and its contribution are linked with the African social, political and 
historical experience. This epistemic perspective is timely as there is a struggle to 
understand the African subject. This in simply means that decolonial epistemic 
perspective with regards to the African subject, its subjectivity and subject is to 
understand the meaning of liberation.   
Coloniality of power 
Coloniality of power is articulated by Quijano (2007) who refers to it is a genesis 
of the domination of power, and it is a form of power that constitutes the basis of 
the ruling classes. The constitution of the global order is ‘a global power 
covering the whole planet’ (Quiljano 2007: 168). Colonialism is the imposition 
from outside and imperialism is the articulation of power to create asymmetry. 
As Quijano posits, the colonial structure of power creates forces of social 
domination and discrimination. As such, coloniality of power should be 
understood through the logic of the new global order, and also to account how 
coloniality of power borders on colonial domination and it being the rationality 
of Euro-North American logic of the empire. The formation of the Euro-North 
American empire can be pointed in the logic of the state formation that is linked 
and distinguished by coloniality of power (Quijano 2000). This has created the 
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impression that the world should be brought into totality, for the logic of the 
empire to penetrate and destruct the local imagination and histories. 
Coloniality of power will be used in this study to distill how Mbembe’s political 
thought will be examined in relation to the thematic area of power in the 
postcolony, which is the fourth chapter of this thesis. Coloniality of power 
operates through its snares that make it to be a matrix form of power. Thus, it is a 
form of power that cannot be pointed directly since it hides itself with its effect 
felt as it affects every sphere of social existence and also the lived experience. 
One of the exhibitions of coloniality of power can be traced in the logic of the 
imperative to form and maintain the modern-nation state that came into being 
through the mode of imposition. According to Quijano (2000), coloniality of 
power organised people into the homogeneity of the nation-state, in order to 
effect and exercise authority in all spheres of life. Such an organisation made 
effective the mode of domination and classification, race being the priori as the 
organising principle, including the geographic location that was marked by 
means of the nation state.     
According to this view, coloniality of power carries with it colonialism, but the 
one that tries to wear a humane face, but that is given away by its effects, that are 
inhuman. They are inhuman as coloniality of power is the elaboration of 
colonialism through a modified form, but with structures that perpetuate 
subjection. Coloniality of power is able ‘to impose its colonial dominance over 
all the regions and populations of the planet, incorporating them into its world 
system and its specific model of power’ (Quijano 2000: 540). The logic behind 
coloniality of the power is its directionality of seeking to impose and also having 
the power to define. Such power enables it to singularise the planet in a singular 
mode of universalism where heterogeneity is not that of the local difference, but 
the difference that is only recognised by and within universalism.   
Thus, the multiple forms of splitting and projection that go on between those in 
dominant and those in subordinate positions in the social hierarchy have psychic 
consequences for those ‘below’ that reverberate back onto those ‘above’; the 
split polarities of omnipotent assertion and hostile dependence will tend to mark 
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the form of relations between dominant and subordinate subject (Layton 2008: 
68).  
Therefore, coloniality of power is a model of power that is centred and circulated 
around the idea of race as the organising principle—‘a mental category of 
modernity’ (Quijano 2008: 182). It is through the idea of race where there are 
hierarchies and classifications. This also includes the idea of who belongs and 
who does not—the logic of inclusion and exclusion. The idea of race determines 
how coloniality of power operates, since those who are considered inferior races 
will be at the receiving end of subjection. The idea of race has proven to be 
longstanding and durable and it ‘presupposes the element of coloniality’ 
(Quijano 2008: 181). This is because those who are raced are located in the geo-
stratum of the lacking subject and coloniality of power has the same effect with 
that of colonialism but in a way that is indirectly human. In other words, 
colonialism was overt in its dehumanising project, but coloniality of power 
assumes the covert role, but with the same devastating impact of subjection. 
Subjection is ratified upon the African subject by making it to comply with the 
demands defined and imposed by coloniality of power. It is in this state of affairs 
where subjection of the ‘Other’ is dramatised (Layton 2008).   
Coloniality of power operates through modernity that is a Western paradigm 
founded on tensions between social regulation and social emancipation (Santos 
2007). Emancipation in this sense is the freedom that is a form of a gift, given by 
the oppressor to the oppressed, not to liberate but to create an impression that the 
oppressed are free, while they are not in a genuine sense. There is discrepancy 
between current experiences of the oppressed who are finding themselves in the 
darker side of modernity and the fallacious promises that comes with modernity. 
As Santos (2007) states, modernity spreads globally violating all forms of life on 
the other side of the abyssal line.  
The asymmetry of power is also visible in the level of conversation. According to 
Walsh (2002), the asymmetric process of interaction is visible between the 
relationality of the local level and the global level. Coloniality of power is the 
form of power that entangles and traps. This is a form of subjection in that the 
African subject is singularised to legitimise its otherness on the basis of its 
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subjection. This takes form of a matrix that makes it difficult to point out and 
articulate subjection and normalising it. So, the articulation of social and political 
power inequality and asymmetry should at least be the basis to understand 
coloniality of power (Boiden et al. 2011). This should open the possibility of 
understanding how power is cobwebbed in institutionalised and systematic forms 
that ratify subjection. Colonial of power hides behind the normal existential 
conditions and presents itself as it is normal, whereas it is not as it still 
perpetuates the logic of colonialism in an implicit form that cannot be challenged 
since that is the part of reality.  
Coloniality of power is still a form of domination today even after the colonial 
political order was destroyed (Quijano 2007). Colonialism was explicit in its 
political formation, existence and execution, something that coloniality of power 
seeks to hide, and selling the idea of the new world order that seeks to demonise 
colonialism, but still attached and complicit to it. ‘Coloniality of power has 
proven to be longer lasting than Eurocentred colonialism’ (Quijano 2007: 171). 
The logic of coloniality of power is informed by the imposition of power by the 
strong on the weak, with the empire as the centre of control and the ex-colonised 
in the margins. As Kleinman and Fitz-Henry (2007) state, subjection affects 
those exposed to institutionalised power and structural violence as they are in the 
outskirts of the empire. The empire might be absent as a form of geography and 
discourse, by it is present in the logic through that coloniality of power, with its 
snares composed in a matrix form to conceal itself to make subjection not to be 
accounted for.  
Coloniality of power accounts for the sphere of control by mean of imposing the 
colonial model of domination in the implicit form. It is the systematically and 
structurally linked to the process of elaboration of power. Coloniality of power 
does not open the multiple narratives outside its own canonical hegemony that is 
propagated by modernity. So, in this lens, the world is the creation and the 
property of the empire. The empire is the dominant design of singular modernity 
(universalism) through the process that have ‘shaped and sutured empire, nation 
and globali[s]ation’ (Dube 2002: 197). So, the presentation of modernity reflects 
it as the creation and constitutive part of the empire. Friedman (2002) idea of 
‘symmetrical inversion’ that suggest the emergence and assertion of those at the 
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receiving end of subjection does not account for the asymmetry of relations with 
regards to the African subject and the world.   
Quijano (2008) identifies four elements of structure of power in terms of control 
of labour and its resources and products; control of sex and its resources and 
products; control of authority and its modes of violence; and lastly, control of 
inter-subjectivity and knowledge. For there to be power, there must be control 
and authority. This can be enforced by co-operation, hegemony and violence. All 
four elements of structure of power are directed towards the African subject, and 
affect it in devastating ways. Coloniality of power ‘dismantle[s], simultaneously, 
existing forms of social organi[s]ation and ways of life’ (Mignolo 2007a: 157). 
Power structure is entangled that makes colonial matrices of power to reproduce 
what Grosfoguel (2007: 215) articulates as, the ‘social, economic, political and 
historical conditions of possibility for a subject to assume the arrogance of 
becoming God-like’. Adding to this, Dube (2002: 209) refers to ‘the economy of 
power of the modern nation-state’—that is, that which gave ways to create 
hierarchies and open ways for politics of exclusion and oppression, the very basis 
of subjection.       
Coloniality of power articulates the basis of state formation, since ‘societies are 
power structures’ (Quijano 2008: 205). The independence of Africa did not mean 
the independence of the African subject. This independence was just a gesture of 
giving the Euro-North American subjection a human face, now the brutality 
being executed by the African subjects themselves and also subjection, through 
its structural positionality, being directed to the African subject. Africa in 
particular is informed by Euro-North American liberal discourses that did not 
break Africa from the shackles of colonialism. According to Quijano (2008) 
political independence was prone to make newly found states that were based on 
inheritance and still bound to colonial linkages weak. The African subject is still 
trapped in the snares of colonial matrices of power, since the African subject is 
perceived as incomplete. Coloniality of power is entangled form of power that 
proved to be durable and stable with regards to its colonial character through its 
matrix form (Saldivar 2007). Such a formation presupposes the element of 
coloniality that is hidden in everyday forms of life making subjection invisible, 
and as a result, legitimate.  
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According to Grosfoguel (2007), coloniality of power is the continuity of 
colonial power structures and it is a form of a system of domination in the 
absence of the colonial administration. For Walsh (2002: 79), coloniality of 
power operates ‘[t]hrough strategies of manipulation, co-optation, division, and 
control’. This logic of the dominant apparatus has been that of controlling and 
auguring that coloniality of power will remain intact. It is the restructuring and 
metarmophising of modernity with the aim of maintaining subjection. This is 
made possible also by the logic of patronisation that aims to control by 
converting and integrating the local experiences into the global order (Walsh 
2007). This pacifies the agency of the local experiences that are located in the 
existential realities that are negative to them as the cause of the global power 
designs. As such, the needs and warranties located in the local histories and 
imaginations of the African subject will be abandoned. This then defects the 
whole purpose of the struggle by the African subject against its dehumanisation 
and injustice hidden in matrices of coloniaity of power. 
The local experiences will then have the global design as a site of political 
subjectivity with the imagination of feeling as if such experiences are in the 
centre of the global power designs, but that in any way, put them in marginality. 
So, the whole thing about interconnection and belonging to the global is just a 
myth since coloniality of power keeps the colonial situations in place (Walsh 
2002). So, hierarchisation and classification of the world continues, to effect 
asymmetric power relations. According to Saldivar (2007), coloniality of power 
has the capacity to hegemonies, marginalise and interpellate the African subject 
as minor. For Saldivar, coloniality of power denotes a modern regimen of power. 
This should be understood on the basis that power is about (re)domination. This 
is why the world still remains polarised and such is necessary for the survival of 
the centre of power—the Euro-North American empire. Such reality is kept in 
place to make coloniality of power inevitable and also preventing any form of 
antagonism or revolt against it. Coloniality of power still draws a clear line 
between the privileged and dispossessed, since it is in its nature and origin 
polaristic. Such a global design assumes the ‘contingent and hegemonic 
functions’ (Walsh 2002: 83). Coloniality of power is a perverse form of power in 
that the global order is made artificial, while it is real as it is planned, justified 
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and naturalised (Lander 2002). In its predatory form, it is linked though in a 
covert form, with the myth of civilisation.  
Grosfoguel (2007) adds that coloniality of power produces and maintains 
colonial situations. These are located in the cultural, political, sexual and 
economic oppression or exploitation directly affecting those who are subordinate. 
According to Walsh (2007), the site of existential condition of the African 
constitutes both the political and social realms. This affirms the fact that the 
existential reality and the material conditions of the African subject cannot be 
singularised since this is subject of multitudes, but its singulalisation made by 
coloniality of power. Walsh also adds the fact that coloniality of power has the 
power of othering by means of racialisation and subalternisation being the 
connecting points emanating from the colonial encounter. Dube (2002) confirms 
this by unmsaking the subtle aspects of the colonial othering process by showing 
how the project of power moulds the provisions of progress, shapes and 
constructs histories and imaginations by singularising them under the guardian 
and control of the empire. This creates a situation where pacification of critical 
thinking and critical ways of political life are totalised by coloniality to enable 
coloniality of power to operate with ease.    
Similarly, Santos (2007) argues that the cartography of modernity with its 
abyssal line of thinking should not be messy since it may lead to messy practices. 
The practices are however messy in that ethics are abandoned in the other line of 
the abyssal thinking. So this is the cartography of modernity that does not show 
its darker side. In Santos understanding, the existence and the drawing of the 
abyssal lines are both literal and figurative. Also, for Santos, the co-presence of 
these two abyssal lines of thinking suggests the deeply going impossibility of co-
presence. This lays testimony to the fact that differences are running deeper and 
deeper, and these are the differences that represents the form and content of 
power relations. It is clear that in this state of affairs, power relations are 
asymmetrical. This is the cartography that is the constitutive part of subjection. 
However, further to disabuse the notion of symmetrically at the heart of 
methodologies of equilibrium, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) deploys the notion of a 
myth of decolonisation to suggest that the legacy of colonial power continues 
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through coloniality of power seen through the juridical political decolonisation, 
that is the infamous Africa’s independence that produced postcolonial Africa. As 
Grosfoguel (2007: 219) adds, ‘[t]he heterogeneous and multiple global structures 
put in place over a period of 459 years did not evaporate with the juridical—
political decolonize[s]action of the periphery over the past 50 years (or so)’. The 
colonial matrices of power are still in place and they trap and authorise the mode 
of political, economic, cultural and environmental freedoms in the parts of the 
world that have been colonised. As a result, the residue of colonialism and its 
structures, in the absence of the colonial administrations, remain intact and this 
makes the status quo to remain. The effect of change in the part of the worlds 
formerly decolonised through juridical-political freedoms, remain just cosmetic 
shells of freedom. This means, the period has moved from colonialism to 
coloniality.  
Coloniality of power is the continuity of colonial structures through subjection. It 
is the restructuring and the metarmophosis of colonialism through the amoebic, 
but purposeful structure of modernity with the sole aim of maintaining 
hegemony. Coloniality of power produces what Grosfoguel (2007: 220) refers to 
as ‘colonial situation’, that is: 
Cultural, political, sexual, epistemic and economic oppression/exploitation of 
subordinate raciali[s]ed/ethnic groups by dominant raciali[s]ed/ethnic groups within 
or without the existence of colonial administration (Grosfoguel 2007: 220).  
Coloniality of power as Mignolo (2000) argues is the (re)constitution and (re) 
configuration of the planet and its continental divisions articulated through the 
production of knowledge and the logic of classification. For Mignolo, it is 
important to understand the global designs through that the empire narrates itself 
to control and authorise itself in order to exercise domination, exploitation and 
oppression. Coloniality of power should be understood from the locus of 
enunciation of the ex-colonised, to unravel the asymmetrical power relations that 
give effect to the continued injustices of colonialism. It is through coloniality of 
power where knowledges and local histories are rendered obsolete as they are 
outside the logic of colonaility. When they are outside they are those kinds that 
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are informed by continued resistance to coloniality of power, that in turn 
continue to negate and renders such resistance obsolete.  
It is clear that coloniality of power is a global hegemonic form of power that 
seeks to totalise every sphere of existence and the lived experience. It deprives 
the African subject the capacity to define and articulate its lived experience and 
colonial situation. To really challenge and understand coloniality of power that 
claims invisibility is to unravel the darker side of modernity (Mignolo 2009, 
2011b).  The lived experience of the darker side of modernity is that of ‘colonial 
histories and millenary struggles to confront the social, political, epistemic, 
racialised and existential effects of these histories’ (Walsh 2007: 231).   
Understanding coloniality of power should go beyond the understanding actors, 
but structures that give life to this form of power.  Walsh (2007) calls for power 
structures of the global designs to be interrogated through understanding the 
modes of operation of coloniality as the axis of reflection. This is a form of an 
initiative that produces critical thought that  seeks to understand power structures 
through another mode of critical theory that is outside and the alternative to 
modernity and its—‘ism’(poststructuralism, postmodernism and post 
colonialism). Such structures are the ones that militate against the agency of the 
dominated. The thinking from below is the very basis that seeks to untangle the 
(re)constitution and (re)confirguration of the planet as done by coloniality of 
power.  
Coloniality of knowledge 
The subjectivity of the African subject is important in understanding coloniality 
of knowledge. Mignolo (2009) suggests that the subject position is important in 
terms of understanding subjection. Mignolo further suggest that the knower 
should be questioned rather than the known to understand the very epistemic 
foundation of subjection. This means questioning the very apparatus and the 
locus of enunciation of the knower in relation to the known. For Mignolo, the 
subject is the very basis of maintaining the locus of enunciation. This unveils the 
concealment of the Euro-North American epistemology that suggests the a priori 
of the knower in contrast with the unknower who happens to be the African 
subject. For Mignolo, the subject controls and dictates the rules of knowledge—
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so be it such figure is implicated and there is no objective or detached being from 
knowledge. Adding the African subject in this explanation suggests the 
problematic of the subject that constitutes lack and bears no any form of 
epistemic privilege.  
Coloniality of knowledge will be used in this study to distill how Mbembe’s 
political thought will be examined in relation to the thematic area of the modes of 
self-writing, which is the third chapter of this thesis. Knowledge is always 
situated, and Grosfoguel (2007) articulates the notion of the locus of enunciation. 
In terms of the locus of enunciation what matters is the enunciation, not the 
enunciated. The African subject’s vantage point it is enunciated to understand its 
subjectivity in relation to the subjection that comes into effect through the 
manner in which knowledge is used as an instrument of subjection. For this to be 
framed properly, it is important to state that the locus of enunciation of the 
African subject can be problematic if the subject is geographically located in 
Africa but engages Africa from the loci of the empire. This is what strengthens 
coloniality of knowledge that often hides its locus of enunciation to normalise 
subjection. The locus of enunciation of the African subject thinks with the 
African subject and from the African subject’s subjectivity.  
It is not thinking for the African where ‘theory was still located in the North 
while the subject [or object] are located in the South’ (Grosfoguel 2007: 211). 
The locus of enunciation as Walsh (2002) articulates is about thinking and 
speaking from the geopolitical and historical location. This affirms the 
importance of subjectivity of the African subject, being at the centre of the 
modes of self-understanding. This is informed by colonial difference that guides 
the reflection and offers a lens through that to view the world. The locus of 
enunciation as Walsh (2008: 61) articulates, is also ‘epistemologically 
diagrammed spaces’ that offer a possibility where other knowledges exists—
pluriversality and regimes of truth.  
Coloniality of knowledge should be understood geopolitically. Euro-North 
American global design strategy is informed by binarism and hierachisation that 
keeps the imbalances of power and the colonial legacy intact. These are the very 
forms of epistemic violence that excludes, marginalises, demonises and even 
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eliminates forms of episteme that differ from modernity (Grosfoguel 2007). 
Knowledge distinction has been that global history has an unchanging and 
always in favour of modernity and keeping silence on its darker side. Coloniality 
of knowledge creates mechanistic narratives that are informed by dominant 
tendencies informed by subjection that discards other subjectivities differing 
from its own. As Walsh (2007: 225) points  out,  ‘[t]o speak of the geopolitics of 
knowledge and geopolitical locations of critical thought is to recogni[s]e the 
persistence of a Western hegemony, that positions Eurocentric thought as 
‘universal’, while localising other forms of thought as at best folklore’. 
Coloniality of knowledge originates from epistemic violence and racism that 
dates back 500 centuries ago. To add to this view, Lander (2002: 257) has it that 
coloniality of knowledge ‘legitimi[s]e ongoing practices involving the 
coloni[s]ation of people, culture, and the environment’. This clearly shows the 
multitude of forces involved to make subjection possible in so far as knowledge 
is concerned.  Grosfoguel puts it these simpler historical terms: 
We went from the sixteenth century characteri[s]ation of ‘people without writing’ to 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century characteri[s]ation of ‘people without history’ 
to the twentieth century characteri[s]ation of ‘people without development’ and more 
recently, to the early twenty-first century of ‘people without democracy’ (Grosfoguel 
2007: 214). 
These characterisations are part of the Euro-North America global design 
systems, the forms of characterisation in centuries with regards to coloniality of 
knowledge more especially to the Africa subject. Knowledge has been that of 
Western canonism that is in need of transplants and appendages that reproduce 
such knowledge. The subjectivity of the African subject has been at the margins 
of Western civilisation as the sole purpose of this civilisation was to engage in 
epistemicide. ‘Knowledge-making in the modern/colonial world is at once 
knowledge in that the very concept of “modernity” rests and the judge and 
warrantor of legitimate and sustainable knowledge’ (Mignolo 2009). For 
Mignolo, knowledge-making entrenched modernity with its imperialist purposes 
largely informed by subjection.  
Coloniality of knowledge creates a situation where epistemic members in the 
colonies reproduce information from the empire’s locus of enunciation, in the 
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fashion that Mbembe consciously or unconsciously does. It is in this schema that 
the African subject is reduced to the agent of docility who defines and dictates 
what constitute knowledge and what does not through the subjectivity alien to 
itself. This is done in the hidden locus of enunciation where claims of objectivity 
and detachment from the empire will be advocated, whereas the reverse is true. 
The subjectivity of the African subject rests in a state of lack, void and 
deficiency that justify subjection on the basis of marginality and racialisation. 
The knowledge that comes from the African subject is stigmatised, since the 
subjectivity of such a subject is framed similar to the subject. That is, for that the 
African subject is stigmatised and this makes it to be inferiorised and misplaced. 
According to Mignolo (2009:18), ‘coloniality of knowledge rests in the 
depositor, warrantor, creator and distributor of universal knowledge’. The sole 
purpose of modernity is to serve the interests of empire. As Walsh (2008) states, 
the sites of knowledge that are necessary for other regimes of truth are repressed, 
marginalised, disciplined and destroyed.    
The epistemic decolonial shift that is the movement of the geography of reason 
clearly indicates that knowledge about Africa should be looked through the locus 
of enunciation of Africa not that of the empire—that is, Euro-North American 
imperial global designs that are the constitutive parts of modernity, modernity 
that is also the constitutive part of coloniality, since both cannot survive without 
the ‘Other’. Modernity is informed by the expansionism of Western civilisation 
that is seen as the absolute civilisation that is the only process than other forms of 
civilisations. This goes hand in hand with hegemonic narratives projected as 
absolute to mask the injustices that come with subjection. Such a condescending 
attitude is informed by the logic of coloniality of power that sees other forms of 
knowledge as not being capable of producing knowledge as they are outside the 
bounds of Western modernity (Boidin et al. 2011). So, this means for them to 
constitute knowledge, they must be within Western modernity to qualify as 
knowledge.  
‘Coloniality of knowledge is precisely the affirmation of the zero-point and the 
success in silencing or relegating other epistemologies to a barbarian margins, a 
primitive past’ (Mignolo 2007a: 162). Maldonado-Torres (2004) calls for 
knowledges that are the very antithesis of modernity. Such knowledges of 
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course, are that put the African subject at the centre, and taking cognisance of the 
subjectivity of such a subject to counter subjection. For Maldonado-Torres, these 
are alternative knowledges that find their locus in the cracks of the continent, in 
borders, in the global south, in diaspora, in movements of people as well in death 
and suffering that may face at the violent hands of the defenders of violent states.      
Santos (2007) submits that knowledge is not conceived in abstractions but 
practices and interventions—that is, knowledge is a political project. Knowledge 
is not created, produced and socialised for its own interest sake, but to reach 
particular ends, and with the political project of modernity—to organise the 
world and to ratify subjection of the African subject. As Santos (2007: 37) posits, 
knowledge is ‘[e]mbedded in different Western and non-western cultures, such 
experiences used not only different categories, symbolic universes, and 
aspirations of a better life’. The understanding of coloniality of knowledge 
should be through the lens of understanding the world system that has been 
constructed by hegemonic Eurocentric paradigm for the past 500 years with the 
purpose of domination, exploitation and oppression (Grosfoguel 2007).  
According to Santos (2007), modernity is the epistemic empire with the mutual 
interdependence exhibiting the accomplished manifestation of abyssal thinking. 
This means, modernity promotes monopoly of universal abstraction that is 
embedded in the dichotomy of true and false (Santos 2007). In the darker side of 
modernity lie other forms of truths, that is, in the other line of abyssal thinking. 
The colonised zone of existence is said to constitute beliefs and practices that are 
exotic, marginal and idolatrous in practice—that cannot be considered forms of 
knowledge. So the relegation of other knowledges on the other line of abyssal 
thinking suggests that they are barbarian since they are said to be devoid of 
Western civilisation. As Lander (2002) points out, such relegation amount to 
knowledges of abyssal epistemology being reduced to myths and superstition. 
Abyssal epistemology discredits other forms of knowledge and its 
fundamentalism is hidden behind the codes of objectivity, universality, scientific 
truth with the notions of verifiability, reliability and validity. Lander (2002) 
amplifies this perspective in pointing out that Western knowledge is known as 
scientific knowledge that is embedded in truthfulness, universality and 
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objectivity, while it relegates other forms of knowledge outside the conception of 
knowledge itself.  
Coloniality of knowledge is a form of world and knowledge, and on the opposite 
side of it, there are forms of the worlds and knowledges otherwise, the very 
antithesis of coloniality of knowledge (Escobar 2007). Knowledge creation and 
transformation is a hegemonic project that always responds to actors’ desires and 
needs as well as institutional demands, the very basis that informs and 
strengthens modernity (Mignolo 2007a). It is clear that theorising the African 
subject in spaces within modernity negates the radical content of the critical 
theory that is essential for the subjectivity of the African subject. The likes of 
Antonio Gramsci, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, to name but a few, acquire 
the canonical status to the extent that they are used as theoretical tools to study 
Africa. This form of canon loses sight of the languages and narratives that are 
located in the subaltern location of the world, because they are a form of critical 
thinking located within modernity. This really implies that it is a form of thinking 
that is alien to the lived experience of the African subject, and its knowledge 
bears not much relevance even if the application or duplication is made much to 
fit into the subaltern.  
Also, the African subject runs the risk of reproducing modernity in the subaltern 
by asking questions similar to that of modernity. This really implies that the 
project itself is limiting and self-defeating as far as Africa as a geography of 
reason is concerned.  Africa as the ex-colonised zone, and now a zone of that 
inhibited by the African subject should not be understood as a mere object of 
study, but a geo-political location that has its forms of knowledge and forms of 
regimes of truth that claims no universality by a view of the world that should 
co-exist with others. Such co-existence does not imply being integrated in the 
global design systems, the very sites of epistemic violence and racism, but the 
one that (co-)exists in its own right. In other words, Africa should not be 
understood as a region, but an epistemic space. It is in these epistemic spaces 
where counter-hegemonic discourses exist that question the very basis of 
modernity and its concealment of its darker side. As Escobar 2007) posits, 
epistemology and philosophy include the need to understand subject position to 
assert the construction of meaning to reflect and understand the darker side of 
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modernity. This is what Maldonado-Torres (2004: 30) calls radical diversality 
that refers to ‘a critique of roots that bring into light both coloniality and the 
epistemic potential of non-European epistemes’.  
It is important to understand genealogy of thought in order to understand its 
mode of operation. According to Mignolo (2011a; 2011b) modernity, 
postmodernity and altermodernity have their historical grounding in the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Decoloniality has its historical 
grounding in the Bandung Conference of 1955 in that 29 countries from Asia and 
Africa gathered. According to Mignolo (2011b) postmodernity unlike modernity 
has many fractures or various paths since it is claims to be informed by 
multiplicity, complexity and hybridity. But then, it is important to point out that 
postmodernism is located within a moment of crisis of modernity and it is a 
critique of modernity within modernity.  
Postcolonialism is also trapped within the critique of modernity within 
modernity. Postcolonialims came into being building from the epistemic blocs of 
poststructuralism and postmodernism. Postcolonialism differed with 
poststructuralism and postmodernism in that it articulated the lived experience of 
the Third World, however, just like poststructuralism and postmodernism, it was 
trapped within modernity. So, the ‘posts’ in their modes of critique—that is, 
poststructuralism, postmodernism and post colonialism are not liberatory but 
emancipatory. In other words, they do not overhaul modernity and its continued 
structure, coloniality—but then, the interest is just to reform the very basis and 
rationality of epistemic violence  embedded in modernity. This as a result, keeps 
epistemic racism and violence intact since these—‘posts’ and ‘isms’ are critiques 
of modernity within modernity. Epistemic racism and violence is so pervasive 
that even critical theory fails to take into account the naturalisation, 
intransigence, complicity and blindness of the long standing effects of coloniality 
that by origin and character can be traced from colonialism itself (Walsh 2007).      
According to Quijano (2008: 189), modernity diluted and dominated all forms of 
culture, human life, spirituality, ‘especially knowledge and the production of 
knowledge under its hegemony’. The logic behind this was to make sure that the 
dominated do become appendages of modernity. This means that by reproducing 
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and appropriating modernity as if it is their own. It is clear that this has the 
devastating impact of creating in self-deception of the colonised. Such is true in 
the fact that the colonised are alienated from modernity, even if they can claim to 
its agents, they are mere appendages. Modernity is exclusively European and the 
expansionist project of modernity claimed to redeem the primitive, barbaric, 
dark, dirty, oversexed, inferior past of the colonised. Mudimbe (1988) amplifies 
to say that African subjects are ‘viewed as primitive, simple, childish and 
nonsensical’. ‘The mythical portrait of the coloni[s]ed therefore includes an 
unbearable laziness, and, that of the coloni[s]err, a virtuous state for action’ 
(Mimi 1965: 80). This deception is a greater charm as it was able to make most 
blacks to turn them from savagery into being, the charm that gained the status of 
irrefutable truth. It is the dominated who suffer from the ontological crisis that is 
created and sustained by modernity in the colonies. This is epistemic violence 
that is devastating and over-lasting (Quijano 2008).  
The status of poststructuralism, postmodernism and post colonialism has been 
that of Western canonism, the very strength of modernity. The use of Western 
canonism in the name of poststructuralism, postmodernism and post colonialism 
are indeed radical, but their radicalism is the one with epistemic limits since it is 
the critique of modernity within modernity. Their use as theoretical intervention 
in application to Africa poses some epistemic problems on the basis that it is a 
theoretical apparatus that negates radicalism and agency of the forms of 
knowledges that have been silences and marginalise by modernity. There should 
be instead, the co-existence of knowledges where different epistemologies will 
exist. Knowledge in the margins of modernity is still knowledge and the 
Eurocentric modernity always regards knowledge as that which circulates in the 
hegemonic discourses.   
The perspective of modernity in relation to knowledge gives the impression that 
knowledge is hegemonic, colonising and overcoming (Quijano 2008). Other non-
European knowledges are not regarded as knowledge as they are not sharing the 
same epistemic lens and geography of reason with that of modernity.  Modernity 
(re)produces itself as a culture and history, also to add, a reality. Coloniality of 
power constitutes modernity in its Eurocentric origin and character. As Quijano 
(2008) states, modernity as the agent of epistemic violence and epistemic racism, 
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it naturalises itself through the lived experience of the colonised from those who 
find themselves in the logic of power. 
According to Walsh (2007), coloniality of knowledge renders invisible and 
subaltern other forms of knowledge in a form of subjection that is systematic and 
continuous. The problem is not the epistemic frames but the manner in which 
they have ‘historically worked, to subordinate and negate “other” frames, “other” 
knowledge, “other” subjects and thinkers’ (Walsh 2007: 224). The problem when 
criticising coloniality is the epistemic trap of reproducing meta-narratives of 
coloniality—while ignoring the local knowledges and historical imaginations. As 
Walsh (2007: 224), states, this does not ‘depart from modernity alone but also 
from the long hori[s]on of coloniality’.  
Coloniality of knowledge gains much ground as it considers other epistemologies 
outside modernity as inferior. The epistemology of the West has been cemented 
by the power to define—the very basis of its domination and its conception of the 
world (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). According to Santos (2007), modern ways of 
Western thinking treats other knowledge ecologies as abyssal. The abyssal 
thinking is the system of visible and invisible distinctions consisting of 
exclusion, degration, exploitation, and dehumanisation of the African subject. 
According to Santos (2007: 3) ‘[t]he exclusionary character of this monopoly is 
at the core of the modern epistemological dispute between scientific and non-
scientific forms of truth’. This means the epistemic status of the knowledge on 
the other side of modernity—the other line of abyssal thinking are indeed non-
authoritative knowledge and are at worse, labelled as things that are outside 
knowledge. It is clear that knowledge is what only mimics modernity, or its 
transplant. What modernity requires qualifying other knowledge outside 
modernity is that modernity is ‘the same abyssal cartography [that is] is 
constitutive of modern knowledge’ (Santos 2007: 8).  
Maldonado-Torres (2004: 51) calls for ‘radical diversality’ that refers to the 
‘effective discourse and critique of the roots of a decoloni[s]ed and non-racist 
geopolitics of knowledge. Radical diversality is a genealogical approach 
informed by the purpose of uprooting modernity. Radical diversality is at the 
core of the African subject subjectivity that is not concerned about symptoms of 
76 
 
the phenomena, but its technologies of subjection. It is also a form of learning 
from the silenced and marginalised discourses that were rendered invisible and 
impotent by modernity. The rationale behind radical diversality is why other 
epistemes are rendered barbarian and not a form of knowledge.  
There is need for the forms of knowledge that is criticism of modernity outside 
modernity in the form of meta-criticisms. These are geo-politics of knowledge 
that responds and confronts the empire from the ex-colonised zone (Quijano 
2008). This will bring to light the darker side of modernity that is hidden in 
coloniality of knowledge. Modernity consists of colloralies that are the 
constitutive part of the Eurocentric hegemony that then implicates modernity as 
the part of modernist enterprise (Escobar 2007). The canonism of modernity 
within modernity corresponds exactly with the power of modernity to silence, or 
to render invisible knowledge and subjects that are critical of modernity, more 
especially its darker side. So this means, if knowledge of the ex-colonised is 
declared non-existent, so to the modes of existence of the ex-colonised. As 
Boidin et al. (2011) state, this is a marginal pursuit of knowledge that is informed 
by agency and consciousness. Such epistemic sites are necessary to open way for 
de-colonial criticism that is necessary as it exposes the darker side of modernity. 
The ex-colonised experience is a necessary centre for critical thinking and action.  
Coloniality of being 
The third pillar of decolonial epistemic perspective, namely coloniality of being 
was conceptualised by Maldonado-Torres (2007) tracing its genealogy from the 
link between ontology and power, and also the link between being and colonial 
history. Maldonado-Torres (2007) also adds that coloniality of being is also 
linked with the understanding of coloniality of power and also in addition to it 
coloniality of knowledge. That is to say, coloniality of power plus coloniality of 
knowledge is equals to coloniality of being. Maldonado-Torres offers the 
explanation that the concept of being in terms of the articulation of power, 
coloniality, came from the relationship between power and knowledge that are 
the constitutive parts of modernity. Coloniality of being emerged as Maldonado-
Torres (2004) points out from the reflections of modernity/coloniality and the 
conception of the modern and colonial world.  
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Coloniality of being will be used in this study to distill how Mbembe’s political 
thought will be examined in relation to the thematic area of the politics of 
violence, which will be the fifth chapter of this thesis. The question of coloniality 
of being in this perspective can only be understood on the basis of exploration 
and the discursive interventions that questions power relations and the logic and 
the configuration of the world. Also in addition to understand the structural 
positionality of the African subject in that process of subjection. The notion of 
being is that of racial invention where the notion of race is used as the organising 
principle through the combination of power and knowledge, the very constitutive 
parts of subjection. These were the arsenals used to create the Other, the Other of 
Europe, the aberration of the norm, the non-being whom there will be no penalty 
or justice is such a human figure is dehuminised.  
This is what makes African subject to be the damne or ‘wretched’ or the 
condemned of the earth who are rendered otherwise, as they are indeed the other 
(Maldonado-Torres 2004). The damned of the earth are those who are excluded 
and they are considered the aberration from the norm. In this form, they are 
found in the outskirts and wastelands of the empire, the geography that is seen as 
devoid of any content of being and notion can come out of it. In this logic of 
modernity, there is what Maldonado-Torres (2004) refers to as ‘forgetfulness of 
coloniality’, that is simply that, modernity tends to forget that it is the sole 
creator of the damned of the earth who are trapped in structural violence. The 
damned of the earth also exists in the condition that are designed, maintained and 
decorated by the configuration of power—that is, the colonial matrix of power.  
Coloniality of being in relation to the African subject means that this subject is a 
non-being—an ontologically void subject. ‘Coloniality of [b]eking suggests that 
[b]eking in some way militates against one’s own existence’ (Maldonado-Torres 
2004: 43). The fundamental point is that the structural positionality of the 
African subject is that of being racialised, implicated, criminalised and 
persecuted. The African subject is the aberration from the norm and for it to be 
dealt with it has to be eliminated and excluded in the anti-black world. The 
stereotypes that inform the invention of African subject are still alive to the state 
of attaining some form of conical truth that then put the majority of blacks in 
their own place—exclusion and marginalisation of the hellish conditions.    
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People who are subject to the most profound human experiences—suffering 
massive violence and incomprehensible cruelty, the routine degradation of 
poverty and despair, the terrors of madness and life-threatening disease or even 
facing the impossible dilemmas of providing care, whether surrounded by the 
highest technologies into remote abstractions, discursive forms, or subject 
positions (Biel et al. 2007: 13).  
The logic of the African subject being the damned and condemned of the earth is 
specific in so far as the lived experience of the African subject is concerned. It is 
in this condition that the African subject is dispossessed of ontology, and this 
creates an object where the raw power of subjection is justified. The African 
subject experience is tied with these forms of dehumanisation that relegate it to 
the hellish zone of non-being; hence the impossibility of the African subject 
articulating its own lived experience in terms of what has made it hellish in the 
practice of everyday life. The everyday life of the African subject is that which 
has lot of demands in that its state of damnation cannot be fixed by mere 
reconciliatory gestures or political treaties. The living of the African subject 
damned of the earth, is itself that which constitutes political demands. The 
political demands of the African subject are difficult to compensate, and for that 
to be such a reality there should be destruction of the universal, the very 
impossibility that can only bring blacks to the state of being human. 
The African subject can become human by the very basis of destructing 
coloniality of their own being. Coloniality of being carries with it the logic of 
violence that creates pathologies, the very things that make sure that the African 
subject is the sole target of industrial complex of subjection. So in this logic, 
being is associated with the empire is seen as the mode of survival for the 
African subject (Maldonado-Torres 2004). The African subject even if it can 
receive patronage from the empire, it is still trapped in the hellish world, and it is 
in this logic that coloniality of being can be understood in its perversity and 
excess of subjection. What is essential to point out is the fact that the existence of 
the African subject is that of uncertainty.  
According to Maldonado-Torres (2004: 41) ‘[b]eing and [e]mpire are closely 
linked in that they are limiting, rather than limited. They give ontological and 
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geographical expression to the imperatives for expansion, power and control’. 
Coloniality of being is centred on the idea of race, with the African subject being 
racialised of course, that then determines the nature of space and time. Human 
differences and structures of power create difference that is exhibited through 
inequality and the hypocrisy of utopia propagated by the empire that by any 
means, excludes the African subject in actual terms. This hypocrisy of modernity 
that has gained a conical status in the contemporary life is founded on the 
trinitarian slogan of liberty, equality and fraternity. The promises in this slogan 
go hand in hand with the racialisation, exploitation and elimination of races that 
are dehumanised by the empire—that is, the industrial complex of subjection at 
best.   
Modernity hides damnation—that is, its darker side from the view informs its 
redeeming practices that are a worse form of hypocrisy. The empire with its 
narrative of Western civilisation is violence for the fact that it is armed with what 
Maldonado-Torres (2004: 43) calls ‘the logics of domination’ to organise the 
world around the idea of race. Coloniality of being means the African subject 
who is constructed by the empire. Coloniality of being is not only the extra-
ordinary event of violence, the manner in which modernity continues as part and 
parcel of geo-political and body-political history (Maldonado-Torres 2004). In 
short, modernity, that is essentially subjection, is the constructor of the lived 
experience of the colonised. As Maldonado-Torres 2004: 44) argues, ‘coloniality 
of [b]eing could become one possible way to theori[s]e the basic fundamentals of 
the pathologies of imperial power and the persistence of coloniality’.  
Death is part and parcel of the colonised beings as modernity is the non-ethics of 
war. Power relations and effects on human condition in society are features by 
colonial reality and the racist crimes that are the living legacy. The death of the 
African subject is part and parcel of human life, the life that is dehumanised in its 
form. The forms of lives that are assumed by African subjects are structurally a 
form of death since the death of an object cannot be accounted for. Thus, death is 
the ordinary life that is seen as normal because it is the death of the subject that 
constitutes lack, void and deficiency. The ordinary life explains itself through the 
chasm of coloniality (Maldonado-Torres 2004). The modernist project, through 
its darker side is anti-ethical to the worst extent as ethics do not apply when 
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coloniality systematically directs itself with the African subject. Coloniality of 
being is informed by both deception and self-deception. The lived experience of 
the African subject finds itself within self-imposed veil that generated the 
misrecognition of humanity, fomented self-deception, and legitimated 
colonisation (Maldonado-Torres 2004).  In amplification, Césaire (1972) puts the 
state of equation which means that 'colonisation = thingification'.  
It is in this context of the said thingification Maldonado-Torres (2007) shows that 
coloniality of being cannot be fully understood without paying attention without 
it being a form of realm of war, conquest, genocide, lynching that have been the 
embodiment of the lived experience of the African subject. The genocidal 
attitudes that were to render the African subject its victim are turned into 
objecthood in need of subjection as the African subject is devoid of ontology. 
Coloniality of being as an ontological dynamic is informed and rationalised by 
the violent and genocidal attitudes of seeking to obliterate and dehumanise 
blackness in the face of the anti-black world. This was perceived as just and 
proper since the darker side of modernity outplayed itself in the colonies. As 
Maldonado-Torres states, the code that exists in the empire is not applied as in 
the case of the colonies. Basic conditions for human life to do not apply, and the 
modernist project, that is violence par excellence, justifies this as necessary 
under the pretension that they are creating a just world.  
Similarly, Mignolo (2009) argues that body politics are politics articulated by 
those considered humans. They are the politics of the darker side of modernity. 
The African subject is regarded as alien, not human, and this makes the lived 
experience to be centred on agency and continued struggle to be located in the 
loci of politics of emergent. The African subject wants to realise humanity and 
such humanity is not in its existential plane is not the same with that of 
modernity and its myth of Trinitarian slogan. As Mignolo (2009) has it, they are 
resisting the arrogance of modernity that decides to label non-human and to 
dehumanise people it dislikes. Maldonado-Torres (2007) argues that coloniality 
of being cannot be understood without seeing non-ethics of war regulate actions 
of the colonisers. Exception to ethics come into being and become a norm from 
colonialism that has been superseded by coloniality. In the logic of modernity 
ethics are suspended or dislocated in favour of the advocacy of war that is the 
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hellish disaster and a worst form of dehumanisation. As Maldonado-Torres 
(2008a: xii) puts it, naturali’[s]ation of human difference brings difference in the 
articulation of ethics and gives a form of justification to the ‘production of hell 
and zone of non-being’.  
In other words, non-ethics of war become transformed and normalised. The code 
of conduct is altered to justify slavery, constitutive of colonised and even their 
dehumanisation. The non-ethics of war as Maldonado-Torres states regulate the 
actions of the colonisers, but such regulation is that of imposition and not of 
deterrence. This is because the non-ethics of war are directed towards the black 
body, the body that implies a scandal as it is always suspected and can be 
dehumanised at will in this anti-black world. Non-ethics of war are a constituent 
part of coloniality of being and they are armed with a huge load of both direct 
and indirect violence. They are in this form, targeted towards the non-being that 
cannot be accounted for, in the sense, non-ethics of war are a direct political 
project with the advocacy to eliminate the non-being and if there is no 
elimination, the purpose is to render the existential condition a hellish zone of 
non-being. Non-ethics of war justified slavery, constitutive of the blacks who are 
not only the non-wage products, but those outside the grammar of things human, 
the very basis of their dehumanisation. The African subject in the eyes of 
coloniality of being symbolises people as property because they are devoid of 
ontology, they are mere objects. They can be killed, enslaved, jailed, humiliated, 
and lynched with impunity. The life of the African subject is nearest to death and 
also, a hellish existence.  
To be sure those who suffer the consequences of such a system are primarily Blacks 
and indigenous people, as well as all of those who appear as colo[u]red. In short, this 
system of symbolic representations, the material conditions that occur therein, that 
are also at the same time derivative and constitutive of such a context, are part of a 
process that naturali[s]es the non-ethics of war. The sub-ontological difference is the 
result of such naturali[s]ation (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 256).   
Conquest and colonisation were centred on the issue of race (Maldonado-Torres 
2007). The problematic of coloniality of being as a starting point should be the 
issue of the colour line (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). This can be attributed to the 
fact that coloniality of being is the paradigm of war that is informed by non-
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ethics of war (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). It is clear from Maldonado-Torres 
thinking that in the world of war and violence, ethics are at stake. The world has 
been trapped in the logic of a death world for the African subject since it cannot 
claim injustices due to its lack, void and deficiency at the subject level. This 
world is the empire that turns excessive violence against the African subject in a 
direct form through the industrial complex of subjection. The non-ethics of war 
have assumed a legitimated form of political life, the life that excludes the 
African subject in that war is declared against it. This is made possible through 
the nature and the logic of structural violence with its crude ability to make the 
abnormal normal. This is the form of violence that is selective and exclusively 
directed towards the African subject due to its sense of objecthood. Maldonado-
Torres (2008a: 240) argues that ‘[i]n modernity, this fundamentally anti-ethical 
genocidal modality has become naturali[s]ed through racism of various kinds’.  
Coloniality of being means nearness or always walking next to the shadow of 
death since it is, through its paradigm of war—homicidal and genocidal through 
its modalities of violence. The propagation that modernity is a civilising mission 
aiming to save the barbarians from their own fatalistic forms of political life that 
are in the dark made it to a regime of truth and redemption. The deception of 
modernity was not seen, that should be understood on the basis of tracing and 
accounting from the deception of modernity by revealing its darker side. The 
darker side of modernity is the exhibition of the project of racialisation in its 
dehumanising form (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). Modernity is not the civilisation 
of inclusion as it projects, but that of exclusion and dehumanisation as it denies 
the basis of co-existence of beings. The existential condition of the African 
subject is ‘tragedy, death and sadness’ (Fischer 2007: 427).  
As Maldonado-Torres (2008a) states, for coloniality of being to succeed, the 
formative of the anti-black world should come into being in a forms of identified 
agent, that is, racialisation of black bodies that are non-existential in the 
ontological sense. It is in this world where there is, as Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 
240) puts it, ‘unethical excess of signification’ to give way to the world of what 
he also calls ‘community of masters’. The notion of community of masters 
valorises ethics of power needed to maintain the pathos of domination and self-
control that keep the structure of coloniality of being intact (Maldonado-Torres 
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2008a). This means, the notion of community of masters is the master morality 
that is constitutive of modernity, from its beginning, its changing faces and to the 
present. The code of conduct of the community of masters has been the same and 
that is, being ‘complicit with the paradigm of violence and war’ (Maldonado-
Torres 2008a: 53). The logic of conquest and domination more so towards the 
black bodies and to create the anti-black world is seen as necessarily justifiable 
since the civilisation mission as stated before, is necessary for the barbarians. 
The interests of civilisation was and is only benefiting the community of masters, 
and the very opposite of what they claim to serve.   
It is the forgetfulness of coloniality that sees modernity as only a redemptive 
discourse and the rescuing mission infirmed by good will to make a difference to 
the lives of the damned of the colonised. Coloniality forgets that when it kick-
starts its operation it attacks the African subject, and in doing so, the mission is 
to make it docile and even to dehumanise it to keep the project of modernity 
going. As Maldonado-Torres (2004) states, coloniality of being also find 
themselves in the plane of excess of being where violence  and genocidal 
tendencies find prominence. Coloniality of being calls to the attention to look 
seriously into the devastation caused against the body of the African subject and 
also the continued acts of oppression, where racism is manifest.  
Coloniality of being shows that racism is both ontological and epistemic, and its 
singular purpose is to render black inferior and maintain privilege enunciatively. 
Coloniality of being points out then that inferiorising and assimilating the 
African subject to the point of docility is a priori. Coloniality of being is 
concerned with the lived experience of those who suffer from subjection 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007). Maldonado-Torres thoroughly deploys the thought of 
Frantz Fanon through existential phenomenology to account for the 
understanding of the lived experience of the African subject. That is, Fanon is 
applied for the purpose of ‘thinking ontology in the light of coloniality and the 
search for decoloni[s]ation’ (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 242). It is clear that the 
locus of enunciation of coloniality of being is both phenomenological and 
existential. Both are the very basic tools to understand the subjection of the 
African subject who happen to find him or herself in the world that is the 
antithesis of its being and existence—the anti-black world. The idea of race in 
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modernity reaches the pathological point of naturalising the non-ethics of war. 
‘[T]he colonial side of [b]eing sustains the colo[u]r line’ (Maldonado-Torres 
2007: 251).     
Abyssal thinking presents that impossibility of meeting points and co-presence of 
the two sides of the line. Beyond abyssal thinking there is, as Santos (2007: 2) 
states, ‘non-existence, invisibility, non-dialectic absence’ that really apply to 
Africa, a place that habits the human life that is dehumanised. According to 
Santos, non-existence means not existing in any relevant or comprehensible way 
of being. Whatever is produced as non-existent is radically excluded because it 
lies beyond the realm of what the accepted conception of inclusion considered to 
be its ‘Other’. As Maldonado-Torres (2007: 253) puts it, ‘[t]he absence of 
rationality is articulated in modernity with the idea of the absence of being in 
others. Misanthropic scepticism and racism work together with ontological 
exclusion’.  
Acccording to Maldonado-Torres (2007) coloniality of being appears in 
historical projects of modernity that represent the face of civilisation with the 
sole interest of advancing the imperialist project, without any consideration of 
the lived experience of those who have a different outlook than that of the 
empire. The idea of race is seen as a priori and it is a starting point of the project 
of coloniality in general and coloniality of being  in particular is directional as 
race as a point of departure. Ontological differences are produced with the basis 
of ‘Othering’ the colonised through the fundamental existential characterisation 
and symbolic realities, which turn to materialistic conditions that define social 
existence along the racial lines.   
It is clear from Mignolo (2011b) that the anti-black world cannot listen to the 
complaints of the African subject. The demands of the African subject are 
impossible to meet since blackness is denied justice due to its non-belonging. 
The existential experience of the African subject is unique since they the African 
subject is the racialised individual who have his or her existence being always 
questioned. In the world characterised by subjection of the African subject, the 
existential experience is considered not important since it is the experience of the 
object. Coloniality of being means that the being of the African subject is a being 
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of an object that does not have agency and existence. Santos (2007) argues that 
non-existence manes not existing in any relevant or comprehensible way of 
being. Whatever is produced as non-existence is radically excluded because it 
lies beyond the realm of what the accepted conception of inclusion considers its 
other.  
Coloniality of being is about the lived experience of the African subject, and for 
coloniality of being to be engaged, there should be agency and consciousness. 
According to Maldonado-Torres (2004) there is a need for critical accounting of 
the Euro-North American typology of being—not being in the world imposed by 
modernity that renders being into non-being. The revoking of the being is 
necessary to affirm presence, that is possible through ontological existence for 
the African subject, not object. The African subject should be a subject infused 
with ontology and lived experience surrounded by a continued struggle for 
liberation.  
Towards de-colonial turn  
From coloniality of power, knowledge and being as constitutive parts of 
modernity and also as a rallying point of critique, it is important to introduce the 
synthetical moment of decoloniality that is coined as de-colonial turn. This is to 
foreground the fact that the African subject’s subjectivity is de-colonial turn and 
to affirm the positionality of the ways of thinking and doing that get rid of 
coloniality. De-colonial turn refers to a process and undertaking of ‘producing a 
radical and alternative knowledge’ (Grosfoguel 2007: 211).  
De-colonial turn will be used in this study to distill how Mbembe’s political 
thought will be examined in relation to the thematic areas the political thought of 
Frantz Fanon and also the idea of South Africa, which form part the sixth and 
seventh chapter of this thesis respectively. De-colonial turn is located at border 
thinking and delinking, meaning that they are not part of modernity and they are 
not criticisms of modernity within modernity, but outside it to expose its darker 
side. Hardt and Negri (2009) claim that: ‘[t]o understand modernity, we have to 
stop assuming that domination and resistance are external to each other, casting 
antimodernity to the outside, and recogni[s]e that resistances mark differences 
that are within’. It seems then that antimodernity is not a decolonial project as 
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Hardt and Negri fault that decoloniality is antimodernity. Decoloniality on the 
contrary is on the outside of modernity, it is not within and it engages the darker 
side of modernity. Modernity form the standpoint of decoloniality is not seen 
only as power relations and the unfinished project as the perspective of Hardt and 
Negri suggest—modernity is the constitutive part of coloniality. Modernity qua 
antimodernity is a mere reformist agenda and in this shape it has the capacity to 
arrest resistance and contain within.  
Decolonial epistemic perspective is a ‘pluriversal epistemology of the future; an 
epistemology that delinks from the tyranny of abstract universals’ (Mignolo 
2007a: 159). The location of looking at the world should be rounded in localised 
experiences. It is the epistemological breaking ground should not be mediated, 
but the one informed by the lived experiences of the subject emergent who are 
opening up the new vistas of knowledges and the modes of understanding worlds 
around them outside the totalising project of modernity. According to Walsh 
(2007: 226), ‘Western thinking must be confronted and a different thought 
constructed and positioned from “Other” histories and subjectivities’. Decolonial 
horisons are necessary to be imagined and engaged so to create a path leading to 
decolonisation. Decolonisation is the action that aims to undo the complex 
colonial matrices of power. Exploitation, domination, colonialism and genocide 
among others, require another form of politics that are anti-politics. This means, 
politics that are outside the realm of institutionalised politics informed by the 
experiences of the people and they are informed by the resistance tradition as 
they challenge subjection of coloniality that is part of the violence that rewards, 
disciplines and punishes.  
Anti-politics are anti-hegemonic politics of struggle against structural violence 
that is unethical. They are politics of the critical discourse that form political 
intervention since politics are informed by discourse—but then, the discourse not 
that of modernity. The starting point of this discourse is that the empire through 
the colonial encounter is the very cause of the colonial condition. Decoloniality 
rather than postcoloniality is the heart of delinking. This is what Maldonado-
Torres has to say: 
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Decolonisation itself, the whole discourses around it, is a gift itself, an invitation to 
engage in dialogue. For decoloni[s]ation, concepts need to be conceived as 
invitations to dialogue and not as impositions. They are expressions of the 
availability of the subject to engage in dialogue and the desire for exchange 
Decolonisation in this respect aspires to break with monologic modernity. 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007: 261). 
The genealogy of de-colonial turn can be traced to array of thinkers of liberation 
like Aimé Cesairé, Amilcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara, Steve Biko, Frantz Fanon 
to name but a few who confronted coloniality and its principal apparatus and its 
management, as well as its maintained ossification. De-colonial turn is a 
particular manifestation of scepticism towards coloniality that seeks to re-
introduce the new conception of the world to bring accounting to historical and 
contemporary injustices (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). At the centre of de-colonial 
turn is the subjectivity of the African subject, the subjectivity that is combative in 
nature as it is directed towards subjection. For Maldonado-Torres, the roots of 
de-colonial turn are critical responses to racism and colonisation as articulated by 
racialised and colonised subjects.  
The de-colonial turn highlights the epistemic relevance of the enslaved and 
coloni[s]ed subjectivities into the realm of thought at previously unknown 
institutional levels. It introduces questions about the effects of coloni[s]ation in 
modern subjectivities and modern forms of life as well as contributions of 
raciali[s]ed and coloni[s]ed subjectivities to the production of knowledge and critical 
thinking (Maldonado-Torres 2008a: 8).  
As Walsh (2007) points out, the absence of colonial experience does not allow 
any articulation of such an experience and neither there will be any form of 
agency. This also includes the impossibility of being located in any epistemic 
location of colonial difference. Such a form of agency and articulation of thought 
is ignored and at best, also suppressed since it is not a critique of coloniality 
within coloniality, but a critique of coloniality outside coloniality itself. De-
colonial turn advocates new ethics of humanity and recourse that are directly 
pointed towards the bankruptcy and hypocrisy of the empire that is scandalised 
by its tendency of being unethical and negating the humanity of the African 
subject. De-colonial turn in emphasis is about constant search for humanity, and 
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in this instance, the humanity of the African subject. Phenomenologically it is 
about giving a new philosophical basis of confronting coloniality and searching 
for truth to realise liberation (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). This attacks the very 
basis of the crisis of modern Euro-North American imperial condition. De-
colonial turn is informed by the principled stance of dismantling social injustices, 
pushing for radical transformation, and the construction of the new society in that 
there will be the self in the African subject.   
De-colonial turn aims to expose modernity and its Euro-North American 
hypocrisy.  According to Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 5), ‘[d]ecolonial theory and 
praxis do not emerge from “wonder” in face of a strange world, but out of 
scandal and horror in face of the “death world” of coloniality’. This is found in 
condition of ‘hell’ that is the world the condemned and excluded find themselves 
and they are made to live in that world by means of structural violence. The 
African subject is the existential element in de-colonial turn. It is in such living 
condition that it is robbed of its existence through dehumanisation.  
The [coloniser] proves that coloni[s]ation… dehumani[s]es even the most civili[s]ed 
man (sic), that colonial activity, colonial enterprise, colonial conquest, that is based 
on contempt for the native and justified by that contempt, inevitably tends to change 
him (sic) who undertakes it; that the coloni[s]err, who in order to ease his (sic) 
conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man (sic) as an animal, accustoms 
himself (sic) into an animal (Césaire 1972: 41). 
The African subject is turned into a being who has no claim to value, even 
essence. De-colonial turn means conceptualising and theorising beyond 
modernist lenses (Maldonado-Torres 2007). For Walsh (2007), theory is a tool of 
struggle in that the representation of thought is informed by perspectives from 
the subaltern. It is in this condition where attention is placed on structures of 
social reality and theories seeking to understand such reality. As Walsh argues, 
such realities are political and de-colonial in character opening up spaces that are 
offering decolonial possibilities.  
According to Maldonado-Torres (2007: 262), ‘[d]e-colonial turn involves 
interventions at the level of power, knowledge, and being through varied actions 
of decoloni[s]ation’. De-colonial turn ensures that the experience of the African 
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subject—that of being enslaved, colonised and oppressed is combated by 
injecting subjectivity infused with consciousness through critical thinking and 
subject formation. De-colonial turn is the important site of creating a new world 
based on the new imaginaries of gender, nature/environment, new economy, 
political and cultural sites of existence. For this to be possible there is a need for 
a clear and renewed subject position to assert the construction of meaning of the 
world. Quijano (2008) argues that de-colonial turn is the struggle against 
exploitation and dehumanisation. It is a destruction of coloniality of power, 
coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being. It is not a matter of putting an 
end to modernity, but to render it impotent after its destruction in the face of the 
oppressed world.  According to Walsh (2007: 233), the aim of de-colonial turn is 
‘to build new critical communities of thought, interpretation and intervention’.   
De-colonial turn opposes paradigm of war that is constitutive part of 
modernity—the paradigm that has made the social formation of the world 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007). According to this perspective, modernity is the 
scandal of war, death and dehumanisation hiding behind redemptive and 
salvationistic tendencies. Political and epistemic intervention as Maldonado-
Torres argues should come from the condemned of the earth. De-colonial turn 
exposes the darker side of modernity, and also brings into being decoloniality. It 
introduces forms of de-linking that Maldonado-Torres (2004) regards as a radical 
dislocation of Europe and its roots.  
As Mignolo (2011b) makes clear, decoloniality from the Third World is a 
necessary thought to rethink, re-create and re-constitute Africa. Mignolo (2011b) 
posits that decoloniality presents itself always as an option and opens up a way of 
thinking that delinks from the chronologies of new epistemologies of new 
epistemes or new paradigms. Grosfoguel (2007) amplifies this view by pointing 
out that there is a need to read and write Africa outside poststructuralist, 
postmodernist and postcolonialist Western canons—but think, read and write 
Africa from a decolonial critique that is outside modernity.  According to 
Mignolo (2007b), de-linking is about theorising and engaging the global imperial 
designs out of the fringes and also criticising and articulating knowledge outside 
modernity. It means challenging the hegemonic and dominant forms of 
knowledge with specific reference to economy, politics, culture to name but a 
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few. It means moving in a different direction outside of the global imperialist 
design. 
‘By presenting itself as an option, decolonial critique opens up a way of thinking 
that delinks from the chronologies of new epistemologies or new paradigms’ 
(Mignolo 2011c: 273-374). Delinking as Mignolo articulates it, means not 
accepting the conditions imposed upon the oppressed self and the option of 
delinking opens the option of decolonisation. For this to happen, the critique of 
modernity should be outside modernity. For delinking to be possible, there 
should be epistemic disobedience (Mignolo 2011c). Delinking means politics of 
interruption in the sense that coloniality does not what to be interrupted, but 
needs a mild criticism, that is criticising modernity within modernity that is a 
scandal. As Maldonado (2007) captures it, opposition to scandal is the very 
process of delinking. For delinking to be possible, there should be 
epistemological disobedience. Modernity constitutes epistemological canonism 
that totalises the regime of truth and then projecting itself as the sole truth—that 
is, epistemological canonism that cannot be questioned due to the myth of 
modernity as universality. 
Delinking as the constitutive part of the locus of enunciation for the subjectivity 
of the African subject is informed by as Mignolo (2000, 2007b, 2011c) refers to 
as ‘colonial difference’. Colonial difference is a privileged site that entails 
knowledges and worlds otherwise—that is, the worlds that are marginalised, 
silenced and discredited since they exist in the exterior borders of modernity 
(Escobar 2007, Mignolo 2007b, 2011c). Colonial difference brings to the fore the 
persistence of contested forms of knowledge and power that are a direct attack to 
modernity. Colonial difference is informed by exteriority, a way of thinking and 
its locus of enunciation is the ‘ethical and epistemological perspective of a 
liberation philosophy framework: the Other as oppressed, as woman, as racially 
marked, as excluded, as poor, as nature’ (Escobar 2007: 186). The right to own 
the self, that is located in the ‘Other’ developing ones modes of life of politics, 
economy, culture—is often ignored or denied by modernity and its hegemonic 
discourses. In other words, the very basis of liberation is denied. Colonial 
difference exposes the epistemic and cultural hegemony of modernity and how 
these as processes of subjection affect the African subject.   
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Colonial difference questions the modes of recognition that are conferred by the 
empire. These are not genuine but arresting discourses and conditions. The 
restoration of the human being to take its place is absent, and what colonial 
difference shows is the necessity to promote active and progressive effort outside 
modernity to advance and realise decolonisation. This is only possible by 
thinking from the limits of being and being rooted in the cries of revolt that are 
commonised by the lived experience of racialisation, oppression, exploitation 
and elimination (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). The struggle that informs colonial 
difference confronts non-existence, racist colonial structures, systems and 
institutions in the political formation that is informed by praxis (Walsh 2007).    
According to Mignolo (2011c), colonial difference justifies the state that 
decoloniality has the aim of not only changing the content of the conversation, 
but the content and character of the conversation itself. It means the overhauling 
the whole structure of conversation to open up space for a new kind of thinking 
that is located in the site of the colonial difference. Decoloniality does not mean 
breaking with the colonial relation, but the very action of delinking with 
coloniality (Maldonado-Torres 2007). This means the opposition to and 
confrontation with the darker side of modernity. This is the side that is entangled 
with colonial power relations that are informed by ‘the racial, gender, and sexual 
hierarchies that strengthen Euro-North American modernity and give further 
elaboration to enslave, exploit and subjugate’ (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 261).  
Escobar (2007) articulates the notion of colonial difference to argue that it the 
reside thought that alternatives should be theorised and imagined outside 
modernity to endure that  the alternative thought is the one that opens the vistas 
of decolonisation. According to Escobar, then, colonial difference is a privileged 
site where social transformation can emerge through engaging both epistemology 
and political space. The issue is to allow new ways of thinking and such ways 
cannot emerge is they are within the prism of modernity, but they should be 
outside modernity. That is, decolonial epistemic perspective is interested in other 
forms of modernity, but also the alternatives to modernity (Escobar 2007). As 
Walsh (2007) has it, colonial difference creates the collective sense of belonging 
and unlearning dominant narratives by stretching the horisons of political 
imagination.  
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Mignolo (2011c) identifies three scenarios of global features. The first is 
rewesternising and the unfinished project of modernity. This is the imperial 
project rehabilitating western hegemony to control authority and economy. This 
is done on the basis of reforming the project of modernity on the basis that the 
locus of power will always continue to perpetuate coloniality where the western 
hegemony will always be in operation. In other words, asymmetrical power 
relations will always remain intact. The second feature is dewesternisation and 
the limits of western modernity. In this feature, exploitation and imperial politics 
of emerging economic giants gain much ground.  
This shows that modernity is not coming from Euro-North America only, but 
through emerging economic fronts and the tendency of neo-colonialism sets the 
ground. The third and final is dewesternising and the emergence of the global 
political society delinking from rewesternisation and dewesternisation. It is in 
these forms that the resistant political tradition is in total opposition to 
modernity. Justification and motivation of society delinks from rewesternisation 
and dewesternisation. Mignolo (2011c) re-articulates colonial difference that is 
necessary to have the existence of trajectories that are both dewesternised and 
decolonised. The dewesternised trajectory is about thinking from the empire, 
while the decolonised trajectory is about thinking from and with Africa. As 
Mignolo argues, decolonised trajectory calls for thinking exteriority that defies 
the directives of the empire. Since border thinking introduces the new terms of 
epistemic formulation and engagement it is seen as a threat to modernity since 
modernity has controlled the terms of epistemology. Colonial difference is the 
thought that leads to ways of thinking and doing in the global political society 
de-trapped from modernity (Mignolo 2011c).  
De-colonial turn is not fundamentalist, or some form of a new abstract universal. 
It is not claiming to improvise on the building blocks of rewesternisation 
(Mignolo 2011a; 2011c). Both aim to maintain the episteme of modernity that 
they claim to criticise. Grosfoguel (2007) also opposed any form of 
fundamentalist epistemic project but argues for pluriversality of epistemologies. 
The very basis of decolonial thought is critical dialogue and broader cannon of 
thought. This clearly shows that there is no singularity but multiplicity, wherein, 
modernity’s absolutism that hides behind diversity is exposed by pluriversality. 
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The idea as stated is ‘to propose an alternative decolonial conceptualisation of 
the world system’ (Grosfoguel 2007: 212). The world system is part of 
modernity as it is constructed by hegemonic Euro-North American paradigm. It 
is in this paradigm where modernity for the past 500 years ‘assume[s] a 
universalistic, neutral, objective point of view’ (Grosfoguel 2007: 213). This is a 
fallacious positionality that has been propagated to the extent that it has been a 
regime of singular truth. Mignolo further introduces the notion of de-colonial 
option that he articulates thus: 
The de-colonial option is the singular connector of a diversity of de-colonials. The 
de-colonial path has one thing in common, the colonial world, the fact that regions 
and people around the world have been classified as underdeveloped economically 
and mentally. Racism not only affects people but also regions or, better yet, the 
conjunction of natural resources needed by humanitas in places inhabited by 
athropos  (Mignolo 2009: 3).  
The experience of being connected has meant that people and regions have been 
singularised, and have been reduced in atomistic and mechanical terms. This 
gives modernity the leverage in its epistemic privilege spread its singularity in 
the world as if there are no pluralities. De-colonial turn as Mignolo (2009: 3) 
states, constitutes agency as people in the subaltern position refuse to be told 
what to think, do and feel. They even do not have to adhere to the paradigm of 
modernity or look up to it to get a sense of recognition. De-colonial turn 
questions the very basis of modernity including its civilisation of death hidden 
underneath. What informs it is the audacity that breaks the epistemic silences 
hidden in Western epistemology (Mignolo 2009). It questions the control of 
knowledge to challenge the very basis of the rules of the game—that is, the logic 
of modernity that sees its criticism as something that should be within itself—
critic of modernity within modernity.  
Engaging in the de-colonial option is not being fundamentalist—but engaging in 
shifting the geography of reason with a clear locus of enunciation. Shifting of 
geography of reason is ‘unveiling and enacting geopolitics and body-politics of 
knowledge’ (Mignolo 2009: 14). The power to name and define must emerge in 
the discourses of geo- and body- politics. These are politics informed by 
epistemic disobedience. This means that the purpose is to reverse the injustices 
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of the past the initiative that should be understood in political and strategic terms 
(Walsh 2002). As Mignolo (2009: 15) has it, ‘for this simple reason, the task of 
de-colonial thinking and the enactment of the de-colonial option in the 21
st
 
Century starts from epistemic de-linking: from acts of epistemic disobedience’. 
Delinking from webs of imperial knowledge is to form the African subject who 
is not caught within the ‘racial matrix of modern/coloni[s]ed world’ (Mignolo 
2009: 17). The world that blacks are free from being cursed, racially profiled, 
racialised and despised—the dismantling of the anti-black world. Political 
agency arises as a matter of response and destruction to this racial nature of 
modern and colonial world—then, the epistemic de-linking and epistemic 
disobedience if the nature of this politics of emergent black subject. In this form, 
the de-colonial option takes root. As Walsh (2002) states, delinking aims to 
recover and reconsider knowledges distorted and lost during the colonial 
encounter and process. This calls for the need to redefine and resisting the 
imposition of modernity through its imposed superior civilisation and superiority 
of social institutions.  
Maldonado-Torres (2008a) also introduces the notion of de-colonial reduction 
that simply means skepticism towards modernity. This is the instigator and 
perpetuator of the paradigm of war. De-colonial reduction exposes the deceptions 
of the empire by revealing its hidden dimensions—that is, the darker side of 
modernity. According to Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 245), ‘[t]he de-colonial 
reduction is, therefore, performed in praxis and not only in theory’. This shows 
that coloniality is the fundamental axis of reflections. As Maldonado-Torres 
(2008a: 245) states, ‘[v]anquishing Eurocentrism in its many forms becomes one 
of the most urgent tasks of the de-colonial reduction’. This is necessary because 
people who are at the receiving end of coloniality emerge from dehumanised 
world both culturally and epistemologically.  
According to Maldonado-Torres (2004: 36), ‘[d]ecoloni[s]ation is about the 
creation of a new symbolic and material order that take the full spectrum of 
human history, its achievements and its failures, into view’. This is a process of 
creating a new being. Also, it includes responding to the damned of the earth and 
injecting critical consciousness—a process of revolutionary learning. Forgetting 
about the damned of the earth is an inherent part of modernity, as a form of 
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sickness that has afflicted other forms of decolonisation, fundamental to 
reproducing modernity. Such forgetfulness creates ‘a state of amnesia that leads 
to murder, destruction, and epistemic will power—with good conscience’ 
(Maldonado-Torres 2004: 36). Opposition to such forgetfulness is necessary to 
create space for alternative critical thought that call for the creation and 
sustaining of a new being—a being in the world instead of a non-being in the 
anti-black. This is the world where the non-ethics of war are naturalised and 
legitimised.  
The ethics that are being called for in the world of beings are that of de-colonial 
turn. Their desire is not rooted in the locus of enunciation of the Euro-North 
American empire. De-colonial turn is not only a response to modernity with its 
non-ethics of war. Rather, it is about unpacking the lived experience embedded 
in racialisation and colonisation (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). The de-colonial turn 
is informed by praxis that is the radical confrontation with the empire and the 
new conceiving of the subject self-voices of critique that do not seek to transform 
but informed by agency and intention to vanquish coloniality. This promotes 
alternatives to dehumanist, racialist, non-ethics of war—the very products of the 
anti-black world that comes with colonialism and elaborated and sustained by 
coloniaity. The intention of de-colonial turn is to open new vistas of thought to 
further advocate expansion of borders of thinking, the ones that are de-linking 
from coloniality.  
Conclusion  
This chapter engaged three pillars of decolonial epistemic perspective namely - 
coloniality knowledge, coloniality of power and coloniality of being. The aim 
was to give an exposition of the colonial situation that, in contemporary form, 
can be understood as coloniality that puts the African subject in the structural 
positionality vulnerable to the industrial complex of subjection. This means 
coloniality continues to hide colonial relations by naturalising, institutionalising 
and normalising subjection. Coloniality emerges from the contact points or the 
colonial encounter that articulates the modes of operation and appropriation of 
restructuring the world to give the same effect as colonialism did, and make way 
for modernity to be strengthened.  
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Decolonial epistemic perspective is in the same line of the political, social and 
theoretical interventions that sought to challenge injustices and inhumanity of the 
subaltern, just like other anti-colonial struggles, but then, placing the African 
subject at the centre, to understand its subjectivity and subjection. Decolonial 
epistemic perspective continually challenges coloniality that singularises the 
world through the notion of universality by looking at the world from the darker 
side of modernity as the site of reflection.  
As a synthesis to coloniality, this chapter has deployed de-colonial turn that is a 
political project that aims to chart a way for a continuous liberation confronting 
coloniality. The de-colonial turn is informed by border-thinking, delinking, 
colonial difference and de-colonial option all that are directed at searching for 
other possible worlds and thinking that are counter to coloniality and that are 
leading to decolonisation. Such a decolonisation is a decolonisation of power, 
knowledge, and being that are, as a result of modernity, trapped in the loci of the 
Euro-North American empire.  
So, it is necessary to engage in the form of thought that counters coloniality, and 
the form that configures what coloniality hides. Such a world is the possible 
worlds that can be realised by engaging in continuous praxis that charts the 
terrain leading to liberation that will see the emergence of the African subject 
after subjection has been combated. The subsequent chapters will deploy 
coloniality of knowledge, coloniality of power, coloniality of being and de-
colonial turn respectively and apply them to the political thought of Mbembe. 
Their deployment serves as testimony to the fact that Mbembe stands on the side 
of coloniality and this reifies subjection.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
MBEMBE AND THE MODES OF SELF-WRITING 
 
Introduction  
In this chapter, decolonial critical analysis is deployed to examine Mbembe’s 
intervention with regards to modes of writing and representing the African 
subject. Mbembe’s intervention has been that of adulation and criticism. He takes 
a controversial position in terms of how the modes of writing African should be. 
Mbembe is very critical of the modes of self-writing done by African subjects. 
The question then is: who should then write about Africa? The self-writing of the 
African subject is the emergence of the subject. The simple question is whether 
Mbembe’s criticism of African subjectivity as it is, is the criticism that is in 
defence of the Euro-North American episteme and canon, or whether it is the 
criticism that advances the frontiers of knowledge in Africa? Decolonial critical 
analysis is used here to unmask Mbembe’s conception of African modes of self-
writing and to argue that they are perpetuate coloniality of knowledge. 
The first entry point in this chapter is to analyse Mbembe’s criticism of 
populism. Secondly, and linked to the first, the chapter unpacks politics of 
naming and vulgarity as a tool is used by Mbembe to describe, rather than 
explain, the subjectivity of the African subjects. Thirdly, the chapter 
problematises the critics of Mbembe’s African modes of self-writing, mapping 
out their differences in terms of their modes of criticism. Fourthly, the chapter 
engages the notion of cosmopolitanism and Afropolitanism, the latter that is 
coined by Mbembe and the chapter argues for the necessity of the geography of 
reason. Fifthly and finally, the chapter argue that Africanity that is criticised by 
Mbembe is indeed the necessary mode of writing Africa.  
In defence of populism 
In his conception of African modes of self writing, Mbembe’s (2002a) core and 
pertinent issues which bares critique to African subjectivity consists of a number 
of pointers. Mbembe warns that Africa should get out of the ‘epistemic ghetto’ 
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and embrace epistemic practices of the ‘worldliness’. This means Africa should 
move into the world and it should not have the polemic relationship with the 
world. For Mbembe, the epistemic crisis that are placing Africa at the gridlock, 
which are coined as faked philosophies that are bordering of victimhood and 
have nothing to offer to the world are Afro-radicalism and nativism. They are, as 
Mbembe labels them, ‘narratives of loss’ and these are narratives that govern 
African discourses. These are discourses which are still caught in the 
colonialism, slavery and apartheid as meta-narratives which should be 
transcended if not abolished altogether, and that is something that hampers 
Africa not to bring anything new in the epistemic realm.  
By implication, it means that these are narratives that are making Africa not to 
write itself, and as a result, Africa has no narrative of its own since it is caught in 
victimhood. This them creates self-inhalation of African subjectivity where in 
which the metaphysics of difference, as Mbembe claims, make African 
subjectivity to be caught in authenticity the point of it being an illusion. It means 
that for Mbembe there is nothing exceptional about the modes of writing that he 
coins as Afro-radicalism and nativism. Therefore, the mode of writing qua 
African subjectivity that Mbembe advocates is Afropolitanism as Africa is 
moving towards worldliness. Arguably, it seems to Mbembe that what 
characterises African subjectivity of those whom he labels as Afro-radicalists and 
nativists and deligitimising their epistemic practices is that which is akin to 
populism. By implication and as Mbembe’s critique stands, there is nothing 
philosophical and nothing that holds epistemic virtue that comes from populism. 
It is essential in this context to interrogate the manner in which Mbembe (2002a) 
frames populism and how such framing trivialises the very essence of populism 
as a political project of decolonial critical analysis predicated on African 
subjectivity. The framing that Mbembe applies trivialises the subjectivity of the 
African subject that in the effect of being named degenerates into the form of 
what Césaire (1972) ‘thingification’—that is, that which renders the African 
subjectivity as a thing and that is not of benefit but a mere populism in its empty 
sense. In this sense, as Mbembe affirms, populism cannot be the subjectivity of 
the African subject and therefore, not any form of knowledge. This is coloniality 
of knowledge that is the concerted effort to deny other subjectivities and that 
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must be qualified by means of mimicking Euro-North American discourses and 
cannon and not to have any epistemic privilege of their own. Also, it follows 
from Mbembe’s perspective, that there is nothing of epistemological essence 
with regards to populism, but it is just a faked philosophy. The verdict that 
Mbembe has is that such knowledge from African subjectivity is that if it is 
knowledge, then it is populist and not truth. The regime of truth, it seems, resides 
outside populism. It is of interest to note the fact that populism or being populist 
seems to suggest that which borders on the absurd.  
There is nothing, according to Mbembe, that is truthful or original that can come 
out of populism. Also, it is not clear how populism is defined in terms of its 
terrain—the terrain of being located in Africa in relation to the African subject. 
This is coloniality of power, the concerted effort to deny other subjectivities 
subjectivity and for them to have subjectivity they must be disciplined through 
the mimicry of the Euro-North American canon. If they resist such mimicry and 
assert their own subjectivity, they are referred to as populist. Populism if it were 
to be positive and not a pejorative term that relegates the subject to the politics of 
absurdity and irrelevance, it would attribute the form of politics of necessity in 
terms of the way the African subject engages in decolonial critical analysis. 
Populism seems to assume the attribute of the negative in Mbembe’s subjectivity 
and this is the liberal conception of coloniality of knowledge that delegitimises 
other forms of subjectivities. In this liberal conception, populism is seen as 
archaic, primitive, dangerous, and exotic—in this form, populism assumes the 
level of the occult. 
The notion of populism can be traced through variety of histories, trajectories 
and horisons. Populism, according to Laclau (2005) is the way of constructing 
the political. In amplification, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008: 12) posits that it ‘has no 
single parentage, no single origin, no single genealogy and is watered from many 
springs, some local and some global’. Scott (1985: 23) argues for ideological 
edifice where ‘[t]he ideological work of repair and renovation is never-ending’. It 
is the ideology of critique embedded on how things should be in vision and how 
they should be in their attainment. The construction of the political is both 
articulation and re-articulation of the existential conditions of the African subject 
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qua subjection. Populism suffers from what Laclau (1977) refers to as 
‘theoretical nihilism’—that is, the concept that has been denied of content.  
The African subjectivity that Mbembe (2002a) labels as Afro-radicalism and 
nativism is the form of subjectivity as decoloniality, the mode of writing from the 
locus of enunciation of the African subject that also suffers from theoretical 
nihilism. This theoretical nihilism stems from the fact that populism is regarded 
‘as pathological symptom of some social disease’ (Canovan 2004: 241). Such a 
stance towards populism calls for it to be negated because it is autochthonous 
and occult. This therefore suggests that populism does not have any other 
beneficial political essence. Populism has degenerated as a term of abuse that is a 
weapon to silence those who are in opposition to its ideals (Cowen 1984). 
Theoretical nihilism towards populism created the impression that ‘assumed that 
nationalist politics did not raise any interesting theoretical questions’ (Gavin 
2004: 241). 
Mbembe is clear, through his theoretical nihilism with regards to the African 
subject being engaged in faked philosophies. That said, this renders African 
subjectivity a faked philosophy, the very thingification with no epistemological 
essence. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008), it is simplistic to dismiss Afro-
radicalism and nativism as faked philosophies and antiracist racism. What 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni calls for is that they should be understood as having developed 
in the intestines of colonialism and having to rupture in the postcolony. Being in 
fierce opposition with these two streams of populism, Mbembe (2002a; 2002b) is 
concerned with the idea of the world, omitting the fact that this is the world that 
is autochthonous to the African subject.     
The African subject writes itself not as an individualist exercise, but the writing 
that engages Africa from the point of view of the having to grapple with the 
complex nature of subjection as coloniality of knowledge that afflicts the African 
subject’s existential conditions and this is of course, denied. The mode of writing 
that Irele (2001: 67) advocates is ‘an effort toward an expressive grasp of the 
world in which that experience unfolds’. This, as Irele points out, is based on the 
concrete reality of history that bears on existential concerns. The mode of writing 
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predicated in African subjectivity is informed by the spirit of antagonism and this 
is caused by the existential reality of African subjectivity is.  
Since these are definitions of a discursively produced resurgent subjectivity that is 
volatile, polyglot, and unconcerned with discovering the persistence of the original 
state, it would seem that critics who continue to volari[s]e the identity of the struggle 
and the realm forms of situated agency asserted in the struggle over presentation, do 
so without returning to the notion of an ahistorical essential and unified self (Parry 
1999: 219).   
What Parry argues for is the importance of understanding the locus of 
enunciation of the African subject. The African subject constructs, tells and 
speaks it the manner that is contextual and circumstantial (Parry 1999). 
According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007: 176), ‘“populism” alludes to a kind of 
contradiction that only exists as an abstract moment of an ideological discourse’. 
Mbembe’s theoretical nihilism does not take into account the existential 
conditions, complex as they are, that are part of the African reality. Mbembe 
(2001a) suggests complexity, conviviality, multiplicity in among other things as 
constitutive parts of the African reality. Populism cannot be, without any 
qualification, the abstract thingification that is made for its own sake; there is a 
reason to it and a fundamental one of course. This has led Laclau (2005: 19) to 
state that ‘populism has not only been demoted: it has also been denigrated’.    
In defence of populism through decolonial critical analysis it is essential to draw 
from Laclau (2005) reconceptualisation of the concept from its negative 
connotation, it is essential to argue that populism is in this sense, a political logic 
presupposing the epistemological intervention for the purposes of African 
subjectivity—rather it being reduced to a movement. Populism as a political 
logic, it is, as Laclau (2005: 117) states, related to ‘institution of the social’. 
Populism cannot just be dismissed as faked philosophy—but it is informed as the 
construction of the political (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007). Existential conditions and 
socio-politico realities need to be engaged from the very forces of subjection. 
According to this perspective, it follows then, that populism should be 
understood on the basis of exclusion. As such, populism is one of the important 
ways of constructing the political, in this case, the subjectivity of the African 
subject.  
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It is essential to clarify that the populism being defended is not populism in its 
general sense of the term. This means the populism of evoking emotions that 
borders on delivering of speeches that are devoid of content and bearing no 
relevance of bringing liberation to fruition (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007). Laclau 
(2005: 3) argues that, “populism’ intends to grasp something crucially significant 
about the political and ideological realities to that it refers’. It confronts, as 
Laclau states, the ontological limits and absence of analytical tools to understand, 
or to solve its mode of articulation in that the African subject emerges. Such 
emergence is the very formation of the political. This formation eventually leads 
to the affirmation of political, the very basis that informs the subjectivity of the 
African subject. The latter here is the subject not the object at the receiving end 
of subjection, but rather, the subjects that exposes and combats coloniality of 
knowledge qua subjection.  
Mbembe (2002a) regards African subjectivity by the mode of writing of the 
Africanists as faked philosophies only interested in metaphysics of difference. To 
suggest that African subjectivity in relation to Afro-radicalism and nativism 
promotes faked philosophies and also engaging in dead-ends means that its 
epistemic grounding is the fake one—the thing in itself. In support of Mbembe, 
Appiah (1992: 56) states that nativism constitutes ‘us, inside, them, outside. That 
is all there is to it’. Even if that is the case, as both Mbembe and Appiah suggest, 
it seems that they are limited to engaging in reductionism and not engaging the 
complexities of the Afro-radicalism and nativism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007) also 
adds that populism should have a nodal point. It is constitutive of the political—
the African subject as a political being—is essentially grounded, located and 
populism enables its emergence by means of decolonial critical analysis.   
As Stanley (2008: 96) argues, ‘the intuitive association of populism with 
negative traits discerned against the backdrop of mainstream normality’. It seems 
as if the power of the occult, when looked in this sense, makes populism to be 
named as a fake philosophy. In other words, the occult is nothing but the mere 
deceit and betrayal in the epistemological sense. Populism in this sense is the 
mode of writing that possesses much potency, and for that matter, the occult one 
that promotes faked philosophies. What Mbembe (2002a) continues to argue has 
long being engaged by Parry who writes: 
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When we consider the narratives of decoloni[s]ation, we encounter rhetorics in that 
‘nativism’ in one form or another is evident. Instead of disciplining these, theoretical 
whip in hand, as a catalogue of error, of essentialist mystification, as a masculinise 
appropriation of dissent, as no more than are antiracist racism, etc., I want to 
consider what is to be gained by an unsententious interrogation of such alternatives 
that, if often driven by negative passion, cannot be reduced to a mere inveighing 
against the iniquities or a repetitive of the conical terms of imperialism’s conceptual 
framework (Parry 1999: 221).          
In support of Parry’s argument, Laclau (2005: 12) opines that, ‘the imprecision 
and emptiness of populist political thought cannot be dismissed so easily: 
everything depends on the perfomative at that such emptiness is all about’. The 
question then comes in terms of who defines and through what criteria. Who 
defines philosophy in terms of its authenticity or otherwise in relation to the 
subjectivity of the African subject. The African subject for its philosophy not to 
be fake, it seem that it must be authentic and it is of interest to inquire about who 
determine the philosophy of the African subject, something that is of concern 
with regards to the manner in which Mbembe engages it in relation to the mode 
of writing done by Africanist thinkers and intellectuals. It seems that to Mbembe 
the African philosophy for it to be original, it must draw and mimic the Euro-
North American philosophy. This is a clear indicative case of coloniality of 
knowledge that suggests that African subjectivity cannot claim subjectivity of its 
own. As Appiah (1992) claims, the attack of universalism, that is by implication 
the West, by means of particularism, is in fact universalism. Being in defence of 
the West, Appiah criticises Chinweizu et al. (1980) by stressing that: railing 
against the West by nativists suggests that the latter are propagating it as they are 
the products of it (Appiah 1992). Mbembe amplifies Appiah thus: 
[I]t has been amply demonstrated that even where they start as a counter-reaction to 
European vilification, most of the counter-discourses are always deeply embedded in 
the conceptual structures of the West (the arch writing). To a large extent, the West 
is their roots. They draw, in their wake, key elements of imperial discourse (Mbembe 
2006b: 148). 
Even though the Afro-radicalists and nativists are products of the colonialism—
that is, the source of subjection and the distorted subject formation through 
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coloniality of knowledge, it does not necessarily follow that they are propagating 
it in their modes of criticism. Chinweizu et al. (1980) emphasise the importance 
of working from the standpoint of Africa and not from some abstract 
universalism, that by the way, excludes them. The problematic here is that the 
African subjects seem not to have their own subjectivity and cannot write in their 
own terms. The only thing that is of concern to Mbembe is that the mode of 
writing Africa should not be different or in opposition to that of the Euro-North 
American episteme. It is, instead, that which is determined for and what is 
essential is to save it from itself not to become populist. So, the emergence of the 
African subject should be measured in the authentic philosophical sense, as 
opposed to it being a faked philosophy that renders it fake in its mode of writing. 
That is to say, the African subject cannot in its mode of writing, authorise or 
represent itself. Doing so seems to Mbembe, to amount to populism. 
Epistemologically, it is not been authorised by Mbembe who possesses the tools 
to authorise what is fake and what is not. It seems the authenticity of the African 
subject is that of exteriority and total irrelevance. These pejorative labels of 
coloniality of knowledge have assumed the status of normality.  
According to Vincent (2009), populism comes through moral panic and 
legitimises a dangerous political culture. Such a form of populism, she argues, 
legitimises oppressive conformism that delegitimises other forms of 
subjectivities. Populism, according to Vincent (2009), is the ‘politics of lowest 
denominator’. Laclau (2005) dismisses this alarmist approach that perceives 
populism as abnormal, dangerous, deviance, manipulation, irrational and 
undefinable. The formation of the subjectivity of the African subject is denied. 
Populism suffers from what Laclau (2005: 14) refers to as ‘elitist dismissal’ that 
forms part of ‘processes of simplification and emptying attempt to perform’. 
What is being advocated by Mbembe is the populist onslaught that its basic 
purpose is to hide subjection.   
As decolonial critical analysis shows in opposition to Mbembe, what is populism 
in its negative sense, of course, is defined and determined by coloniality of 
knowledge—the very source of the Euro-North American episteme. When 
populism rooted in Africanist thought it is perceived as ‘[t]he presentation of an 
unchanging and static set of “tradition”’ (Vincent 2009: 218). Populism from this 
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rigidity of coloniality of knowledge is seen as the mechanism that resists change. 
But then, from the stand-point of decolonial critical analysis it needs to be 
interrogated by asking rhetorically: what change and in whose terms, and what is 
static and in whose terms? This is how Laclau (2005: 16) clarifies the point being 
made that: ‘[i]f populism is described merely in terms of “vagueness”, 
“imprecision”, “manipulation” in its procedures, and so on; there is no way of 
determining differentia specifica  in positive terms’.  
Mbembe relegates the subjectivity of the African subject to the Euro-North 
American canon as a source with its tools or arsenal to define. The African 
subject emergence is therefore denied subjectivity and this is coloniality of 
knowledge proper. The denial stems from the proposition that it is populist and 
its knowledge claims are not truthful—faked philosophies. The power of this 
knowledge is marginal in the whole cannon. Mbembe seems to be concerned by 
the power of populism that is infused in the Africanist thought and to suggest that 
it possesses some form of hypnotic power that will inevitably hypnotise all the 
African subjects who are at the receiving end. To accuse populism as being 
autochthony, the accusation should account for the fact that populism simplifies 
the political space through decolonial critical analysis in order to unearth and 
expose coloniality of knowledge as a form of subjection. Laclau makes the 
following claim.  
So we can say that progress is understanding populism requires as a sine qua non, 
rescuing it from its marginal position within the discourse of the social sciences—the 
latter having confined it to the realm of the non-thinkable, to being the simple 
opposite of political forms dignified with the status of a full rationality (Laclau 2005: 
19).    
Epistemologically, it seems to Mbembe that the knowledge from the Africanist 
frontier is singular and no contestation features. It also seems as if the 
epistemological cult in the occult and exotic form where subjectivity is agency. 
For the fact that the colonial encounter meant different experiences, it follows 
that forms and degrees of subjection differed as well. Then, it is important to 
state that populism is not occult as Mbembe seems to suggest. Still, it is not clear 
how Mbembe accounts for differing perspectives that do exist within the locus of 
what he refers to as populism and its supposedly faked philosophies. For that 
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these are philosophies, simply suggest the need for pluriversalising or to say the 
least, differing perspectives. Populism differs for what it is; it does not suggest a 
common name since it is embedded in radically different experiences (Minogue 
1969). The pluriversal nature of the political or philosophy qua original as 
Mbembe advocates will mean the need the problematisation of populism, and not 
reducing it to a homogeneous whole. This means, there are many forms of 
populism and not all of them are of the negative, there are positives ones too. But 
also, it is problematic to suggest that they are promoted to the same particular 
end. As Cowen (1984: 72) opines: ‘[i]f the paradox is to be unravelled then 
another tradition of populism should be brought into play’.  
Populism qua faked philosophies, if they are not epistemologically valid as 
Mbembe seems to suggest, seems to border on the notion that the Euro-North 
American episteme is the authentic one—that is, the foundation of original 
philosophies. For this reason, the Euro-North American episteme is the source of 
truth that African subjects should strive for instead of searching for their own, 
and in their own epistemological terms they must ensure that they must derive 
everything from Euro-North American episteme. The truthful nature of such 
epistemology is that it should be used by the African subject for it to be truthful 
and of course, getting itself rid of the occult of populism. To be precise, the mode 
of writing by the African subject should be a clone of the Euro-North American 
epistemic locus. Such means the knowledge coming from such a locus is not 
faked philosophies; and it is essential to point out that this is coloniality of 
knowledge.  
It is not clear from Mbembe’s claims whether the African subject in order for it 
to emerge at the point of its subjection that it should revive itself from the ashes 
of subjection by seeking guide and wisdom from that which subjects it. Put 
another way, should the African subject be dependable to Western subjectivity or 
its own subjectivity? If that is indeed the case, and on the affirmative of course, it 
should be stated that the existential conditions of the African subject do demand 
that there should be their own liberators from subjection and that would call for 
their own epistemological demands and their mode of writing. This being the 
necessity will require that they have their own analytical and conceptual tools to 
explain the subjection that confronts them. Their power, if it is occult and 
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mystique cannot be accused of being fake for that its mode of writing is not 
dependable to the approval of the Euro-North American episteme. If that is the 
case, it will therefore be correct to see Mbembe as being serviceable in denying 
the subjectivity of the African subject to emerge and as the advocate of 
coloniality of knowledge. For Mbembe to call for stylising the self seems akin to 
be mimicry that seeks inclusion in the Euro-North American episteme without 
changing the existential condition that comes with subjection of the African 
subject. In is in the juncture of stylising the self where the African subject 
‘interprets subjectivity as time’ (Mbembe 2002a: 242). 
Subjectivity change with move of time, since to Mbembe time is on the move, 
the same to subjectivity. This means that Afro-radicalism and nativism deal with 
slavery, colonialism and apartheid, things that to Mbembe are irrelevant in time 
and also in subjectivity. To stylise the self therefore means, to transcend—that is, 
subjectivity that is much preoccupied with the present and the imaginaire of the 
future.  To stylise seems to border on the notion of abdicating responsibility and 
having nothing to do with the past and its plague on the present. To stylise the 
self as the mode of writing does not engage head-on with the assumed hidden 
and amoebic forms of subjection. If populism is negative, it might not be the case 
of universalism that Mbembe defends. Even locality still holds much relevance.  
Further still, it is important to ask whether Mbembe accepts that the African 
subject and the subjection that afflicts it should be the arrested discourse under 
the guise of the stylising the self. It seems so for that the mode of writing the 
African self should be stylised to suite the Euro-North American canon, that by 
implication, is not populist and faked, but truth and authentic. It means that forms 
of subjection should not be combated through decoloniality, and the self should 
just stylise itself and deny that subjection still exists. This is aversion that is the 
flight from responsibility, and that amounts to bad faith (Gordon 1995). For the 
fact that Mbembe (2002b) acknowledges that there is power in the false, it means 
contextuality, something of the opposite effect. The African subject is truthful in 
its confrontation through decolonial critical analysis to epistemological and 
ontological frames of its subjectivity in relation to subjection. So then, the 
criterion of defining cannot apply for African subjects, because they are rendered 
with the incapacity of not defining, but must be defined. For the mere fact of 
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being defined and authorised—Mbembe by implication, of not being aware 
maybe, justifies subjection that afflicts the African subject.  
The mode of writing by the African subject within the frame of the arrested 
discourse means that it is not located in Africa, but elsewhere. As Mbembe 
seems to suggest, such a subject embraces the notion of worldliness. It is in the 
interest of the Euro-North American episteme to embrace the notion of 
worldliness as the world is their property, their plantation with slaves as well 
who are of course, a form of property. The idea of worldliness does not take into 
account the forms of subjection that are in the matrix form that continue to attack 
African subjects. The Africanist frontier with its mode of writing is in constant 
antagonism form of decolonial critical analysis to suggest, of course, the 
predicament of the African subject that can be rooted from subjection. Being 
worldly as far as African subjects are concerned, when subjection still exists is to 
engage in the form of deception. It is, therefore essential to ask if such a form of 
deception is not a faked philosophy itself perhaps.  
Mbembe as a disciple of Michel Foucault could have at least engaged the notion 
of the regimes of truth. What is truth is something that is relative and often at 
times context-specific, and the same applies to what is false. This, of course, 
depends on the epistemic location of the subject and the realm of subjectivity 
prevalent in that context. What is truth is a regime and truth cannot assume the 
status of singularity. Foucauldian regimes of truth typology suggest plurality of 
truths. Mudimbe (1994: 212) argues that ‘the will to truth in Europe seems to 
espouse perfectly a will to power’. If taken seriously, this suggests multiplicity of 
truths and falsifications will also be that of multiplicity. As stated, both truth and 
false assume the matter of relativity and context. Then, to regard African 
subjectivity as faked philosophy when it confronts subjection will therefore mean 
fakeness of the Euro-North American episteme that Mbembe want the African 
subjectivity in its mode of writing to embrace and of course, not to critique.       
The point here is that there are regimes of truths. To move beyond Foucault, to 
give the populist label to African subjectivity in its mode of writing should be in 
African terms. This does not mean that there should be not any form of criticism, 
there should be. However, it cannot be that which suggest that African 
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subjectivity should be dependable to the Euro-North American episteme. Indeed, 
this has been part of the Euro-North American epistemological DNA to suggest 
and propagate that Africans are perpetual children and they cannot think. That 
sad, and being entrenched to the point of being pious—the African subject in the 
form of antagonism, should write itself in its own term. This has indeed, proven 
to be something blasphemous, hence the politics of naming that condemns 
African subjects writing themselves.  
The African subject in writing itself through populism as a forms of decolonial 
critical analysis is faced with epistemic violence—that is, subjection that even 
haunts the stylising of the self even if it evades responsibility through bad faith. 
In terms of what Mbembe advancing the frontiers of knowledge in the mode of 
the African subject writing the self, the attribution of populism qua fake 
philosophies to demean the agency of the African subjectivity means that the 
African subject will always be trapped in coloniality of knowledge. Populism, 
being subjectivity of African subjects, essentially means that it is a subject-
position. It is of interest to note that this attack comes through the politics of 
naming and vulgarity. Populism has been relegated to the margins as a result; it 
keeps resurfacing in a potent force. The marginalisation of the African 
intellectual thought is partly one of the main reasons why populism keeps on 
resurfacing. This can be partly explained by stating that Africans were and are 
still being acted upon, and when they want to act for themselves they are 
criminalised. The burst boil of populism can also be explained by the continued 
subjection, that incapacitates any forms subjectivity that is about to emerge from 
the African subjects. The criminalisation of populism occurs through politics of 
naming and vulgarity, and the sole purpose of this is to impose censure.  
The politics of naming and vulgarity 
At the heart of Mbembe’s critique is the mode of writing where in which the 
African subject writes itself by means of African subjectivity. African 
subjectivity, ‘is exactly the result of political subjectivity’ (Ramphalile 2011: 8). 
Therefore, populism is the formation and the emergence of African subjects. 
According to Laclau (2005), the politics of naming and vulgarity degenerate into 
rigid designators. The politics of naming in their intent, aim to delegitimise what 
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it names so that what is named can be tamed if it was antagonism. Laclau (1977) 
refers to politics of naming and vulgarity as politics informed by censuring 
alternative ideas—dismissing them as populist. African subjectivity is given 
names and such naming is in a way, suggest that African subjectivity is archaic 
and therefore unnecessary. Politics of naming and vulgarity lead to the mode of 
representations that are embedded in practices and institutions (Laclau 2005). 
Mbembe argues that the mode of writing the African self through the discourse 
and narrative of Afro-radicalism and nativism is governed by what can be 
referred to ‘narratives of loss’ (Mbembe 2002a: 239). Mbembe charges that these 
narratives of loss led to dead end philosophies.  
Mbembe sees Afro-radicalism as mere instrumentalism and political opportunism 
and nativism is metaphysics of difference around the idea of race. Both Afro-
radicalism and nativism are seen by Mbembe as modes of writing the African 
self that contaminates the subjectivity of the African subject by binding it to 
victimhood. As Mbembe (2002a: 240) states, ‘the contemporary African modes 
of writing the self are inseparably connected with the polemics of self-
constitution and the modern philosophy of the subject’. To Mbembe, they do not 
offer much as they are glued in contradictions and as such having nothing to 
offer. In articulating the mode of writing adopted by Mbembe, Robins has this to 
say: 
Mbembe’s writings are a provocative challenge to African scholarship. His works is 
strongly influenced by European theorists such as Derrida, Foucault, and Bakhtin, 
and African anti-imperialist and dependency theorists such as Samir Amin have no 
place in his intellectual Patheon.  
Rather than critique of neo-colonialism and global capital, Mbembe writes about the 
excess of the postcolony, including the connivance of “the masses” in rituals of state 
power (Robins 2004: 20). 
For Mbembe, the modes of writing that are grounded in the existential conditions 
of the African subject, that often points to subjection, they are the mode of 
writing the self that are propagating victimhood. This is amplified by Adeeko 
(2002), who states that Mbembe rejects the ideologies of refutation as they do not 
explicate clearly the existential conditions of the African subject. For Mbembe, 
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as Adeeko states, they are ineffectual. According to Mbembe (2002a: 243), both 
Afro-radicalism and nativism are ‘permeated by the tension between voluntarism 
and victimi[s]ation’. Therefore, they are of irrelevance to explain Africa as it is.  
For Mbembe, the ways in that the Africans write their experiences of the postcolony 
through these languages of life are precisely the ways in that Africans create 
meaning for themselves in the world. In this distinctive sense Mbembe challenges 
nativists and Afro-radical models of African self-writing (Ralphs 2007: 23). 
It seems that in the light of Mbembe’s view, Afro-radicalism and nativism should 
be abandoned as they even lack self-reflexitivity. What Mbembe is in favour of is 
the exploration of the possibility of writing the African self located ‘on common 
discursive terrain’ (Mbembe 2002a: 245fn). This being the African subject who 
is at the receving end of subjection that marks difference and othering, Mbembe 
still insists on sameness  arguing that the African subject is like any other being. 
Little effort is made though to problematise subjection that creates the zone of 
distinction and the response of the different mode of writing coming to those 
African subjects who wholly resist subjection.  Wickramasinghe has this to say: 
So what leads Mbembe to locate his thinking about identity within the framework of 
an elusive and imagined Africa rather than for instance in the nation-state is perhaps 
nothing less than the feeling that an African identity is an identity not only coming 
into existence but also that exists already in a incorporeal sort of way 
(Wikramasinghe 2001: 41).  
It is essential then to ask this question: beyond naming things and valgurising 
them, what is Mbembe’s contribution in understanding the subjectivity of the 
African subject and what does this tell? The politics of naming as engaged by 
Mbembe, in the sense of contribution can be seen as a form of vulgarity towards 
the subjectivity of the African subject in relation to Afro-radicalism and 
nativism. The politics of naming calls names and as such, they possess the 
descriptive power, like vulgar itself. They provoke a sense of imagination since 
descriptions in their own carry the meaning that is easily associational with 
reality, and again, like vulgar itself. But to Mbembe, the politics of naming are 
the tool of vulgarising the subjectivity of the African subject from the point of its 
own emergence—that is, subjectivity emerging from the locus of enunciation of 
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the African subject. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) states, Afro-radicalism and 
nativism are both products of colonialism, and they are at the heart colonial and 
decolonial issues. 
Mbembe does not point out how colonialism produced Afro-radicalism and 
nativism. What Mbembe assumes is that both these discourses created 
themselves. So, Mbembe does not offer hope or a remedy or even a political 
project rooted in the African subjectivity in its own right (Wickramasinghe 
2001). The emergence of the African subject is vulgarised through the politics of 
naming for the purpose of rendering it impotent. It is clear that the large corpus 
of Mbembes attack, loaded with the politics of naming and its vulgar was 
regarded as the last testament to the end of African narratives that question the 
basis of the their existential predicament, hence this led Mbembe to be audacious 
enough to proclaim that they are dead ends. Mbembe evokes the politics of 
naming and vulgarity to regard Afro-radicalism and nativism using Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s perspective to dramatise them as ‘frivolity and hallow, vanity, 
gluttony and envy, the excess of the flesh and of the senses’ (Mbembe 2002b: 
630).  
According to Mbembe (2002a), both Afro-radicalism and nativism revolve 
around slavery, colonisation and apartheid. It seems to Mbembe that slavery, 
colonisation and apartheid—the basis tenants of subjection in its primitive and 
contemporary form, should not be feature in the African subjectivity. For 
Mbembe (2002b: 630), Afro-radicalism and nativism ‘falsify the event itself 
(whether slavery, coloni[s]ation, or apartheid) in the very act in that they claim to 
name it and to decode its signification’. It seems wrong and philosophically false 
for Mbembe that Afro-radicalism and nativism remain tenacious to articulate 
their existential condition in relation to subjection. Mbembe regards subjectivity 
of Afro-radicalism and nativism as not truth—therefore, as dead ends. Mbembe 
(2002b: 631) state that ‘[t]he philosophical poverty of these discourses is 
notorious, and several isolated attempts to correct this shortcoming have not 
succeeded’. From the stand-point of decolonial critical analysis it is of interest to 
know in whose interests have these attempts have been made and who defines 
what is philosophical poverty and notorious—or perhaps, what is a better 
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philosophy that does not constitute dead elements for the benefit of the African 
subject.   
By the virtue of opposing the idea of slavery, colonisation and apartheid, 
Mbembe opposes the idea of subjection. What concerns Mbembe is that they 
should not be present in the mode of writing the African self that is impacted and 
shaped by subjection. There is no singular African subjectivity but subjection in 
its singularity and its directionality is clear—the target is always the African 
subject. Decolonial critical analysis shows that subjection has devastating effects 
when applied to the psyche and body of the African subject. The desire for the 
African subjects to write themselves to counter coloniality of knowledge cannot 
be understood without confronting subjection that has created them. Therefore, 
the mode of writing must be that of emergence of the African subject and that 
can only exist by confronting subjection and dismantling it instead of wanting to 
reform it, or at worse, collapsing the self into it. The subjectivity of the African 
subject should not be demised through politics of naming and vulgarity as if they 
are just concerned with recapture the past. Vincent (2009: 219) who agrees with 
Mbembe, argues that populism is preoccupied with ‘narratives of return... [that] 
always seek legitimacy by appealing to a putative original state that has 
somehow been distorted’. 
It is clear from this distinction that Mbembe (2002b) suggests that they are 
irrelevant. But then, Mbembe does not point out why these naming are so 
essential with regards to Africa and also African subjectivity. Since vulgarity has 
no positive aspects to it or any attributes, derogatory in intent, Mbembe’s 
treatment of Afro-radicalism and nativism is indeed in the negative light. This is 
to ensure that what they are called borders on vulgar. Mbembe seems content 
with the fact that there is a lack of synthesis in subjectivity of the African subject, 
and what only preoccupies it is instrumentalisation and metaphysics of 
difference. As such, this renders them useless and of no purpose for any form of 
African subjectivity like coloniality of knowledge does. They are seen as 
invented for the sole purpose of assuming victimhood. Such victimhood is casted 
in such a way that it negates colonial wounds and its psychic injuries. For 
Mbembe, the state of injury is called by those who feel the pain that in turn is 
named and vulgarised as something reduced to the state of victimhood.  
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The African subject, in its mode of writing, should not, according Mbembe, 
mention any form of injury and pain that comes with subjection. If it does, it is 
named and vulgarised. The politics of naming are used as an arsenal to attack the 
African subject’s subjectivity at the point of emergence, the emergence that 
assumes the forms of politics of antagonism. For the fact that African 
subjectivity through Afro-radicalism and nativism are still standing in the face of 
politics of naming and its vulgarity, the fact remains that they are concerned with 
subjection that afflicts the African body politic. Subjection seems to be 
minimised in Mbembe’s analysis with regards to African subjectivity. Mbembe 
justifies his stance to introduce the notion of self-reflexitivity, as opposed to the 
African subjectivity that he accuses of being caught in the ghetto. This state of 
being caught in the ghetto makes African subjectivity not to embrace 
worldliness. As such, Mbembe hastens to say that being ghettoed make African 
subjectivity to fail being in the complexity of time as subjectivity. This is 
precisely because, for Mbembe (2001a), time is the phenomena that is on the 
move since subjectivity is multiplicity, coalitions, calibrations, and 
concartinations. African subjectivity if it stems from Afro-radicalism and 
nativism is regarded as autochthony for that is articulate in racial terms and also 
out of time. As Mbembe puts it: 
Philosophically, the Hegelian thematic of identity and difference, as classically 
exemplified in the master-bondsman relationship, is surreptitiously reappropriated by 
the ex-coloni[s]ed. In a move that replicate an unreflexive ethnographic practice, the 
ex-coloni[s]ed assign a set of pseudohistorical features to a geographic entity that is 
itself subsumed under a colonial name (Mbembe 2002a: 244).  
It is against this background that Mbembe provides the politics of African 
solidarity are important, and it is essential to pin down why they get so named 
and vulgarised. It is not enough for Mbembe to name Afro-radicalism and 
nativism as residing in the negative, without problematising why they are in such 
a state. It is impossible for them to be positive to subjection, and being in the 
negative is explainable. It is not by choice being negative, but by circumstance.   
Mbembe seems to omit the fact noted by Gordon (2000) that the world is 
organised in racial terms, and therefore, race is the organising principle. For the 
fact that the primacy of race features in African subjectivity means that it is 
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engaged in the battle of racial antagonism. This racial antagonism suggest that 
the subjection that is antagonistic to African subjectivity is comes through the 
prism of race, and is targeting the specific race that happens to be the black race. 
So, therefore, the making of race as a focal point cannot be, in simplistic terms, 
be labelled as victimhood. The subjection of the Africans subject is justified in 
racial terms. Race is what burdens the African subject. Hence the formation of 
subjectivity that wants to rid itself of subjection is the one that is the solidarity of 
race against subjection that attacks race in specific terms. The subjection can be 
said to be racist and to resist it, it will require the racial solidarity, in its form of 
the strongest. There is nothing wrong to have the solidarity based on race and the 
existential conditions that are experienced by the African subject are racial.  
The evoking of race or engaging in race cannot be subjected to the politics of 
naming and its common feature of vulgarity for that these are just politics that 
border on the blackmail of the African subject when it attempts to disentangle 
itself. The politics of naming and vulgarity are used to label the African struggles 
for subjectivity as anachronism for the fact that such struggle mark themselves in 
racial terms, that is of course of necessity. The construction of the African 
subject in relation to the notion of subjection has been that of the racial other, the 
other with no subjectivity and who should be acted upon. Subjection is the act of 
self-justification and that should not be antagonised by those who are abject. 
African subjectivity through the narratives that are labelled as Afro-radicalism 
and nativism seek to de-otherise the African self and infuse it with ontological 
essence rightful to it through decolonial critical analysis. Indeed, such a task to 
ontologise the African subject will not be apologetic in its mission to see its 
emergence. African subjectivity being named and vulgarised, instead of being 
interrogated from its locus of enunciation seems to be what is missing in 
Mbembe’s attack to it. This attack by Mbembe is tantamount to coloniality of 
knowledge in that it denies African subjectivity from the stand-point of 
decolonial critical analysis.  
The politics of naming framed within the locus of enunciation of Mbembe’s 
critique seems not able to advance the frontiers of knowledge in understanding 
the mode of writing of African subjectivity. What features in the thought of 
Mbembe is that it is trapped within the discourse of naming and vulgarising. This 
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amounts to the incapacity to explain that degenerates into dramatisation. In 
addition, a vast array of names being called against African subjectivity amounts 
to just naming and vulgarity. The politics of naming and vulgarity are a 
technique used in the hegemonic fashion, for that it in their rhetorical sense, 
generalised and non-contextual. Therefore, they assume the state of high moral 
position is delegitimising the other. The politics of naming and vulgarity hide 
behind rationality and universality as they project themselves as the standard 
marker of truth. They approach Afro-radicalism and nativism as those that 
constitutes lack and as the aberration of rationality.   
Mbembe’s politics of naming refuses to empathise with those who are in the 
locus of abjection qua subjection at the point of interrogating. It could have been 
essential for Mbembe to interrogate why those who are in this existential 
predicament continue to be of relevance in even in the 21
st
 Century. To merely 
reduce them to politics of naming and vulgarity suggest that they are a bane to 
subjection and their cause should allow the archive of ethical politics to be 
interrogated. If not, it would be correct to suggest that the what is of centrality to 
Mbembe’s capacity to engage in politics of naming and vulgarity, is not 
interrogation, but scratching the surface, hence the power to describe and not to 
explain. Therefore, to name does not mean the interrogation of the phenomena, 
but to vulgarise it. 
Mbembe (2002a) claims that African subjectivity that is Africanist and 
decolonial in intent, creates a polemic relationship with the world. It seems as if 
the idea of difference is created by the African subjects themselves, while he 
opposite is fundamental true. If this is the case as Mbembe suggests, then it 
means that the world that Mbembe is in defence of, did not create a polemic 
relationship with Africa.  In short, there is no form of subjection that existed and 
kick-started on the attack on the African subject. So then, African subjectivity 
from the existential condition of abjection is just there to distabilise the world 
that is at peace. The African subjectivity has nothing to challenge in so far as 
subjection is concerned. Such a challenge is of course, the one that might justify 
the politics of naming and vulgarity. It seems, then, that it is normal to name and 
vulgarise what is agency from the abject that are entangled within subjection. 
Contrary to Mbembe, it is worth mentioning that it is the world that created and 
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still sustains the polemic relationship with Africa. It is in the nature of this 
polemic relationship that the state of constant comparison, as the abject being 
devoid of subjectivity and having no capacity to articulate its own grammar of 
suffering (Wilderson 2010). 
For the fact that the African subjects have no grammar of decolonial critical 
analysis—that which Mbembe labels as diabolical triad of slavery, colonisation 
and apartheid why is it then that African subjects act the way they do? Mbembe 
suggests that in the contemporary, the thematic of Afro-radicalism and nativism 
thesis are exhausted. As they are based on race, Mbembe argues that what makes 
them outmoded is that in this era of subjectivity as time, race assumed surreality 
or multiplicity. Mbembe provides two reasons, the first is that the thematic of 
race is undergoing various shifts, and secondly, whiteness is not potent as it was. 
Mbembe (2002a: 266), boldly declares that ‘[t]he forms of racial consciousness 
are changing all over the continent’.  
In contradiction, Mbembe acknowledges that the notion of radical different was 
used to exclude the African subject. He writes:   
Because of this radical difference, it was deemed legitimate to exclude them, both de 
facto and de jure, from the sphere of full and complte human citizenship: they had 
nothing to contribute to the work of the universal (Mbembe 2002a: 246). 
It is essential to add that: 
Their objective was to canoni[s]e difference and to eliminate the plurality and 
ambivalence of custom. There was a paradox to this process of reification. On the 
other hand, it looked like recognition. But on the other, it constituted a moral 
judgement, because ultimately, custom was only made specific the better to indicate 
the extent to that the world of the native... could not serve as the basis for a praxis of 
living together in a civil society (Mbembe 2002a: 248).  
As Mbembe states, the African subject had to be converted, for that this was a 
condition for recognition. This is how Mbembe puts it: 
African subjects could have writes and enjoy them, not by virtue of their 
subordination to the rule of custom, but by reason of their status as autonomous 
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individuals capable of thinking themselves and exercising reason, the perculiary 
human faculty (Mbembe 2002a: 248). 
This recognition, contrary to Mbembe’s claim, did not mean the absence of 
subjection—thus, the recognition did not take away the condescending attitude of 
coloniality of knowledge that the African subject lacked subjectivity. For the 
African subject is regarded through subjection as the lacking subject, such a 
colonialist stance simply suggests that there cannot be any other form of 
subjectivity that can come out of the African subject, even if it existential 
conditions suggest otherwise. In other words, if subjectivity emerges from the 
African subject, it must be denied. Decolonial critical analysis in its application 
and amplification of subjectivity has ontological essence necessary for the 
African subject. African subjects, through equivalence of differences are 
excluded ‘equivalent in their common rejection of the excluded identity’ (Laclau 
2005: 70). This then automatically triggers subjectivity of African subjects to 
rise—as through subjection—African subjects are regarded as what Laclau 
(2005: 70) refers to as ‘totality as object’ that is ‘a failed totality’.   
According to Laclau, the logic of equivalence subverts difference. So the denial 
of African subjectivity is effective as it is made through the politics of naming 
and vulgarity. These are used as a form of disciplinary mechanism to silence 
what antagonises subjection. As such, this is the denial of African subjectivity. 
The mode of writing that is characterised by any relation to subjection and also in 
opposition to it through decolonial critical analysis is disciplined through naming 
and vulgarity. Mbembe (2002a) however acknowledges that civilisation made the 
category of the human and the non-human. The latter of course, is the African 
subject who is structurally positioned inferior to the human who executes 
subjection. So, how then, should African subjects who are not infra-humans write 
themselves? The essential point to make is that their mode of writing that is 
disciplined through coloniality of knowledge is the one that is indeed essential 
and worthy to be resisted through African subjectivity that Mbembe 
fundamentally opposes through naming and vulgarity.  
To take this to another level, it seems as if the politics of naming and vulgarity 
are a form of subjection since they reinforce coloniality of knowledge. 
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Subjection at this level, takes the form of complicity and disciplinarity. Being 
complicit with subjection is subjection, and disciplining those who oppose 
subjection is subjection par excellence. So, subjection can also be understood on 
the basis of antagonism and in opposition to the emergence of subjectivity of the 
African subject. As such, Mbembe seems to imply that subjection should not be 
challenged. In other words, if there is no African subjectivity this means that 
there is nothing that is going to challenge subjection. If the African subject is 
accused by Mbembe of rejecting the world and being in the ghetto, why is it like 
this in relation to the world it inhabits? Put another way, why is it that African 
subjectivity in the mode of writing that Mbembe names and vulgarises act the 
way it does? Mbembe seems to suggest that African subjectivity emerged out of 
nowhere and it is not the result of subjection that makes it to have the polemic 
relationship with the world. The African subject cannot be expected to stand still 
as an object as it has been perceived against subjection. The African subject is 
not an object and on that basis it must write itself in the mode of emergence—
that which is necessity.  
The African subject is the subject that should write itself in its own mode of 
decolonial critical analysis. Even though politics of naming and vulgarity have 
such a dramatising potency and the power to tame as disciplinary mechanisms, 
the African subject must nevertheless write itself in its own modes. As such, 
Africa will never be the problem to be solved, but the voice that speaks to, for 
and about itself to antagonise subjection with its mode of silencing what is 
antagonistic to it. Mbembe in his politics of naming and vulgarity does not allow 
the African voice to be heard, and this is of course subjection. This is not just a 
voice that is preoccupied by narratives of loss as Mbembe suggests, but the voice 
that aims to dismantle subjection. The figure of the African subject is reiterated 
in the manner in which it speaks for itself (Mbembe 2002a). For Mbembe, such 
liberation of the Africa subject in terms of its speaking cannot be legitimate at the 
level of subjectivity since this is seen, by Mbembe, as the subjectivity of 
fabrication. The narratives of loss should not be criminalised for that they explain 
the existential condition of dispossession of land, humanity and labour of the 
African subject.  
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As Mbembe (2002a: 235) fiercely argues, ‘[s]elf-affirmation, autonomy, and 
African emancipation—in the name of that the right to self-hood is claimed—are 
not new issues’. For the mere fact that they are not new issues, it logically 
follows that there is a force that prevents those issues that Mbembe says they are 
not new. In short, they are not new since subjection is still old, and if it is old, 
how can issues be new? So, in addition, if they are not new issues they point out 
that what they confront still haunts the present—a spectre. These are the issues 
that keep on rising again and again in opposition to subjection. It is will be self-
defeating to say that these issues should not feature, including of course, the 
pursuing of genuine liberation for the emergence of the African subject. 
Therefore, to move beyond the yoke of old and new, suffice to say that the 
narratives of loss are a bane to subjection since they aim to expose it, no matter 
how amoebic and invisible it pretends to be. The subjectivity of the African 
subject means that the African subject is concerned about the liberation of 
Africans from subjection. 
Africa, its subjects and their subjectivity are in the world that is pervaded by 
subjection. This is the real world in existential terms, not a fictionalised one as 
Mbembe politics of naming and vulgarity seems to suggest. There is no way that 
the African subject can resist just for the sake of resisting. For that there is 
African subjectivity that antagonises subjection, simply means there is subjection 
out there. Even if African subjectivity can be named and vulgarised, the fact still 
remains that subjection still exists and it is antagonistic to African subjectivity.  
Mbembe’s contribution, despite its flaws, has made those who advocate African 
subjectivity under the umbrella of the heterogeneous Africanists, to rethink their 
positionality that essentially led then to strengthen it amid the politics of naming 
and vulgarity. The politics of naming and vulgarity as advanced by Mbembe, do 
not advance the frontier of knowledge but they serve to entrench coloniality of 
knowledge. It is not even clear what modes of self-writing should African 
subjects pursue to combat subjection if they abdicate the responsibility to do so.       
The politics of commendation and criticism 
Mbembe’s ‘African modes of self-writing’ provoked a lot of reaction and to note 
this is to look to two forms of this reaction by modes of criticism. These can be 
121 
 
formulated as Public Culture critics and CODESRIA Bulletin critics. It is worth 
noting that these are forms of critics that are different in terms of their structural 
positionality—that is, their subjectivity and their locus of enunciation brings to 
bear the different understandings of Mbembe’s essay. The structural positionality 
of the reactions to Mbembe’s essay are worthy of attention for the mere fact that 
the essay was an attack to the African nationalist scholarship, that Mbembe 
subjected to politics of naming and vulgarity.  
Public Culture critics were featured in the journal that Mbembe published his 
essay and the issue did not in a way include the Africanist but people from the 
poststructuralist, postmodernist and postcolonialist bent, similar to the 
intellectual identity of the essay itself. That is to say, their subjectivity and their 
modes of commendation and/or criticism are the ones that Mbembe comfortably 
associates with. The journal, Public Culture and its space was indeed in a way, 
given to those with more or less ideological congruency. The journal itself does 
not, by the manner of its ideological slant, give space to Africanist thought, the 
thing that can be expected from journals anyway in relation to the identity of the 
scholarship. As such, Mbembe and the critiques entertained each other in the 
absence of the Africanists thinkers who were subjected to Mbembe’s attack. It is 
ironic that people who responded in Public Culture are not the people whom 
Mbembe directed the attack to. Also, there is no way that the articles that contain 
decolonial critical analysis could have found their way in the pages of Public 
Culture. It is impossible for even Public Culture to entertain Africanity as the 
mode of writing. It is essential to interrogate the politics of publishing, and of 
course, the much muted issue being that of censorship. For the mere fact that 
Mbembe regarded African subjectivity being caught in the ghetto, such 
subjectivity cannot be allowed in Public Culture.  
The whole content of the African modes of self-writing indeed is having a 
serious problem with African subjectivity. The criticisms in Public Culture do 
not give sufficient attention to Africanity and its modes of self-writing. Neither 
nor did they entertain the manner in which African subjectivity has been subject 
to politics of naming and vulgarity. The writing of the African subjects and its 
subjectivity did not form part of the argument of most parts the Public Culture 
critics. The reason for this is their structural positionality that has no concern for 
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subjection that afflicts the African subject and this is a clear case of coloniality of 
knowledge.  
Quayson (2002) agrees with Mbembe on autochthony, that he locates to slavery, 
colonialisation and what he refers to rabid globalisation. Also, Quayson points 
out that Africans contribute to their own woes and predicament that are part of 
the postcolony. In engagement with Mbembe, Quayson (2002: 586) rightfully 
asks: ‘why does this explanatory impulse persist in African modes of writing up 
to the present time?’ This is the fundamental question that, depending on the 
frame of the context and the locus of enunciation, can be the one that will 
fundamentally explain the reasons that African subjects who are concerned with 
subjection write the way they write. This question, is rightfully posed in reaction 
to Mbembe’s criticism on the modes of writing of the African subjects, but then, 
it seems that the answer that it warrants is not the one that will expose subjection 
that befall the African subject. The reason for this is, of course, are the questions 
that Quayson framed, that were aimed at interrogating Mbembe. They are framed 
thus: ‘are Africans somehow so compulsive in their dreams of a pure and nativist 
identity they fail to conceptuali[s]e the issue in any other way? Why this 
obsession?’ (Quayson 2002: 585-586).  
The manner in which subsequent questions are framed, serve as testimony to the 
fact that in relation to the one they derive from, the locus of enunciation of 
Quayson and Mbembe alike, of not being grounded in the existentialist 
conditions of the African subjects in their combat of subjection. Subjection is not 
central to Quayson, and therefore, his critique on Mbembe is not in relation to 
subjection in its concrete terms. Quayson engages in politics of naming by 
stupefying the epistemic and ideological content that informs African 
subjectivity. For Quayson to refer to Africanity—one component of African 
subjectivity concerned with subjection and in favour of the emergence of the 
African subject—as ‘compulsion and dream’ is to negate the force it has, and to 
misdirect it not to confront subjection. Perhaps, it could be agreed that it is a 
compulsion but it cannot be a dream for a per se as it confronts and is confronted 
by something that exists—subjection. It is also not a dream to return to the pre-
colonial past, but the combative engagement starting from the colonial encounter.  
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Quayson, in relation to the aforementioned question he formulated, he 
polemically responds to them to say: ‘[t]here are no blacks in Africa’ (Quayson 
2002: 586). According to Quayson, in agreement to Mbembe, African 
subjectivity is said to be caught by ‘denominative excess’ that limits the African 
modes of writing to adopt a transcended mode. To transcend, for Mbembe and 
Quayson alike, is to avoid subjection, and not even mentioning it in the modes of 
writing Afrcan subjectivity. However though, Quayson (2002: 587) points out 
the need to ‘contemplate the total negation of Africa means—before we can put 
it to any good use of post-slavery,—colonialism, and—apartheid’. The whole 
discourse of wanting to define and re-defining, or for that matter, discovering and 
rediscovering what Africa is, or means, is not of primary importance since this 
will not be of any help. The existential conditions that befall Africa, as a result of 
what Africa is, really point to the need of countering subjection. What is Africa? 
Africa is subjection. This means, therefore, the importance of combating 
subjection. The act of combating starts first with interrogating what is subjection, 
that forces inform in and how does it work in its multiplicity and metamorphosis 
forms? These are existential questions that Mbembe and Quayson are not 
concerned about.  
As such, they only promote the ‘post’; they are futuristic to suggest that there 
was a clear break between the past and the present. The present cannot be 
effectively futuristic if the past is featuring in the present. This perspective is 
naive in that it does not take into account that the past, present and the future are 
linked. There is no breaking point in so far as the existential conditions are 
concerned. The avoiding of subjection in the modes of writing by the African 
subject means turning away from what Africa is—that is, the mode of writing 
Africa should raise concern about subjection as long as it exists. Subjection is 
not, as Mbembe (2002a) states, ‘fictionalised conspiracies’. Subjection qua 
coloniality of knowledge is conspiracy itself. Quayson’s (2002) call for 
transcendence can be seen as the accomodationist project. The project of 
transcendence is limited for the fact that subjection does not allow any 
negation—but denying it.  
As such, the self-blaming of the African subjects comes to the fore, and as such, 
the impression is that African subjects are equally responsible for subjection that 
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afflicts them, and they have only themselves to blame, and also, they have 
agency. Of course, these remarks are made in the light that does not make any 
mention to subjection. Therefore, does it mean then, that the negation that 
Quayson points to is to absolve subjection and its continuity? For Quayson to 
point out effects of what he calls the ‘culture of impunity’—does this suggest it 
pervades the whole of Africa, or if it were a country, the whole of it? This will 
then mean that the African subject is homogeneous. Since Africanity is multiple, 
the same to African subjectivity. This multiplicity is of course, framed not on the 
basis of conviviality, fragmentation and displacement (Mbembe 2001), but the 
multiplicity of African subjectivity that confronts subjection. The existential 
conditions that befall the African subjects are not the same, and their course is 
multiple forms of subjection, hence the justification for the multiple forms of 
subectivigty of the African subject. For Quayson (2002) to note ‘[b]ut the 
attempting to free ourselves from calcified process of thought is surely the 
crucial first step’. 
Jewsiewicki (2002), who differs from Qauyson, points to Mbembe’s reluctance 
to deal with the African subject. In relation to the route that the African subject 
takes, in relation to subjectivity, Jewsiewicki writes: 
This is the route taken by Mbembe to unmask these theories of the African subject 
that situate slavery, coloni[s]ation, and apartheid as ordeals. Passage through these 
ordeals is supposed, in these theories, to have united African aspirations to 
sovereignty, dignity, and knowledge (Jewsiewicki 2002: 595).    
Jewsiewicki continues: 
Mbembe argues that there is no African subject who, as a victim of injustices, has a 
particular mission whose accomplishment could confer an identity and a duty to for 
uniting. For him, there is no African subjectivity that constitutes a collective destiny 
forged by history, whether the latter is written in terms of laws or contingencies 
(Jewsiewicki 2002: 599). 
Jewsiewicki being concerned about the denial of Africa subjectivity in its own 
terms highlights the state of paternalism, where the African subject assumes the 
subordinate position. The African subject’s subjectivity should be derived from 
those who execute subjection. Subjection is what defines the positionality of the 
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African subject, this also includes, the formulation and enunciation of 
subjectivity. Subjectivity is, as Jewsiewicki (2002: 592) points out, ‘constructed 
in relation to the other’. The other of course, is rightfully positioned to be at the 
receiving end of subjection. As such, this points out to asymmetries that exist in 
relation to subjectivity. These asymmetries make subjection to be justified, and 
of course, the African subject is the target. Subjection was informed by what 
Jewsiewicki (2002) referred to as colonial indiscipline, that even produced 
indiscipline in the postcolony. The African subjects find themselves in time and 
space that is modicum of discipline.  
Guyer (2002) argues that the modes of writing, according to Mbembe, points to 
the lack of the African subject to embrace modernity. The mode of writing that 
Mbembe calls for is the one rooted in modernist thought. This borders on 
coloniality of knowledge as the African subject must draw from, and also mimic 
the Euro-North American mode of writing. Thus, coloniality of knowledge still 
perpetuates the alienation of the Africa subject from its existential conditions, the 
very thing that informs the modes of its own self-writing. According to Guyer 
(2002: 600) Mbembe places ‘failure at the feet of African scholars and thinkers 
who have not aspired ambitiously or desperately enough, have not imagined at 
the limits of possibility, unlike others in the face of profound existential 
challenge’. To think of African predicament as comparable to others, as Mbembe 
does compare it with Jewish experience, the existential challenge still remains 
and this comparison is no way profound to really unearth the existential 
conditions of the African subject in relation to subjection. The subjection that 
afflicts the African subject is beyond comparison, for that it is sustained and 
continued through coloniality of knowledge. Being beyond comparison can be 
partly explained by the African subject being in wretchedness of existential 
condition.  
Thus, Mbembe does not even allow the interrogation of subjection and what is 
prioritised is how African subjectivity, that is regarded as mechanistic, must 
adopt the mode of writing that is informed by modernity. Guyer’s (2002: 601) 
view that ‘Africa existence demands risky and ambitious thought’ resonates with 
African subjectivity writing itself and in its own terms. The subjectivity that 
informs this is of course, stands the risk of being named and vulgarised. This 
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risky and ambitious thought does not necessarily mean a particular kind of 
thought—for example, Mbembe’s thought embedded in coloniality of knowledge 
where the mode of writing should gravitate towards the universal. In the face of 
naming and vulgarity, being trapped within this, African subjectivity should 
nevertheless adopt the locus of enunciation that is ambitious and risky. It seems 
to Mbembe that African subjectivity deserves to be censured and mutilated as 
long as it points to subjection. As such, it is important to ask then: why Mbembe 
does not tolerate it then? The fundamental question to ask is: who is Mbembe 
writing for and why is he engaged in the desperate attempt to make African 
subjects to follow his mode of writing that is complicit and apologetic to 
coloniality of knowledge?  
For Vergés (2002: 607), Mbembe ‘proposes a reformulation of the project of 
modes of self-writing’. This means that what Mbembe proposes, is something 
different in relation to the manner in which writing is done. This would mean 
that the manner in which the writing is should be different. But then, it is 
important to point out that Mbembe approached the mode of writing by the 
African subject as something that is homogeneous and of course, in absence of 
subjectivity. This generalisation borders on Hegelian racist stereotypes and 
ignorance of Africa. Mbembe fails to take into account the contestations within 
that the African subject writes itself, and its existential conditions. Perhaps, the 
mode of writing that is fundamentally opposed is that which Mbembe refers to as 
being the one concerned with ‘fictionalised conspiracies’. Vergés (2002: 608) 
argues that ‘[t]he task would be to rewritten the economy of Africa, escaping the 
twin pitfall of dependency and underdevelopment’. The mode of writing perhaps 
will point to new challenges that are facing Africa. The argument can still be 
made that dependency and underdevelopment discourses are not pitfalls, and 
that, as any other forms of paradigm, has its own strength and weakness. Also, 
the argument can still be made that they confronted subjection that was able to 
metarmophise itself, and it still remains that subjection that still continues.  
The African subject with its intellectual intervention militating against 
coloniality of knowledge; its mode of writing should not be negated as the 
burden of pitfalls, but that which should be built upon. Vergés (2002) rightly 
argues that ‘Africa is not locked in the past. Rather, many of its strictures pre-
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figure things to come’. For Mbembe to label African subjectivity as archaic 
means for him it is locked in the past and modernity is rupturing in the present. 
On the contrary, the reverse is true. The effects of the past still haunt the present, 
and that is part and parcel of modernity. The past is not buried; therefore, the 
spectre of the past will continue to haunt Africa’s presence and future. With 
regards to the present, Vergés (2002: 609) remarks, ‘[d]issonance, disharmony, 
and friction constitute our present’. The past, from the colonial encounter, has 
been about subjection. Subjection still haunts and the African subject is the one 
haunted since subjection is the militancy of existence of the African subject. If 
the drive is the mode of writing the Africa’s future without dealing with 
subjection, it follows that subjection will continue to haunt the future. This is 
mainly because coloniality of knowledge is the scandal of the past and it 
continues to haunt the present and also the future if the African subject cannot 
write itself from the stand-point of de-colonial analysis.    
In response, and in affirmation to Mbembe, Dirlik (2002: 611) writes, ‘[a]nti-
imperialism does not make much sense when colonialism as a system has 
disappeared from much of the world, and it is no longer all that easy to 
distinguish coloni[s]ers from coloni[s]ed in configurations of global power’. 
Dirlik fails to take into account the global matrices of power, that continue to 
engage in subjection, and this is easily evident in the asymmetrical global power 
arrangements. What is also of concern for Dirlik, is the African modes of writing 
that are concerned with the past. 
But a pre-occupation with the legacy of the past may also obstruct recognition of the 
problems that have emerged in the present—problems that, however new, also recast 
our understanding of the past (Dirlik 2002: 614).   
The nature of the problems that still feature in the present are not new, they are 
part of the continuity of the past. As stated before, there has not been a breaking 
moment between the past and present hence the continued existence of 
coloniality of knowledge. The problems that exist in the present did not just 
emerge naturally, they were and they are still created—and they will be still re-
created as long as subjection still features. Dirlik (2002: 614) in support of 
Mbembe, states that ‘[a]bsorption of the past without recognition of 
128 
 
transformation in the present is not the best way to direct’. For the mere fact that 
subjection still continues, what matters is not understanding the problems of the 
present and omitting the past, the present should be understood in line with what 
concerns the African subjects who are concerned with subjection. The 
arrangement of the present is seen as innocent from any form of subjection, and 
the African subject is not a driving force behind those arrangements, but an 
object deserving subjection.  
Perhaps, Dirlik could have asked why the anti-imperialist discourses keep 
resurfacing when imperialism has been claimed to have disappeared. To merely 
regard the anti-imperialistic senseless is to name and vulgarise it as Mbembe 
does, and not interrogating it and explaining it. What should be taken into 
account is that those whom their existential conditions are informed by 
subjection, it is easy then, in opposition to Dirlik, to argue that they are 
colonised. They are colonised by subjection, and this means the continuity of 
colonialism, and that has assumed another form of subjection that is hidden 
behind structures and institutions. Put simply, colonialism ‘disappeared’ and 
there is there is neo-colonialism that still perpetuates the system of colonialism 
itself. Dirlik defends his argument that is in support of Mbembe to say:  
The vast majority of the populations of formely coloni[s]ed societies have in 
conditions of despair, to be sure, but it is no longer very plausible to offer 
colonialism as an explanation of their condition. Marginali[s]ation, rather than any 
systematic colonial exploitation, better explains it (Dirlik 2002: 611). 
It is clear that this is the simplification of subjection that is reduced to 
trivialisation. Dirlik should also point out that marginalisation of African subjects 
is something that cannot be explained outside colonialism, and its continuities 
qua subjection. The marginalisation of the African subject is not something new 
it came with colonialism, and for the fact that it remains, as Dirlik argues, as an 
explanatory factor, this mean that colonialism continues. Dirlik (2002) even 
acknowledges that colonialism was systematic this should explain its complexity. 
Such complexity creates and re-creates structures and institution that in their 
configuration, militate against the ontology of the African subject, and also its 
subjectivity. The existential condition of the African subjects cannot be 
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thoroughly explained by omitting subjection that entrench itself through 
coloniality of knowledge. There are a variety of networks through that subjection 
works. To land the blame to those who still continue to point out subjection, is 
also to absolve subjection. Dirlik (2002: 612) is right to say, ‘[a]s with 
colonialism, so with nationalism’. The attempt has been made by Dirlik and 
Mbembe alike to disentangle the two, and the failure to acknowledge that 
nationalism, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) points out, that it is product of 
colonialism.   
According to Dirlik (2002: 613), ‘[a]nti-colonial ideologies no longer make 
sense, as they appear hindsight not only to have been futile but also to have 
shared it the assumptions of the very colonialism they sought to overthrow’. 
Those who fought colonialism under the banner of nationalism many became the 
agents of colonialism. There must be an explanation provided by Dirlik and even 
Mbembe that nationalists did not, in most of the time exercise absolute discretion 
and they were still in service of the colonial project. They were in power not to 
decolonise, but to replace colonial masters to become the managers of colonial 
structures that led to the continuity of subjection. Subjection at this level can be 
understood as those who were managers of the colonial system, became 
intermediate points between the colonial masters and the African subjects. In 
other words, they were subjecting their own to subjection in service of the 
colonial masters that also subjected them to subjection. They were subjugators 
who were also subjugated. In opposition to Dirlik (2002) proposition that 
nationalism was in totality—the liberation of all Africans, the liberation of 
Africans has not been experienced, and there will never be such liberation as 
long as subjection continues. For the mere fact that there are continued struggles 
of various kinds by African subjects, and new questions coming out of these 
struggles, this suggests that subjection still continues and it is necessary to have 
those kinds of the struggles continuing. So, it is important to ask Dirlik and 
Mbembe alike: is colonialism gone or is it still persisting through a masked face?  
According to Segall (2002) the notion of trauma, of course as a result of 
subjection, still continues to haunt the present. As Segall states, trauma erupts 
from the narratives of the victims of subjection, and he puts the notion of law on 
the basis of the disruption of is construction. It is essential to point out that the 
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construction of law by the African subjects who are at the receiving end of 
subjection is not of good help. Segall opines that: 
While the victim may capture the helpless psychological position of a subject during 
the moment of torture and terror, the second performance of identity under the 
structure of law enforces a continued victimisation role (Segall 2002: 619). 
The notion and the construction of law has been the disciplinary tool. This tool to 
discipline has been that of legitimising subjection, and in the configuration of the 
law itself—the state of impartiality and reason—the law is the end itself, the 
absolute truth. There is no law that is akin to justice for African subjects as their 
existential conditions expose the suspension of law. Subjection was exercised by 
the permission of law, and such subjection was justified and this was made to 
moralise torture and terror of the African subjects. The torture and terror that 
took place as the mechanisms through that subjection enforced itself, this was 
enforceable by law. In other words, the law is subjection and, subjection is law. 
So, where there is subjection, there is law. 
The contemporary globali[s]ation of national law, local adoptions to it, and the 
resistance of postwar trauma set the conditions for what might be termed a 
postcolonial performative of victimisation (Segall 2002: 617-619; emphasis added). 
It will be argued, contrary to Segall, that the modes of writing by the African 
subjects in contestation to subjection are not the performance of victimisation. 
The notion of victimisation, as advocated by Mbembe (2002a, 2002b) borders on 
the politics of naming and vulgarity. The notion of victims is used in this sense to 
label the African subjects as responsible for their own existential predicament. 
African subject do not perform as the colonial gaze would have it, under the 
rubric of African subjectivity they are engage in the struggle against subjection. 
This is not the struggle for its own sake, but the struggle to make the African 
subject to emerge as a fully human being as subjection dehumanises.  Contrary to 
Segall and Mbembe alike, this struggle is not the one that is involved in 
performing victimhood, but the one that is informed by unmasking subjection 
and opening vistas of imaginations on how to combat that subjection for the 
emergence of the African subject.  
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Jules-Rosette (2002) questions whether Mbembe is not prophesying doom for 
Africa. It will be argued here that this is something that has been done in the 
process of subjection. Such prophesy of doom was that of making subjection to 
be viable, as it will be easy for African subjects to hate themselves and their 
space, and not being capable to resist subjection. According to Jules-Rosette, 
Mbembe provides a blanket criticism against African subjects mode of writing 
and does not engage the spaces of cultural resistance that this writing opens. The 
blanket criticism happens at the unfortunate juncture in that Mbembe is silent of 
subjection. According to Jule-Rosette (2002: 604), ‘[t]his development is not a 
product of proletarian nostalgia as Mbembe suggests, but merely a fact of daily 
life’. For the fact that African subject points out clearly what puts them in the 
existential predicament they happen to find themselves, Mbembe does not 
entertain and out rightly dismisses them through the politics of naming and 
vulgarity. What African subjects then face as the result of Mbembes mode of 
writing the African self, is that their choice must be choice-less. The African 
subjects ‘occupy an empty space of creativity where new ideologies and cultural 
strategies are shaped and deployed’ (Jule-Rosette 2002: 604). All these allow the 
creation of African subjectivity informed by the existential conditions the 
African subjects find themselves in and striving how to negate subjection. These 
empty spaces, locate themselves in the traces of slavery, colonisation and 
apartheid, that Mbembe vulgarises for affirming themselves by exposing 
subjection for what it is. Their mode of writing is writing themselves and writing 
for themselves in order to get liberation. In opposition to Mbembe’s naming and 
vulgarity, Jule-Rosette writes: 
In his critique of traditional essentialism, Mbembe downplays the fact that traditions 
were, indeed, transmitted across the Middle Passage and may be revived, and even 
reconstructed, for legitimate cultural purposes (Jule-Rosette 2002: 605).  
For Jule-Rosette, the mode of writing the African self qua African subjectivity 
lies in the creative spirit. What is essential then for Mbembe to engage is this 
creative spirit, that will then suggest the changing nature of the African modes of 
self-writing in its own terms and own canon, and of course, is own existential 
conditions. Diagne (2002) argues for keeping Africanity open and regards this as 
beneficial for the purposes of creativity. It is, therefore, essential to ask what 
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qualifies Mbembe to hold the monopoly of defining what is creativity and what 
is not, and through what canon qua Africa subjectivity? It will be argued here 
that there should be no such monopoly and what should be emphasised is that 
creativity is contextual. Creativity qua the modes of writing by the African 
subject should be defined and deployed in their own terms that are of course 
resonating with the existential condition that is contextual. This contextuality is 
explained by the fact that subjection operates differently in different contexts, 
and what explains these contexts is subjection. Diagne (2002: 621) is concerned 
with the notion of authenticity and argues thus: ‘[a]uthenticity here conveys the 
idea that meaning does not come from the past (the figure of tradition, or 
repetition); that it is not a projection of tradition on the present and the future’.  
For Diagne, authenticity still persist to project itself in the future and towards the 
world by means of anticipation. According to Diagne, the dead-end of the 
invented self that should be avoided and escaped as the mode of writing is the 
one that panders on authenticity. Whatever the cause or intent, the notion of 
authenticity and tradition are colonial inventions. What is of concern for African 
subjectivity is the mode of writing that unmasks subjection. Authenticity even if 
it was the cause and intent worthy of pursuit, it will not help matters since 
subjection cannot be unmasked by returning to the pre-colonial past. Diagne also 
cautions that authenticity is not exploration in the sense of self-writing. Diagne 
(2002: 622) argues for ‘inauthentic understanding of subjectivity’ that 
contributes to ‘understanding Africanity in an ontological sense’. For Volger: 
Real socioethical philosophy seeks to reveal the ethical grounds for individuals’ 
actions, projects, self-conceptions, and so on, by situating the individual in the world 
in a way the way that makes sense of selves in their circumstances. And congeries of 
similarity situated individuals may share systematic modes of self-presentation 
(Volger 2002: 626).  
If this is indeed the case, why African subjectivity is name and vulgarised by 
Mbembe? The idea of the universal, of monolith truth as propagated by Mbembe 
does not hold. Vogler argues for the understanding of African subjectivity in 
relation to its existential conditions. What African subjectivity is also concerned 
about is making sense of these existential conditions and engaging them in order 
to deal with subjection with pathologises existential conditions. Vogler is 
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concerned with Mbembe’s blanket criticism that regards African subjectivity as 
‘an unproductive trope of victimisation’ (Vogler 2002: 626). This does not help 
matters if Mbembe does not point out the necessity of African subjectivity to 
continue to write itself in the manner in which it has been written. The mode of 
writing has been changing, and due to the multiple site of struggles launched for 
the emergence of the African subject. For Vogler: 
To note the need for a new African imaginary, and to suppose that philosophy might 
be of service in articulating it, do not require assuming that congeries of disturbed 
lives will have to be remade individually from the inside out in order to allow for 
more effective modes of collective (Vogler 2002: 627).  
The locus of enunciation of Public Culture critics is not that of African 
subjectivity and it will be unfair to expect from them to treat the subject matter of 
Mbembe’s essay with what is not an existential condition to them. The 
CODESRIA Bulletin critics saw it necessary to use their own intellectual outlet 
that is accommodative to their thought that its locus of enunciation is Africa. 
This was in order to engage the Euro-North American epistemic centre that 
Mbembe was propagating that for, while he was in opposition to African 
subjectivity. CODESRIA critics indeed have a scathing attack to Mbembe, as it 
engages the politics of naming and vulgarity deployed by Mbembe. Mbembe 
seems to have touched the raw nerve and especially of his former collegues arch 
rivals. Mbembe’s essay is engaged in the confronting manner and not in the 
evasive form that the Public Culture critics took. This is the form of critics that 
originates from African subjects and through their subjectivity—the mode of 
writing Africa itself.  
The mode of writing by the African subjects is advocate by those who emerge 
from the CODESRIA Bulletin front, the very ones that Mbembe (2002a, 2002b) 
directed his attack to. It is essential to engage their response and/or engagement 
to Mbembe, since this has not featured in the pages of Public Culture. 
CODESRIA Bulletin critics are informed by opposition to liberal framing of 
reality, problems and solutions that are not in support of the liberation of African 
subjects (Soyinka-Airewele and Edozie 2010). The mode of writing that are 
advocated by the African subjects cannot be reduced only to slavery, colonisation 
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and apartheid as Mbembe suggest, these move beyond that. The mode of writing 
advocate by the CODESRIA Bulletin frontier is concerned with the construction 
and reconstruction of:  
[N]ew strategies of resistance and change at the local and global levels and supports 
the struggle to transform both the objective indicators of crises on the continent 
while embracing the struggle for “voice,” “representation,” and “agency” of 
coloni[s]ed peoples from internal and external forces of oppression and exploitation 
(Soyinka-Airewele and Edozie 2010: 28).  
These modes of writing cannot be reduced to what Mbembe suggests. They even 
go further to interrogate the local and the global situation. To argue that the mode 
of writing by African subjects is preoccupied with the authentic past and 
nostalgic return to it is a gross misrepresentation. This is the view held by Scott 
(2009: 7) who writes: ‘[w]e need, in other words, to give up constructing an 
image of colonialism that demands from us an attitude of anticolonial longing, a 
longing for anticolonial revolution’. Since the oppositional tradition has become 
the mode of writing for the African subject, and also the mode that is angry, as 
Falola (2005) defends, it is essential to reiterate that this mode of writing the 
African self is informed by decolonial critical analysis to expose the continued 
subjection that befalls the African subject. Not only is this blamed from the 
external, but internal as well.  
So, it is the critics of both the internal and external form to subjection. In an 
attempt to challenge subjection and to free themselves from it, African subjects 
should name, reflect and act upon subjection (Alschuler 1980). For Alschuler, by 
naming subjection, African subjects will the capacity to identify and this is the 
way of defining a problem; by reflecting on it is to understand the causes of 
subjection and by acting on it is to engage in measures to resolve it. It is 
important in their modes of writing that African subject should name, reflect and 
act on their existential conditions that are clouded by subjection. Therefore, they 
should not be denied the manner in which they articulate these modes of writing 
and the position they purport and defend. The politics of repetition cannot 
emerge from these modes of writing as Mbembe (2002a; 2002b) suggests, but 
they can only emerge is if the African subjects depend on the oppressor to free 
them from subjection (Alschuler 1980). If they rely on the oppressors ideology to 
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free them from subjection they are bound to reify subjection, the politics of 
repetition par excellence.  
The contention by Zeleza (2010) is the glibly dismissal of African difference and 
world significance by those who had the disempowering theories in relation to 
African subjectivity. Zeleza is critical and in opposition to the accomodationist 
project that is advocated by Mbembe that African subjects must embrace 
worldliness. Of concern to Zeleza (2010: 75) is the ‘gestures of intimate 
familiarity with Western intellectual fads or for refuge from dealing with the 
structural deformities of the postcolonies and postapartheid South Africa’. What 
is of concern to Zeleza (2003) is Mbembe’s disdain for Africanist scholarship 
and also his denial of African authenticity, identity and difference.  
On the contrary, Mbembe (2002a) and Dirlik (2002) view that colonialism and 
imperialism are exhausted and subjection in its various forms is disappearing is 
reinforcing the idea that there should be no resistance to coloniality of 
knowledge. Zeleza (2003) acutely points out that Mbembe’s essay was a 
desperate attempt to couch African subjectivity to be included in the universal 
and that it should abandon is demands of uniqueness, sovereignty and self-
determination. These are political demands that are part of African subjectivity 
and they will never wane, as long as subjection continues. Zeleza highlights, in 
response to Mbembe’s concern of ghettoisation of African subjectivity that the 
question is about the terms of engagement, and those should be, of course, 
dictated by the African subjects themselves. The idea of opening up to the world 
should be done in the terms of the African subjects. Zeleza (2003) correctly point 
to Mbembe that the international that Mbembe refers to, is the very same one that 
marginalised and continues to marginalise Africa. As such, gravitating towards 
it, in order to get out of the ghetto, seem to suggest the complete surrender to it, 
and become the appendages of the international.   
Murunga (2004) argues that Mbembe’s attack on African subjects, particularly 
their Africanist scholarship is based on the fact that they are trapped in the self-
imposed ghetto that has steeped them into a dead-end. These borders on the 
stereotypes that are being bandied around that African subjects cannot think. For 
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them to do so, they must be acted upon. It is clear that Mbembe is, by and large, 
in total opposition to African subjects writing themselves. As Murunga states: 
Whatever strategy the [p]ostcolonialists/culturalists adopt, three conclusions are 
inescapable. First, because they disengage identity issues from the broader 
domain of human social experience, they end up treating culture as if it were 
suspended above economic and political realities. Their works are largely 
ahistorical, they treat identity as a sign or text inscribed with multiple meanings 
that need only to be deconstructed as an exercise in mere intellectual curiousity 
and elegance. By laying out the notion of identity as multiple, shifting, entangled 
and intersecting, it becomes possible to render a permissive idea of Africanity as 
a tabula rasa on that one can create an identity at will, devoid of any relation to 
historical and social reality (Murunga 2004: 27).   
It is clear that Mbembe’s mode of writing, or the one that he criticises African 
subjects for not adopting, is the mode of writing that is not centred on Africa. 
African has been reduced to a footnote by Mbembe and this is coloniality of 
knowledge at its best. As Murunga asserts, Mbembe is silent on the mode of 
writing that objectifies Africa, the mode of writing located in the Western canon, 
that is loaded with the negative view of Africa. In light of Murunga’s view, the 
idea of multiple ancestries as propagated by Mbembe and also by extension, 
other postmodernist thinkers, avoids the polaristic nature in that Africa is put at 
the receiving end of subjection. ‘As often as possible, the smothering is 
accompanied by equally deceitful slogans of peaceful globalisation or an 
accommodating multiculturalism in that African identities are allegedly equally 
paired with other identities globally’ (Murunga 2004: 27). There can be no 
pairing whereas there is subjection. African identity is the other, and in no ways 
it is regarded as equal with other identities. If not, there could have not been any 
subjection. But subjection exists to correctly point out that there is no pairing. 
The mode of writing that African subjects must adopt, its canon is irrelevant in 
explaining the existential condition that still traps African subjects. What is 
essential for Murunga not to ignore the totality of the African experience as 
Mbembe does. Combativeness of African subjectivity is dismissed by Mbembe, 
while he imposes pliant sameness. As Murunga argues, resistance to subjection 
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cannot be confused with resistance to change. The change that should not be 
advocated is the change that supposes that subjection should be avoided in 
pursuit of another ideal. It is clear in African existential conditions that 
subjection is part of the problem and it must be engaged. ‘With regards to self-
writing, there can be no doubt that the pernicious effects of racism, their 
connection to capitalism and empire have influenced African cultural identities 
and generated specific modes of self-writing’ (Murunga 2004: 16). 
Zegeye and Vambe (2009) argue that African subjects are castigated and faulted 
for using their own epistemological devices of decolonial critical analysis to 
challenge subjection. Subjection, that Zegeye and Vambe (2004: 10) coin as ‘the 
unequal historical relationship between Africa and Europe’ is something that 
cannot just be ignored or wished away. It is still embedded in the modes of 
writing by the African subjects. The modes of writing that calls for the 
emergence of the Africa subjects are quickly criminalised as the return to the 
purist pre-colonial past. Even if these modes of writing are not in that nostalgic 
sense, they are quickly criminalised as such. This is done for the sole purpose of 
silencing them, and them not engaging subjection. When the modes of writing by 
the African subjects borrows from the globalised canons they are accused, and 
when they call for the rethinking of the precolonial past, the same predicament of 
being criminalised applies (Zegeye and Vambe 2009). The mode of African 
writing that dares to pronounce precolonial will be met with fierce criticism of 
being archaic, primitive, romantic and static to name but a few labels that are 
also meant to vulgarise. Zegeye and Vambe refer to this strategy as creating a 
‘political and ideological cul-de-sac’ to immobilise African modes of writing. 
For Mbembe (2002b), African modes of writing have failed to write Africa for 
itself, and he regards the mode of writing by the African subjects who write 
about themselves being plagued by the crisis of language (Zegeye and Vambe 
2009). It is clear that for Mbembe (2002b), the mode of writing should be 
externally authorised, and be embedded in the Euro-North American canon. 
There cannot be any form of authorisation and writing by the African subjects 
themselves. Their actions are criminalised when they write themselves, and it 
seems as if they must get authorisation and confirmation from the Euro-
American canon and episteme on how they must write themselves. The African 
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modes of self-writing are no singular but plural, due to the context specificity of 
subjection. As such, these mode of writing if they are rooted in the existential 
conditions of the African subjects, cannot by any means, avoid subjection that 
informs their subject-position. This does not mean stasis, but the ‘new ways of 
thinking about and for Africans’ (Zegeya and Vambe 2009: 28). The new ways 
will not mean avoiding subjection, since new problems are still informed by 
coloniality of knowledge and decolonial critical analysis is essential to engage in 
the mode of writing that is embedded in African subjectivity.   
On the geography of writing: cosmopolitanism and Afropolitanism  
Mbembe (2002a) puts forth that Afropolitanism is practices of the self—in that 
the politics means the continuous shift—that is, stylising the self. The mode of 
writing the self takes the self as the nomad and sees difference as the moment of 
rapture. Difference is appreciated as it is seen as the bridge that will lead to the 
striving of sameness. Mbembe’s modes of writing suggest that Afropolitanism is 
the appropriate mode of writing. Osha (2005: 154) purpots that ‘Mbembe is 
reflecting on the state of academic discourse on Africa [that] seek to differentiate 
his own discourse from existing crtitical formations’.  The term, Afropolitanism 
was coined by Mbembe, and it is often identified with him. The mode of writing 
in the Afropolitan sense embraces ‘culturally hybrid existence’ (Kwabe 2011: 
49). In no way does Mbembe’s conception of Afropolitanism problematise 
coloniality of knowledge and this is mainly because it is created and exists within 
the rubric of coloniality of knowledge. By manner of amplification on what is 
Afropolitanism and its mode of writing Mbembe passionately argues that: 
Awareness of the interweaving of the here and there, the presence of the 
elsewhere in the here and vice versa, the relativisation of primary roots  and 
memberships and the way of embracing, with full knowledge of the facts, 
strangeness, foreignness and remoteness, the ability to recognise one’s face in 
that of a foreigner and make the most of the traces of remoteness in closeness, to 
domensticate the unfamiliar, to work with what seem to be opposites—it is this 
cultural, historical and aesthetic sensitivity that underlies the term 
“Afropolitanism” (Mbembe 2007b: 28). 
Mbembe also continues to hasten that: 
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Afropolitanism is an aesthetic and poetic of the world. It is a way of being in the 
world, refusing on principle any form of victim identity—that does not mean that it 
is not aware of the injustice and violence inflicted in the continent and its people by 
the law of the world (Mbembe 2007b: 28- 29).  
It is clear from this conceptual framework by Mbembe that Afropolitanism is the 
politics of newness, and as such, politics that are futuristic and, paradoxically 
alien to the subjectivity of the African subject. According to Mbembe, 
Afropolitanism is the creation of another way of being in the world. It means that 
the configuration is the new mode of writing the African self. Afropolitanism is 
that which connotes the personal, and identity formation signification (Kabwe 
2011). It seems that Afropolitanism as the mode of writing regards this 
interweaving of worlds as the opportunity for African subjects to seize, but then, 
being silent to coloniality of power. The notion of Afropolitanism has been 
inspired by Mbembe’s encounter with cosmopolitanism. According to Appiah 
(1997), cosmopolitanism is being the citizens of the world—that is, the 
cosmopolitan patriot. Even to Mbembe, Afropolitanism means being the citizen 
of the world, that of course, being Africans who are accommodated in the 
cosmopolitan configuration. It essentially means, the cosmopolitan project done 
in Africa. Appiah (1997: 619) writes: ‘[c]osmopolitanism and patriotis, unlike 
nationalism, are both sentiments more than ideologies’. Even though there are 
various interpretations of what cosmopolitanism is and what is patriotism, what 
remains to be explained by Appiah is the place of subjection in this formulation.  
Cosmopolitan patriotism suggests the citizenship of belonging to nowhere in 
specific geographic terms—it is mobility in the forms of circulation of human 
beings. Appiah (1997: 618) argues that this comes with the sense of enjoying 
‘migration, nomadism, diaspora’. Bentley and Habib (2008: 4) argue for 
cosmopolitan citizenship as ‘the essential foundation for, the outcome of, a 
globalised world’. This is seen as the realisation of citizenship, not only in the 
global sense, but also on the site of political existence. ‘The political co-existence 
of citizens depends on being able to agree about practices while disagreeing 
about their justification’ (Appiah 2006). Appiah calls for the universal values as 
a site of social exchange among different units of citizens to create a whole 
citizenship. Such values do not necessarily have to be agreed upon, rather they 
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are negotiated and contested towards reaching a mutual understanding and if not, 
tolerance. ‘We can live together without agreeing on what the values are that 
make it good to live together, we can agree about what to do in most cases, 
without agreeing about what is right’ (Appiah 2006: 71). 
Cosmopolitanism is propagated as a response to globalisation a response in that it 
imagines the possible on what globalisation was to become. That is, globalisation 
saw the homogeneity, convergence and divergence of economic boundaries and 
yet undermining the character and form of the nation-state. Cosmopolitanism 
went further to chart a way for political imagination—the politics of sameness 
among citizens in the world. The major claim is that cosmopolitanism is a world 
of ethics, embedded in humanity, recognising differences and living in tolerance. 
Cosmopolitanism is said to shape the political discourse to bring to life the 
politics of imagination. This is the imagination that is lived through the pursuit of 
building non-racial communities that are non-nationalist. That is, a condition 
where differences are not a barrier and characteristics like race are transcended 
and what is important is the human value and ethics. Cosmopolitanism claims to 
lives in the state of values that are universal in nature, at the same time they have 
their locality. The emphasis of cosmopolitanism is to work towards the politics 
of sameness—that is, living together in difference and diversity. Appiah (2006) 
warns however that respect for human diversity does not necessarily mean that 
everyone is a cosmopolitan. At key is the celebration of cosmopolitan 
citizenship, the citizenship that has transcended race—the cosmopolitan 
citizenship (Bentley and Habib 2006).  
Cosmopolitanism sees the existence of the state as necessary but not in a 
Westphalian sense. That is, the state is tamed but is necessary precondition of the 
global order. Appiah (2006) argues that the cosmopolitan value of living together 
and of importance is to fight for common good. Politics of belonging or of being 
rooted to a specific geographic area (a nation-state in this sense) is featured with 
ambiguity, since belonging is not at the centre, but what is at the centre is to find 
oneself in that ambiguity—belonging and not belonging. Appiah (2006) 
emphasises the ‘web of relationships’ that are important in determining the 
political life. It seems from this that cosmopolitanism suggests the universal, 
finding commonalities everywhere, but the actors who are in conversation are the 
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ones that are (re)shaping the understanding of the political and the worlds 
attached to it. ‘Still, engagement that strangers is always going to be engagement 
with particular strangers; and the warmth that comes from shared identity will 
often be available’ (Appiah 2006: 98).  
The mobility of cosmopolitan political actors is that of mobility, they are creating 
the new world, the world of possibilities. Archibugi (2004: 465) is of the view 
that cosmopolitanism calls for ‘institutional reform in a democratic sense as 
opposed to the neo-/proxy-imperial global governance that America often calls’. 
Looking at the European model as a one of the examples of cosmopolitan 
formation due to its supranational structure, he states that such a formation is 
based on consensus between states. That is, the integration of states who share 
common interests (as the European Union as a regional body) but however 
warms that the European Union case cannot just be spread and applied 
everywhere without taking the localities into account. Archibugi (2004) in what 
he refers as ‘cosmopolitan democracy’—an initiative to globalise democracy and 
at the same time democratising globalisation, is a move in that there is a total 
overhaul in the ways in that democracy, globalisation and cosmopolitanism are 
understood. As such, this even calls for the leading Euro-North American liberal 
states. 
Cosmopolitanism is claimed to be the interruption of territory and it brings the 
politics of the new living.  It connotes the new forms of life, the life that consists 
of those who are making it in the world as nomads. That is, those with no sense 
of geographical attachment—the travelers, self-stylised individuals and the 
exiled who reduce the world into the abstraction (Mbembe 2001b). In a political 
sense, cosmopolitanism, it will be argued here, struggles to grapple with the 
pressing issues like migration, racism, xenophobia just to name a few. As such, 
the world is just reduced to abstractions and the concrete issues and the 
challenges that are facing the world are overlooked. Since so much emphasis is 
on the politics of transcendence, opening up to the world—the destruction of the 
local identity. Of primary should be the issue of humanity at large, something 
that calls for negation of race, gender, class, ethnicity to name a few.   
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It is clear from the notion of cosmopolitanism that Afropolitanism as formulated 
by Mbembe (2002a, 2007b) is the transplant of cosmopolitanism into Africa. 
Afropolitanism like cosmopolitanism from that it is indebted to, centre on the 
idea of migration and subject formation. ‘Afropolitans are a community of 
international wanderers who vacillate between feeling at home anywhere and 
nowhere’ (Kwabe 2011: 48). This means that the African subject must embrace 
the condition of belonging nowhere, as if the world is so accommodating for the 
African subject to belong nowhere. The African subjects by the virtue of being 
raced, often at times become homeless as the world that Afropolitanism says they 
must embrace is the very antithesis of their existence. The idea of belonging 
anywhere and nowhere is an illusion in existential terms of the African subject. 
There is no mode of writing that belongs nowhere. Though this is a fashionable 
claim, it borders on the absolute fallacy and deception of non-situatedness and 
this is coloniality of knowledge at best.  
More pointingly, even those who still embrace the idea of Afropolitanism, they 
are often reminded by the world they so wish to embrace as the same that they 
are still the dehumanised of this world. To suggest that African subjectivity 
should transcend space and time and engage in globalist imaginary discourses is 
scandalous. Kwabe (2011: 46) argues that Afropolitanism is ‘the project of 
probing issues of cultural identity and perfomatively investigating the nuances of 
a particular kind of subjectivity in order to creatively validate ways of being in 
the world that are becoming more increasingly common’. Zeleza (2010: 75) 
argues that Afropolitanism sells the idea of ‘to bring together the Africa-for-the-
world and Africa-for-itself’. Those who propagate Afropolitanism avoid, as 
Zeleza states, of showcasing the African difference to the world, but cast around 
minute cases of exceptionalism in order to be accommodated in sameness to the 
world. The idea the commonality of the world and the culture of sameness 
downplays the asymmetric global power patterns. It is also essential to state that 
the idea of sameness or common is dictated by those whom asymmetric power 
global patterns are in their favour.   
Mbembe (2007b) argues that there are interweaving of worlds, and this creates 
the different conception of the world as that of asymmetry and subjection. The 
argument being advanced by Kwabe (2011) and Mbembe (2007b) alike is that 
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the project of probing subjection fails to take into account luminal spaces, 
hybridity, conviviality and so on, and being reduced to binary cultural poles. The 
responsibility of the African subjects is to embrace this world, and what is not 
mentioned is how the principles of embracing difference, hospitality and 
tolerance are realised. These are mere liberal values that bear no relevance to the 
African subjects who are at the receiving end of subjection. It seems then, that 
the manner in which this world is re-configured is something that does not signal 
change in any form, but the masking of subjection—that is, the continuity of the 
past.    
Afropolitanism argues for politics that are not burdened by the past, and that is, 
of course, tradition. As such, being aesthetic and poetic, these are politics 
embedded in creating the African subject qua modernity. Mbembe (2002a: 265) 
captures Afropolitanism as a ‘[p]roject of reenchanting tradition [that] is based 
on a set of fragmentary ideas and social practices—on an imaginaire that draws 
its referents from both local and global sources’. Mbembe also adds that: 
Another vehicle for reenchanting tradition and recycling local identities that is 
coming to the fore is the market. The market’s role in the process is particularly 
apparent in the contexts of tourism and the politics of heritage (Mbembe 2002a: 
266).   
The world, in the Afropolitan sense, is not seen as a threat. The world is claimed 
to be seen as that of uncertainity embedded more in the politics of possibility. As 
Mbembe (2002a: 258) puts it, ‘on the contrary, it is imagined as a vast network 
of affinities’. In the Afropolitanism sense, the world is that of familiarity. The 
imagination of the world, its state and also that of becoming, should be reasoned 
along these lines. Mbembe argues that everyone can imagine and choose what 
makes them African. For Mbembe, being African is a matter of choice, not that 
of a historical accident.  For there to be a matter of choice for being African does 
not apply when the African subject want to be European or American. Even if 
the African subject is born and bred in the Euro-North American setting, the 
burden of being African still applies. The African subject is faced with 
subjection, that stems from the autochthonous and xenophobic nature of the 
world that Mbembe seeks to embrace. Why then, should those who are not 
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Africans have the right to choose whether they are Africans or not, but for 
Africans not being the matter of choice?  
According to Mbembe (2002a), Afropolitanism is that which is detached from 
essence and attached to the nomadic, since the self is created on the basis of 
continuity and also, uncertainty. Being attached to the nomadic means that the 
experience of uncertainty and, being in that of the adventurous nature, this gives 
the world a completely different configuration. Afropolitanism draws its ‘power 
from the rehabilitation of origins and membership’ (Mbembe 2002a: 265). This 
of course, is happening at the belly of the empire—globalisation.  
It can be further stated, under contemporary processes of globali[s]ation, the idioms 
of kinship deployed it the process of claiming citizenship-relations such as filiation, 
genealogy, and heritage—can be converted into recyclable resources (Mbembe 
2002a: 266).  
The drive of Afropolitanism is of course to Mbembe’s appraisal, the conversion 
to the ‘international lexicon of rights’ (Mbembe 2002a: 266). It is important to 
note that as far as the subjection of the African subject is concerned, 
Afropolitanism seems to be a mirage. It is a mirage in the sense that it does not 
deal with the existential condition caused by subjection. According to Mbembe 
(2007b: 29), ‘we need to move on to something else if we want to revive the 
intellectual life in Africa’. Being in favour of this move seems to be the move to 
nowhere in as far as African subjectivity that is supposed to be grounded through 
decolonial critical analysis. Though Mbembe justifies this move of ‘something 
else’ on the basis of Africans being dispersed around the world, this does not 
exonerate Africans from experiencing subjection, and of course through 
coloniality of knowledge. Even if the world can be seen as that of mobility, or 
what Mbembe (2002a) refers to as the ‘world in movement’, this does not take 
the explanation way that subjection is still the feature of this world. If this 
subjectivity is not grounded, and while being concerned with subjection, it will 
defeat the whole purpose of making the African subject to emerge. Mbembe 
makes a concluding note that: 
Attempts to define African identity in a neat and tidy way [have] so far failed. 
Further attempts are likely to meet the same fate as long as criticism of African 
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imaginaries of the self and the world remain trapped within a conception of 
identity as geography—in other words, of time as space (Mbembe 2002a: 271). 
Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis is akin to Mbembe who writes: 
From that conflation has resulted a massive indictment of the twin notions of 
universalism and cosmopolitanism, and in their place a celebration of autochthony—
that is, a construction of the self understood in terms of both victimhood and 
mutilation (Mbembe 2002a: 272). 
Afropolitanism seems to be the mode of writing that is ‘flexible’ and its 
geography is fragmented and not identifiable to Africa is the locus of 
enunciation. The locus of enunciation being something that is arbitrary of course. 
This arbitrary nature is because of having the ability to imagine, since there are 
no borders of imagination, and rightly so, to choose. Mbembe’s stance is that the 
mode of writing for the African metropolis is the writing of possibility, 
complexity, and conviviality to say the least. Afropolitanism is basically the 
mode of writing advocating coloniality of knowledge and with its claim of 
locating such a space on par with that of the rest of the world. What is not 
mentioned by Mbembe is that Afropolitanism is the mode of writing Africa from 
the Euro-North American canon; the very thing that reinscribes coloniality of 
knowledge. It is in this mode of writing where those who are in Africa and at the 
receiving of subjection must embrace modernity as it is, even if it is in crisis and 
does not even apply to their existential domain mainly because the existential 
condition of the African subject being that of exteriority par excellence.  
The mode of writing should not even affirm decolonial critical analysis stance—
oppositional and resistant—to that of the Euro-North American canon that 
Afropolitanism advocates. The myth of coloniality of knowledge is the 
narcissistic image of the Euro-North American episteme and how it sees itself in 
writing Africa and not Africans writing themselves. Afropolitanism as the mode 
of writing does not take epistemological considerations of the African subject 
qua decolonial critical analysis into account. The geography of reason is not in 
Africa and it is elsewhere, since Afropolitanism calls for hybridity and non-
situatedness. The African subject must continue to follow that mode of writing. 
Though Afropolitanism is on the point of emergence, it requires the African 
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subject to speak to the world. Afropolitanism being that of the worlds—the 
African subject and is subjectivity—it puts emphasis on, to name but a few, the 
notions of neighbourhood, brother/sisterhood, responsibility. Also, the mode of 
writing of Afropolitanism is preoccupied with citizenship, democracy and 
humanity.   
Mbembe states that Afropolitanism is infused with the African modes of writing that 
constitutes a capacity for narrative synthesis—that is, a capacity to generate as many 
stories as possible in as many voices as possible—can sustain the discrepancy and 
interlacing multiplicity of norms and rules characteristic of our epoch (Mbembe 
2002a: 272). 
According to Mbembe, Afropolitanism is the globalised way of thinking and 
writing Africa. That is why he regards Africa writing itself to the world, and in 
doing so, African subjects must assert themselves to the world. This assertion to 
the world has been done by African subjects in various trajectories of their 
struggle against subjection. Since they have been expressing themselves in the 
modes of writing that Mbembe does not approve, and that even unmask 
Afropolitanism as an illusion, that is why they are referred to as traditional, 
which is to suggest that they have not written to the world. Even though Mbembe 
(2002a), calls for the mode of writing that is in ‘wayward form’, it lacks the 
‘within form’. For Mbembe, Afropolitanism presents a new form of writing 
and/or re-writing modernity. It is the mode of writing that transcends borders. It 
is the mode of writing of the interconnection and the in-between. The mode of 
writing that takes the within form takes seriously the existential condition in that 
the African subjects find themselves. It is the form of writing that is not obsessed 
with subjection, but committed in exposing it for what it is.  
It is not clear from Mbembe, that element is important in relation to 
Afropolitanism, whether it is African or cosmopolitanism (Ohwovoriole 2011). 
Although Afropolitanism claims being rooted in Africa and then speaking 
affirmatively to the world, it is essential to ask how Africa affirms itself while it 
belongs nowhere. The world is not universalist as it is represented. The world is 
the solidarity of continents, the Euro-North American formation sees itself as the 
world and, as a result, other worlds are peripherised and/or at worse, are rendered 
not to exist. Afropolitanism, in its gravitation, seeks to gravitate towards the 
147 
 
Euro-North American world, hence Mbembe’s defence of coloniality of 
knowledge. Afropolitanism is then, that which advocates for the accomodationist 
project in the asymmetric power dynamics of the world. This partly explains the 
censure of subjection, but the advocacy of sameness, rights and responsibilities. 
This accomodationist project is deliberate construction of modernity that does 
not allow subjection to be problematised since this will bring material realities 
into the fore, something that calls for the opposite of what is anticipated. In other 
words, taking into account the questions of justice and reparation, that are denied 
by modernity qua subjection, this will disrupt the whole project of 
Afropolitanism.  
Bringing the questions that systematically problematise subjection, the answers 
to these questions are the ones that will disrupt the whole project of modernity 
that is advocated and defended by Afropolitanism. The nature of these questions, 
that are concerned with subjection are so potent that they collapse the very logic 
of exclusion and deception of modernity. If Africa must affirm itself to the 
world, the questions of subjection must feature, to collapse the asymmetrical 
world. Afropolitanism will just be reduced to a myth and fantasy if subjection, 
that it detests, does not form part of the equation Therefore, there is nothing 
different on Afropolitanism and cosmopolitanism since Africa is still in the 
margins and non-existence—the very configuration of coloniality of knowledge.   
Africanity: the mode of writing as necessity  
Mbembe (2002a) is in total opposition to Africanity as a mode of writing, and 
such opposition trivialises it through the politics of naming and vulgarity. 
Africanity as the mode of writing by African and for themselves is justified 
because of its popularity among those who are experiencing subjection and it is a 
way of negating coloniality of knowledge. What Mbembe advocates is the 
universalistic move that claims that humans are the same. This, Mbembe knows 
that is deception of coloniality of knowledge that claims that all humans are the 
same whereas they are not. In short, humans are not the same and the idea of the 
universal is exclusive as it only caters for those who think that they are human 
than others. Mbembe regards Africanity as something that is trapped within the 
mode of writing that celebrates the glorious past. It is essential to point out that 
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Africanity is not what Mbembe regards it to be. It has many genealogies, 
trajectories and horisons that are rooted in decolonial critical analysis. It is not, 
also, that which is trapped in the law of repetition that often leads to murderous 
violence. For Africanity to function, Mbembe (2002a) states that it is based and 
largely depends on superstition. Mbembe even goes further to charge Africanity 
as hatred of the world at large. According to this perspective, Africanity wants a 
world where others do not exist. For Mbembe then, it essentially means that 
Africanity should embrace the world, even such a gesture means submitting to 
subjection.  
As defined by Mafeje (2000), ‘Africanity is an assertion of identity that has been 
denied’. For Mafeje, being ahistorical is something fashionable, and this is 
propagated at the greater risk of historicity. Asante (2007) defines Africanity as 
‘generality to all of the customs, traditions, and traits of people in Africa and the 
diaspora’. Asante also affirms that Africanity broadcasts identity and being as 
modes of self-writing.  As a determined historical project, Africanity asserts its 
identity for the purposes of epistemological and ontological autonomy of the 
African subject. The moment in that subjectivity of the African subject exists, it 
struggles to emerge and subjection prevents it from such an emergence. For 
Mafeje, Africanity proffers a new form of identity, the emergence of the African 
subject. As Mafeje (2000: 67) states, ‘[t]o evolve lasting meanings we must be 
“rooted” in something’. This emphasises the importance of the African subject 
thinking from where it is, its locus of enunciation. The locus of enunciation is 
‘rooted in the present and the past’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 12). This is not only 
in geographical terms, but of importance, the epistemic location. This confirms 
the fact that knowledges are situated and the content and intent of Africanity is 
informed by its epistemic location.  
The epistemic location is concerned with the existential conditions of the African 
subject. This makes Mafeje (2000) in opposition to Mbembe, to argue that the 
‘free-floating signifier' is an illusion since all epistemic projects are grounded in 
the lived experience. To amplify Mafeje, Asante (2003) argues that Africanity is 
a place to stand on, a base that militates against the idea the floating signifier. 
The two reasons that Mafeje provides suggests the following: firstly, no 
epistemology and cognition takes place outside the existential conditions. 
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Secondly, historical juncture defined epistemology in social and intellectual 
form. Africanity is rooted in rebellion. It is, as Mafeje (2000: 67) asserts, ‘a 
conscious rejection of past transgressions, a determined negation of negations. 
Initially, such representations will not be credited by those who uphold the status 
quo’.  
Essentially, Africanity is the mode of writing that opposes and combats 
subjection. The mode of writing Africanity advocates for ‘is the affirmation of 
African political thought’ (Mudimbe 1988: 87). The mode of writing that 
Adesina (2008) proposes the African subject to gravitate towards is endogenity. 
Endogenity ‘refers to an intellectual standpoint derived from rootedness in the 
African condition; a centering of African ontological discourses and experiences 
as the basis of one’s intellectual work’ (Adesina 2008: 135). This is the mode of 
writing that is ‘grounded in and driven by the affirmation of African experiences 
and ontological accounting for the self’ (Adesina 2008: 134). Endogenity is the 
mode of writing that is derived from within the Africa and affirms the 
subjectivity of the African subject and from the epistemological and ontological 
point of African subjectivity. The mode of writing that Mbembe proposes is what 
Adesina refers to as extraverted account that borders on ‘the status anxiety of 
wanting to be cosmopolitan’ (Adesina 2008: 146). Africanity as the mode of 
writing qua endogenity is as Adesina (2008: 148) notes ‘[a]n unapologetic and 
relentless commitment to Africa’.  
Mafeje (2000) insists that Africanity is the politics of refusal. Such refusal stems 
from the mode of writing that is informed by ‘the conscious refusal to be turned 
into “free-floating signifiers”’ (Mafeje 2000: 67). Mbembe (2002a) still contends 
that Africanity is based on primordial reading propagated as democratic, 
progressive and radical. Africanity is the politics that creates ‘the neurosis of 
victimi[s]ation [that] fosters a mode of thought that is at once xenophobic, racist, 
negative, and circular’ (Mbembe 2002a: 252). According to Butler (1997), [t]he 
insistence that a subject is passionately attached to his or her own subordination 
has been invoked cynically by those who seek to debunk the claims of the 
subordinated’. African subjects are often blamed and also accused of being 
responsible for their own subjection. The attribution of blaming the victims of 
subjection seems to be common place in Mbembe’s thinking. Shivji (2003: 9) 
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argues that ‘Africanity and Africanness are demeaned if not demoni[s]ed, as the 
so-called “victimhood” mentality of the Africa’. This attribution of blame is done 
in the manner that it absolves subjection. As Bouris (2007) states, victim blaming 
has made the lives of victims tremendously difficult in a sense that victims are 
not allowed to articulate their suffering. This further victimises the victim instead 
of assisting such a subject, moreso in the context where subjection persists. The 
tendency of blaming the victims of subjection reifies subjection and as such, it is 
advocated to exonerate the perpetrators form responsibility.   
But then our philosopher Mbembe detracts from his insight by giving the impression 
that both the subjects and the objects of racism are guilty of the same crime. 
Rejecting racial subordination or being treated as the other cannot be construed as 
the reverse side of the same coin (Mafeje 2001: 15). 
Africanity exists because of subjection—a racist one for that matter because it 
de-ontologises the African subject. The structural positionality of the African 
subject is problematic in the sense that it is at the receiving end of subjection. So, 
it logically follows that subjection in its mode of operation creates the 
victimhood. Mbembe argues that the notion of victimhood is the one that makes 
the Africanity to be trapped in to the ghetto. ‘At the heart of the postcolonial 
paradigm of victimi[s]ation, we find a reading of the self and the world as a 
series of conspiracies’ (Mbembe 2002a: 251). It means for Mbembe then, the 
existential conditions that are pathological par excellence in their dehumanisation 
projects are a series of conspiracies when they are problematised. In opposition 
to Mbembe, Parry writes thus: 
If we look at the work of contemporary critics recounting figures of colonial 
resistance, not from rhetorical strategies of the dominant discourses but by revising 
dispersed and connotative informal sources, these projects do not appear as 
preoccupied with victimage, or as enacting a regressive search for an aboriginal and 
intact condition/tradition from that a proper sense of historicity is occluded— 
charges that have been made against such undertakings (Parry 1999: 217). 
To Parry, the outright criticism of discourses like Africanity, without engaging 
them is premature and it borders on coloniality of knowledge. Taking for granted 
the potency of subjection leads Laclau to opine, in defence of Africanity that: 
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Such institution, however, as we already know is not an arbitrary fiat but 
proceeds out of social demands and is, in that sense, inherent to any process of 
social change. This change, as we also know, takes place through the viable 
articulation of equivalence and difference, and the equivalent moment 
presupposes the constitution of a global political subject bringing together a 
plurality of social demands (Laclau 2005: 117).  
This then means, as Laclau stresses, that political logic is context specific, so as 
Africanity. Africanity is recreation and finding life for liberation from subjection. 
On the contrary, Mbembe (2002a) argues that it is in Africanity where the 
distinction between authentic and inauthentic is made. This distinction is the one 
that Mbembe warns that it can lead to violence and the paranoia of the native and 
the settler. Autochthony is linked to the politics of space and identity (Dun 
2009). Dun even goes further to suggest that autochthony is even linked to 
violence that informs the continuity of conflict. Dun regards autochthony is the 
producer of violence and violence in this sense has seductive power to evoke 
paranoia of ontic uncertainty. ‘Within autochthonous violence there is an implicit 
discursive and performative connection between clarity and purity’ (Dun 2009: 
123).   
It is important to then highlight that this distinction, of the native and the settler 
is not valid since there can be authentic and inauthentic within each of them. 
Also, the distinction between authentic and unauthentic cannot automatically 
lead to autochthony. It is not clear from Dun, that Africanity that suggests the 
authentic African subject at the level of its subjectivity and the existential 
condition that it finds itself, whether that leads to autochthony. For Mbembe 
(2003b: 629), Africanity ‘proposes a return to an ontological and mythical 
“Africannes”’. Contrary to Mbembe, Africanity goes beyond reversal, corrective 
and celebratory discourses and it should not be reduced to ‘fantasies and 
unnecessary mystifications’ (Mafeje 2001: 14). Duns (2009) is, however, correct 
to point out that autochthony is not new and is also not exclusively African as 
Mbembe seems to suggest. Autochthony is inherited from colonial practice as it 
‘continued after independence’ (Dun 2009: 114). Appiah writes: 
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The reason that Africa cannot take an African cultural or political or intellectual 
life for granted is that there is no such thing: there are only so many traditions 
with their complex relationships—and, as often, their lack of any relationship—
to each other (Appiah 1992: 80).   
In opposition to Appiah, Mafeje (2001: 14) argues that ‘Africanity is an 
expression of a common will’. Africanity, on this basis, does not claim any form 
of purity and it is not fundamentalist, it is concerned with African subjectivity 
qua subjection. Africanity is the discourse that crystallises around the politics of 
grievances, and as such, it is concerned with the manner in which they must be 
articulated and advocated by those who are experiencing subjection. In short, 
they must speak for themselves and in their own terms of decolonial critical 
analysis, as they are the one who are experiencing subjection. This can even be 
articulated in Laclau’s sense who writes: 
Under the circumstances, a natural reaction would be to assert the symbols and 
ideological values of society from that he (sic) has come, in order to express his (sic) 
antagonism towards the new society that exploits him (sic). Superficially this would 
seem to be the survival of old elements, but in reality, behind this survival is 
concealed a transformation: these “rural elements” are simply the raw material that 
the ideological practice of the new migrant transforms in order to express new 
antagonisms (Laclau 1977: 157). 
This opposes the point persistently made by Mbembe that Africanity is fixed and 
trapped the past. To amplify this opposition, Chinweizu et al. (1980) write: 
This cultural task (Africanity) demands a deliberate and calculated process of 
sycrenism: one that, above all, emphasi[s]es valuable continuities within our pre-
colonial culture, welcomes vitali[s]ing contributions from other cultures, and 
exercises inventive geni[o]us in making a healthy and distinguished synthesis from 
them all (Chinweizu et al. 1980: 239).  
This debunks the claim propagated by Mbembe that Africanity is archaic and 
static, and resists change. What is key in Africanity is that, it is ‘flexibility’ in its 
own terms, not those externally imposed, but its own. Africanity as Chinweizu et 
al. point out is informed by the process of experimentation. Experimentation 
serves ‘the purpose of moderni[s]ing and revitali[s]ing the tradition’ (Chinweizu 
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et al. 1980: 239). To modernise and to revitalise are in the own terms of 
Africanity and this suggests that the whole process of experimentation is not the 
nostalgia of the pre-colonial past. It is clear that Africanity is concerned with the 
existential conditions in that it finds itself, and the primary thing being on how to 
dismantle subjection. To dismantle subjection, Chinweizu et al. argue that the 
mode of writing by Africanity makes existential conditions that are 
incommunicable to be communicable.     
The antagonisms in it, do not only want to transform subjection, but to destroy it 
in order to create new forms of lives. Africanity is not reformist, but combative 
in intent. Such a stance justifies the need in of pursuit of liberation and as 
Chinweizu et al. (1980: 239) remark, ‘our culture has to destroy all encrustation 
of colonial mentality’. Mbembe (2002a) is correct to warn against the nativity of 
authentic and inauthentic subjects as they can degenerate into other forms of 
othering. But to point further than Mbembe, these other forms of othering often 
happen among the African subjects themselves, hence the causes of xenophobia 
among African subjects. There have been minimal cases in that the natives 
otherise the settlers. What is common is the settles othering the natives, through 
subjection, and the natives otherising themselves within categories given by the 
settler. It seems, in Mbembe’s view that Africanity should not confront and 
combat subjection, but avoid it and pretend that it does not exist. This is what 
Mbembe has to say about Africanity: 
According to this point of view, the history of Africa can be reduced to a series 
of subjugations, narrativi[s]ed in a seamless continuity. African experience of the 
world is supposed to be determined, a priori, by a set of forces—always the same 
ones, though appearing in different guises—whose function is to prevent the 
blooming of African uniqueness, of that part of the African historical self that is 
irreducible to any other (Mbembe 2002a: 243).  
The absence of grammar of decolonial critical analysis creates the problem in 
African subjectivity. The fear to exorcise subjection seems to suggest that the 
latter should not be seen as the source of the former. So, the mode of writing that 
should exist, as Mbembe suggests, is that of co-presence and creating the future 
for ‘all’ humanity. The amount of subjection afflicted upon the African subject, 
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is not comparable to any other form of suffering. So to Mbembe, subjection 
should not be linked with suffering. It seems then to Mbembe that suffering 
should be that of absence. If this is the case, the African subject even when such 
a subject can suffer from subjection, should not in any way point subjection out 
as the source of suffering, the right thing is for the victims of subjection to blame 
themselves, and not saying anything about subjection.  
According to Mbembe (2002a: 252), Africanity ‘is based on masks that are 
retained by remodelling them to suit the needs of each period’. He continues to 
argue that the politics of Africanity are based on ‘diabolic couple formed by an 
enemy—or tormentor—and a victim’ (Mbembe 2002a: 252). Dun (2009) seems 
to be in agreement with Mbembe to suggest that the modes of opposition by 
Africanity—or what Mbembe refers to as metaphysics of difference lead to 
accusations being launched against Africanity as victimary economy. Such 
economy is said to give explicit violence legitimacy and such violence is directed 
to those who are casted as unauthentic. It means then, whatever discourse that is 
structurally oppositional to subjection, and in favour of Africanity, is bound to be 
autochthony that leads to violence. It is here, as Mbembe suggests, that the 
enemy must be wiped out. So, it means that Africanity is the form of subjectivity 
that is preoccupied by absolute violence and total destruction. In addition to this, 
Mbembe also argues that the politics of sacrifice take precedence. To Mbembe it 
seems that this is what Africanity is all about. If indeed, that is the case, Mbembe 
attributes the naming to Africanity as murderous or by extension, that which is 
genocidal in tendency since it loathes the enemy. To Mbembe (2002a: 252) it 
simply means ‘politics as sacrifice and history as sorcery’. Mbembe seems to be 
silent though, about subjection that is murderous and genocidal, with the African 
subject as its target.  
Africanity does not degenerate into subjection as Mbembe claims, neither is does 
it trigger autochthony. Africanity as Mafeje states:  
At no stage did Africanity imply a desire to oppress others: the underlying sentiment 
has always been self-liberation and autonomy of the African subject’. It is a 
straightforward political and social issue determined by the march of times (Mafeje 
2001: 14; emphasis added).     
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Mbembe seems to suggest that Africanity is responsible for the continued crisis 
that still befalls the continent. But then, it is essential to question whether the 
victims of subjection should indeed be blamed for the crisis that is befalling 
them, and that uses some of the elements within the victims themselves to ratify 
subjection. This is not, of course, to exempt the African subjects, the victims of 
subjection that also have the responsibility, but then, to question the hierarchy 
and sophistication of forces of subjection at play. According to Bouris (2007), 
‘freeing the victim identity from its past simplicity is no doubt a radical departure 
from earlier victimi[s]ation discourse that posits the victim as an innocent and 
implicated subject’.  
Though this is true, is it, therefore, incorrect then for Mbembe to imply that 
African subjects are responsible for their own misery, and the presence of 
Africanity is something liable to that. Even then, it also seems that Mbembe does 
not engage subjection, something that in relation to Africanity, see as fiction 
driven by paranoia and not existential condition of the African subject. Mbembe 
(2002a) rejects the view that suggests that the long history of subjection seem to 
define the African subject. Mbembe dismisses the legacy of history that befalls 
Africa as a basis through that they should write themselves. It means then, the 
lived experience and existential conditions that Africanity engages should be 
ignored to suggest criticism against ‘naive critical attitudes with regards to the 
so-called struggles for national liberation’ (Mbembe 2002a: 243).    
Mbembe’s (2002a) critique of Africanity is rested on the following points. 
Firstly, he argues that Africanity is not seriously the colonial disruption that 
eroded the authentic African subject. Secondly, Africanity produces those who 
keep on enjoying and pursuing material benefits of colonialism. Thirdly, 
Africanity is criticised for inventing the narrative of liberation around premodial 
ideals and utopia. Fifthly, its notion of liberation borders on the obscene of 
acquiring power. Sixthly and finally, Africanity is not reflecting on the slave 
trade and colonial domination. To lump Africanity as the homogenous and 
mechanistic episteme by Mbembe’s critique, loses the fact that Africanity is a 
contested terrain and cannot be reduced to the points of criticism put forth by 
Mbembe. Mbembe (2002a) regards Africanity as the politics of sacramental 
practice that are premised on destroying everything that the master has. 
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As such, politics required a total surrender of the individual to a utopian future and to 
the hope of a collective resurrection that, in turn, required the destruction of 
everything that stood opposed to it. Embedded within this conception of politics as 
pain and sacrifice was an entrenched belief in the redemptive function of violence 
(Mbembe 2002a: 251).     
Africanity like many forms of Africanist epistemological interventions calls for 
the solidarity of African subjects, who happen to be, by virtue of circumstance, 
being at the receiving end of subjection. The solidarity of the African subjects 
has been a favourite response and antagonism to subjection (More 2009). African 
solidarity is racial simply because subjection is racist. Solidarity of the African 
subjects involves the question of how to combat subjection. At the centre of it, it 
calls for justice and humanity that is of necessity for the African subjects. For the 
fact that African subjects are at the receiving end of subjection, their subjectivity 
means that they collectively resist and combat subjection.  
In dominant African narratives of the self, the deployment of race is foundational to 
difference in general, but also to the idea of the nation since racial determinants are 
supposed to serve as the moral basis for political solidarity. In the history of African 
being, race us the moral subject and at the same time an imminent fact of 
consciousness (Mbembe 2002a: 254). 
Solidarity shows that Africanity is a bane to subjection. As such, subjection 
being a scandal avoids being exposed and it trivialises. According to Depelchin 
(2005), [t]he promotion of individualism has paradoxically resulted in the 
silencing of individuals when faced with assigning responsibility for crimes 
against the community’. What Mbembe does is the form of negating Africanity 
and making it to disappear, and deligitimising it—hence the loathing of racial 
solidarity—since what solidarity confronts is subjection, that is racial in its 
modes of operation. Africanity is not in collusion and complicit with subjection. 
Africanity gives power to form, to make the subjectivity of the African subject to 
be fuelled with agency to combat subjection. The African subject’s subjectivity 
lies in Africanity as it is a combative ontology.  If it does not combat subjection, 
the African subject cannot emerge and the spirit of combat comes with solidarity 
that is strength. Africanity is, according to Canovan (2004) typically 
confrontational and oppositional in style. This is of course, criminalised. 
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Africanity that is criminalised for most part of being angry in its modes of 
writing is defended by Fayola who writes: 
Contemporary Africans have a right to be angry, but they must also probe into the 
reasons for institutional failure, the roots of that lie in the colonial past. They must 
question the inherited forms of government, economy, and relations between Africa 
and the West. They must situate the African condition in a global context: a poor 
continent supports the industriali[s]ed West with its labo[u]r, raw materials, and 
service payments on debts, among other mechanisms that transfer wealth abroad. 
They must situate African politics in the context of colonialism: modern political 
institutions are derived more from the colonial past than the pre-colonial (Falola 
2005:4). 
It is clear from Falola that the right for the Africans to be angry is justified and as 
such, such anger is rooted in the existential conditions that Africans find 
themselves. To criminalise the anger of Africans is not justified since this 
criminalisation, as Mbembe does through politics of naming and vulgarity 
deliberately chooses to ignore the existential conditions of the African subjects 
and chooses to name events. Slavery, colonisation and apartheid are not only the 
events and they are the lived experience of those who are at the receiving end of 
subjection and there is no way that they should not be mentioned or referred to in 
the modes of affirming Africa subjectivity. These are the events of 
dispossessions and these are the events that produced angry subjectivities which 
are justified. As such, slavery, colonisation and apartheid should be subjected to 
critique, even though such a critique is angry. As Mafeje (2000) argues, 
Africanity would have not existed if there was no racism. The anger that is 
featured in the modes of writing Africanity critique the colonial and the neo-
colonial, the latter that have taken over from their masters but still serving them. 
Africanity is concerned with the postcolony’s inheritance of the colonial virus 
that kept the infrastructure of subjection intact. To realise autonomy is to be 
liberated from subjection, and his is what is essential for Africanity that wants 
the liberated African subject. Liberation can be realised through solidarity, since 
Africanity is the act of the political. That is, for Africanity to emerge, the 
struggle for liberation must be pursued in collectively due to the collective nature 
of the existential conditions.   
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Africanity qua African solidarity exists because subjection negates and denies 
them personhood. The modes of writing deployed by Africanity are that of 
necessity and as such, the practice of naming and vulgarising such modes of 
writings is of no help. Mbembe (2002a) states that the modes of writing 
Africanity is the mobilisation that is in the service of a partisan struggle. As 
More (2009) points out, the critics of African solidarity dismiss it as racially 
divisive, irrational, morally objectionable and racist. It is important to point out 
that the struggle of the African subjects should be partisan if need be since 
subjection singularises the African subjects in its modes of operation. According 
to More, Mbembe is of the view that any race based solidarity—and that is, by 
blacks attempting to solidarising themselves—that it is racist. Mbembe avoids 
the ‘fact that racists consciousness always operated at the level of the collectives’ 
(More 2009: 34). In other words, African subjects are racialised through 
subjection for the mere fact of being black.  
If, as it is commonly agreed, racism is predicated on the assumption of the existence 
of race, if race refers to a collective or group of human beings with certain socially 
identifiable physical traits, then racism cannot be a phenomena directed against a 
single individual; its reference to a group. Consequently, to the racist consciousness, 
human beings always exist as collective wholes and their identities inhere in those 
collectives (More 2009: 34). 
The writing of the self, of that of the African subject through Africanity, should 
not lose sight of solidarity that Mbembe labels as partisan struggle. More (2009) 
asks the following fundamental question: ‘[h]ow should human beings react 
when others constitute them into a collective based on certain features deemed to 
warrant hostile and negative treatment of those so characterised?’ The answers to 
this question indeed justify Africanity as the mode of writing, as necessity of 
course.  
The modes of writing by Africanity are that sutures fractured pieces of ontology 
and epistemology of the African subject. To suture is to intensify solidarity that 
is necessary for restoring African subjectivity. So, the mode of writing cannot be 
that of the African self to be stylised, but the African selves to be liberated from 
the tentacles of subjection. Africanity asserts that the African subject is the figure 
of solidarity—not that of nomadic fragmentation, displacement, difference and 
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hybrid and these are things that perpetuate coloniality of knowledge. The 
opposition to solidarity borders on the idea that there is no subjection and the 
world is hospitable and accommodating. Subjection is the antithesis of solidarity, 
and the manner in which it operates constitutes the unitary face that singularises 
the African subject in the unified whole to disfigure and destroy it. Since 
Africanity calls for solidarity on racial grounds, subjection operates though the 
racial logic that criminalises the African subject ontologically and 
epistemologically.  
So, for there to be a point of emergence of subjectivity, solidarity of the African 
subject is of necessity. What attacks this solidarity seeks to maintain subjection. 
The case being of course, such solidarity has the strength to confront and counter 
subjection in fierce terms. Africanity, rightfully so, advocates solidarity on the 
basis of necessity. It is clear that solidarity does not emerge in a vacuum, but out 
of circumstances of subjection. The African subject is ain a structural 
positionality of being made the subject of survival, something that Africanity 
opposes. Such opposition makes Africanity, as Mbembe does, to be criminalised. 
More (2009) explains the fact that those who are in opposition to African 
solidarity cry racism. Mbembe who is the critic of African solidarity says nothing 
about subjection that is something resisted an combated by those who advocate 
African solidarity. The famous question that is seen as a desparate attempt to 
evade subjection and criminalise African solidarity as More (2009: 22) puts it is: 
‘[s]hould we not just reject black solidarity and embrace interracial or cross 
racial antiracist solidarity instead?’ This question is a form of bad faith, the flight 
from responsibility (Gordon 1995). It is the question that pretends as if 
subjection does not exist, and it is aimed at creating the impression that those 
who are advocating for African solidarity are in pursuit of a worthless cause.  
African solidarity, a worthy cause, is informed by the need and quest for 
liberation—the very antithesis of subjection. As More (2009: 27) puts it, 
‘[s]olidarity is a product of positive reciprocity’. It does not aim to execute 
subject as Mbembe suggest that it is a mere autochthonous practice.  
Subjection, in terms of Africanity is that which should be combated. The mode 
of writing through solidarity, as Africanity does, suggests the necessity of the 
emergence of the African subject. The tool of naming and vulgar are also 
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confronted in showing their limits, and as deployed to Africanity they are assume 
words like ‘regression’, ‘autochthony’, ‘reverse racism’, ‘victimology’. This is 
done just to cast Africanity in a negative light as coloniality of knowledge done 
when African subjectivity engages in politics of antagonism. This is what 
Mbembe says: 
We are told that African history is essentially governed by forces beyond Africa’s 
control. The diversity and the disorder of the world, as well as the open character of 
historical possibilities, are repeated in accord with conspiracy always fomented by 
the forces beyond Africa’s reach. Existence itself is expressed, almost always, as a 
shuttering (Mbembe 2002a: 251-252). 
Africanity, with what Mafeje (2000) adds that it is combative ontology, also 
emphasise the point that it is of necessity. The mode of writing as necessity is 
decolonial critical analysis and, as More (2009) points out, it is wedded with 
African solidarity, and it is not just a mere pledge, but intent that translates into 
actionality. It is the mode of writing that shows that African subjectivity is the 
site of resistance and politics of commitment. It is not a mere response, but 
resistance infused with a combative spirit. For the fact that there is resistance, it 
means there is subjection.  
Thus, for example, if one examines the historiography of resistance in Africa, the 
interest is focused on the facts of resistance, and less on how the resisters defined 
and understood in their flesh, so to speak, what they were resisting. The fact that 
those histories were not written either by those who actually resisted or their 
descendants did make a difference. The questions they would have liked to be asked 
tended to be pushed aside, and covered, silenced by questions reflecting the interests 
of professional researchers (Depelchin 2005: 5). 
African solidarity is advocated and defended by Africanity against subjection. If 
Africanity was responding to fictionalised conspiracies as Mbembe states, there 
could have been no fierce ratification from those who are not at the receiving end 
of subjection. According to Parry (1999: 222), ‘while the reciprocity of the 
colonial relationship is stressed, all power remains with the Western discourse’. 
This is what Africanity is combating. It is not as Mbembe claims, that Africanity 
fights against what does not exist—fictionalised conspiracies. It has to be 
interrogated why so much effort is made to name and vulgarise Africanity 
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instead of it being left alone, if it is a fictionalised conspiracy. Such fierce attack 
to Africanity simply means that those who engage in coloniality of knowledge 
and are complicit to it do not want the African subject to emerge. Mbembe insists 
that Africanity with its politics of sacramental sacrifice is characterised by two 
tensions of the move. The first is the universalising move that is informed by the 
politics of sameness. The second is opposed by politics of opposition—the 
particularistic move. According to Mbembe (2002a: 253), ‘the latter move 
emphasi[s]es difference and specificity by accenting, not originality, as such, but 
the principle of repetition (tradition) and the values of autochthony’.  
Africanity interrogates through its resistance, dissent and combat, the manner in 
which subjection masks itself in coloniality of knowledge. This masking serves 
the purpose of mystifying the existential conditions of the African subject, and 
reducing the claims that point out to subjection to mere ridicule, and at worse, 
naming and vulgarising them for the purpose of negation. Africanity as a form of 
subjectivity stands in opposition to pacification. This oppositional character 
stems from the fact that ‘the colonised were never successfully pacified’ (Parry 
1999: 215). According to Parry, problematising the subjection is indeed the work 
of oppositional practice. Africanity is the counter-discourse, with its combative 
modes of writing that creates the African subject who is not pacified. This is not 
opposition for its own sake—but it is subjectivity that makes the African 
subjective to move to the affirmative position. Subjection makes the African 
subject to fail ‘to contest the conventions of that system of knowledge it 
supposedly challenges’ (Parry 199: 216).  
What explains such an effort can be attributed to the fact that Africanity exposes 
the scandal of subjection. The scandal is made to such an extent that the life of 
the African subject is made normal. ‘The idea of Africanity that is not black is 
simply unthinkable’ (Mbembe 2002a: 256). In response to Mbembe’s charge 
Mafeje (2000: 70) responds thus, ‘Africanity cannot be nurtured outside Africa’. 
So, therefore, this charge by Mbembe is indeed correct, and there is nothing 
wrong with Africanity being unthinkable outside the lived experience of the 
African subject. For the fact that Africanity is affinitive to decolonial critical 
analysis, this tells something about the existential condition of the African 
subject.  
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Africanity, according to Mafeje (2000: 69), ‘is an insistence that the Africans 
think, speak, and do things for themselves in the first place’. As Mafeje has 
warned, Africans who are at the bottom of the pile should think from the 
standpoint of Africa, and not the universal that bears no relevance to their 
existential conditions. Even though Mbembe also charges Africanity of being 
preoccupied with race and autochthony, he does not give genuine reasons why 
Africanity is like that. It is worth mentioning that Mbembe is silent on the 
Western subjects, and them being contaminated with subjection—the very thing 
that Africanity is in opposition to. Subjection is preoccupied with race, because 
for it to function, it must racialise African subjects. To amplify this, Mafeje 
(2000: 68) writes: ‘[f]or people who has been degraded and accorded a sub-
human status, it would not take much effort to fathom this reflex’.    
What Africanity confronts is the dehumanising project. It confronts what empties 
the ontological content of the African subject and such a project is racism. It is 
pivotal to point out that subjection survives because of racism. This racism qua 
subjection, attacks African subjects collectively. African subjects are subjected to 
subjection on the basis of being raced. That is, subjection becomes self-justified 
on the basis that is dehumanises that is raced, and that cannot be human. As 
More (2009: 36) elaborates, ‘[r]acism is dehumanisation and human alienation 
par excellence’. Subjection cannot hide its scandal if it is directed towards that 
which is human; it hides towards that which it dehumanises. For that the African 
is said to constitute lack, void and inefficiency that are the very basis of 
dehumanisation, subjection reigns with impunity. This is because there is nothing 
to be accounted for what is not human. Dehumanising in a way humanises 
subjection, a scandal.  
Africanity re-humanises the African subject and its subjectivity. This cannot be 
done only on the basis of recovery of tradition as Mbembe suggests. Mbembe 
argues that the recovery of tradition is so central that the African subjects have 
the anxiety of reaching the past to confront the humiliation of subjection.  So, for 
that to take effect, there is no need for that which is not the African subject and 
not in the receiving end of subjection to dictate when and how the African 
subject should be humanised, if it denies the existence of subjection as the tool 
for dehumanisation. Subjection dehumanise subjectivity, the latter that is the 
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component of the articulation and re-articulation of the political. According to 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007), articulation and re-articulation constitute contradiction 
interpellation—both that can, on the other hand, form the body of subjection.   
Africanity is not a type of mobilisation of social reality or existential conditions 
different from itself— but, constitutive of itself (Laclau 2005). If social reality or 
existential conditions are contaminated by coloniality of knowledge, the 
Africanity is the mode of writing as necessity. It is the mode of writing formed 
with the intent of combating subjection. This mode of writing is informed by 
making political demands. Africanity is a form of political demands. These 
demands, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 1141) argues, are turned into legitimate 
aspiration since they are the ‘way of constructing the political’. As Laclau (2005: 
74) argues, these are demands that are plural in nature that ‘constitute a broader 
social subjectivity we will call popular demands—they start, at a very incipient 
level, to constitute the “people” as a potential historical factor’.  These demands 
by African subjects through Africanity are articulated in ‘anti-status quo 
discourse ... [that] inscribe their demands as one more equivalent link’ (Laclau 
2005: 75). It is worth noting Laclau’s emphasis of political demands who writes: 
[T]he emergence of the “people” requires the passage—via  equivalence—from 
isolated, heterogeneous demands to a “global demand” that involves the formation of 
political frontiers and the discursive construction of power as an antagonistic force 
(Laclau 2005: 110).  
Adding to this, Mafeje notes: 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that those African intellectuals who insist on 
Africanity do not think of it only as a necessary condition for resisting external 
domination but also as a necessary condition for instituting social democracy in 
Africa (Mafeje 2001: 16). 
Africanity is decolonial critical analysis proper and it is embedded in the politics 
of commitment. As Chinweizu et al. (1980) argue the responsibility of the writer 
who is informed by Africanity is the mode of writing that is akin to socio-politico 
commitment. The mode of writing qua commitment is the locus of enunciation 
of the African subject and is largely concerned with the existential conditions 
caused by subjection. As Wa Thing’o (1997) notes that the way power in society 
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is organised and constituted can affect writers and their writing in several ways. 
The writer as a human being is a product of history, of time and space. The mode 
of writing form the African subject qua Africanity is informed by the collective 
experience of those who do not deny that there is subjection and it should be 
combated. Hence Africanity is a combative ontology (Mafeje 2000). Chinweizu 
et al. (1980) criticise the mode of writing that is informed by privatism that is 
pre-occupied with abstractions alien to the existential conditions. As Wa 
Thiong’o puts it: 
What the African writer is called upon to do is not easy: it is demanded of him that 
he recogni[s]e the global character of imperialism and the global character and 
dimensions of the forces struggling against it to build a new world. He (sic) must 
reject, repudiate, and negate subjection and be in pursuit of African subjectivity 
(Thiong’o 1997: 75; emphasis added).  
Privatism is the mode of writing that does not like to engage with the lived 
experience as they are much closer to trigger subjection, that privatism masks or 
avoids. Africanity as the mode of writing is informed by commitment that 
advances the courses of combating subjection. ‘Thus, Africanity, if properly 
understood, has profound political, ideological, cosmological, and intellectual 
implications’ (Mafeje 2000: 67). Africanity as the mode of writing that 
constitutes indefinite antagonistic articulation and re-articulations—is to 
understand the existential conditions that still traps the African subjects. 
Subjection is still intensifying. To suggest that the past, as Mbembe always 
stresses, is open ended does not mean the absolving of subjection. Africanity is 
the mode of writing as necessity for that the liberation of the African subject is of 
much importance.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter, decolonial critical analysis was deployed to shows that coloniality 
of knowledge is inherent in Mbembe’s conception of African modes of self-
writing that propagates the notion that Africa should be written from the 
epistemic loci of Euro-North American canon. This has been demonstrated by 
defending populism as the mode of writing qua African subjectivity, and that it 
has various genealogies, trajectories and horisons. As such, it is necessary to 
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understand populism from Laclau’s conception that removes it from the 
conventional pejorative understanding that borders on the politics of labelling 
and vulgarity. Mbembe is critical of African subjectivity in relation to the modes 
of writing and reduces it to two camps, namely: Afro-radicalism and nativism—
that he labels as occult or autochthonous practices, or to say the least, labelling 
this mode of critique as synonymous to flogging a dead horse. It has been 
demonstrated that in doing this Mbembe criminalises African subjectivity to be 
institutionalised, normalised and naturalised and this is coloniality of power.  
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the modes of writing that Mbembe 
proposes for the African subjects are problematic in so far as they negate the 
possibilities of autonomy of the African subjects from subjection. It has been 
demonstrated that the manner in which Mbembe’s essay has been engaged in 
Public Culture and CODESRIA Bulletin raises some problematic areas. Public 
Culture critics were not the ones that Mbembe attacked and they chose to 
respond, and the response has not been that of those who were attacked. The 
responses in Public Culture are enunciated from poststructuralists, 
postmodernists and postcolonialist canon’s that Mbembe is comfortable with. 
Mbembe entertained such critiques, while censoring the Africanist that he 
criticised. The CODESRIA Bulletin critics, the Africanists, were not treated in the 
spirit of engagement by Mbembe, but outright dismissal. It means, for Mbembe 
then, they were, and they are not worthy of engagement. The closing out of 
Africanists from Public Culture debates is ironic. 
The mode of writing that Mbembe proposes for the African subject is the one 
that embraces worldliness and stylising of the self. Afropolitanism is proposed as 
a way by Mbembe, and it has been demonstrated that it is not uniquely African, 
and it is transplanted from cosmopolitanism. So Afropolitanism is coloniality of 
knowledge and it avoids the existential condition of the African subject that is 
plagued by subjection. Afropolitanism will remain an illusion as long as 
subjection continues. The mode of writing that is relevant is the one that still 
draws from the anti-colonial critique, and that is concerned about the existential 
conditions of the African subject. Africanity, as the mode of writing that is of 
necessity, aims to understand the existential condition of the African subject 
from within as Mafeje insists.  
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The existential conditions being articulated are part of the lived experience of the 
African subject and the necessity of them articulating those conditions in their 
own terms for the purpose of their own liberation. Mbembe’s attack on 
Africanity as the mode of writing is akin to denying Africans to be angry of 
abuse. The anger of Africanity that is decolonial critical analysis is the mode of 
writing that is informed, to say the least, by political demands, construction of 
the political, enunciation existential conditions from within, and combating 
subjection—and this does this mean the creation of another form of subjection, 
but the emergence of the African subject. In the following chapter, coloniality of 
power will be challenged by examining Mbembe’s conception of power in the 
postcolony.           
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MBEMBE ON POWER IN THE POSTCOLONY 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, decolonial critical analysis is deployed to examine the notion of 
the postcolony as formulated by Mbembe to understand the performativity of 
power, the autocrat and the fetish, politics of eatery by the comprador 
bourgeoisie, the character of the African state and also, unmasking the notion of 
mutual zombification. This is done on the basis of understanding the conceptual 
underpinnings of Mbembe’s notion of the postcolony. Decolonial critical 
analysis is used here to unmask the notion of coloniality of power that is the 
subjection of the African subject. This pathology is attributed to the fact that the 
condition in the postcolony is dictated on external basis.  
This chapter will firstly explore the notion of performativity of power in the 
postcolony. It does this by asserting that this can be understood based on 
entanglement that is the defining feature of the postcolony. Secondly, the figure 
of the autocrat and the notion of fetishism will be analysed to account for the 
understanding of how power is performed in the postcolony in relation to the 
notion of commandement. Thirdly, the chapters will then examine the politics of 
eatery and the zone of accumulation. The argument is that there is no symbiotic 
relationship between the autocrat and the aristocracy surrounding him, but 
relational parasiticity and the zone of accumulation is global in scale and with the 
autocract as its appendage. Fourthly, the chapter considers the idea of the 
national project and the character of the African state by arguing that the past, 
present and future should be understood in terms of interconnectivity instead of 
being atomised. Fifthly and lastly, the chapter seeks to unmask the notion of 
mutual zombification as articulated by Mbembe and argues that the ruled are not 
complicit to their own oppression, but are subjects whose resistance is informed 
by agency.  
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Performativity of power in the postcolony 
The major contribution by Mbembe (2001a) is that of coining the concept of the 
postcolony that does not mean after colonialism but rather, sedimentation of 
epochs in one history. The postcolony is the interpenetration of epochs—that is, 
pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africa. What is the meaning of the 
postcolony, something that can be accounted for with much difficulty, to 
Mbembe it is the relatively easy in terms of resolving. For Mbembe, the ‘post’ 
does not mean after colonialism, the postcolony, therefore, is a history of stasis, 
the one that is caught in a singular space. The contribution of Mbembe also is 
that of not looking at these epochs in linear and separated terms, they are layers 
of a similar problem.   
Mbembe introduced the concept of the “postcolony” which is useful in capturing the 
mind-set of a particular calibre of leadership and a particular configuration of power 
and the unique of mode of postcolonial governance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b: 79). 
Mbembe’s contribution is indeed profound, but it does not trace the mechanistic 
and dynamic tools to understand how power in the postcolony is the constitutive 
part of asymmetrical relations and the structural logic that sustains the face of the 
empire and the postcolony being reduced to mere docility and the state of 
madness. In short, Mbembe does not engage the manner in which coloniality of 
power is constituted and also its mechanics. Decolonial critical analysis is 
deployed here to unmask coloniality of power in order to account how coloniality 
of power works. Bayart (2009: 106) agrees with Mbembe noting that ‘[t]he lines 
of concatenation, from the pre-colonial to the colonial and postcolonial phases 
have been added to the previous linkages’. The postcolony constitutes ‘puzzles 
and complexities bearing on old devils and new devils, chiefly African but also 
European’ (Davidson 1992: 320). The problems in the postcolony register the 
incomplete and mutilated African state and its existential conditions. As Mbembe 
(1992a: 3) opines, ‘[t]o be sure the postcolony is chaotically pluralistic, yet it has 
nonetheless an internal coherence. It is a specific system of signs, a particular 
way of fabrications simulacra or re-forming stereotypes’. The postcolony 
according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 235), is ‘imbricated in the colonial, 
nationalist, and even pre-colonial history and politics’.  
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The postcolony as it is, is still trapped in coloniality of power and this is showed 
by the paradox being that, the metropolis being the symbolic reality that weighs 
heavily in the colony. In addition, a better understanding of the postcolony is to 
locate it in the global order of colonial matrices of power—that is, the macro 
political scene. This will allow the intervention of understanding the locale 
within that power in the postcolony exists, and the global within that power in 
the postcolony is subjected to. Power in the postcolony should be understood in 
the manner of its performativity. Performativity, according to Mbembe (2006b: 
143), refers to ‘the sensory life of power in the postcolony’. For Mbembe, it is in 
the postcolony where power corrupts all senses. Performativity of power in the 
postcolony is in the manner of subjection to ensure that asymmetries remain 
intact. According to Butler (1997), power should be understood as forming a 
subject. For Butler, the subject is initiated through a primary submission to 
power, that reflects the omnipresence of power. The hierarchies of power are 
invisible but are alive as the African subjects who are at the receiving end, but 
cannot point them out can feel them. This then explains the condition—the 
postcolony, as the entangled time and space. 
For Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009), the postcolony originates and is a product of 
colonialism. Therefore, being the product of colonialism, the postcolony is still in 
the state of perpetual abyss. Such abyss can only be understood by unravelling 
the complex of the postcolony within coloniality of power using decolonial 
critical analysis as a rallying point of critique. The postcolony is a ‘terrain of 
conquest, violence, police rule, and authoritarianism’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 
259). The postcolony is the antithesis of liberation. To add to this, the newly 
independent Africa after colonialism as Davidson (1992) points out produced a 
form of nation-statism that did not continue the liberation project. According to 
Davidson (1992: 10), ‘liberation led to alienation’. This therefore does not mean 
there was liberation, but rather, its unbecoming led to alienation. In short, 
liberation did not materialise in the postcolony. As Olson (1993) argues, no 
society can work well in the absence of peace, order, stability and provision of 
public goods. The simple fact to denote from Mbembe (2001a) is that, the 
postcolony is the arrested discourse. There is no moving forward, centeredness, 
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and moving forward. What then features in the postcolony is the sense of 
disorder that makes it unanimous consent not to exist.  
Therefore, the postcolony as Mbembe suggests is the state of entanglement. In 
such a condition, the more attempts are made to disentangle; the more 
entanglement takes place. Thus, according to Mbembe (2001a: 14), ‘the 
postcolony encloses multiple durées made up of discontinuities, reversals, 
inertias, and swings that overlay one another: an entanglement’. The postcolony 
as it is an entanglement, points clearly to the fact that it is a dangerous structure. 
It is the era of harmful frontiers, the continent being an artificial framer—that is, 
entanglement. It is a place as it characterised by violence, coups, plots, 
clientelism, corruption, factionalism and succession uncertainities. As such, the 
postcolony is the era of instability. As Ralphs (2007) notes, entanglement and 
displacement are two sides of the same coin, where the positionality of the 
African subject is the entanglement of time. The opposite of the postcolony 
should have been that of ‘peace order, stability and nonmaterial security’ 
(Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 18).  
For Mbembe (2001a), conflict in the postcolony arises very easy simply because 
it is entangled and this is the entanglement of the phenomena that is chaostically 
pluralistic. In the postcolony the stakes are high when it comes to power and as 
such, power is pursued and actualised in whatever means necessary. For 
Mbembe, the postcolony lacks uniformity or commonality; it is shaped and 
reshaped in arbitrary terms. The postcolony is the inheritance of colonialism—
the mode of the state and its institution found on colonial model. ‘So these, being 
alien models, failed to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of a majority of African 
citizens, and soon proved unable to protect and promote interests of those 
citizens, save for a privileged few’ (Davidson 1992: 12).   
Power in the postcolony is regarded as its own making—that is, the postcolony 
has power and its own power. Power in the postcolony and the way it is 
performed is that of mimesis—however improvised. The power of the 
postcolony and its performance has been borrowed from colonial technologies of 
subjection, but that are still targeting the postcolonial subject. Therefore, power 
of the postcolony is not power in itself, but the power imposed. The postcolony 
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inherited, reinvented, refashioned and improvised colonial practices and methods 
of power. The postcolony has not seen competitive regimes, and also, the spectre 
of viable succession continues to haunt it. The postcolony when it comes to its 
own authenticity as far as power is concerned, is an illusion for that it draws from 
different methods and practices of power. So, power in the postcolony should be 
understood in the manner of its performativity. Mbembe (2001a) attributes the 
notion of entanglement in the postcolony and such attribution clearly shows the 
complexity of power.  
What exists in the postcolony is the full grip of power, and even if there is 
political change there has not been a huge mark of absence of political agency, 
but deadly conflicts. The postcolony can be said to be, as far as power is 
concerned, that which is fraught with controversy and melodrama. Power in the 
postcolony is performed on the basis of authoritarian tyranny. It is such that its 
absoluteness borders on the actual state of subjection. Power is performed in 
such a manner that it produces the regimes of rigidity that stipulates and dictates 
the political. Power is not legitimised but it is a tool to repress, punish and 
discipline. One party system is a form of governance and this make the 
postcolony to be a party state. Even though there is a multiparty system, the 
technology of one party is still intact since the ruling power can even subject the 
opposition to the level of timidity. Such nature makes the colonial structures to 
remain intact as they are institutionalised, naturalised and normalised becomes 
banal (Mbembe 1992b; 2001a). ‘Surges, abrupt cancellations, abundance, 
scarcity, inconsistency, and unpredictability are endemic to postcolonial life’ 
(Cole 2006: 201). Power in the postcolony takes the form of what Mbembe 
(2011a) refers to as the hybrid model of governance that constitutes of three 
elements namely: paramilitary, civilian and pseudo-customary. The hybrid model 
suggests the combination in that brutality and coercion is the paramount resource 
of governance. This model is replicated in the postcolony, such that it has the 
after-life.  
The postcolony is the era of the non-resolution, and as such, it has been a spectre. 
This essentially means the postcolony is not only entangled, but the era of further 
entanglements. The postcolony is fraught with incompleteness, it is that of the 
de-facto position. What is clear as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) points out is that the 
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postcolony is still trapped in coloniality of power. This can be traced far beyond 
the colonial encounter, and it can be understood in terms of how the making of 
the world constitutes the making of the ‘Other’. The existential condition for the 
other is in the postcolony. It is the condition of crisis that has normalised and 
institutionalised itself in the form of permanent crisis. The postcolony cannot be 
understood outside the realm of coloniality of power. The postcolony, to go 
beyond Mbembe, should not be understood as the phenomenon inaugurated by 
the African leaders and their elite when they failed in the state making project, 
but the sedimentation of epochs.     
Performativity of power in the postcolony is the manner in which coloniality of 
power works. This, therefore, means that the performativity of power in the 
postcolony as much as it can be a hybrid model as Mbembe (2011a) characterises 
it, its mode of improvising ratifies absence of power. This absence of power 
means that the power dynamics in the postcolony are indeed that of constant 
subjection from the colonial metropolis. In the postcolony, the modes of 
subjection are directed at those who are supposed to be liberated from coloniality 
of power. According to Mbembe (2001a), the postcolonial state institutions and 
political machinery are in place to ensure disciplinary power as the mechanism of 
governance. This is what Mbembe refers to as commandement and this connotes 
the idea that subjection and discipline are a priori. Commandement is the 
postcolonial regime that is informed by authoritarian domination (Robins 2004).  
Commandement is the system of rewards and punishments, its mechanism of 
coercive force finds place for the sole purpose of obedience and docility. 
According to Adeeko (2002), commandement as Mbembe theorises it, shows the 
parameters of the relations of subjection. As Butler (1997: 6) posits, ‘attachment 
to subjection is produced through the working of power’. What is necessary is to 
affirm the position that Mbembe’s reluctance to acknowledge the postcolony as 
the condition that created itself, but that which is design by colonialism, and even 
in its symbolic end, that will continue with the colonial legacy through 
coloniality of power. Performativity of power in the postcolony is the state of 
continuity, state of permanence. According to Decalo (1985), ruthlessness is 
institutionalised through commandement and as such there is little regard for 
human life. Commandement as Davidson (1992: 88) points out was ‘found to be 
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sufficiently reasonable in proving explanation, and sufficiently persistence in 
extracting discipline’. This has been befalling the postcolony and the emergence 
of the postcolony has been that of entanglement. Mbembe points succinctly that:  
[Commandement] embraces the images and structures power and coercion, the 
instruments and agents of their enactment, and a degree of rapport between those 
who give orders and those who are supposed to obey them without, of course, 
discussing them (Mbembe 1992a: 3).  
In the postcolony, commandement is the ‘authoritarian modality par excellence’ 
(Mbembe 1992a: 3). In short, commandement denotes colonial authority. The 
postcolony that Mbembe is concerned with is that state power creates its own 
meaning and institutionalisation of meaning. It is, the improvisation, re-making 
and reconstituting the colonial state in the postcolony. Hence the processes of 
making a universal code of meaning in the postcolony (Mbembe 2001a). 
Commandement has to be extravagant to show potency of performativity of 
power. It, as a form of technology of subjection and mechanism of discipline, it 
does not have enough power as it did under colonialism, except to say that it is 
has been improvised. And as such, to improvise does not necessarily mean 
projecting potency, the opposite is also true. In other words, the commandement 
in the postcolony might be improvised and made to appear potent—but it is just 
that, negation. ‘According to the formulation of subjection as both the 
subordination and becoming of the subject, power is, as subordination, a set of 
conditions that precedes the subject, effecting and subordinating the subject from 
the outside’ (Butler 1997: 13). For Butler, power on one hand is external to the 
subject and on the other it is the arena that the subject assumed or located in. 
This is because the becoming of the subject is indebted to power. This is through 
resistance, agency, complicity and ambivalence. Therefore, the emphasis is 
essential to put that the subject cannot be understood outside the realm of power.   
Nevertheless, the nature of the postcolony is such that, in its tenacity, to make 
commandement to be potent as far as the projection of power is concerned.  The 
simple reason is making the performance of power to be felt by the postcolonial 
subjects. Commandement can assume the state and the level of sorcery, and 
sorcery here should be understood as a technology of power. Such technology as 
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Ciekawy (1998) argues, applies to both the colonial and the postcolonial 
condition in Africa. It can be for Ciekawy (1998: 119) ‘both processes of state 
formation and the new forms of magic and the occult’. Ciekawy states that there 
are five technologies of power that ratify the notion of commandement. The first 
technology of power is witchcraft by commandement is the manipulation of 
discourses of witchcraft using the state apparatus. This often creates the 
impression that the state of that of the collective sense of being, whereas that is 
not the case since there are competing interests. The state apparatus can act in 
bad faith and charge witchcraft against those they perceive as a threat to the state 
and subject them to disciplinary power.  
The second technology of power involves the policing discourse of magical harm 
using the state apparatus. This is largely used to constrain and influence the 
subjects to act in the manner that is commendable by the state. As Ciekawy 
(1998: 128) has it, [s]tate agents have the power to prevent, survey and 
intervene’. The African subject in the postcolony is in a difficult position to 
defend itself against the might of the state apparatus that is often atagonistic to it. 
The third technology of power is the creation of sets of ideas and practices about 
the power of the state. This technology illustrates the ability of the state and its 
apparatus not only to repress or police, but creating dialogues of rule. Arenas of 
conviviality in those dialogues are created between the rulers and the ruled 
(Mbembe 2001a). The fourth technology concerns the negotiation and creation of 
common moral discourse—that is, a false sense of collectivism and consensus. 
The state apparatus emerge as those who can detect and identify mystical harm 
and its agents. The fifth and final technology is the production of ‘Othering’—
that is, naming and labelling ‘witches’ who should be eliminated, punished, or 
disciplined. These are politics of categorisation.  
These five technologies of power help to create the state both in the colonial and 
postcolonial epoch—though in differing degrees due to periodical and contextual 
issues (Ciekawy 1998). This is because these two periods are not linear, and 
indeed there was collaboration, co-optation and resistance. So in the postcolony, 
these modes of political action have created differentiality, though there has been 
a ratification of commandement. For Ciekawy, technologies of power are 
augmented by other overt technologies of power like political assassinations, 
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criminalisation of dissent, attacks by the state apparatus on protests, strikes and 
marches and detention of opposition leaders and members. This is done all in the 
name of commandement, at best; performativity of power in this sense is that of 
creating docility. According to (Ciekawy 1998), statecraft is paradoxical in that 
witchcraft and statecraft emerge dialectically, and in the continuous process. This 
suggests the fact that the idea of the state, both in colonial and the postcolonial 
sense, is embodied in or it embodies commandement. The impression created is 
that the five technologies of power, the very process of commandement are 
informed by interests of the ruled and the rulers and also preventing any form of 
harm. According to Decalo (1985), authoritarian patterns of governance have 
become a permanent feature in African political life. Authoritarian rule has 
become normalised and institutionalised.  
As Mbembe (2001a) notes, the postcolony in terms of performativity of power is 
particularly revealing, also dramatic where subjection and discipline are common 
place. The state in the sense of the postcolony relies on what Ciekawy (1998) 
refers to as technologies of magical power. The postcolony is clouded or pre-
occupied by performativity of power and the manner in which power is used to 
subject and discipline. This is the only way the postcolony can see itself. This is 
a form of banality of power ‘because it is made up of repeated actions and 
gestures’ (Mbembe 1992a: 3; 1992b: 1). This form of predictability means that 
the performativity of power is banal simply because it is known how power is 
performed and what will take place as the result of that performance. As 
Karlström (2003: 59) argues, ‘[t]he postcolonial state stages itself through public 
spectacles and imaginary—lavish presidential send-off and homecoming, 
proliferating national holidays, and elaborate state-sponsored titles and honours’. 
Ritual and routines of the state create subjectivities and identities that are tied the 
nature of governing citizens and ruling subject (or object) (Nuijten 2004).  
Mbembe has this to say: 
The signs, vocabulary, and narrative that the commandement produces are meant not 
merely to be symbols; they are officially invested with a surplus of meanings that are 
not negotiable and that one is officially forbidden to depart from and challenge. To 
ensure that no such challenge takes place, the champions of static power invent 
entire constellations of ideas; they adopt a distinct set of cultural repertoires and 
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powerfully evocative concepts; but they also resort, if necessary, to the specific 
political consciousness into being, but to make it effective (Mbembe 2001a: 103).  
Mbembe (2001a) claims to evoke the elements of the obscene, vulgar and 
grotesque that lurch on three things. Firstly, it is the timing and location of the 
occasion where the state power dramatises itself. Secondly, its actual material is 
used to project the majesty of power. Thirdly and finally, it is the invitation of 
the gaze by those who are watching the performance of power—that is, subjects 
in the postcolony. This is how Ciekawy puts it: 
Witchcraft technologies constitute a discourse of power concerning magical harm 
directed by human beings that is employed by people who have accesss to particular 
political and economic resources of the state that enable them to exert a dominant 
influence on the politics of magical harm (Ciekawy 1998: 123).  
The power of the state and its apparatus exists in a form of omnipresence by 
finding ‘ways of getting into its subjects most intimate spaces’ (Mbembe 2001a: 
121). The autocrat is said to have a spell. According to Adeeko (2002: 5), the 
autocrat ‘enjoys his tenure only because he has created some means of subjecting 
the citizens’. Power intensifies and improvises disciplinary mechanisms inherited 
from colonialism. Power intensifies and improvises itself to become the 
institutional, natural and normal state of affairs. Magical harm in the postcolony 
is that which corrupts all senses (Mbembe 2001a). The magical harm of the 
autocrat in a fetishist sense is actualised through the coercion of the state and its 
machinery. This makes the magical harms of the autocrat to assume a pervasive 
character and affect all forms of lives in the postcolony. The magical harm of the 
autocrat is embedded in local, regional and national political processes—that is, 
the process of state formation (Ciekawy 1998).  
The administering of pain by the state power and through its apparatus is to 
administer it to the point of excessive proportions (Mbembe 2001a). This is to 
make sure that power is capacitated to the extent that it corrupts all senses.  Pain 
should, as Mbembe (2001a) states, be systematically applied to produce the 
imagery of fear. Performativity of power in the postcolony is that of excess and 
such cannot stand dissent that is regarded as witchcraft and therefore, in need of 
subjection resulting from commandement. Decalo (1985) argues that the policies 
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of the postcolony are circumscribed by external factors beyond the authority of 
the postcolony. This points out to the constitutive nature of coloniality of power. 
African actions are not taking place in their own forms and in a vacuum. They 
are clearly orchestrated and they are controlled and directed externally by 
coloniality of power.  
The intervention needed is that of understanding the power dynamics in both 
macro and micro sense. The form of power and the manner of its performativity 
in the postcolony says little with regards to the performativity of power in 
totality. Decolonial critical analysis shows how power dynamics form the basis 
of linkages and entanglements of the postcolony. Power in the postcolony is 
indeed problematic more in the manner it is directed to African subject in that 
this signifiers subjection. Performativity of power in the postcolony serves the 
machinery state. The state is, therefore, the machinery that is answerable to 
coloniality of power by the manner in which it relates to African subjects as its 
practices power are in a form of subjection. Such performativity bares testimony 
to the fact that in the postcolony there are objects, who must in all time assume 
the role of docility and bow to the might of the state. The postcolony enjoys 
negative sovereignty that is institutionalised inside and manifested in normalised 
and effective internal control and popular acceptability’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2013b). The sovereignty of the postcolony is not sovereignty from the empire, 
but the sovereignty that it must perform power with impunity upon itself 
perpetuating coloniality of power.  
It is of interest to note that the foundation of the state in the postcolony is the 
state that is not the state in the real sense. It is the state that performs power in 
absolute terms within its own boundaries, and such power is not powerful 
externally. Therefore, such a state of affairs suggests that power that is conferred 
to the state in the postcolony is the external power that constitutes colonial 
affinities. It is the power that the postcolony should be accountable to. That is, 
the power of the postcolony in the manner of its performance is only limited to 
its internal control forms of subjection. Its power is limited power in the macro 
sense of the political because the postcolony cannot assert itself in relation to the 
colonial metropolis which is the real arsenal of power. As much as the state in 
the postcolony objectifies its subjects, it is also subjected by the external power 
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structures and its forms of relations. Performativity of power is the contested 
source of legitimacy in the postcolony for that the manner in which it is exercised 
is seen as been oppositional to the expectations of African subjects in the 
postcolony.  
According to Mbembe (2001a), the manner in which performativity of power is 
in the postcolony is that of destruction, the one directed at those who are 
powerless. Performativity of power is linked to the legitimating of a particular 
ideology, but that which is potent in the fictional sense for that it does not 
liberate from coloniality. What the use of this ideology is, it is the very fact of 
legitimising the performativity of power. It is the ideology of self-interest, self-
adulation and self-importance. The manner in which it is imparted is that of 
subjection to ensure the visibility of power.  Performativity of power in the 
broader sense of the political is not potent since its potency is internal only and 
externally it is accountable to coloniality of power. As such, it is directed at the 
powerless subjects. Performativity of power in the postcolony is ‘powerless but 
reveals itself in the guise of arbitrariness  and the absolute power to give death 
anytime, anywhere, by means, for any reason’ (Mbembe 2001: 13). This serves 
as testimony to the fact that the postcolony in terms of performativity of power, a 
sense of technology domination. Subjection, the very essence of the colonial 
project, has been improvised in the postcolony and it still persists in greater 
proportions.   
The autocrat and fetishism 
The performativity of power is the function of plurality of state institution and 
machinery, but what is central to such functionality is that of the embodied form 
around that power crystallises—the autocrat. In terms of the African leadership 
in the postcolony, there are various types of leadership in the African political 
scene. What is of interest for this study is the figure of the autocrat, as such a 
figure has been the main focus of Mbembe. To cast the net wider to look at 
African leadership in general will not do justice to understand the notion of the 
autocrat in concrete terms. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) have provided a typology 
of the prince, autocrat, prophet and a tyrant to understand the nature and 
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character of personal rule in Africa. But then, this typology has been that of 
personal rule.  
To extrapolate in brief terms Jackson and Rosberg explain these forms of 
personal rulers in these terms. The prince is the ruler with the ability to create 
loyalty, cooperation and support through skilful manipulation and personal 
charm. The autocrat dominates the whole political scene and does not share or 
cede power. Prophets are leaders infused with a visionary ideology that is linked 
to the conduct of their political rule. The tyrant is the extreme form of ruler who 
has not constrains in the exercise of power—that is, the political is the arena of 
arbitrariness. It must be pointed out that there are no clear distinctions of this 
typology in so far as the African political landscape is concerned.  
This typology is fluid, in that the characteristics of one type or more can be found 
in another. The autocrat might fuse the characteristics of a tyrant, prince and 
prophet in tandem and use them in the context he deems fit in the regime. For the 
purpose of this study the autocrat is the main focus of this study. The figure of 
the autocrat in the regime is the president for life (Mbembe 2001a). Arguably, 
the autocrat is the centre of political life. The presence of the autocrat through the 
performativity of power in the form of commandement is made to be felt in the 
postcolony. Commandement is a fetish, it demands power and projects it is a 
form of excess—it means, therefore, the absence of power in the real sense of the 
term. 
In the postcolony, fetishistic power invested not only in the person of the autocrat but 
also in the persons of the commandement and of its agents—the party, policemen, 
soldiers, administrators and officials, middlemen, and dealers (Mbembe 2001a: 111). 
The image of the autocrat as projected is that of potency that assumes the 
character of the omnipotence and this frequently conflicts with a reality that is 
much more complex and less clear cut. The autocrat’s power is, in this form, 
limited since not everyone in the postcolony is reduced to docility. According to 
Decalo (1985), the autocrat and his authoritarian system by the very nature of its 
foundation and content, is superficial. This sense of superficiality is seen through 
the claims of the autocrat claiming to rule by divine right (Olson 1993). The 
autocrat, in a way, assumes the form of power that is often closer to that of 
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sorcery or witchcraft. As Decalo points out, the power of the autocrat is largely 
based on ratification of the non-existent societal controls by mean of 
commandement. According to Geschiere (1998), sorcery and witchcraft have 
been the idiom for understanding power relations. The idea of sorcery and 
witchcraft is used in the sense of understanding the taming of the ruled—if there 
is such a case in point. The modes of action and political implications of sorcery 
and witchcraft are available. What then is profound is the fact that sorcery and 
witchcraft found themselves in the level of the political and they have so much 
profound impact. The power of the autocrat, as the autocrat would like it, should 
be seen in divine terms, the power that rightfully belongs to the autocrat and no 
mode of justification is needed. Power and the autocrat should not be seen as 
separate entities, but one.  
The nature of power in the postcolony in relation to the autocrat is that of 
hallucination. The autocrat must be able to have the power to seize all senses of 
power and create a drama in that the space of power should be in the state of the 
sacred. The manner in which power reaches the hallucinated form, as Mbembe 
(2001a) states, is that the figurative is turned into the real. As Mbembe (2001a: 
165) argues, ‘power in the postcolony can be said to be a construction of a 
particular type: hallucinatory’. Focusing on the following yesteryear autocrats: 
Idi Amin of Uganda, Francisco Macias of Equatorial Guinea and Jean-Bedel 
Bokasa of Central African Republic, Decalo argues that, ‘[a]ll three tyrants, 
moreover, implicitly or explicitly, relied on soothsayers, sorcerers, and diviners 
top spread the myth of their omniscience and divine powers’. (Decalo 1985: 224)  
These three political figures have in the sense of projecting their power that is 
often said to be intensified by sorcery or witchcraft. This magical prowness 
induces fear for its omnipotence and immortality—the very sense of assuring 
greater powers. According to Geschiere (1988: 49), ‘[t]he knew state elite seem 
to view the sorcery and witchcraft complex as a diffuse but omnipresent threat to 
the new relations threat to the new relations of domination’. The manner in 
which power is performed in the postcolony seems to be tied to sorcery and 
witchcraft depending on divine intervention. Sorcery and witchcraft can be seen 
as a reason that is counter-state and therefore the commandement of the state can 
eliminate those whom are considered the enemies of the state.  
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Systematic institutionalised violence, routine massacres, brutal liquidations, and 
reigns of terror may be merely alternative means of societal control in the context 
of a vacuum of political legitimacy and authority within [those] insecure 
dictators pursue their goal of paramount power (Decalo 1985: 231).  
The autocrat is the law and cannot be subjected to any other form of law. The 
autocrat is the ruler and cannot be ruled. The power of the autocrat is the arsenal 
that explains the manner in which power is exercised. The power of the autocrat 
should be that of potency in the manner in which it is exhibited and projected—
for that this practice should in consequence strike fear in the postcolony. The 
potency of such power is such that it should resemble the magical craft—that is, 
witchcraft that is famous in the postcolony and something that is connoted in 
negative terms. The power of the autocrat is fetishism to such an extent that the 
fear it carries the potential to bewitches the subjects both in realistic or in 
figurative terms. The power of the autocrat in its actionality is such that it carries 
the ability to induce magical harm (Ciekawy 1998).  
The magical harm, the power to bewitch can also be as far as it relates to the 
autocrat and how it is understood and interpreted is to speak or not to speak 
about it. As Nuijten (2004) states, the exercise of power is marred with incredible 
stories and fantasies. ‘These fantasies, desires and spectacles produced by 
techniques of governmentality, rather than producing rationality and coherence, 
generation enjoyment pleasures, fears and expectations’ (Nuijten 2004: 211). As 
such, they are not primitive, backward—or being the symptom of traditional 
society. To speak about the power of the autocrat demands, then, the regulation 
of speech. That is to say, to speak positively is permitted and to speak negatively 
will be regarded in blasphemous terms—that is, it is out rightly banned. The 
autocrat rules by excess—by the way that interest him. Restrain is not that of the 
interests of the African subject in the postcolony.  
Therefore, excess take the toll and for there to be excess it will be discretion of 
the autocrat. This form of excess shows that the autocrat has the ability of 
making fiction to be reality. It is, in a sense, the evidence that the autocrat is 
detached from reality and as such alien to the citizens that must be governed. So, 
what is brought into being as far as the autocrat is concerned is to make sure that 
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power is used in the sense of regimentation. Regimentation then, is to rule 
subjects in the postcolony in a more controlled form, who must in return be 
allegiant and patriotic to the regime of the autocrat. 
Furthermore, the controversy that comes into being is that as much as there can 
be subjects in the postcolony, what the autocrat in the fetish sense seeks to have 
are objects. The manner in which the autocrat rules is not fit for citizens and/or 
subjects, but only for objects. The figure of the autocrat possesses power and will 
to impose. If citizens emerge in the postcolony, the autocrat will subject them to 
violence, for that this is the form of violence that seeks to blind, silence and 
deters any opposition. The excess of the autocrat should be excess par excellence 
for that its interruption is the invitation of violence. ‘This type of ruler tends to 
dominate the oligarchy, the governance, and the state without having to share 
power with other leaders’ (Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 78). Jackson and Rosberg 
point out that the autocrat possesses discretionary power to direct the state 
apparatus and its principle is that of excess.  They write: 
Autocracy depends on the fortuitous confluence of circumstance and ability. Fortune 
favo[u]rs an Autocrat in part by not creating rivals of comparable skill and 
determination to dominate. But autocracy depends most notably on the strength of 
will and ability of the ruler to dominate, as well as his ability to confine and largely 
limit the process of politics to issues completely within his immediate competence 
and control (Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 78).      
This is amplified by Bratton and Van de Walle positing that: 
Authoritarian leaders in power for long periods of time establish rules about who 
may participate in public decisions and the amount of political competition allowed. 
Taken together these rules constitute a political regime. Regime type in turn 
influences both the likelihood that an opposition challenge will arise and the 
flexibility that incumbents can respond (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994: 454). 
Decalo (1985: 212) amplifies thus: they ‘create a vast societal void within that 
they often enact their personal and whims, a vacuum that is particularly 
destabilising for successor regimes’. As Bayart (2009: 256) points out, ‘the 
spatial hold of the [s]tate is incomplete’. This sense of incompleteness is seen in 
the manner in which the national project of Africanisation is pursued by the 
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autocrat. The autocrat will often link his excessive of power in the manner that 
will be said to resemble the pre-colonial Africa. Fed with populist impulses, the 
autocrat will even project the fallacy of a symbolic Africanist (Decalo 1985). 
Indeed, Africanisation is used by the autocrat to mask brutality or even to justify 
it. Africanisation in its pseudo form is a fetish populistically mobilised. The aim, 
as Bratton and van de Walle (1994) argue, is that, the autocrat aims to create a 
unitary organic ideology to direct political mobilisation in highly controlled 
form. If such control is weak force will be applied to strengthen it and yet to put 
the face of the autocrat in power and all form of political life. Both Bratton and 
van de Walle contend that the coercion of the autocrat undermines legitimacy 
they often to get from the subjects they rule. The system of obligations in the 
postcolony are embedded on loyalty and dependence, where in that the autocrat 
if the primary figure with a godly status—a fetish.  
Decalo (1985: 212) argues that the autocrat rules in an absolute imperial manner 
often for the sole purpose of self-gratification or glorification and everything 
working to his sole advantage in the disadvantage of others. Decalo adds that 
ruthlessness is institutionalised and there is little sensitivity shown for human 
life. The privilege and prerogative of the autocrat is a priori. The autocrat has 
monopoly and ‘[h]e will use his monopoly of coercive power to obtain the 
maximum take in taxes and other extractions’ (Olson 1993: 569). For the 
autocrat to exist, it seems that there is a need for violence to prevail. This is the 
violence that is reinforced with the power that the autocrat has. The autocrat 
exercises the regime that is rooted in common law, where the law is created, 
ratified and exercised in arbitrary terms. This law has its form of life in the 
political, the very essence of power. As such, such power is exercised by the 
extended form of power—that is, the machinery of the state with its might 
weighing down on the subjects in the postcolony to discipline and punish them if 
they resist or disobey. 
The power of the autocrat is not potent and in this sense it is the power that 
operates in the manner in which it depends on the collective. Then this is the 
collective that in the sense in the one that gets collapsed to the individual. The 
individual therefore, does not mean that the power is wielded by the individual; 
the individual needs the machinery of the state and its agents. It is this collective 
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who are in a way able to make the power of the autocrat to be exhibited, to be 
seen, to be felt. As such, the power of the autocrat is the power of the cell  that 
constitutes the technologies of subjection. According to Decalo (1985: 212), ‘the 
personal dictator possesses maximum power to the extent feasible within a given 
society’. As Mbembe notes:  
Postcoloniality could be seen behind the facade of a polity in that the state 
considered itself simultaneously as indistinguishable from society and as the 
upholder of the law and keeper of the truth. The state was embodies in a single 
person, the president. He alone controlled the law, and he could, on his own, grant or 
abolish liberties—since these are, after all, malleable (Mbembe 2001a: 105).  
The main threat to the autocrat is the possibility of removal from power. Popular 
vote cannot remove the autocrat from power but ‘only assassination, rebellion or 
military coup can contradict the principle of indefinite rule by one leader’ 
(Mbembe 2010: 1). The autocrat surrounds the self with the might of the state 
apparatus and uses it as a tool to deter those who have aspirations. The hand of 
power of the autocrat is the state apparatus that is an effective tool of technology 
of subjection. What surrounds the autocrat is the atmosphere of paranoia. 
On top of unrestrained licentious is the unending exercise of brutality. The autocrat 
is quick to anger. The slightest thing can annoy him to the point of losing all self-
control (Mbembe 2001a:162).  
This is informed by the fear of the autocrat being deposed from power. ‘The 
autocrat goes into a blind panic and can take no more’ (Mbembe 2001a: 151). 
The fear of the autocrat should be dealt with by exercising violence for the 
source of this fear. This is even applied where the source is imaginary or real. 
Nevertheless, there should be violence of some sort, and the nature of this 
violence should satisfy the autocrat in that it should assure that the source of fear 
is dealt with. The machinery of the state, rather than the hand of the autocrat 
commit such violence. But then, it is still the same since this violence is carried 
out with the prerogative and in the name of the autocrat. This is only possible in 
the realm of power as the state machinery is the embodiment of power. It is only 
with power that the autocrat can exist and engage in the political technology of 
ruling.  
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In the postcolony the discourse of defying power underground has been common 
place. ‘Under cover, therefore, of official slogans. People sang about the sudden 
erection of the ‘enormous’ and ‘rigid’ presidential phallus, of how it remained in 
this position and of its contact with ‘vaginal fluids’’ (Mbembe 2001a: 106).  
The body of the despot, his frowns and similar decrees and commands, the public 
notices and its communiqués repeat over and over: these are primary signifies, it is 
these that have force, that get interpreted and reinterpreted, and feed further 
significance back into the system (Mbembe 2001: 106). 
Mbembe also adds to say: 
 It is the conscious of avoiding such trouble that ordinary people locate the fetish of 
state power in the realm of ridicule, there they can tame it or shut it up and render it 
powerless. This done, the fetish takes on the status of an artefact, an artefact that is a 
familiar friend, a member of the family, for the rulers and for the ruled (Mbembe 
2001a: 109). 
‘The dramati[s]ation of the postcolonial commandement takes place especially 
during those ceremonies that make up the states liturgical calendar’ (Mbembe 
2001a: 119). The coming into power of the autocrat has actually meant the 
continuity of atrocity of the postcolonial subject. In this state of affairs, the state 
becomes militarised to make ‘the society terribly traumatised and deeply 
polarised’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 231). The anticipated hope of change for the 
better since colonialism was declared as over did not mean the end of misery for 
the postcolonial subject.   
According to Mbembe (2001a: 123), ‘[c]eremonies have become the privileged 
language through that power speaks, acts, coerces’. This power has been 
enforced in the postcolony to the point where it assumes the character of 
immortality that is linked to the persona of the individual, the autocrat. The 
figure and the persona of the autocrat is something familiar with the postcolony. 
What then is missing from Mbembe is who names or labels them as such and 
through what criteria. It is then interesting to know why are they labelled as such 
and they are allowed to stay in power for long—to the state where they claim the 
sense of the mortality—the president for life phenomenon. As Bratton and van de 
Walle (1994: 474) argue, ‘[t]he strongman may even pre-empt his own removal 
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from office by declaring himself president for life’. According to Mbembe 
(2001a), the autocrat claims immortality in the sense of being in power and only 
death can do part between the autocrat and power and, life of course, is the state 
of close affinity.   
What sustain the autocrat in power cannot only be the complicity of the people, 
but the orders and the interests of coloniality of power. Indeed, the imposition of 
autocrats in most of the African states has not been the will of the people, but the 
interests of coloniality of power. It is the simple case of the colonial father and 
the perpetual child who will make sure no to disobey the orders of the patriarchal 
figure. On the other hand, the disobedience of the autocrat to the Euro-North 
American empire is not considered a threat as long as it does not unsettle the 
interests of colonial relation that are based on plunder, control and exploitation. 
The existential condition of the African subject is often worsened by these state 
affairs, and as such, this calls for resistance or opposition. ‘Thus there were 
avenues of escape from the commandement, and for longer or shorter periods of 
time, whole areas of social discourse eluded control’ (Mbembe 2001a: 105).  
Such opposition from the vintage point of the autocrat is seen as a form of 
insubordination that will then invite the wrath of the autocrat through his 
apparatus. The state apparatus is intensified to such an extent that it its form of 
subjection is made be feared and to symbolise the power of the autocrat. In this 
form, the state apparatus is answerable to the autocrat and the autocrat as a 
puppet is answerable to Euro-North American empire—that is, coloniality of 
power. 
What is clear is that the use of security organs of the state in a partisan manner, and 
the use of combative units of a particular political party and particular personality, 
are violations of standing constitutional structures governing security forces  
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 226). 
The power of the autocrat is not all might as it is dependent to the will of the 
people, the will of obedience even if it comes into being through other means 
necessary. What sustains the autocrat is the subjectivity that they engage in the 
form of populism that at times is often bad faith. It is bad faith in the sense that 
the autocrat claim to understand  the plight of the people whereas this is just false 
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pretence of buying their legitimacy, and this is made to be effective as possible. 
If not, the technology of subjection will be applied. 
Subjection is at the heart of the postcolony, more so because the autocrat 
demands legitimacy. Subjection is an injunction that keeps the spirit of the 
autocrat alive in the imagination and existence of the postcolonial subjects. It is, 
according to Lewis (1996), a matter of political manipulation employed through 
rhetorical skill and personal charm to convince the nature of reformist intentions 
of the autocrat. The autocrat promises subjects, with often of course, empty 
promises just to win their hearts and also to ensure obedience. If not, coercion is 
used since the autocrat can survive without legitimacy and popular will. As 
Lewis (1996:102) states, subjection was melded with predatory rule. When 
legitimacy dissipates subjection is improvised, the very ratification of 
commandement. This does not matter whether the postcolonial like the autocrat 
or not, the autocrat will become alive and well as long as he is protected by the 
state apparatus.   
The autocrat can be perceived as not to be accountable to anyone. This is not 
entirely true as the colonial matrices of power assume the invisible character but 
functional enough to make the autocrat and the postcolony to be reduced to their 
whims. Democracy hides its imperial impulses that are informed by coloniality 
of power. It originates from the location of the empire and constitutes colonial 
impulses that can in a neutralised form, claim high moral ground. According to 
Olson (1993), a democrat and the autocrat are informed by the same impulse of 
the self-interest. They are both aiming for accumulation of huge surplus in their 
terms of political office. The difference is that the democrat is constrained and 
can be removed by popular will. But then, this does indicate that the democrat 
might accumulate while in office to have abundance when the political term or 
career comes to an end.   
Democratic political competition, even when it works very badly, does not give the 
leader of the government the incentive that an autocrat has to extract the maximum 
attainable social surplus from the society to achieve his personal objectives (Olson 
1993: 571). 
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The power of the autocrat in the fetish sense is absolute power; therefore, there 
cannot be any source of power. Promises of the autocrat are ambitious and they 
are never fulfilled. The autocrat cannot be held accountable even betraying those 
promises, since he is the ruler. He rules without being accountable and 
answerable —for that those who are ruled are objects. ‘The regime ultimately 
created its own rhythms of time, work and leisure, and from them acquired a 
degree of predictability’ (Mbembe 2001a: 120). Indeed, this makes power to 
improvise to take a toll of excess. The postcolony appears as its own making, 
whereas it is not —but then, being the product of colonialism where power 
makes the character of the autocrat to be beyond comprehension. 
Commandement is the exhibition by the autocrat to make his wield of power to 
be obeyed, if not feared by the postcolonial subjects. Mbembe (2001a: 122) 
opined that ‘[i]n the world of self-adoration that is the postcolony, the troupes 
summoned to dance bear witness to the central place accorded the body in the 
process of commandement and submission’.  
Olson (1993) calls for a rational autocrat and for Mbembe there is no such. For 
Olson the autocrat can provide public goods for the country for that the autocrat 
has interests in the country. As Mbembe will contend to this, this in the 
postcolony is a different case where the autocrat has no interests on the good will 
of citizens and their well-being. ‘The autocrat is also an acoustic fact, since his 
speeches are broadcast by the radio and even float in popular song’ (Mbembe 
2001a: 154). Mbembe adds that: 
Furthermore, the autocrat is virtually offered at hand’s reach—his face on the 
national currency, his face on the uniform of a citizen may wear, his name on the 
stadium, the airport, or the main avenue of the capital (Mbembe 2001a: 155). 
The autocrat is omnipresent and Mbembe has also this to say:    
What defines the postcolonial subject is the ability to engage in barque practices 
fundamentally ambiguous, fluid and modifiable even where there are clear, written, 
and precise rules. These simultaneous yet apparently contradictory practices ratify, 
de facto, the status of fetish—that state power so forcefully claims as its rights 
(Mbembe 2001a: 129).    
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The powerlessness of the autocrat is projected as power, whereas it is absence of 
power. Power in the postcolony is that of hallucination (Mbembe 2001a). The 
idea of power and its practice in the postcolony is that of fantasy but fantasy in 
the level of the real. What is considered abnormal or an ideal is that which 
finds—in most cases, actualisation in the postcolony. Power has been about the 
disciplinary and coercive mechanisms. The form of regime is that of ensuring 
that it assumes the visible and audible. This is made to such an extent that the 
rule should be institutionalised and normalised. The autocrat is therefore 
exhibiting power—the power that is the fetish since it is not power, but its 
absence and the mode of power that assumes the embodies presence being 
coloniality of power.  
Politics of eatery and the zone of accumulation 
The autocrat and the aristocracy who are often the comprador bourgeoisie in the 
postcolony eat in excess. It has been the mode of operation in the postcolony as 
that those who are closer to the helms of power have privilege. They eat while 
others are hungry. The form of eating in the postcolony is that which is abhorred 
by the subjects in the postcolony since it borders on excess and waste. The nature 
and character of this eating can be understood in terms of bribery, theft, looting, 
extortion, expropriation, rent-seeking, cronyism, patronage, graft and 
embezzlement to name just a few. Politics of eatery ‘breach in the wall of 
prohibitions’ (Mbembe 2001a: 112).  
The politics of eatery should be understood in the realm of coloniality of power 
in that those who are at the position of power have access of accumulation and at 
the same time they inhalate themselves in the form of eatery. They do that at 
their own disadvantage since it is their population that suffers, but having not to 
care at all. The scandal of fortune that in many times originates through theft, 
plunder and exploitation just like in colonial epoch does not invite any sense of 
moral shame, not even the sense of guilt nor does it contribute anything to the 
state that is being plundered. The locus of power therefore, dictates the proximity 
of eating by the comprador class. ‘On top of unrestrained licentious is the 
unending exercise of brutality’ (Mbembe 2001a: 162). Politics of eating go hand 
in hand with brutality.  
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As Bayart (2009: 231) adds ‘[t]he stakes involved in these rivalries and these 
frauds are without doubt sufficiently high for violence to be common’. They are 
politics of accumulation—in form; they are marred by violence if the comprador 
class do get interrupted. These politics are that of ‘a veritable war fought without 
restraint and with total disregard’ (Ojukwu and Shopeju 2010: 16). These are 
politics of whatever means necessary. Olson (1993) points out to the 
monopolisation of theft and protection of the tax-generating subjects. Such 
protection is not that of good faith, but such that to ensure that the base of 
accumulation—that is, the subject taxed is large enough for the largesse of 
extraction. They eat first and do not even leave remains, they eat all! The politics 
of eatery means that the interest of the comprador bourgeoisie is paramount and 
as such they must be served at the expense of the people they are supposed to 
serve. As Goldsmith (2004: 89) notes, they ‘favour excess current consumption 
and neglect the public’s capital stock’. The comprador bourgeoisie are in the 
postcolony a dominant class. Bayart (2009: 228 -229) posits that ‘[a]s soon as 
positions of power within the dominant party command access to social and 
economic resources, the logic of schisms becomes irrepressible, and political 
fragmentation spreads’.  
The dominant class, and, in the sense of the postcolony, the nationalist 
bourgeoisie, have acquired much that sharing is seen as necessary. Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982: 80) point out that ‘moral constrains on the existence of power are 
absent’. The politics of eating are that of eating without getting full, eating is 
arbitrary. The impulse of excess is the one that are taking order and they are in 
the sense the fabric of the political. This is informed by excessive vanity and 
flight of fancy (Decalo 1985). The politics of eatery create deep structural 
inequalities and most often, wealth is pursued by whatever means necessary. 
Patronage networks fudge the public and private spheres of the political. The 
political  base is rooted in the politics of eatery where in that the sole aims is to 
treat the public affairs as private, and being largely dependent on the selective 
political incentives embedded in patronage that creates a predatory bias 
(Goldsmith 2004). What exists is eating in both the public and the private 
political spheres with parasitisim and excess being open enough to open unfair 
advantage.  
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For there to be no violence, eating must continue in excess. The politics of eating 
are indeed accompanied by tragedy in the postcolony. The struggles of the 
comprador class have a devastating spill over effect to the postcolonial subject 
that at times has resulted into warfare. In amplification, Ndlovu-Gatsheni writes: 
In the process of political contestation the people of Zimbabwe have gone 
through a lot of traumatic experiences because of elite struggles for power. 
Across the colonial and postcolonial history of the country, elite struggle for 
power and elite disunities have resulted in conflict and even wars (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2009: 300).  
Liberia, Angola and Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo serves as 
testimony to this. The large proportion of the crisis in the postcolony has been as 
a result of comprador struggles for accumulation and access to power. Such 
struggles have indeed proven to have power to influence the postcolonial 
subjects. Indeed, such influence can be seen in the waste of the existential 
condition where warring factions are brought to being siding with the sites of 
power struggles matching that of the factions of the comprador bourgeoisies. 
According to Decalo 1985), the comprador bourgeoisies are glued together by 
socio-economic patronage and plunder. The struggle in the postcolony is often 
centred on the struggle for state power, and the sole purpose being that of having 
access to accumulation of wealth.  
Furthermore, Mbembe and Roitman (1995: 335) point out that the comprador 
bourgeoisie are ‘often in competition and conflict, they plotted a structure of 
interests and set in motion a regime of ownership and modalities for the 
reali[s]ation of private revenues’. Such, on the other hand, might not be that of 
taking over the power of the state, but to fight for inclusion in the nest of 
accumulation or the wealth that power offers access of accumulation to. Such 
struggles are not concerned about taking over the state, but to have the tendency 
of the comprador bourgeoisie having to project the image that now it is their time 
to eat too. Such is the projection of claiming victimhood of oppression and 
exclusion and the politics of eating are seen as a cure. But then, the problematic 
has been that the form of eating is that of eating without getting full - that is, 
excess. 
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Enjoyment and need for assuagement are thus complementary and take various 
forms: excess intemperance, extravagance and dereliction, the capacity to set limits 
(arbitrariness) and to breach them (transgression)—in short, the apparent facility 
with that, with a simple fiat, one can decide to set up anything or abolish anything 
(Mbembe 2001a: 167). 
The postcolony possesses, through coloniality of power qua commandement, the 
rights to enjoy excess. This excess is that of indefinite nature. The dynamics of 
power are such that the relationship between power and wealth are so close. This 
closeness creates blurriness, as such, both become a unitary. This is simply 
because; access to privilege means proximity to power. ‘These lines of 
interdependence do not of course exclude inherent conflicts of interests’ (Bayart 
2009: 100). The self-interest of the comprador bourgeoisie is hardened in similar 
ways the autocrat holds the firm grip to power, and such a grip is even supported 
by the elite. This is because is the autocrat loses power; the self-interests of the 
comprador bourgeoisie will be threatened. It is in this state of affairs that the 
autocrat and the comprador bourgeoisie protect each other. Such is not a 
protection in the symbiotic sense, but the protection based on parasitism. This 
parasitism is informed by personal interests. The comprador bourgeoisie are 
obliged to protect the autocrat for that they will lose their materialistic gains. It is 
not that they are in favour of the autocrat, but theirs is in pursuit of the 
materialistic gains that are only possible to make in the reign of the autocrat.  
Personal favours are the heart of the political—this often yields material security 
and material rewards (Bratton and van de Walle 1994).    
Bayart (2009) makes an intervention and call for the notion of the patrimonial 
politics that are pervasive in the postcolony. This also highlights the fact that 
politics of eatery is the nature of the accumulation and appropriation of wealth 
par excellence. But then, Bayart does not explain who is in charge of that wealth 
and what power relations around patrimonial politics are. It is not enough to only 
point out to the patrimonial network to account for this state of affairs, but a 
diagnosis of the power networks in broader terms is needed.   
When the rule is built on personal loyalty, supreme leaders often lose touch with 
popular perceptions of regime legitimacy. They lack institutional ties to corporate 
groups in society that could alert them to the strength of their popular support. 
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Instead, they surround themselves with sycophantic lieutenants who protect their 
own positions by telling the leader what he wants to hear and by shielding him from 
dissonant facts (Bratton and van de Walle1994: 462).    
According to Bayart: 
The link between holding positions of power within the State apparatus and 
acquisition of wealth is also clearly related to the political hierarchy. The exercise of 
supreme authority in particular generally goes hand in hand with a proportional 
increase in wealth (Bayart 2009: 87). 
According to Davidson (1992), the way of defending clientelism—is a form of 
patronage style of politics. Politics of eatery exist through various means and one 
that is pervasive is in a form of illicit economy. This can include smuggling, 
money laundering, commercial fraud, human trafficking, drug trafficking and 
other global forms of crime. Lewis (1996) argues that this illicit economy is 
lively and the form of eating is such that it is done in the public view. The 
comprador bourgeoisie who are benefiting from these economies through 
patronage and the protection of the autocrat do so with impunity. They know that 
they are only accountable to the autocrat so to serve their self-interests. 
According to Lewis (1996: 97), ‘state officials fomented growing corruption, and 
sanctioned or organised as expanding realm of illegality’. The postcolony is 
fraught with the practice of cheating the African state for personal gains and 
accumulation in excess. 
Discourses of “eating” and the size of political “bellies” are thus anchored in a moral 
economy of politics, in that the engorgement of politicians’ bodies take place within 
a social matrix of substantive reciprocities, and this confirms the legitimacy of their 
authority (Karlström 2003: 68).    
In the postcolony, as Mbembe (2001: 148) puts it, there is ‘orgiastic enjoyment 
of power’. The accumulation zones are always in a form of a tyranny. They are 
zones of moral bankruptcy inherited from the colonial. ‘In this respect at least, 
the contention is clear: the African post-colonial apparatus has replicated, 
internalise and totalised the power structures introduced through colonisation’ 
(Weate 2003: 6). They are informed by violence and brutality, and they are 
centred on the moral economy of corruption (Oliver de Sardan 1999). This is 
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means the justification of arbitrariness and normalisation of corruption by those 
who practice it. It is the accumulation zone that normalises the manner of 
extraction, appropriation and indulgence that borders on the zone of immorality. 
The zone of immorality exists and is despised for the mere fact that it cannot 
stand the test of principles though different, but that are necessary to bring the 
form of life in the postcolony that is beneficial for those who are ruled. The zone 
of accumulation ratifies the politics of eatery since corruption as a form of socio-
political mechanism is that of forced legitimation. For the fact that the zone of 
accumulation should at all times be the exclusionary zone, the zone for a few—
the aristocracy. In this accumulation of zone, what exists is what Mbembe (2001: 
102) calls ‘a tendency to excess and lack of proportion [...] that constitutes a 
distinctive regime of violence’.  
The zone of accumulation in the exclusionary sense aims not to conceal. The 
extraction, appropriation and consumption are made to be laid to be bare. They 
must be seen by the subjects in the postcolony who are mostly often in the 
margins. They can only see how power is enjoyed in terms of eatery. Their role 
is just to witness. The zone of accumulation excludes them, but it also exists to 
be seen. They assume banality in the manner of their extension and 
generalisation (Oliver de Sardan 1999). Such extension and generalisation will 
mean decentralising and privatising the bureaucratic personnel into cliques who 
engage in illicit forms of economy and blurring the lines of the public and private 
sector. Most often lean towards the private arm so that they can extract as much 
capital as possible since the political office is used as a tool to make illicit gains.  
Even though the zone of accumulation is stigmatised, it continues the way it is, to 
such as extent that is makes itself normal. The manner in which the zone of 
accumulation is stigmatised is the fact that it is linked with the corruption 
complex. This in the postcolony does not yield any solid moral ground in the real 
sense since condemnation does not bring an end to it. The corruption complex 
might be ethically problematic, but there cannot be any punitive measures. 
According to Oliver de Sardan (1999: 29), [t]he complex of corruption is almost 
unanimously experienced as an evil, or even as a calamity’.  The socio-political 
norms are forced to tolerate it, to accept it even in the face of moral 
condemnation and criticism. The illicit character of the zone of accumulation is 
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backed by the machinery of the state, and in the sense of the state, the make of 
the law and the source of power in the postcolony, the illicit character even if it is 
so, it is made not to have such an illicit character.  
In such state of affairs, this has made the postcolony to assume the corruption 
complex. The functioning of the public and private spheres of the political, 
across various social, political and economic strata have assumed the common 
and the routine—that is, banality (Olive de Sardan 1999). The illegality of 
corruption does not exist in the postcolony, only the rhetoric of stigmatisation 
that exists. As such, the corruption complex has pointed out the sense of 
enjoyment in the punitive sense. As Mbembe (2001:115) notes, ‘the status of 
those condemned is not the same’. Those who are condemned will not be 
affected because they are the power and the law unto themselves. Their impunity 
is the exhibition of their greasy material wealth and the lavishness that demands 
the public eye to witness, more especially the public eye of those in the margins 
of the zone of accumulation.  
Mbembe’s analysis is profound in understanding the zone of accumulation. 
However, such a zone is limited in the postcolony and does not account for other 
forms of accumulation that the postcolony is part of.  This then leave the critique 
of coloniality of power on the wayside. The zone of accumulation in the global 
scale is necessary to be engaged in relation to the postcolony. This is because 
such a scale is able to locate the position, contact points and levers of control as 
far as accumulation is concerned. The politics of eatery, therefore, assume the 
industrial complex of accumulation in relation to the postcolony. Such is the 
scale in that needs of capitalism are fused to ensure systems of relations that are 
asymmetric and that are configured in a centred hegemony (Quijano 2000). The 
zone of accumulation in the global scale constitutes of extensive web of 
international commercial fraud and other regional and local accumulative zones. 
The regional and local accumulative zones are subject to the whims of the global 
accumulation zones that clearly visibilises coloniality of power at the global 
scale manifesting through global matrices of power.  
The politics of eatery at this level is nothing compared to the eatery in the global 
zone of accumulation. The global accumulation zone entangles the postcolony 
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through the economy of plunder and extraction. In form, this economy is the 
theft by the autocrat and his clientele—the comprador bourgeoisie. As Lewis 
(1997: 91) puts it, ‘[f]or elites, the state provided special access to nascent 
markets and illegal activities, and manipulated key policies to provide opportune 
‘rents’’. This is nothing compared to the illegality of the empire. The form of 
theft and plunder by the postcolony is nothing compared to the empire that 
accumulates on the global scale that the postcolony is answerable to.  
The national project and character of the African state 
The essential question that Mbembe (2010: 1) poses is: ‘[i]s there anything at all 
to commemorate, or should one on the contrary start all over again?’ This 
question is too important to ignore for the fact that, the character of the African 
state in the postcolony is contrary to the national project that was articulated 
during the heydays of independence. Again, it is in the postcolony that the 
political dream of freedom was deferred as subjection remained a defining 
character of the postcolony. The direction that let the present to prevail—the 
postcolony, is the betrayal of the national project. This betrayal is masked and 
buttressed by the call to commemorate independence, and more so to the recent, 
more than five decades of independence. In the postcolony, as Mbembe (2010:2) 
notes, ‘the vision of power has hardly changed’. The national project as coined 
by Lumumba-Kasongo (2011), in its imagination, experimentation and 
execution, provides the social, political and economic platform for creating the 
project to realise the African state in service of its populace and itself. To 
examine the direction of the national project is to locate it within the political, 
social and economic context of the state. The present even to some point suggest 
that the national project cannot be idealised for it discredited past and 
impracticality. Mbembe (2002a) argues that, at present, the idealisation of the 
national project is reduced to self-defeating nostalgia, nativism and the site of the 
faked philosophy—all of that is a baggage of victimhood (Mbembe 2002a).  
Mbembe is infamous for criticising any form of the national project, its discourse 
of resistance. To them there should not be any form of the national project, but 
the initiative where Africa shows itself to the world. Mbembe correctly argues 
against the romanticisation of the national project, but they are fundamentally 
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wrong to reduce it to victimhood. It is in fact the opposite, ‘the return to the 
source’ where people ‘return to the upwards paths of their own culture’ (Cabral 
[1979] 2007: 173). Cabral had the national project in mind when he referred to a 
reconversion that is basically re-Africanisation. Mbembe (2001a: 119) points out 
that ‘[t]he postcolony is thus characterises by loss of limits and sense of 
proportion’. The postcolony has proven to be pathological in the sense of the 
African state. The character of the African state is juridical-political boundary 
inherited from colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). The character of the African 
state is that of the giant theft machine that creates misery to the existential 
conditions of the subjects in the postcolony. The African state has not been built 
on striving for better good, hence the existence of the African national projects in 
the advent of the post-independence period.  
The challenges that can be encountered in the national project are numerous 
since the national project is caught within the conundrum of the postcolony. The 
national project should also be understood within the broader terrain of the 
postcolonial African state that must bear witness to its betrayal rather than its 
realisation. The national project has largely been betrayed, but that does not 
suggest its irrelevance. This betrayal stems from it not being actualised and 
centering the people at the mantle of the struggle since power was and is still 
fictionalised. According to Shivji (2003: 3) the national project, ‘lends itself to 
the reactionary side of bourgeoisie nationalism, or what later came to be called 
‘nation-building theories’.   
The failure of the African national project to materialise made it impossible to 
imagine the African dream of having fundamental changes after colonial 
oppression. What pervaded the postcolony was nothing other than the easy 
option of pillaging the state. This form of political thinking has been the one that 
has pervaded most of the polity in the postcolony. It is in the postcolony that 
political imagination is not seen beyond it—that is, there is nothing that leads to 
another form of life in that the character of the state can be that of the beneficiary 
and that which can be related to. ‘The point is that African states and their 
political leaders have not taken any project toward achieving developmental 
objectives seriously’ (Lumumba-Kasongo 2011: 68).  It is in these schemes of 
things where the legitimacy of the national project has been tainted and indeed it 
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was just reduced to a mere fiction or so to speak, the unrealisable utopia even in 
the imaginary sense. As Bayart warns: 
Contrary to the popular image of the innocent masses, corruption and predatoriness 
are not found exclusively amongst the powerful. Rather, they are modes of social and 
political behaviour shared by a plurality of actors on more or less a great scale 
(Bayart 2009: 238). 
The postcolonial state has been haunted by what Bayart (2009: 98) refers to as 
the problematic of ‘the relationship of complementary and hybridisation between 
private and private capital, rather than a relationship of exclusion and 
competition’. The national project that is created before and after colonialism is 
still in the conundrum of repetition without difference. In terms of the betrayal of 
the national project Fanon ([1961] 1990) cared so much for it to the extent that 
he did not in his ideal romanticise it, but forewarned about the pitfalls. Still in the 
present, the idealisation should be that of the unthinkable, the impossibility and 
in the gaze of the Afro-pessimist the route to total failure. The national project 
that is linked to progressive national consciousness is the one of the route less 
travelled, or so to say, the route not travelled. The postcolonial route has been 
that of autocrat and aristocracy rushing to the colonial office and engaging in 
repetition without difference, or the difference been that they are mastering the 
technology of oppression more than their colonial masters. The betrayal means 
then, not being able to carry out the national project, if not also abandoning it in 
the continued phase of the colonial struggle. Fanon in expressing disappointment 
has this to say: 
The leader, because he refuses to break up the national bourgeoisie, asks the people 
to fall back into the past and to become drunk on the remembrance of the epoch that 
led up to independence… During the struggle for liberation the leader awakened the 
people and promised them a forward march, heroic and unmitigated. Today, he uses 
every means to put them to sleep, and three or four times a year asks them to 
remember the colonial period and to look back on the long way they have come since 
then (Fanon [1961] 1990: 136).  
According to Ekeh (1975), to fight for independence was about that bourgeoisie 
class would take over from the colonisers. The bourgeoisie class in the struggle 
for independence ‘raised hopes and expectations of the ordinary citizens’ (Ekeh 
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1975: 103).  Added to this, one of the major factors that signal the failure of the 
national project is the postcolonial abyss where African leaders are devoid of 
imagining an alternative Africa and African being. The national project was that 
of trying to make the African state fit within the mode of colonial governance. 
Coloniality of power that is the postcolonial abyss means that the African state 
has not been decolonised. The African postcolonial state appropriated 
colonialism. The black face is put as an exhibition of colonial power, the very 
thing that made Fanon ([1961] 1990) to charge “laziness” and “intermediary 
type” to those who will betray the national project. The pitfalls of the national 
consciousness suggest the betrayal of the national project and also deviating from 
its route map. This failure has given the African state a predatory character.  
The ruling classes who have abdicated in favour of the leader, irresponsible, 
oblivious of everything and essentially preoccupied with the pleasures of their 
everyday life, their cocktail parties, their journeys paid for by government money, 
the profits they can make out of various schemes—from time to time these people 
discover their spiritual waste land at the heart of the nation (Fanon [1961] 1990: 
148).   
Echoing Fanon, Ndlovu-Gatsheni states that: 
The failure of the state to deliver material benefits and freedoms to ordinary people 
resulted in a problematic relationship between state and citizens. Those in control of 
the state became only full citizens, together with their clients and cronies. The 
majority of the people became subjects once more, just like under colonial rule. 
Instead of governing, the elites in charge of the state became rulers in the crudest 
sense of the term. Whereby their words became law and they reduced citizens not 
only to subjects but also to powerless sycophants and hungry praise singers (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2012: 81). 
The power of the African state is not that of legitimacy, but that of having its 
power being projected through commandement (Mbembe 2001a). The crisis of 
the African state is such that it makes the state to assume a predatory character. 
This character has been that of the state being a thief from the public, the state 
that does not have the interests of those whom it rules. 
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Public expenditures can also be interpreted as one of the registers of sovereignty. 
It provides the sites were the state endeavo[u]rs to combine the mostrative 
exercise of physical violence and arbitrary symbolic acts. In this way, 
expenditure is part of an omnivorous political configuration, where public and 
private forces mingle; where spoils, salaries, exactions, fees and monopolies are 
inseparable; and where the state apparatus and framework of extraction are one 
and the same (Mbembe and Roitman 1995: 337).   
The above view has been highlighted by Ekeh (1975: 91), who argues that ‘[t]he 
publici[s]ation of the private realm—that is, the conversion of private activities 
and resources into material for the public realm—is characteristic of absolute 
regimes’. This is the case of Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) under 
the kleptocratic leadership of Mobuto Sese Seko. Lewis (1996) argues that the 
postcolony has seen the shift from prebendalism (decentralised patrimonial rule) 
to predation (consolidation of dictatorship). Predation as Lewis states, points to 
the personification and concentration of power to give form and character of the 
African state. In short, predation and prebendalism are at the heart of the 
postcolony. The predatory state is commandement par excellence. According to 
Lewis (1996: 99), ‘[p]redation embodies a reconfiguration of neo-patrimonial 
rule, towards more despotic and rapacious control’. Mbembe writes: 
Conversely, in states where the predatory rage characteristic of the first phase of 
coloni[s]ation has been more or less contained, it is the elasticity in the redistribution 
of utilities that partially underpinned the legitimacy of the postcolonial government 
and also made the relations of inequality and coercion tolerable (Mbembe 2001a: 
51). 
Olson (1993) opposes the notion of predatory state and argues that it is 
misleading. According to this perspective, the autocrat protects and provides the 
masses with public goods to secure legitimacy. The subjects might have little or 
nothing while the autocrat has in excess. Mbembe deploys the notion of 
overloading to argue that ‘[e]verything leads to excess’ (Mbembe 2001a: 119). It 
is in this condition that the form of political life is that of impunity of the 
postcolonial state. The postcolonial African state inherited the state of impunity 
from colonialism. The character of the African state was fashioned by 
colonialism to be in the real cosmetic sense, to be all powerful and arbitrary (Ake 
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2000). Such impunity has been that the state has been used as a machinery of 
plunder, theft, exploitation that are coupled with gratuitous and systematic 
violence. In machinery form, the state has made violence to be a technological 
formation—the technology of subjection.  It has been known that what existed in 
the postcolony has been a state that takes the form of economy of violence. ‘The 
government’s response was to tighten the screws of political repression and 
violence’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 241). The motive behind this is that the state 
wants to legitimate itself.   
Africa, a headless figure threatened with madness and quite innocent of any notion 
of centre, hierarchy, or stability, is portrayed as a vast dark cave where every 
benchmark and distinction come together in total confusion, and the rifts of a tragic 
and unhappy human history stand revealed: a mixture of half-created and the 
incomplete, strange signs, convulsive movements—in short, a bottomless abyss 
where everything is noise, yawning gap, and primordial chaos (Mbembe 2001a: 3).     
In the postcolony, self-deception and perversion are abound (Mbembe 2001a). In 
the postcolony the embodiment of the machinery of extraction by the state has 
not only been the autocrat, but also the clientele of the autocrat. The language of 
violence is in the era of colonialism, and thus in an improvised form is abound 
when the giant theft machine is in operation. The language of violence that 
affects and corrupts all the senses is such that its excess is making sure that 
docility remains for plunder and theft to continue unabated, no matter that 
degrees of excess they may take. ‘Such unconditionality and impunity can be 
explained by what long constituted the credo of power in the colony’ (Mbembe 
2001a: 26). ‘The continent, a great; soft; fantastic body, is seen as powerless, 
engaged in rampant self-destruction’ (Mbembe 2001a: 8). In Africa, the modern 
state has been imposed from outside and the ‘political structuring’ of the country 
by the post-colonial regimes is far from complete’ (Geschiere 1988: 38). 
Violence and domination are forms of relationality. The postcolonial state creates 
as a result objects and negates subjects. There are many possibilities of responses 
to domination that go beyond conviviality, complicity and destruction (Weate 
2003). 
What is fundamental in the African state is to understand the subjectivation of 
the crisis and the crisis of the subject. The crisis of the African state in the form 
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of its character as Mbembe and Roitman (1995: 323) put it ‘the crisis as a 
constitutive site of particular forms of subjectivity’. This affects the existential 
conditions of the subjects in the postcolony both in imaginary and material terms. 
According to Mbembe and Roitman (1995: 326), the crisis of the character of the 
African state ‘belong at the most to the domain of the obvious or self-evident, 
and at least to the banal or that which no longer evokes surprise’. The character 
of the African state cannot be exceptional but banal since its forms of 
dramatisation of crisis are institutionalised and normalised. The subjects in the 
postcolony are often trapped in the mode of not understanding their existential 
crisis simply because the state apparatus institutionalises and normalises their 
lived experience on the basis of pacification that will then yield the sites of 
coping mechanisms. This does not suggest though that the subjects in the 
postcolony are uniform, as with any other typical character of the oppressive 
state, the role is to have pacification that reduces subjects to objects.  
There are, in the postcolony, the politics of evasion or erasure of institutions that 
are making the state accountable. The character of the African state is abounding 
with instances of taming or abolishing institution that ensure accountability, 
legitimacy and egalitarialism. What is a priori is to make sure that theft, plunder 
and exploitation continue unabated.  To amplify this point, Mbembe and 
Roitman (1995: 339) state that ‘[t]his attests to a sense of loss both the material 
sense of the waste and dilapidation as well as in the sense of existential 
deprivation and disorientation’. The large scale of corruption and politics of 
extraction has led to the incapacitation of the state. The state becomes debt 
burdened and dependent in the external hand outs that are the mechanics of 
coloniality of power. The national project, if it were to be taken seriously, would 
have not resulted in the route map of betrayal. 
The postcolony is indeed indebted to the colonial power. The betrayal of the 
people is seen as convenience. The mode of life in the postcolony assumes the 
figure of destruction that produces certain pathological attachment and existential 
crisis of having to live in the hellish zone of non-being. This comes into being 
though betrayal that is indeed repetition without difference. To understand this 
postcolonial abyss of repetition without difference suggests the actualisation of 
the ideals of the national project is something that is caught within global 
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imperial designs. For these designs to be effective, they need native assistants 
whom Fanon ([1961] 1990) refers to them as ‘intermediary types’. The national 
project is betrayed  by these intermediary types ‘with the mind of a huckster, 
only too glad to accept the dividends that the former colonial power hands out to 
it’ (Fanon [1961] 1990: 141). Indeed, the postcolony has produced a breed of 
junior partners instead of leaders. These junior partners are so attached to their 
patriarchal figure—the colonial metropolis. The national project will not be 
actualised as long as these colonial affinities are still in existence and in control 
of Africa. This then suggests that the character of the state has never changed. 
The coming of independence meant the improvisation of the colonial state qua 
coloniality of power.  
The postcolony then is entangled simply because there has never been a 
decolonisation of the African state. The character of the state is that of coercion 
rather than consent (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). This is because in the context of the 
postcolony there must be commandement and it can only come into being 
through legitimacy, but self-legitimation. The only answer on how to delink from 
global imperial designs lies in the character of the African state being in need of 
been thoroughly decolonised. Colonial affinities carry with them technologies of 
subjection that mutate and adapt—that is, they are amoebic in form and shape. In 
this form and shape, they are able to hide behind structures and become banal.  
The national project that was supposed, and is yet still supposed to bring 
material, existential, social and spiritual renewal is still in the belly of the global 
imperial designs. These designs operate through coloniality of power. 
Mutual zombification unmasked 
According to Mbembe (2001a: 125), ‘[t]he link between the commandement and 
its subjects, in postcolonial as in colonial form, meant not only control but also 
connivance’. Coloniality of power through state machinery constitutes routines 
and rituals and this is seen in stamps, maps and flags or other symbols of the 
state (Nuijten 2004). There are de-centred practices of power in the postcolony 
that have such potency that they threaten the hegemony or coercion of the state. 
Through laughter or conviviality the postcolonial subject seeks to unmask the 
godly figure the autocrat aspires to be (Mbembe 2001a). The postcolonial 
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relationship between the rulers and the ruled need to be understood in other 
forms and Mbembe (1992a; 1992b; 2001a) fundamentally opposes the binary 
function of resistance/domination, counter-discourses, counter-movements. The 
better way that Mbembe suggests is to understand postcolonial relationships 
between the ruled and the rulers is that of conviviality.  
Conviviality as Mbembe (2001a: 104) states, is a relationship fraught by 
commandement and its ‘subjects having to share the same living space’. It is the 
manner in which the link between the rulers and the rules assume complex forms 
of relations. These are forms that are in opposition to conventional forms of 
relations. Mbembe (1992a; 1992b; 2001a) argues that the rulers and the ruled are 
entangled by intimate tyranny. This creates what Mbembe calls mutual 
zombification that means the performativity of power by the rulers and response 
and articulation of that power means impotency. Mutual zombification is the 
impotence or the state of powerlessness of the ruler and the ruled as ‘each has 
robbed the other of vitality and left both impotent’ (Mbembe 2001a: 104). 
Mutual zombification as Flores (2011: 78) puts it, is an ‘idiom of suffering 
through intimacy’. For Flores, Mbembe’s injunction of mutual zombification is 
said to be the state of engaging in the modality of theorising that veers from the 
familiar. In contrast to Flores, Karlström (2003: 58) argues that ‘Mbembe’s 
portrayal of African politics contains much that is familiar’.  
For Mbembe, what makes African subjects to appear complicit is ‘a unitary 
system of ensnarement’ (Mbembe 2001a: 128). Mbembe does not mean this in 
the sense of coloniality of power but the proximate relations between the rulers 
and the ruled. If Mbembe took coloniality of power into account and seriously, it 
would then mean that for resistance and convivial play of vulgarity to take place, 
this will create the impression that there is absence of agency whereas there is. 
Mbembe still insists that: 
Strictly speaking, this process does not increase either the depth of subordination or 
the level of resistance; it simply produces a situation of disempowerment for both 
ruled and rulers (Mbembe 2001a: 111). 
What Mbembe calls obscene and grotesque are parodies that undermine the face 
of commandement. Obscenity and grotesque undermine officialdom by making it 
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potent through ridicule and laughter. According to Geishiere (1988), relations 
between the ruler and the ruled have become fraught with ambiguities. The 
projection of state power by the postcolonial machinery often invites ridicule. 
Mbembe notes that: 
The question of whether humour in the postcolony is an expression of ‘resistance’ or 
not, whether it is, a priori, opposition, or simply manifestation of hostility toward 
authority, is thus of secondary importance (Mbembe 2001a: 108).   
For Mbembe, African subjects in the postcolony in ordinary ways guide, deceive, 
and toy with power instead of confronting it directly. But then, in Mbembe’s 
sense, the politics of laughter and ridicule suggest conviviality and complicity. 
However, the act of laughter and ridiculing cannot be that of creating laughter in 
itself. The politics of laughter and ridiculing as points out constitutes the very act 
of ‘subverting power relations, exploitation and repression’ (Hammett 2010: 5).  
The ultimate reach of this is not only to ratify power, but to see its other side—its 
nakedness. This in a way intensifies resistance. Hammett (2010) rejects 
Mbembe’s notion that resistance in the context of the postcolony is futile. 
Resistance to a lesser or greater extent, disrupts the power dynamic of the 
postcolony to expose its nakedness, not just laughter. What then this amplifies is 
the narrative of resistance since the intention of resistance in this context is to 
produce out of laughter—unlaughter. In this state of affairs, subjects in the 
postcolony will question the nature and character of power in its multiplicity.  
The aim in this sense is that of producing the moment of existential reflection 
that will then yield resistance and delegitimation of power if such power is in 
contradiction with the aspirations and expectations of African subjects in the 
postcolony. What exists in the postcolony is a situation where ‘promise has been 
replaced by the lack of expectation’ (Mbembe 2001a: 199). It is clear that such 
condition creates banality, but then, this is the banality that creates docility and 
pacification, but can also open the avenue of resistance. The expectations of the 
subjects in the postcolony are such that they will trigger resistance if they are not 
met. The narrative of resistance will then mean that power is questioned and 
challenged.   
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For Mbembe, African subjects can pretend to obey commandement while they do 
disobey it—mostly through laughter or mockery. Such is the activity where 
postcolonial subjects have their own language—that is non-official discourse. 
This laughter often locates itself in the private realm. The autocrat ‘cannot escape 
symbolic sanctions: slander, gossip, character assassination’ (Scott 1985: 25). 
For Scott, the autocrat who claims to wield absolute power does not have the 
total control of the theatrical space. According to Ekeh (1975), what is 
considered right in the private realm is also right in the public realm. In the 
postcolony, and on the contrary, this differs. It is important to add that it is often 
in the postcolony where the line between private and public realms is blurred. If 
laughter is permissible in the private realm, it might not be permitted in the 
public realm. This is more so if it directed at the autocrat or the state machinery.  
The contention of Mbembe (2001a) is that the postcolonial subject makes 
mockery and derision of commandement. However, in nowhere in the postcolony 
the defamation of the autocrat is permissible. The subjects in the postcolony 
would nevertheless continue to defame the autocrat, the aristocrat and the state 
machinery—whether in private or public realm. ‘In fact, officialdom and the 
people have many references in common, not least a certain conception of the 
aesthetics and stylistics is power and the way it operates and expands’ (Mbembe 
2001a: 109).   
Within Africa we perceive distinctive tendencies. Typically, transitions from 
personal dictatorships are driven by spontaneous street protests, focus on fate of the 
ruler, and, in the absence of effective political institutions to channel political 
participation and contestation, tend to dissolve into chaotic conflict (Bratton and van 
de Walle 1994: 485). 
Contrary to Mbembe, it is important to note that the projection of power has been 
met with different degrees of resistance. Resistance is a form of force that 
modifies power though different scale and degrees. The very fact of engaging 
power suggests the manner in which power needs to be changed in content and 
form. The power that one sees in Mbembe is a form of power that Weate (2003) 
calls ‘incontestable power’. That is, the power of the absolute that maintains its 
unchallengeable status. Therefore, resistance is the name that must be given to 
the force that tries or that modifies power (Weate 2003). For the mere fact that 
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freedom is agitated in the postcolony, this shows that there is agency, and not 
conviviality with oppressive aspects of the postcolony. As Cole (2006) posits, 
resistance from below is disruptive and vicious if it has been bottled up. Such 
agency points out to the materiality of resistance, no matter the degree of potency 
or impact. Hammett (2010) emphasises that there are creative ways of 
responding to the expressions and experiences of power. For Hammett, power in 
the sense of agency is not only power over subjects since there is power of 
resistance and opposition, and this also includes the power of self-presentation. 
Moreover, these points to the fact that even if power in the postcolony can have a 
degree of high potency, but it cannot in all means or indefinitely defeat the 
agency of the subjects in the postcolony. This has led Weate (2003: 8) to criticise 
Mbembe thus, ‘Mbembe tries to conceal what is effectively functioning as the 
concept of “resistance” in his text by semantic substitution’. The subjects often 
present themselves in the postcolony to challenge power. Power is not only a 
form of limitation and imposition; it is also ‘power as capacity and agency’ 
(Weate 2003: 7). The subjects in this sense, even if they are disempowered, they 
nevertheless refuse what power confers to them and in the process, the subject 
assert their existential conditions and as such this amends the manner in which 
power is constituted. The colonial legacy is largely intact and this is embedded in 
structures of the postcolony. Mamdani (1996) calls for the ways in that to 
understand how power is organised and the forms of contemporary resistance, 
and the manner also in that it fragments as a result of resistance.   
Through the might of commandement through its response to dissents by 
intimidation, detention, banning, torture, kidnapping and killing, this response of 
the postcolony is still abound. The notion of mutual zombification seems not to 
have enough ground and the postcolony seems to be that which Mbembe (1992a; 
1992b; 2001a) suspends or opposes fundamentally—that of binary function. 
Though what Mbembe proposes in terms of understanding postcolonial relations 
is valid, to some extent, that should not invite a total closure of resistance 
discourse or political action that indeed proves the agency of the political 
subjects in the postcolony. Perhaps it would have been in Mbembe’s thinking to 
suggest that the mutual zombification and also the foreseen absence of 
resistance—the notion of conviviality could have been an additional. Indeed, 
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there are those who are complicit and those who toy with power. As Weate 
(2003: 8) notes, ‘[f]or Mbembe, in an African context, there are simply no spaces 
of resistance available outside domination (unofficial or otherwise)’. For 
Mbembe, the omission of resistance in the power relations of the ruled and the 
rulers is problematic. There cannot be subjection without subjectivity in the form 
of resistance. But also, there are those who confront power in the postcolony 
head on and are not complicit to it, hence not zombified by it. According to 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012), African subjects in the postcolony still continue freeing 
themselves from oppression inherited from colonialism by the autocrat and the 
state machinery. The need for genuine freedom suggests that there is agency, and 
the mode of political existence in that this agency is demonstrated is that of 
resistance.  
According to Hammett (2010), power in the postcolony is the matter of everyday 
life and it is contextual, relational and constitutive in relation to the lives of the 
ruled and the rulers. Therefore, power should be recognised in terms of its 
multiplicity and also the multiplicity of the subjects in the postcolony. Mbembe 
(2001a) however states that, subjects have no single identity, but multiple ones 
that they negotiate and modify whenever necessary. This then stems the fact that 
they African subjects respond to power in the mode of differentiation. The 
subject to be labelled as such precisely points to the fact that there is agency. 
This confirms the argument advanced by Zegeye and Vambe (2009) that facets 
and intricacies of power in the postcolony are pervasive. The way power is 
understood and lived in the political suggests that the postcolony should be 
subject to complexity. Such complexity should not be about relations but how 
power is constituted, and also the manner in which it is exercised. ‘It is within 
the rubric of power relations that dissent, assent, reification and resistance are 
conceived and expressed’ (Hammett 2010: 4). The bone of contention of Zegeye 
and Vambe (2009) is that Mbembe presents the rulers and the ruled as if they 
possess uniform or similar subjectivities all the time. The lack of dynamism of 
the subject, and the manner of difference in reference to the response to power is 
weakens the thesis of mutual zombification. The extent or the level of mutualism 
in the postcolony suggests complexity of the subjects. This even goes to the 
extent of the difference of power and how it forms systems of relations.  
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African subjects in the postcolony, even if they can be casted by the spell of 
commandement, cannot be caught in the rubric of mutual zombification. There 
are in the postcolony ‘visible manifestations of resistance to the abuses and 
excesses of power’ (Hammett 2010: 4). The subjects in the postcolony are not 
passive and the autocrat indeed is the one with absolute power. Even though this 
power can be abducted, as Mbembe (2001a) notes that control goes in tandem 
with conviviality and even connivance, the subject in the postcolony should not 
minimises agency. Weate (2003) argues that the absence of possibility and 
agency is attributing to the fact that the work of the negative is at play. Such 
negativity borders on the obscene in the form of destruction, complicity and 
decay. This means there is no subjectivity. Even in the era of colonialism that 
Mbembe (2001a) states that it is a ‘discourse of madness that threatens all 
dominations’ there was site of resistance. The postcolony has improvised the 
modes of subjection that it has drawn from colonialism for the sole purpose of 
erasing any form of subjectivity for objecthood. These effects even from 
colonialism and to the postcolony never succeeded. There is in the postcolony 
the high level of agency as it was in the colony. This can be seen by the forms of 
resistance that exists even if oppression hardens. This is not to suggest that there 
is no conviviality or connivance in the postcolony.  
What is essential is that the subjects in the postcolony have different forms of 
subjectivities, and different modes of resistance. Those who are ruled are not the 
same, unless if there is no subjectivity. As Zegeye and Vambe (2009) states, 
Mbembe ignores agency and falls in the trap of reducing or confining the 
subjects in the postcolony into the space of the masses without any form of 
agency. This mechanistic form of theorising does not see the postcolony as the 
space of contestation. No form of oppression can exist in the postcolony without 
any site of resistance. Even if such resistance is not visible, this does not suggest 
that it is not there. The site of resistance is not only in those who are ruled. To go 
further, resistance exists in the circuits of power, where those who are close to 
the autocrat or in the apparatus of power do resist in subtle forms in fear of 
marginalisation. The level of complicity can be there for that they are in they are 
in the circuit of power. What exists in the resistance in the site of power resides 
not all those who are close to the autocrat benefit equal amounts of privileges. 
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There are those who are feeling the sense of exclusion and they can form some 
relations with the ruled.   
Conclusion  
This chapter, through decolonial critical analysis, has unravelled the complexity 
and the nature of power in Africa in the sense of the postcolony in that it is 
plagued by coloniality of power. The performativity of power in the postcolony 
is that of mimicry of the colonial regime, and this is improvised by the making 
such power to have much potency. Such potency and extravagance of 
performativity of power comes through what Mbembe refers to as 
commandement—a form of subjection that still operates in a form of coloniality 
of power on the postcolony. It is in this form that commandement in the absence 
of consent, but coercion finds expression. Then, in the postcolony comes the 
figure in the form of power in the fetish sense—the autocrat. The figure of the 
autocrat is entangled by power that has the capacity to entrench and exclude. 
Coloniality of power makes the autocrat’s power not to be absolute and the 
autocrat cannot assert himself his power at the global level.  
This then means that the power of the autocrat is a fetish, it is power without 
power. The arbitrariness of such power is only in the postcolony, not in the 
global scale where coloniality of power presides and the power of the autocrat is 
just that —a fetish. In terms of politics of eatery, the scandal of fortune that in 
many times originates through theft, plunder and exploitation just like in colonial 
epoch does continue. The difference in the postcolony is that the autocrat, the 
aristocracy and appendages of power in the postcolony have assumed a place in 
the zone of accumulation.  The politics of eatery in the postcolony co-exist with 
violence and brutality for that they are pursued in whatever means necessary, as 
long as such pursuits yield material gains. Mbembe’s focus is limited to the local 
zone of accumulation without also focusing on the global scale of accumulation 
and this leaves coloniality of power unexplained. Suffice to say, the two co-exists 
in the asymmetrical and parasitic fashion.  
Also, it is important to note that the character of the African state in the 
postcolony highlights the betrayal of the national project. The national project 
had the content of aspiration and expectation of the subjects of the postcolony 
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being met, and the post-independence period with its euphoria, embarking in the 
fundamental change. The opposite is what happened, and the postcolony being 
what the African subject is still caught within coloniality of power since the 
national project was done within the parameters of coloniality. Power in the 
postcolony is not absolute, and more so in the politics of relations between the 
rulers and the ruled—the relations that are fraught with various kinds of 
complexities. It is partly true as Mbembe is of the view that the relationship 
between the rulers and the ruled is informed by intimate tyranny. The very fact of 
conviviality and complexity as Mbembe puts it suggest that there is no agency in 
the face of oppressive power. It has been clearly stated how agency exists in the 
face of oppression and the politics of ridicule and laughter are not for that sole 
purpose. What they aim to yield are the politics of unlaughter that seeks to 
amplify the contours of resistance. Resistance exists in the postcolony for that 
there are subjects with subjectivities of different kinds and who have different 
understanding to power. Power in the form and character of commandement, 
cannot remain incontestable, it will remain challenged and questioned. In the 
next chapter, the concept of coloniality of being will be challenged by engaging 
Mbembe’s conception of violence in Africa.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MBEMBE ON THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, decolonial critical analysis is deployed to examine Mbembe’s 
conception of the politics of violence to trace the problematique of coloniality of 
being. Mbembe’s conception of the politics of violence is challenged in that it 
does not take into account coloniality of being that makes violence manifest. The 
overall aim is to highlight a different understanding of politics of violence in 
contemporary Africa. Thus, violence in Africa should not only be understood at 
the symptomatic level, but also on the structural level to account for its nature, 
form and logic. This chapter seeks to shed light in the understanding of the 
politics of violence in Africa, and also to account to the ways in which Mbembe 
contributes to African politics. 
The chapter then starts by investigating violence through decolonial critical 
analysis and argues that it is in the level of the libidinal in that it has assumed 
sadistic proportions in its form and character. Then, notion of necropower as 
coined by Mbembe will be problematised by engaging the notion of sovereignty 
and the state of war by the empire. In addition, the ontology of the racialised 
body will be examined to highlight its existential crisis of obsoleteness. 
Furthermore, the form and character of war machines will be examined including 
their predatory nature in the realm of illicit economy. Then lastly, the notion of 
martyrdom in relation to suicide bombing is applied and critiqued from the 
positionality of the racialised body of the African subject.  
Libidinal economy: sadistic trope of pain and pleasure 
The phenomenon of violence in Africa is libidinal, and it is infused by the 
practice of sadism.  It is as Mbembe (2006a: 299) notes, ‘a destruction that 
results in a relative pleasure’. For Mbembe, the warlike act of eroticism assumes 
the form and character of sadism—that is, the sadistic elements are constitutive 
part of the war like act. The manner in which violence is normalised and practice 
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has been sensual and exerted in the manner that assumes the very act that seeks a 
spectacle. This is coloniality of being in that those who are at the receving end of 
this sadistic violence are turned into erotic objects whose bodies are destructed 
through sexual violence and mutilation.  Mbembe (2001a) regards states that in 
Africa violence has become the normal state of things, and violence has assumed 
the omnipresence character. For Mbembe, the murderous character is inscribed in 
the rituals of the colonised. But then, it is not clear from Mbembe that the 
character of violence by the coloniser indeed was not a murderous ritual that it 
derived the excess of pleasure through its sadistic proportions. Mbembe makes 
reference to violence thus: 
There is the violence that the Other inflicts, the violence of being reduced to 
nothingness, so that the mouth that kisses itself is the very same one that, 
simultaneously, eradicates life by producing death; on the other, there is violence 
that one inflicts on oneself: self-exhausion, self-crucification, the void that is the 
founding moment and paradox from that all this is deployed. But how can we speak 
about this without delving further into the two notions of colony and coloni[s]ed? 
(Mbembe 2001a: 182).  
Indeed, going further should even be taking into account the endurance and 
tenacity of the colonial state of affairs in its mutative form. Thus, also accounting 
to the fact that even after the departure of colonialism and the end of the 
colony—real or imagined, its articulation and logic of violence is that of 
transference, reproduction, and improvisation. Mbembe (2001a: 173) puts forth 
that violence ‘has penetrated almost everywhere and virtually nothing escapes it’. 
Violence in its sadistic nature cannot be escaped for that it is conducted in a 
territory—that is, a colonial zone that is a hellish condition (Gordon 2007). This 
colonial zone can also be understood as the state of exception (Agamben 2005). 
It is a zone where coloniality of being signifies the forms of lives that have been 
permanently suspended. This means that the notion of colonial zone also 
precedes colonialism because colonialism in its departure did leave colonial zone 
intact. This was necessary to create the continuity or the residue of colonialism 
where in that the nature and character of violence at the level and direction of the 
body is permissible.  
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It has to be pointed out that the violence that Mbembe largely describes is that of 
the colony, where in that violence is the economy of language. It is through the 
transaction of sadistic acts, in that language was developed—the language that 
was exercised to make violence alive and potent. This language takes the form of 
the political—that is, language turns itself into a political function of executing 
violence against its objects. This is the absolute language of the sovereign power 
with its mode of expression being the foundational part of intention, action or 
fantasy (Mbembe 2006a). The logic behind is this is that, the only language that 
the native understands is that of violence.  Mbembe has the following to add:  
Furthermore colonial violence is linked to the exercise of language, to a series of 
acts, gestures, noises, and sounds, and also participates in the phallic gesture: a 
phallic and sometimes sadistic gesture, insofar as the coloni[s]er thinks and 
expresses himself through his phallus. It is through the phallus that the coloni[s]er is 
able to link up with the surrounding world (Mbembe 2001a: 175).  
Such spectacle is horror, but the one that pain and pleasure are intertwined. 
Lyotard (1993) posits that money or capital is a currency of death; as a source of 
enjoyment—jouissance, it is on the other hand sadistic since libidinal fragments 
that are a pulsion force reinforce it as a currency of death. For Lyotard, this state 
of affairs is embedded in mercantilist politics, where money or capital matters 
than the human life. According to Lyotard (1993: 195), ‘[m]ercantilist desire 
requires what we call stagnation or shortage, but that is for it the condition of a 
surplus—jouissance’. This libidinal economy, where in that jouissance is 
attached requires in this sense, the body of the victim, that can be destroyed in 
order to produce pleasure. Therefore, the practices of violence are a sadistic 
affair, and what is relevant here is the logic of violence against the civilians both 
from the state and the insurgencies. Violence then is the monopoly of reason.  
Mbembe’s (2001a: 174) asks: ‘what does it mean to do violence to what is 
nothing?’ The question as it relates to the object—the African subject, is more 
telling in the existential plane where violence is omnipotent—the value of life 
being devalued because what losses life is outside the realm of life itself. For 
violence to have reached sadistic proportion—a form of excess, simply suggest 
that it is normalised since the body African subject is available to be violated for 
the sake of its racial objecthood. What is of interest in the postcolonial Africa is 
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that civilians have become instruments of violence. Though civilians are at the 
receiving end of violence and there is a need to account for such directionality of 
violence. What makes the practice and the logic of violence to be the libidinal in 
the manner of sadism is the bone of contention here. The intervention is that 
what needs to be understood is the logic of violence and not its symptoms. The 
spectre of violence in the postcolonial Africa needs to be understood on the basis 
of victims becoming killers (Mamdani 2001). In this logic, the victims of 
colonial violence, the regime preoccupied with the language of violence, this 
language has been adopted, creolised and even improvised to sadistic proportion 
par excellence. It is, in the postcolonial Africa that violence is among victims, 
and they find every possible mode to destroy their own, hence the Rwandian 
genocide and other regional civil wars in Africa, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Sudan, Burundi and Democratic of Congo being the case among others. Misra 
(2008) is of the view that there are complex reasons for turning to pure violence 
by outlining four factors. Firstly, this can be linked to the culture of obedience 
where the masses follow their leaders blindly or through fear. Secondly, the 
institutional complicity where the state apparatus is used to single out, 
discriminate and exclude minorities in the call for mass violence. Thirdly, a 
structurally uneven society where there is a deep social deprivation has been a 
reason why this triggers violence. Lastly, the existence of psychological violence 
where there is hatred and “Othering” can cause violence.  
Violence in the postcolonial African assumes another form in that it is the area 
where ethics are abandoned. Žižek (2009) articulates the notion of devine 
violence, and puts forth that those annihilated by it are said to be completely 
guilty, and they are not sacrificed as they are not worthy of it. As Mbembe 
(2001a) notes, violence is expressed through language; it is this language that is 
not used as speech, by the asymmetric relationality of control. This means 
language is not used to communicate or transact, but its form is the commanding 
chain of orders, impositions and even intimidation (Mbembe 2001a). It is in such 
an environment where violence assumes the character of absence of logic. Santos 
(2007) concept of abyssal thinking is relevant to understand violence as the act of 
sadism par excellence. According to abyssal thinking, the world assumes the 
abyssal character where there is ‘vigilant policing and harsh punishment of 
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violations’ (Santos 2007: 9). The abyssal character gives life to the nature of 
violence affirms power, and such is a violence that can be understood at the 
structural level. The abyssal character is in a form of cartography where there are 
lines dividing, in the Manichean sense, humans and savages. Violence and 
appropriation therefore take different forms, hence they are intertwined—and the 
affirmative discourse in such a condition is the violence and appropriation as 
extraction of value (Santos 2007). Such an extraction is sadistic for that it is a 
value extracted from African subjects reduced to objects, therefore, there is no 
prohibition as in the other line. In the lines of the humans, there is existence and 
subjecthood, and on the other line there is non-existence and objecthood. In this 
process of negation, the prize of destruction is made so easy to such an extent 
that the destruction is trivialised so that it reaches the condition of the normal 
(Santos 2007). Therefore, in relation to sadism, its economy of imaginary is 
excess where the possible becomes the possibility of everything.  
Mbembe (2001a) deploys the notion of ‘spirit of violence’ but only in the 
colonial discourse, and argues that this violence assumes the character of 
discourse incantation. It is in this discourse that violence is reduced to the 
magical, hence the libidinal desire of the colony to improvising it. This state of 
madness turns to the sane. Misra (2008) makes a valuable point that the sadistic 
trope of inflicting pain while deriving pleasure is done on the basis of projecting 
and affirming power. This is the power that must be seen by the perceived enemy 
not to confront the perpetrator. According to Butchart (1998) strategies of 
sovereign visibility were devised to project their regime of presentation not only 
as a gaze to the body of the Africa subject, but in reverse,  the shock and 
amusement to the might of colonial violence in its perversity and excess. Such 
sadism was the ritual of the European since it was in a form of disciplinary 
power. To amplify this, Butcher states that: 
The display of its power to punish was not only way that sovereignty invented 
itself to the eyes of its subject. Complementing these violent strategies of 
majestic visibility were less bloody but equally spectacular tactics by that the 
power of monarchical might was fabricated in the course of those more placid 
rituals where the African was approached by the European for the purposes of 
observation and inquiry (Butchart 1998: 62).  
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Mbembe (2001a) is therefore essential to capture this form of relationality, and 
turning back to verbal economy that scarcely alters, its political function is 
intended to break down life, freeze it the better to produce it by trampling it. 
Then, this is what Mbembe sees in the colonial times, the colonial moment that 
he claims that it was the time of multiplicities, overlapping sequences, hybridity, 
entanglement—the event that lacked singularity. Mbembe’s argues that colonial 
spaces are the spaces of terror. This terror is the mode of violence that lacks 
relationality—that is, the violence that is a form of excess. The way violence 
occurs even in the postcolony does not in any way suggests that the army or the 
state apparatus is part of the society it violates. Repetition without change has 
been the political, the life and times of banality par excellence. The way violence 
was practiced in the colony has been improvised in the postcolony.  
Mbembe (2003a) deploys the example of the plantation system to understand the 
politics of violence qua sadism. According to this logic, instilling terror occurs 
by means of seeking pleasure and through inflicting pain—sadism. The pain 
inflicted on the body of the slave—the lifeless object—created pleasure to the act 
of the master. The being of the slave is detached from the body—the slave is a 
mere possession. If the slave is a mere possession, the slave life is that of 
dispossession, and this logic of dispossession means the absence of being. The 
slave is, in other words, the property of the master—and, as Hartman (1997) puts 
it, a being for the captor who determines life, survival and even death.  
Who is a slave, if not a person who, everywhere and always, possesses life, property, 
and body as if they were alien things? Possessing life and body as alien things 
presupposes that they are like external matter to the person who bears them, who 
serves as their scaffolding. In such a case, the slave’s body, life, and work may be 
attacked. The violence thus perpetrated is not supposed to affect the slave directly, as 
something real and present (Mbembe 2001a: 235). 
Mbembe also points out that: 
As an instrument of labo[u]r, the slave has a price. As a property, he or she has a 
value. His or her labo[u]r is needed and used. The slave is therefore kept alive but in 
a state of injury, in a phantom-like world of horrors and intense cruelty and profanity 
(Mbembe 2003: 21; emphasis original). 
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The whipping, raping, and lynching—much that is the economy of torture are 
some of the deeds that created pleasure. For Mbembe, the plantation system the 
political economy of slavery was institutionalised to the extent in that it became 
reality. It is in the plantation where sovereignty to reign at free will on the body 
of the slave normalised. Wilderson (2010: 11) points out that the body of the 
slave is ‘generally dishonoured, perpetually open to gratuitous violence […] 
having no relation so being recognised’. This can also be drawn as far as to 
Patterson’s (1982) articulation of the ontology of the slave in the existential 
abyss of natal alienation. The slave is then, that which is devoid of ontology—
nothingness. Mbembe has this to say: 
The guillotine that language has become can then embark on the exercise of a 
violence all the more savage because done behind closed shutters, bleak and empty, 
marked with cruelty and vertigo. It can, in an access of jubilation, proceed by 
dissection, mutilation, and decapitation. Only in this way can the coloni[s]er, at the 
end of language, deny the existence of the colonised and the coloni[s]ed subjectivity 
(Mbembe 2001a: 181).   
Mbembe (2003a) thinking with regards to the plantation system to understand the 
politics of pain and pleasure is indeed a great contribution to understand the logic 
of violence, more so when it is practiced to the directionality of the civilians in 
the postcolonial condition. The manner in which civilians are treated in the 
condition of violence and civil war in particular is like the practice of the master 
towards the slaves. It is clear that the logic and the economy of torture is still 
rampant in the sense that it is something that demands a spectacle as a matter of 
disciplining and punishing those who are likely to dissent the established or the 
enforcing order. This means, there is no selfhood, the very notion that suggest 
that in the colony is a peak of ontological corruption (Mbembe 2001a).       
According to Mbembe (2003a), what exist are technologies of destruction that 
ensure that they are empowered for that sole purpose of destructing. This is the 
destruction of bodies, and the suspension of ethics applies in that the practice is 
that of displaying the effects of this technology of destruction. As Mbembe 
(2003a: 35) states, ‘[t]he ways of killing do not themselves differ much. In the 
case of massacres in particular, lifeless bodies are quickly reduced to the status of 
simple skeletons’. The technologies of destruction are deployed to make the 
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practice of inflicting pain to be that of deriving pleasure. In this state of affairs, 
what is important is how well and advanced is the state of technologies of 
destruction. Since sadism is often closer to excess, the mode of improvising is 
always present when the technology of destruction is at play. For example, if this 
operates in the manner of amputation, the language or the act will be invented. In 
Sierra Leone and Liberia civil wars, the amputation of civilians was common 
practice and victims were often asked how they would like their amputation. It is 
also common that when young boys were taken by force, drugged and trained to 
kill unpityingly. Also, they would amputate their family member or the 
community members to show their loyalty to the rebel formation they are part of. 
Arguably, ‘capricious violence often sediments into distressingly predictable, 
repeated patterns of wounding as those most vulnerable’ (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2006a: 9).  
According to Misra (2008), civil war is not irrational as it is projected, but it is 
informed by rational intentions. This means that the enterprise of civil war is 
complex in nature and requires understanding circumstances to its emergence 
and prevalence. Civilians are at the receiving side of violence and the mode in 
which such violence is projected is something that cannot be reduce to 
complexity, but the factual reality that the logic of civil war is the abandoning of 
ethics where there are non-ethics of war (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). If war is 
conducted on the non-beings, it is like the mode of experimentation on the 
objects. The object is devoid of any ontological content and such violence is 
legalised, and if not legalised, it cannot be punished. Therefore, the conduct of 
violence is the one that is done at free will.  
Coloniality of being permits the practice of sadistic violence and it has been 
inscribed in the postcolony to such an extent that it is only seen as if it is recent. 
Sadistic violence should be understood as coloniality of being precisely because 
it is the violence that puts the humanity of the African subject into question.  
Drawing from Santos (2007) it is clear those abyssal lines that subject the other 
line—that of non-humans, assumes a permanent character. Abyssal lines clearly 
demarcate the inner workings of coloniality of being and their meaning changes 
at any given historical period, but their position is guarded to ensure the same 
logic in terms of the subjection that is destructive in character. The historical 
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trace will indeed validate that these are the acts that were common practice in the 
colonial encounter and they have found their way into the present. The inflicting 
of pain while deriving pleasure has been present with Africa since the colonial 
encounter, and this was used as a weapon to silence. The logic or illogic of 
cruelty of coloniality of being is embedded in the socio-psychological framework 
of prejudice, insecurity and power projection and it is so pervasive in the 
postcolonial context (Misra 2008). According to Turshen (2004), to the most and 
to the least lethal, violence constitutes of genocide, international wars, internal 
wars and terrorism. The logic behind this sadistic trope of pain and pleasure as a 
disciplinary mechanism was to serve as coloniality of being, to induce fear on the 
side of the opposition, dissents or the perceived enemy. Added to that other than 
the act of humiliating, it is the act of exerting authority and to introduce the 
absence of speech.  
In this libidinal economy of pain and pleasure, bodies that are predated upon are 
made a site of exhibition of this technology of destruction. These are bodies that 
are made to be dead while alive. They are made to be the existence of a lack, and 
this is what is left by coloniality of being to make these bodies to be wallowing 
in want. The pain left in the body and the eyes that are seeing that body should 
assume permanence. The victim does not get healed even if the pain is soothed 
away for that this is the body that should serve as a reminder that the body was 
not like that.  
The traces of this demiurgic surgery persist for a long time, in the form of human 
shapes that are alive, to be sure, but whose bodily integrity has been replaced by 
pieces, fragments, folds, even immense wounds that are difficult to close (Mbembe 
2003a: 35). 
The body has the capacity to, as it has to be, to feel plain. So the horror done to 
the body in this excess form of sadism of unending pain is the expression of 
power to maintain subjection. Thus, adding to the fact that the body belongs to 
the possessors of violence, the subject in the capacity qau master, like in the case 
of the plantation, is the self that is external. The injuries of war as Turshen 
(2004) states are both visible and invisible. Both have different degrees but 
cannot be quantified, but it is important to point that violence and war in 
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particular leaves devastating impacts. Such devastation has taken another trend 
where it is no longer directed at soldiers but the civilians themselves as they are 
the targets of war. Turshen states that in the 20
th
 Century modality and morbidity 
affected soldiers, and this has reversed to the civilians towards the end of 20
th
 
Century and beyond.  
The psychology of violence in divided societies takes root at the level of 
stereotypes and myths that are represented as truth. In explaining conflict in 
postcolonial Africa, Nugent (2004) states that three things feature: the first is the 
contagion effect where patterns of violent conflict and its practices reproduce 
themselves. This often happens in an improvised and excessive in form. 
Secondly, overly genocidal practices and civilians becoming specific targets is 
common place. Lastly, violent conflict is often not ethnic or ideological, but a 
struggle for resources. According to Misra (2008: 48), this ‘habours antipathies 
and animosities against members of the opposing community’ and what matters 
is the tenacity of these stereotypes.  
Labelling or negative stereotyping may appear banal but nonetheless has some deep 
epistemic justification from the perpetrators’ perspective. Negative stereotypes allow 
perpetrators a self-constructed moral high ground on against the ‘[O]ther’. It allows 
that particular individual or group to engage in a one-sided debate about ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ and one’s responsibility. Very often an alluring unsubstantiated myth that 
portrays ‘the other’ in a poor light allows the ethnic homophobe or notes a context in 
that to operate (Misra 2008: 49). 
The case of amputation that has been common place in civil wars situation in 
Africa the body is amputated in that the victims were asked whether they want 
short ‘sleeve or long sleeve’; ‘shot pants or long pants’. This means, whether 
they wanted to have their arm or hand; foot or leg amputated. The rebels did this 
with pleasure, and this is the form of pain that in the act was done in the visibility 
of all the civilians who are attacked.      
The danger behind this crude recreational violence is that it regulates the desire for 
violence among the perpetrators. Seeking out sadistic violence on ‘the other’ 
becomes insatiable for this individualistic or group. Violence seduces the 
paramilitary, the thug, the butcher (Misra 2008: 51).  
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In the context of violence—rapes, torture, mutilations, amputations, burning 
bodies to name a few become normalised. The performance of these acts is like a 
play in the theatre or watching a horror film—not from the screen but in a 
proximate and in naked eyes. The smell of death, blood, mucus and tears comes 
into being. It is clear that the sadistic trope of pain and pleasure assumes the 
uncontrollable character and that is why coloniality of being is the factor of 
interpellation. It is, as Mbembe (2006a: 300) notes that, the ‘[c]apacity to 
prosecute war in other forms’. This is amplified my Misra (2008: 50) who states 
that ‘[t]he wanton lust for inflicting violence on the enemy assumes sadistic 
proportions in some conflict scenarios’. The libidinal economy of the sadistic 
trope of pain and pleasure is also the sacrificial discourse for the empire to 
pursue the political ends. Hardt and Negri (2000: xv) argue that the empire 
‘wields enormous power of oppression and destruction’. The empire has the 
arsenal of meta-rules, but such rules are applied when it suits it, and such rules 
are there for the service of it.  
Sacrifices can be embedded in coloniality of being qua Manichean logic of 
othering leading to the dehumanisation of enemy or disliked persons. Žižek 
(2009: 165) complicates this to say: ‘[i]t is mythical violence that demands 
sacrifice, and holds power over bare life; whereas divine violence is non-
sacrificial and expiatory’. It is clear, when introducing the body of the African 
subject, the body that has been afflicted by violence that it is, due to its intimacy 
and constitutiveness with death, that divine violence applies to it. The act of 
violence towards this body of the African subject cannot be a criminal act, or that 
which is outside the realm of law, but the law itself, since it is the violence to the 
non-ontological entity which cannot be accounted for. The empire in this 
Manichean logic sees itself as paragon of virtue and good, closely to God, while 
others—near evil. This binary is used as a state of necessity to warrant state 
violence in the logic of sacrifice (Frank 2010). This can be traced to Mbembe’s 
formulation of the colonial discourse that he articulates thus: 
Colonial discourse, an aberrant product of the madness that threatens all 
dominations, is stuck deep in the thick clay of contempt, condescension, and hatred. 
Meanwhile, the coloni[s]er gorges on food, scrambles up the tree of language, goes 
on an orgy of pleasure, farts, and collapses into a drunken stupor. The coloni[s]er 
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pinches words, sentences, scratches them, dilates them, slams them, and then erupts 
violently (Mbembe 2001a: 181). 
The colonial discourse suggests that the master, who is the head and component 
of the empire is destined to dominate human life, the human life that it denies 
humanity. According Butler (2004), the empire enjoys projecting its militaristic 
might without regard for human life. For Butler, the wayward military solution of 
the empire is sadism. As Butler (2004: 17) states, the empire in its sadistic 
posture ‘perpetuates and displays its own violence’. The empire’s logic is that of 
deriving pleasure while inflicting pain (sadism). In the sadistic acts the motive is 
to create the discourse of ‘[m]ourning, fear, anxiety, rage’ (Butler 2004: 28). The 
empire has bred the world and it is in this world where violence is the language 
that speaks. The formation and elaboration of it and its frontiers has the marks of 
violence.  
Misra (2008: 50) states that ‘the image of the enemy is conflated in order in order 
to allow the perpetrators to engage in what might be called pleasure-seeking 
violence’. This is a form of violence that is normalised. However, its projection 
is that of spreading terror. By its very nature this is the form of violence that aims 
to dehumanise and to some extent to render lifelessness to its targets. This form 
of violence appeals to the perpetrators (Misra 2008). The practice of violence 
becomes improvised and such is the act of making violence to the state of 
invention. Coloniality of being makes violence to become recreational and its 
sadistic performance becomes a norm. Such acts of sadism emanate from 
recreating and institutionalising violence for it to have maximal impact. It 
essentially means that killing is not is not merely separating the body and the 
soul, but insulting the body in life and also in death. To be sure, sadistic violence 
is the one that requires spectators and witnesses, it is in such a way that its mode 
of recreation leaves a permanent mark of fear. This state of sadistic violence 
should not be understood outside the discursive terrain of the politics of death 
that Mbembe (2003a) coins as necropolitics, where the project of dehumanisation 
and the configuration of power are still entrenched.  
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Necropower: unthinking empire and sovereignty  
Mbembe’s (2003a) deployment of the concept ‘necropower’ suggests the logic of 
conferring life and taking it at free will in the form of killing resulting to death. 
According to this perspective, the empire is the propagator of war and violence. 
In this state of affairs, the advocacy of peace is hypocrisy since the empire 
creates and sustains the state of permanent war.  According to Maldonado-Torres 
(2008a), the empire advocates war, violence and death—the very basis of its 
experience and a form of thought predicated on coloniality of being. The 
sovereign, who is the empire, always decides on the state of exception (Agamben 
2005). The logic of exclusion and othering produces a chaotic geopolitical 
structure, but that keeps the logic of the state apparatus intact with its monopoly 
of violence. Agamben posits that power that is sovereign, the empire, is outside 
and beyond itself. 
According to Mbembe (2003a), sovereignty and violence claim moral high 
ground that they create a political realm where in that there is a power to define 
life and death. Necropower refers to ‘the dynamics of territorial fragmentation, 
the sealing off and expansion of settlement’ (Mbembe 2003a: 27-28). Mbembe 
argues that necropower is the political condition that seeks to render mobility 
impossible and entrenches separation. Mbembe also does not confront and 
charge coloniality of being as something linked to the empire directly through is 
criminality of creating the state of permanent war. The state that defines the 
African condition through the lineage of the colonial encounter and also the 
tentacles of the colonial in the postcolonial condition are absent. The empire 
creates and entrenches the logic of separation, that it is, ‘tatamount to seclusion’ 
(Mbembe 2003a: 28).  
The racist attitude of the empire creates the state of hell in the postcolonial 
African condition. Through its politics of labelling and ‘Othering’, the 
technology that brings the Manichean axis of good and evil that are constitutive 
basis of coloniality of  being, the very condition that creates a stasis. This stasis 
came into being through the logic of seizure and the creation through the politics 
of labelling and appropriation something called the native (Mbembe 2001a). This 
is the framing of the world that makes the logic of empire to make its logic some 
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form of a singular truth. This is no different from the colonial logic, the very 
genesis and the nature of the empire with its ‘Othering’ politics. The empire as 
projected is always a paragon of virtue, the one that can be easily transported 
with military intervention under the guise of ‘regime change’. Butler articulates 
the empire as a:  
Sovereign and extra-legal subject, a violent and self-centred subject; its actions 
constitute the building of a subject that seeks to restore and maintain its mastery 
through systematic destruction of its multilateral relations, its ties to the international 
community’ (Butler 2004: 41). 
Mbembe (2003a) does not diagnose and critically respond to the non-ethics of 
war that have been institutionalised and normalised by the logic of the empire. 
The diagnosis and response of the non-ethics of war through ethical revolt is 
essential to open the archive of understanding the so-called ‘contemporary war in 
Africa’. Mbembe (2003a) articulates the notion of necropolitics to suggest a 
condition of war in contemporary Africa. The political under the guise of war 
assume the role of the sovereign in defence of the empire or in resistance to the 
empire, but resistance that still paradoxically sustains the imperial logic. For 
Mbembe, the state of war has assumed a new form of life where the tradition of 
conventional war is obsolete, and war being understood across time and space. 
Coloniality of being creates the state of permanent war. Racism and colonialism 
are central tropes of violence and war. According to Maldonado-Torres (2008a), 
both promote the complicit character where dehumanisation, violence and war 
are institutionalised and normalised. 
Mbembe’s articulation of the state of war through understanding the notion of 
necropower is innovative, but it has nothing I to do with the existential 
conditions of the African subject and it does not account for coloniality of being. 
The archive that Mbembe draws from is that of looking at the state of war in 
Africa from the European metropole, and not understanding the lived reality of 
the state of war. This then leaves coloniality of being on the wayside. This 
means, Mbembe’s deployment of necropolitics is descriptive and lacks the 
explanatory rigour when it comes to the African context. ‘Mbembe’s interests 
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stops descriptive level, however, that means that the teleogies are observed but 
ultimately not necessarily theori[s]ed’ (Gordon 2008: 240).  
Mbembe omits the role of the empire, and the continuity of effects of 
colonialism. According to Iadicola (2010), the empire establishes and reinforces 
rules of the system of the unjust word. Iadicola charges the crimes of the empire 
as forthright in that they supersede all other forms of crime in the world. Though 
Mbembe condemns the empire in some level, in nowhere does Mbembe 
criminalises the empire. The fact that crimes of the empire are committed with 
impunity; condemnation is not enough. Its crimes assume a normal form of life.  
Those who dominate the governing circles of the empire define empires crimes. 
These crimes are acts of violence and theft that threaten the empire, while acts of 
violence and theft of the empire are defined as normative, if not heroic, in imperial 
history (Iadicola 2010: 33).   
Rather than prosecuting the empire directly, the notion of sovereignty has also 
assumed innocence. There is absence of clearly stating directly that is 
sovereignty is the product and the constitutive part of the empire. Mbembe 
(2000) argues that forms of violence contribute to the establishment of 
sovereignty outside the realm of the state, and are based on confusion between 
power and fact, between public and private government’. The notion of 
sovereignty in relation to Africa is relatively void. The empire has dominant 
through neo-colonial means. The forms and technologies of violence that are 
prevalent in the postcolony originate from colonialism, and it is in the postcolony 
where they are elaborated and improvised. This, therefore, suggests that 
sovereignty is in the heart of violence, for that it is the product of empire—the 
incubator of violence. Mbembe (2003a) states that the conceptualising of 
sovereignty takes a form of configuring based on the logics of power—that is, to 
confer life and death. As Mamdani (2001: 196) states, ‘there is a demarcation 
between life that is considered worth taking (or giving) and life considered worth 
preserving (or enriching)’. It is argued here that this sovereignty is the empire—
the arsenal that confers life and death. The empire constructs sovereignty, so it 
logically follows that sovereignty is the technology of the empire. Thus, to the 
empire and its allies, ‘[v]iolence and war appear to them not as contingent results 
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of particular historical project, but as constitutive dimensions of dominant 
conceptions of civilisation and civilising process’ (Maldonado-Torres 2008a: 5). 
To exercise sovereignty is ‘to exercise control over mortality and to define life as 
the deployment and manifestation of power’ (Mbembe 2003a: 12). This means 
that the empire assumed the role of the patriarchal figure. The empire is then that 
of the patriarchal figure that objectifies whatever that exists under his authority. 
The logic and the make-up of the empire is a form of political life that is 
patriarchal in that it is a community of life that is narcissist. As such, what exists 
outside the margins of the empire is continuously marginalised and subjugated—
the very justification of the empire to render death upon it. Power confers the 
right to kill and Mbembe examines trajectories of the state of exception and 
enmity to have a right to kill. For Mbembe (2003a: 16), the logic of power is that 
of ‘exception, emergency and fictionali[s]ed enemy’. It will be argued here that 
meaning of death takes a different way of death—a death of objects that cannot 
be accounted for precisely because they are not synonymous with subjects. What 
matters for the empire is the patronising political reasoning that is based on the 
perspective that it seeks to civilise, liberate and democratise other parts of the 
worlds. This is how Mbembe puts it: 
The exercise of reason is tantamount to the exercise of freedom, a key element for 
individual autonomy. The romance of sovereignty, in this case, rests on the belief 
that the subject is the master and the controlling author of his or her meaning 
(Mbembe 2003a: 13).   
The conception of freedom applies only to the empire and it is therefore 
symbolically extended. Such an extension means that freedom is cosmetic since 
it is contrary to the lived experience of those who are in the margins of the 
empire. The empire privileges conflict to keep the world ‘order’. The empire is 
the word order that is expressed as a judicial formation (Hardt and Negri 2000). 
This arrangement refers to what Maldonado-Torres (2008a) refers to as the 
paradigm of war that is informed by the logic of reducing the world in singular 
terms. This is the world that the empire regards as its own property, the same like 
the plantation system that has slaves as the property of the master. In other 
words, the body and soul of the slave belongs to the master. This then qualifies 
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the master to exercises sovereignty at free will in his plantation. The conception 
of freedom is that of the master since the slave does not have any form of 
relationality to the form of human existence. The slave, as Wilderson (2010: 11) 
intimates, is ‘a being outside of relationality’. The enterprise of the plantation 
system that is akin to the empire is the negation of black humanity.  
The logic of violence is the discretion to kill indiscriminately and this is a form 
of killing that cannot be accounted for (Mbembe 2003a). Such lack of accounting 
is based on the fact that the colonised are made by coloniality of being to be in 
perpetual state of defeat. Sovereignty is, therefore, the potency of the empire and 
the impotence of the African subject. Mbembe states that sovereignty is two-fold, 
at first it is about self-institution, and secondly about self-lamination. The 
concern for Mbembe’s perspective on sovereignty is that this two-foldedness is 
not for the struggle for autonomy that instrumentalises human existence beyond 
coloniality of being. On the contrary, this sovereignty is about the destruction of 
human bodies (Mbembe 2003a).  
Mbembe’s central problematic is to ascertain the relationship between politics and 
death in those systems that can function only in a state of emergency or a state of 
exception. He shows how the trope of death operates in the formulation of one being 
rendered a subject through an exploitation of the very “work of death” (Ahluwalia 
2004: 636). 
Hogeveen (2010) has it that sovereignty does not share. This is because it is 
dictated and is designed by the empire. The empire cannot share; it must 
conquer, dominate, control and at worse, kill. Such structural arrangements 
cannot in any way ensure cooperation or sharing since these are off-limits in the 
condition where coloniality of being is pervasive. The simple reason is that, 
sovereignty in the lens of the empire is that which obliterates law, since it is the 
law unto itself (Butler 2004). What is the provision of what laws confers and 
protects is that the empire has the power to withdraw and suspend. According to 
Butler, the condition of the existence of rights and their protection is what the 
empire can withdraw.  
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The act by that the state annuls its own laws has to be understood as an operation of 
sovereign power or, rather, the operation by that lawless sovereign power comes into 
being or, indeed, re-emerges in new forms (Butler 2004: 61).     
Iadicola (2010: 38) rightfully asserts that, ‘[e]mpire’s law is fundamentally based 
on a system of unequal justice that violates a central principle of law’. This is 
clear and political figures from the empire, like George Bush and the Tony Blair 
are absolved for not being hauled before the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
and to be charged for war crimes they have committed through the invasion of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The state of being absolved is not that there was an 
intention to subject them to the principles of law. They were the law and the label 
of them being war criminals was absent. They cannot be even prosecuted in the 
ICC. This means they are the community of masters who are the law unto 
themselves (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). Only African dictators, rebels and 
warlords can be hauled before such a court. This affirms the logic that 
sovereignty is arrogated by the empire’s ‘right’ to contaminate sovereignty of 
other nations whom it dislikes or disfavours. The empire can enforce regime 
change in the countries that are not its puppets and if there is resistance war will 
be declared to liquidate such resistance. Therefore, the empire’s military order 
always stands to violate with impunity against those it excludes and finds in 
disfavour.   
The sense of peace by the empire is an illusion and blind faith, but that are 
accepted complicity as truth (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). Fatalism exists in the 
sense that those who are subjected by violence of the empire see their ordinary 
life as normal. For Maldonado-Torres, the advocacy for peace by the empire, 
through its community of masters is hypocritical since such a peace is alien to 
non-violence. For Mbembe (2003a), necropolitics concerns the state of mundane 
violence. This is a state of exception where the international law and a nation’s 
sovereignty are ignored. The state of exception is the betrayal of ‘the mystical 
foundation of authority because sovereign power operates in suspension of 
positive law, enforcing the law paradoxicaly insofar as it is inapplicable at the 
time and place of its enforcement’ (Sexton 2010: 32). As Agamben (2005) 
explains, politics and law create a situation where relations become liquidated 
such state of necessity is affirmed. This means, as Sexton (2010) posits, a 
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suspension of the politico-juridical, the exception becoming the rule that 
connotes the absence of order.  
Mamdani (2001) warns that temptation to present necessity as choice and to strip 
human action of both the dimension of possibility and responsibility should be 
resisted. This warning of course, will not change the attitude of the empire since 
the empire sees the logic of necessity as a tool to create the state of exception. 
The state of exception makes political fact to preside over judicial principle and 
this is the constitutive basis of coloniality of being. The state of exception 
obliterates legal terms and ‘appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal 
form’ (Agamben 2005: 1). In these terms, the law is suspended. For Agamben, 
the state of exception is removed from the law and judicial oversight and this 
creates enough ground for war to be normalised and naturalised. In this 
condition, the paradigm of governance is that of the empire that creates the 
permanent state of emergency to bring into effect any political ends as law or 
suspended law to advance its agenda.  
Iadicola (2010) is of the view that there is complicity in the type of state criminal 
behaviour prevalent in the empire. The disaster that befalls those in the ex-
colonised parts of the world is that criminality is seen as self-inflicted. The 
empire has the power to influence elites, insurgents and influential networks in 
the ex-colonised world on how to engage in the economy of violence. The only 
war crime is that of postcolonial African states acting on behalf of or in the 
interests of the empire during war time (Iadicola 2010). During war time active 
support and sponsorship is provided to the comprador class of the postcolonial 
African states. It is usual that when such a class face charges or extradition from 
the ICC, they are no longer supported by the very same empire that then charges 
them of war crimes. The empire needs to create and maintain the economy of 
violence since violence is foundational to it. ‘The contradictions of imperial 
society are elusive, proliferating, and nonlocali[s]able; the contradictions are 
everywhere’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 201). Hogeveen (2010) intervention is 
important to understand this state of affairs, since the law that is applied by the 
empire is that of its own authorship, not those of the ex-colonised or in the 
margins of the empire. Such laws are subject to violation at will and permit the 
violence meted against those who are in the margins of the empire. Sovereignty 
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in its Westphalian meaning and its trias politica (separation of powers of the 
executive, legislature and judiciary) are thrown on the wayside if not fully 
suspended to fulfil self-interest and predatory nature of the empire. ‘The state 
[produces], through the act of withdrawal, a law that is no law, a court that is no 
court, a process that is no process’ (Butler 2004: 62).  
The empire performs power based on its sole decisions that do in a way have dire 
consequences for the rest of the world. According to Butler, the acts of the 
empire are embedded not in law but another form of judgement. To label or 
define the ‘Other’ for the fact that they are a threat to ‘international community’, 
essentially mean that these are people who are not pandering to the whims of the 
empire and they must be subjected to the whims of coloniality of being. Since the 
empire is in the possession of power, it has the power to define. As Hardt and 
Negri (2000: 23) note, drawing from Foucault, they argue that the empire qua 
disciplinary power sets of ‘the parameters and limits of thought and practice, 
sanctioning and prescribing normal and /or deviant behaviours’. Definitions are 
then designed and shaped in line with the interests of the empire (Iadicola 2010). 
So the notion of politics is that of the reasoning of the empire, the reasoning that 
resonates from the power to define.  
According to Hardt and Negri (2000: 33), ‘[p]ower, as it produces, organi[s]es, it 
speaks and expresses itself as authority’. This links with how power of 
sovereignty creates subjects and how subjectivity is produced. What is not spelt 
out clearly in Hardt and Negri is how subjection takes place when sovereign 
power exerts its own authority and also forming its own subjects. The way power 
exerts itself—that is not legitimate in other societal and spatial positions of the 
world—subjection features since the refusal of legitimacy exists. Hardt and 
Negri do point out that sovereign power demonstrates its effectiveness of power 
through the effective use of force, and this raises a concern whether this is not 
subjection. As Mbembe (2003a: 13) has it, ‘the truth of the subject and politics is 
the exercise of reason’. This form of reason is what the empire holds, to engage 
in the state of exception.  
In truth, the state of exception is neither external nor internal to judicial order, and 
the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold or a zone of indifference, 
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where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur each other. The 
suspension of the norms does not mean its abolition, and the zone of anomie that it 
establishes is not (or at least claims to be) unrelated to the judicial order (Agamben 
2005: 23).  
Politics of necessity suggest that politics are not rooted in legal systems or 
norms. The legally is that of the empire, meaning that politics precedes 
everything as long as they serve the interests of the empire. In this formulation 
law is negotiated. According to Chouliarus (2010), the process of normalisation 
of exception allows the empire to name, label, torture, and dehumanise its 
targets. Secondly, the logic and reason of the empire precedes whatever binds all 
states. The empire operates without any fear of reappraisal because it is the 
power that unites itself. Coloniality of being makes the empire to see its 
righteousness and moral superiority, and this imperial attitude is enforced 
through its political reasoning. The morality of the empire here is means the 
military might.  
The exercise of sovereign power is bond up with the extra-legal status of these 
official acts of speech. These acts become the means by that sovereign power 
extends itself; the more it can produce equivocation, the more effectively it can 
augment its power in the apparent service of justice (Butler 2004: 80). 
This is the totalising discourse and claims officialdom in its propagation of 
singular truths that should not be opposed. It is this arrangement that creates the 
notion of political reasoning, the very act of the empire that sees itself as the 
regime of truth that rules. The paradigm of violence is so inculcated in the 
psyche of the empire to the point that the empire is beyond redemption. In 
addition, it is important to point out that the empire cannot be redeemed since 
this will mean its end. Redemption will mean the empire committing suicide, 
something that is impossible since this will mean the end of the majesty. Since 
the empire was created and sustained through the expansionist logic, it cannot 
allow what it has invaded, dominated, and controlled to secede. If the paradigm 
of war cannot exist, then it logically follows that the empire cannot exist. 
Such a discourse permits the empire to politically exist with impunity and being 
immune from violence. As Mbembe (2003a) states, politics is not a dialectical 
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exercise towards reason, but spiral transgression of political limits. In 
postcolonial Africa the crimes of the empire are hard to ignore, as Iadicola 
(2010) argues, the empire is the largest, most powerful, violent and rarely 
defined criminal organisation. The historical record of the empire is littered with 
plunder, theft and exploitation of resources and killing those who resist such 
practice. It is a regime of violence that is always ready to declare war, and the 
outcome of that war is to destruct the enemy completely. To amplify this view, 
the empire is infested with illusion that it is ethical enough and this makes it to 
claim to be ethical enough to be in the status of declaring war and this state of 
war is coloniality of being. The empire is motivated by selfish political ends that 
are designed as truth in the eyes of its subjects and they are coined as ‘national 
interests’. Those who try to falsify these ‘truth’ are said to be in opposition to the 
order of the notions of peace, self-determination, justice and democracy. They 
are those who are othered and excluded outside the circle of the empire, are 
resistant for being part of the international community. It should be kept in mind 
that the relationality of the empire and its objects is that of asymmetrical 
relations. Such relations reinforce the idea that the world as it is hierarchichised 
and the empire as at the commanding heights of this world since it is a subject 
over objects. 
Iadicola (2010) charges the empire as the violator of sovereignty at will and at 
worse, with impunity. The empire defines and dictates what sovereignty is and 
contravenes its very meaning. Sovereignty and even there has to be after 
sovereignty, the spectre of the ex-colonised and racialised world will continue to 
linger on (Hogeveen 2010). For Hogeveen, the empire’s sovereignty equates to 
the law of violence that legitimises and rationalises itself. Even today the empire 
still possesses the power to define. The argument in this study concurs with the 
view that sovereignty remains a mercantilist, feudal, colonial, imperial and 
neoliberal formation (Hogeveen 2010).  
The predominance of state interest over every personal or joint interest, and its 
furtherance, represents the ultimate objective of the new technique of government 
according to the reason of the state (Chouliarus 2010: 238). 
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Mbembe (2003a) argues that the existence of the other threatens the subject of 
the empire. So there needs to be elimination of that threat to strengthen the 
subject of the empire. As Maldonado-Torres (2008a) explains, the imperial 
violence centers the discourse of the ideals of war that creates the paradigm of 
war and violence. Mbembe’s (2003a) conception of the technologies of 
destruction is essentially linked to the acts of war. The paradigm of war should 
be unearthed to understand its technologies by pointing them out to ‘racial 
policies, imperial projects, and wars of invasion’ (Maldonado-Torres 2008a: 2-
3). This is important to understand the paradigm of war and violence that is the 
genetic make-up of the empire, but then the specificity of such technologies seem 
not to be grounded in the lived experience. Also then, to problematise the state of 
war in Africa and its permanent or recurring character should not be ahistoric, 
since this undermines the presense of the colonial legacy.  
Mbembe (2003a) does not go further to shed light the logic of explaining 
contemporary war in Africa, except to describe it. But then, that is not essential 
to understand African politics with regards to the state of permanent war. In other 
words, necropower is seen as omnipotent, it does not have an ending. 
Necropower is the potency of the phallus that is occupied by its raping mission, 
the very logic of technologies of destruction. ‘It is through the phallus that the 
coloni[s]er is able to link up with the surrounding world’ (Mbembe 2001a: 175). 
The phallus is used as a weapon and it must rape through since its nature of the 
act is invasion. The empire as the embodiment of power has been a phallus in 
form and character—a weapon. War itself can be seen as an extension of 
domination —that is, war is rape both figuratively and literally. The projection of 
war is phallic power. Mbembe’s absence of ethical revolt against this raping 
practice of the empire betrays the very agency that exists in the ex-colonised 
world. The subjects cannot be reduced to mere objects that cannot revolt and 
create another world. Though the empire raped and continues to rape through, 
this does not suggest that there is no way victory can emerge. The slave struggle 
for recognition to the point of the slave winning is a mirage to Mbembe’s 
thinking. The argument here is that Mbembe’s contribution is superseded by that 
of Maldonado-Torres (2008a) who is concerned with coloniality of being that 
creates the hellish conditions of existence, and advocates for decoloniality 
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analysis that is committed to the destruction of the complicit structures of the 
empire. 
State sovereignty in these ungoverned spaces is linked to states absence of 
authority and governance (Clunan 2010). Ungoverned spaces are in a way a 
threat to the empire. If such spaces were not a threat there would not be any call 
for the empire crying for their concern. Ungoverned spaces are the creation of the 
empire and they are beneficial, and at the same time they are working against the 
empire. The empire brought upon itself contenders. Stakes are high that the 
imperial logic of conquest, dominance and control is intensified and re-
inaugurating itself. Being as a clandestine formation and practice, it has become 
exposed. It is military intervention where those who are othered are violated 
through the rhetoric and propaganda of ‘regime change’. The logic is the same, 
but the terminology is different. The international community means the empire 
and it is clear that it does not involve those who are not powerful states and/or 
allies of the empire.   
The empire will keep the weak and failed states intact as long as they are not a 
threat. This exposes the hypocrisy that civil wars or conflicts in those states are a 
threat to global good governance. What is global only suggests what is in the 
domain and the interest of the empire. The ungoverned spaces are virtual realms 
where ‘non-state actors can avoid state surveillance and undermine state 
sovereignty’ (Clunan 2010). Such undermining can be done with relatively ease. 
Clunan states that ungoverned spaces for example are feral cities, failed states, 
offshore financial markets, cyberspace to name a few, and these are the spaces 
where governance de-facto exists.  
Western liberal imperialism created contested territorial spaces. Western embedded 
liberal, and then neoliberal, ideology brought about contested authorities—contested 
control of the economy, polity, and society—and retreat of the territorial state 
(Clunan and Trinhunas 2010: 25). 
The neoliberal project inaugurated globalisation that is the larger transnational 
phenomenon—the very case of ungoverned spaces. The empire pursued and still 
pursues its national interests and capitalism (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010). This is 
the reason why the empire advocated and implemented economic liberalisation 
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and blurring of borders to ensure flow of goods and services. This led to the 
neoliberal configuration of the world through globalisation, and it is the powerful 
states that are leading the process. Also, this condition contributed to the 
privatisation of the state and commoditisation of people as goods. Clunan and 
Trinkunas (2010) extend the argument to suggest that ungoverned spaces are a 
socio-politico-economical arena where state sovereignty cannot hold the centre. 
This is the state weakness or absence or being a contested terrain. The territory in 
the sense of sovereignty has been ceded voluntary and involuntary. This then 
suggests that, ungoverned spaces connote a threat to the state security and the 
state international system. Power resides in the areas that were not powerful and 
this form of softened sovereignty possesses a threat to the empire. The empire 
militarises itself to keep the colonial and imperialistic architecture and 
technologies of subjection in place to subordinate and exclude. The structure and 
technologies of subjection that globalisation opened space for perpetuates the 
hellish conditions of war.    
On the obsolete ontology   
‘Power in the colony involves a tactile perception of the native that makes this 
violence more than simply an aesthetic and an architecture’ (Mbembe 2001a: 
175). In the state of war, the racialised African subject can be easily labeled as 
the aberration from the norm and war will be justified in terms of its means and 
ends. ‘The obliteration of the trans-ontological takes the tendency of producing a 
world in that war becomes the norm, rather than the exception’ (Maldonado-
Torres 2007: 260). According to Maldonado-Torres (2007), the trans-ontological 
is the foundation of the ontological. The racialised body of the African subject 
was in the colonial era, a fatal attraction of the white gaze that made the 
sensationalist description of its form and structure to create the technology of 
invention. This technology, create a new power regime fabricating the racialised 
body to the level of objecthood that gives live to disciplinary power (Butchart 
1998). This is because the body of the African subject is circulated and is 
plagued with stereotypes of disease, deviance and animality, the very things that 
qualifying murderous violence of coloniality of being. As Vergés (1997: 582) 
states, the racialised body is ‘a humiliated, mocked, beaten, raped, assaulted, 
tortured, murdered body’.  
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Nowhere does Mbembe apply coloniality of being to the level of the racialised 
body, but he elevates it to the level of the bodies in general. This means the body 
of the empire, the very centre of the technologies of destructions is equivalent to 
the racialised body. This in a way, the empire is absolved. Nothing is mentioned 
by Mbembe in the postcolonial era, about the racialised body being the target of 
the empire and being affected by coloniality of being. The empire in pursuit of 
non-ethics of war engages in the ritual of sorting and labeling those it does not 
want as enemies of global peace. The humanity of the African subject becomes 
absent in the world, as the body itself carries with it the undesirable, and ceases 
to be part of view and has to register to the world.  
Therefore, the world of the African subject in general and that of the racialised 
body in particular will be subjected to the murderous and rapist lusts of the 
empire. The ideology of war is the basis of ontology and the condition of being is 
in the hands of the community of masters (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). The 
community of masters are those that dictate the form of existence and also 
deciding who may die and who may live. This means, the community of masters 
have absolute power over life of the colonised, the one with a racialised body, the 
racialised body. Such absolute power through its possession and projection 
licenses the community of masters as architects of dehumanisation. This makes 
the racialised body to be a ‘thing’, the character that the racialised body has 
assumed, but that Mbembe only looks in the colonial era and not in the 
postcolony where it suffers from coloniality of being. Since the African subject, 
with its racialised body targeted; it cannot defend itself for that it is subjected in 
the hellish existence—the existential conditions which are foundational and 
constitutive basis of the rapacious violence. As Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 31) 
captures it, the ‘violation of ethics and in the exercise of violence over other 
human beings—by a conscious of lordship’ has been the rationale of empires 
existence.  
Arguably, the paradigm of violence and war has been radicalised and naturalised 
through coloniality of being that has pervaded the world since the kick-starting of 
the invasion and dehumanisation of the racialised body by the empire. This 
radicalised and naturalised, as Maldonado-Torres asserts, is articulated through 
the idea of race. The idea of race as Gordon (2005) argues is used as an 
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organising principle. So it follows that the making of the world by the empire has 
been that of the idea of race with the racialised body as a target. The world ever 
since has been constructed and defined through the ideology of war (Maldonado-
Torres 2008a). Mbembe (2001a: 174) asks, ‘what does it mean to do violence to 
what is nothing?’ Mbembe locates this within the framework of human existence, 
and in particular the ways in which such existence is permitted or terminated in 
the era of colonialism. The existence of the human being should be centered on 
the birth of the subject, something that is not permitted by colonialism, and also 
coloniality through its imperial global designs. The paradox is that coloniality of 
being still suggest that the spectre of colonialism is still haunting today and the 
question, what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing is also akin to 
‘what does it mean to suffer?’ (Wilderson 2008: 100).  
The formulation of these two questions, are essential to understand the existential 
phenomenology of the African subject. To answer them demands some reflection 
on the existential condition of the African subject. It has to be pointed out that to 
Mbembe (2001a) these questions are only relevant in the colony and to the 
historical era of colonialism. In what Mbembe regards as the postcolony, these 
questions are irrelevant since the colonial masters have departed and cannot be 
blamed for the state of abyss that the racialised body of the African subject finds 
itself. These questions are irrelevant to Mbembe in the contemporary for the fact 
that he is ignores structures of violence and subjection.  
Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 103) against ‘radicali(s)ation and naturali(s)ation of 
ethics of war’. The absence means living in the possibility of subjective death 
(Gordon 2007). The lived experience of the African subject is that of the 
transportation and exportation of the negative image, in that the existence of the 
African subject is dehumanised systematically. Maldonado-Torres (2007) 
continues to point out that the African subject needs to be objectified and 
exploited, hence its continuous denigration to the point of the infra-human. The 
empire declares wars to the racialised bodies and creates this state of war as the 
existential reality of the African subject.  
War, however, is not only about killing or enslaving. War includes a particular 
treatment of sexuality and of feminity: rape. Coloniality is an order of things that 
239 
 
put people of colo[u]r under murderous and rapist sight of a vigilant ego 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007: 247).  
The existence of African subject equates to death, the death that cannot be 
accounted for since it is not illegal for the empire to kill the racialised body. The 
bodily life of the racialised body possesses a life that can be taken away from 
that body even if it were to be alive. The racialised body is the body that is 
exposed to vulnerability. As Butler (2004) states, risk, damage, and expunge 
define the subject position of the racialised body. Racialised bodies ‘are given 
over to nothing, or to brutality, or to no substance’ (Butler 2004: 31). The 
racialised body has been an object. Maldonado-Torres points out that:  
Misanthropic skepticism posits its targets as racialised and sexuali[s]ed subjects. 
Once vanquished, they are said to be inherently servants and their bodies come to 
form part of an economy of sexual abuse, and control (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 
248). 
Misanthropic skepticism exists within coloniality of being and this suggests that 
these practices that are often bound and limited only to colonialism and war 
situation. These conditions are in the everyday existence, and more so in the 
spaces inhabited by racialised bodies. In relation to the body, the notion of the 
state of exception is also applicable as Whyte (2010) shows that the individual 
subject, who happens to be the African subject, his or her subjecthood becomes 
objectified through the process of dehumanisation. This means for the back there 
is no subjectivity since subjectivity is under erasure (Wilderson 2010). For Butler 
(2004), the body that cannot be humanised means it does not fit the schema of 
being human. Dehumanisation makes the path and nature of violence easier. The 
legal status of the individual is obliterated as the body is just a mere object of that 
violence is directed to. 
So this means that the state of exception goes beyond Agamben’s (2005) 
terrain—that is, territory and socio-politico and economic structure. The state of 
exception becomes worse when is at the level of the body. The very damnation—
the hellish existence of the African subject is coloniality of being through the 
naturalisation of slavery, serfdom and inferiority justified through the prism of 
race (Madonado-Torres 2007). The idea of race is the identity code through that 
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the state of exception can reproduce itself, and author its own law just like the 
master does in the plantation. The tools of imposition from the state of exception 
are embedded and reinforced through a negative dialectic of law (Whyte 2010). 
The state of exception here is understood at the level through that it attacks the 
racialised body, the body that lives under the surveillance and the control of the 
empire. The conditions of life of the African subject is trapped in coloniality of 
being, the other abyssal line where savagery and dehumanisation are constitutive 
parts of reality. In the contemporary era, they take the form of life through 
structural violence. Structural violence makes the axis of evil of the empire to 
assume the form of the human face. Structural violence is effective in the sense 
that it attacks the level of the body by means of packaging it to the ‘site of a 
common human vulnerability’ (Butler 2004: 44).  This means, the racialised 
bodies are made to suffer because they are that of commonality. So, the 
collective blame is attributed to such bodies and they even get blamed for their 
own dehumanisation and its long-lasting effects.   
Mbembe (2003a) is of the view that the state of exception is a space where the 
slave belongs to the master. According to Maldonado-Torres (2008a), the empire 
is informed by the nexus of power that divides the world according to the logic 
of the plantation. In the plantation, the master and the slave inhabit the same 
territorial space, but the different space of existence. For the master there is life 
and for the slave there is death, the death that is caused by the master. As 
Ahluwalia (2004: 638) notes, ‘[s]lave life was in many ways a forms of death-in-
life’. The life of the slave can be taken at will of the master, for that the owner of 
the slave, the slave being the property of the master. Indeed, the state of 
exception is still informed by the colonial relations, where the body of the slave 
is the property of the master, and only the master can confer life and death on 
this body. In this form of ownership the master can reign free on the body of the 
slave that is the object lacking any form of ontology.  In short, the slave is not 
human and does not possess any form of relationality of being human in the 
world of the master, the plantation. The plantation can be understood as the anti-
black world, that is, the world that militates against the existence of the black 
being. ‘That is, to live in such a world is to be socially dead’ (Ahluwalia 2004: 
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638). This is the world constructed by the empire with its dehumanising project. 
Such a project sustains the hellish condition of created by colonialism.     
At the level of the body, violence does mean the dispossession of law, not its 
preservation. Violence against the racialised body is conducted outside the 
judicial order. This is because, the judicial order is the instrument that governs 
the racialised body, and this is the body that is excluded and left outside of that 
order. Santos (2007) states that there is a law of persons and the law of things; 
and  the law of things state of the economy of violence in the sense that it is the 
suspension of law itself. The law of the empire is therefore the law of things, and 
as Santos (2007) amplifies, this is the law that operates through appropriation 
and violence. As such, for the mere fact that African subjects are things, the law 
of persons does not apply to them, since a thing is not a person. The rule of law 
in this sense connotes the idea that it is the law of things and things here refer to 
those which are outside the domains of subjects.  
Therefore, it follows that African subjects are objects as they are ruled by the law 
of things. So, in this state of things, violence loses its meaning and becomes 
necessity and in its self it becomes self-justified. The master drops and suspends 
law to affirm his form of life over the ‘Other’. The ‘Other’ is a source where 
master derives life. If the slave does not exist, so is the master. Then again, 
coloniality of being is what important to reflect upon through abyssal lines as 
Santos (2007) alludes to them because they divide the humans and non-humans. 
These lines in their cartographical forms are reinforcing each other through their 
double bind form. On the other side of line there are ethics where humanisation 
and life are permitted, and the opposite applies to the other side of line.  
The colonies provided a model of radical exclusion that prevails in the modern 
Western thinking and practice today as it did during the colonial circle. Today as 
then, both the creation and the negation of the other side of the line is constitutive of 
hegemonic principles and practices. Today as then, the impossibility of co-presence 
between the two sides of the line runs supreme (Santos 2007: 10).  
Manganyi (1973: 7) argues that ‘a tolerable environment maintains a distinction 
between “the people” (whose rights and existence are recognised) and the “non-
people” whose existence and rights are not seriously considered’. In this regard, 
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the former is the subject, while the latter is the object—the patterns that fits well 
with the making and the operation of the Manichean structure that affirms the 
logic of coloniality of being. Manganyi argues that the individual experiences the 
body as an object, the body being something outside itself. According to 
Maldonado-Torres (2008a), the empire is constitutive to inhuman pathologies. In 
the colonial world and its aftermath through the imperialistic logic of the empire, 
the pathological is normal. Human beings do not exist, and the form of existence 
that exists is the coloniser and the colonised, the latter who possesses the 
racialised body. The logic of the empire through the use of state of exception is 
to create a norm out of the state of exception.  As pointed out: 
Far from being a response to a normative lacuna, the state of exception appears as 
the opening of a fictious lacuna in the order for the purpose of safeguarding the 
existence of the norm and its applicability to the normal situation (Agamben 2005: 
31). 
This means that coloniality of being presents the very basis of war situations—a 
disaster and a scandal. This is partly because, that if there is no war, the African 
subject will exist, so the permanence of war is the logic of empire. This is the 
very basis of rendering the ontology of the racialised body of the Africa subject 
obsolete. It then means that to assume the positionality of the racialised body is 
to be outside ontology and to be in a deathscape.  
Deathscapes: ways of dying and a ‘life in death’ 
According to Mbembe (2003a), it is in this place where violence can mature to 
the state of being labeled civility. Having a different take to this, Baliber (2001) 
argues that the conditions of violence and extremity fall outside the ambit of 
political civility. Death is made possible by the state of exception, where the 
notion of the other is factionalised to justify the very basis of his or her death. 
Violence in this deathscape makes death to be elevated to the natural state where 
it is a lived reality and a condition of life. According to Mbembe (2003b), the 
mode of life in the political world is that of confrontation and defamiliarity. 
Deathscapes suggest politics of space where ‘raw material of sovereignty and the 
violence it carries with it’ (Mbembe 2003a: 26). Deathscapes, the space inhibited 
by African subjects who are vulnerable to death by the mere fact of being at the 
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receiving end of coloniality of being, not only because they are in proximity to 
such a space, but the fabric of their being is death itself.  As Balibar (2001) notes, 
‘extreme violence has produced a tendential division of “globali[s]ed” world into 
life-zones and death-zones (emphasis original). It is in this condition where life is 
constitutive of death—that is, to live is to die. The will to live simply means their 
will to die. This represents the ‘extreme forms of human life, death-worlds’ 
(Mbembe 2003b: 1). It is in this form that the manner in which those who are the 
targets of the empire in the image of sovereignty should be accounted for, and 
those who are at its margins should not be accounted for as they are not 
sovereign subjects.  
Deathscapes have assumed a complex character, but it is important to point out 
that the condition of violence in its absolute and structural. According to 
Wilderson (2010: 75), deathscapes do exist simply because the nature of violence 
precedes and exceeds the life of the African subject. The empire kills its targets 
through police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools, 
housing and health facilities, astronomical mortality rates to name but a few. 
These are the lived experiences of most of the African subjects, and they demand 
a grammar of suffering that is crowded out as there will be a demand for 
empirical facts, statics and complexity of race and class. These lived experiences 
have their own grammar that articulates terror and death, but such a grammar 
cannot turn into speech, since it is crowded out (Wilderson 2010).  
Mbembe (2003a: 36) posits that ‘terror and death are at the heart of each other.’ 
He also points out further that ‘terror is a defining feature of both slave and late-
modern colonial regimes’ (Mbembe 2003a: 38’). Deathscapes are akin to the 
existence of blacks and this is not as Mbembe assumes, the new forms of social 
existence, but the continuity emanating from the colonial encounter to the present 
era of subjection where death is permissible and cannot be accounted for. It is in 
this condition of war, that is, war against racialised bodies, the bodies that cannot 
be accounted for simply because they are at the lower radar of human hierarchy. 
According to Casper and Moore (2009: 134), war produces missing bodies, both 
literally and figuratively, while amplifying the visibility of other bodies’. This 
assumes the presence of deathscapes where the body of the African subject does 
not matter since it is the body of the object and not that of the subject. 
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Deathscapes have assumed the form of ‘violence that underwrites the modern 
world’s capacity to think, act, and exist spatially and temporally’ (Wilderson 
2010: 2). What is masking the deathscapes and giving them self-justification is 
what Wilderson (2010) articulates as a radical fringe of the political discourse 
that is obsessed with the passionate dream of civic reform and social stability.  
Understanding structural violence from coloniality of being in relation to the 
concentration of the racialised body in the deathscape is akin to the 
understanding of the hidden dimension of this violence. This understanding 
exposes what is hidden in the discourses of the passionate dream of civic reform 
and social stability. Mbembe (2003) in his articulation of necropolitics and 
necropower that produces death-worlds seems to ignore structural violence and 
he only focuses on visible forms of violence—that is, absolute violence. 
Violence in Mbembe’s thinking, only circulates in the matrix form, describing its 
devastation, multiplicity, proliferation and omnipresence—and these are 
symptoms. In other words, the realm of structural violence that sustain the 
plantation and the dehumanisation of the African subject is that which Mbembe 
(2002b) refers to its grammar of suffering as mere victimhood and it genealogy 
dismissed as faked philosophies. Mbembe’s dismissal is outright and fails to 
engage the manner in which subjection operates at the zone of non-being, that 
shows how the perverse of structural violence takes, can be engaged. Structural 
violence is about structures that are hidden in form, and that continue to create 
deathscapes the logic of zoning that Wolfe (2007) calls the blatant racial zoning. 
These are deathscapes that have assumed the level of the normal and natural 
through the mask of structural violence since this is the violence that assumes the 
invisible from, hence the normalisation of pathologies, the very basis of 
deathscapes.  
Mbembe (2003a) is of the view that the state of exception is a space where the 
slave belongs to the master. According to Maldonado-Torres (2008a), the empire 
is informed by the nexus of power that divides the world according to the logic 
of the plantation. In the plantation, the master and the slave inhabit the same 
territorial space, but the different space of existence. For the master there is life 
and for the slave there is death, the death that is caused by the master. As 
Ahluwalia (2004: 638) notes, ‘[s]lave life was in many ways a forms of death-in-
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life’. The life of the slave can be taken at will of the master, for that the owner of 
the slave, the slave being the property of the master. Indeed, the state of 
exception is still informed by the colonial relations of superiority-inferiority. 
This means that the body of the African subject is reigned over.  In short, the 
African subject being denied humanity does not possess any form of relationality 
of being human in the anti-black world that is comparable to the plantation qua 
deathscape. The plantation can be understood as the anti-black world, that is, the 
anti-black world that militates against the existence of the African subject. ‘That 
is, to live in such a world is to be socially dead’ (Ahluwalia 2004: 638). This is 
the world constructed by the empire with its dehumanising project. Such a 
project sustains the hellish condition of created by colonialism.     
The plight decrying the perversity of dehumanisation is dismissed as accused as 
mere victimhood by Mbembe (2001a). Contrary to Mbembe, Hogeveen (2010) 
argue that this denial accounts for nothing that the empire is predatory in its order 
of erasing the other, including the form of speech. Such erasure even goes with 
the distortion and termination of histories and lived experiences. The grammar of 
suffering is not the language of victimhood as Mbembe claims, but is the 
language that grammar of demands. These are demands that are impossible to 
meet (Wilderson 2010). These demands are demands for justice, reparations and 
restitution of labour, land, being and humanity. The meeting of these demands 
simply means the obliteration deathscapes, something that the empire cannot 
concede to. The colonial encounter is informed by violence—a deathscape. 
Deathscapes are a place of no return as there cannot be any resurrection from 
death. The return of resurrection will only come into being by killing the very 
condition that creates such death form—that of the deathscape.     
Deathscapes in the sense of coloniality of being open the vistas of understanding 
a complex form of violence that in its make-up is in a matrix form. This can be 
understood on the difference and division between the coloniser and the 
colonised. This is not a binary, by a complexity of power relation that informs 
the relations between the empire and its objects. The performance and character 
of the empire has been changing through mercantilist, imperialist, colonialist, 
segregationist, globalist and neo-liberal periods. But this change has been 
cosmetic in the sense that the logic of conferring live and death and enslaving the 
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racialised body of the African subject and keeping its environment a deathscape 
has not been changed, but radicalised to the state of naturalised abyss. The logic 
of zoning has been with the empire through its inception. The logic and operation 
of violence in relation to coloniality of being is the very form of zoning that 
renders life and death, privilege and dispossession, and inclusion and exclusion is 
the work of the empire. This is what Wilderson (2010: 80) regards as ‘the 
differential zoning and gratuity (as opposed to contingency) of violence that 
accrue to the Blackened position’. Deathscapes assume the Manichean form that 
is akin to what Santos (2007) regards as cartographical abyssal lines where forms 
of lives differ in each line. Santos points out that there is an invisible distinction 
between the metropolitan societies and colonial territories. Through these 
distinctions, Santos demonstrates that the condition of freedoms that are created 
for the metropolitan societies are impossible to imagine as the necessary 
conditions that can be given to the colonial territories. The colonial territories 
following this account mean that they cannot be the same with the metropolitan 
societies. Therefore, there should be no ethics on that other side of the colonial 
territories and, death is permissible. Coloniality of being as the condition of 
unfreedom means that the existential plane is a deathscape.  
Mbembe’s (2003a) understanding of death is that it is a power of proliferation, 
meaning that death is that which assumes multiple forms. This is the form of 
power that precedes the erectile form of power, for that this is the power of the 
temporal. Death in the power of proliferation should not only be understood on 
the basis of proliferation, but, the power of mutation in its permanent form. Since 
the deathscapes are like the plantation, death is permissible and it is in this 
plantation that death even exists in the liveliness of the object. Therefore, the 
object should be subjected to multiple deaths. ‘Sovereignty consists of the will 
and the capacity to kill in order to live’ (Mbembe 2003a: 18).  The life of the 
master depends on the death of the slave and this form of death assumes the form 
of social death (Patterson 1982). Social death is just like the plantation, the world 
inhibited by the colonised is a deathscape—the place of death, the death that 
cannot be accounted for. This is the form of death that is seen as normal. 
Maldonado-Torres (2008a) argues that the exercise of war and conquest are 
connected to concepts of human community that configures the plantation system 
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that divides the existence of the master and the slave. In this configuration the 
master must live while the slave must die. The death of the slave cannot be 
accounted for.  To be a slave ‘is a right to death in that dying has no value and is 
no longer sovereign’ (Marriot 2007: 227). In amplification, Maldonado-Torres 
(2008a: 31) states that ‘the violation of ethics and in the exercise of violence over 
other human beings—by a conscious of lordship’ is the state of affairs in the 
plantation system.  
Mbembe (2003a) demonstrates that the presence of death defines the world of 
violence. Such a world then inhabits the character of the deathscape, where death 
is permissible. Such permissibility comes to being because death is naturalised. 
This however, does not suggest death as an inevitable form of a life circle, or 
then the end of live. This naturalisation of death means death in larger proportion 
that does not raise any form of agency. Not only that this death is a result of war, 
but the everyday living as a result of coloniality of being. Agamben (1998) 
introduces the notion of ‘bare life’ that is the undermined life, the life that does 
not exist. This form of life is the one lived by those who are situated at the darker 
side of modernity (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). Bare life is the life that does not 
have any form of ontological relationality. Sovereign power ‘is centred on the 
politically ambivalent and judicially marginal figure of the person who can be 
killed with impunity and their reduction to infrahuman condition of “bare life” 
that sanctions their death’ (Gilroy 2005: 48). According to Gilroy, bare life of the 
infrahuman are often contrasted with those of life of the human—life in the 
figure of the latter is enjoyed while on  the former (the infra-human) is the 
condition of perpetual misery and even death.  
Deathscape means death in life—that is, the body is dead while it still possesses 
the soul. So, death should not be a result of death itself, but the appropriation of 
death in life without the liquidation of life. In the deathscape bodies are disposed 
as quickly as possible for that these are bodies of non-humans (Mbembe 2003a). 
The disposal of these bodies, are those who are the subjected to the whims of 
coloniality of being. This form of coloniality is the one of the empire as stated 
earlier, and it is informed by murderous and genocidal lust in its forms and 
content. Agamben (1998) argues that life is qualified, and at the same time it can 
be disqualified by the political. The political here, it is referred the community of 
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masters who are at the echelons of the empire who, in Mbembe (2003a) terms, 
have the prerogative to confer life and death.  
The humanity of the people who are in the deathscapes is negated all the radical 
content (Mbembe 2003a). Mbembe sees the deathscapes as existing in the 
colonial order, and in the contemporary, deathscapes in Africa seem to be 
impotent in the sense that they are not linked to the colonial order. The colonial 
order is historical, so is the deathscapes—the very suggestions that if they do 
exist, they are outside Africa. Africa as a space of death is where there is 
perpetual subjection of death that even amounts to elimination. Elimination with 
its logic and practice of leaving no traces is what preoccupies the empire. It is 
impossible for there to be no traces since the logic of the empire is that of 
perversity and excess. Wolfe (2006) argues that the logic elimination is the 
relationship between genocide and settler colonialism. This means, these are 
intertwined processes and their relationality might assume a complex character to 
disentangle them. Thus, this creates a condition that the Rwandian genocide is 
seen in provincialised and localised terms. This means, it is outside what 
Mignolo (2000) regards as the global imperial designs. However, Wolfe (2006: 
387) cautions that ‘settler colonialism is inherently eliminatory but not invariably 
genocidal’. Wolfe points out that both settler colonialism and genocide employ 
the grammar of race. This technology of destruction is informed by the logic of 
destroying to replace (Wolfe 2006).   
Humiliation, torture and death that come to being through the expansionist 
project that is now referred to as ‘regime change’ has given the empire to kill at 
will. Violence and war are contributing parts of the empire, and when they are 
reaching the African space, they reach escalating proportions. Mbembe (2003a) 
reads the deathscape within the loci of the colony. Deathscapes are still 
perpetuated in the postcolonial or contemporary Africa and this is the condition 
that is not only self-inflicted, but that which is still accountable to the logic and 
operation of coloniality of being. In the postcolonial condition, it is then 
interesting to account for the continuity. According to Morgensen (2011), the 
persistence and naturalisation of subjection in the form of settler colonialism 
defines the present as colonial, while occluding settler colonialism. The gaze 
should then also look at the empire and to extend this, and the notion of bare life 
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is necessary to engage though the notion of coloniality of being as articulated by 
Maldonado-Torres (2007; 2008).   
Deathscapes are the places of subjection in that they create natal alienation—the 
very basis of death (Patterson 1982). The principles of means through that the 
logic of expansion is informing the empire, this can only come into being 
through the creation, elaboration and sustaining deathscapes. The proximity of 
the deathscape and the empire is a curious one. The empire that sees itself as a 
paragon of virtue and the conduit of high moral benchmark distances itself from 
the deathscapes. The empire even justifies its murderous lusts and sadistic 
actions of violence as moral since this is necessary for its well-being and 
interests. So, the empire is the majesty, the authority that cannot be associated 
with the deathscapes since its racial superiority and value is godly and unbloody 
like that of what they regard as savages who are in need for redemption. 
Deathscapes are what are looked in the colonial era, the past that the empire 
draws from to sustain itself but refuses to see itself is the create of deathscapes.  
The simple fact is that they are far away from deathscapes, and it matters a lot if 
they are affected. The plantation, just like the way the condition of war 
described, is that Africa is also a deathscape. According to Morgenson (20011: 
71), ‘[n]ational resistence to incorporation in the body of Western law continues 
to result in being placed in the camp’. This camp is a deathscape, and it is 
justified that those who are in defiance be subjected to the disciplinary power of 
the empire. Mbembe (2007c) gives an account of Ruben Um Nyobe the 
Secretary General of Cameroonian Peoples Union death who was killed as a first 
rebel against colonialism and refusing to be corrupted through its cooptation. 
Mbembe state that Nyobe’s corpse was not enough of being a corpse; it was 
owned by the state. The corpse was even killed by being and as Mbembe (2007c: 
80) states, ‘getting rid of the corpse altogether was impossible’. This 
impossibility was to subjecting such a corpse to multiple tortures and death. 
Mbembe (2007c: 81) also states that Nyobe’s ‘corpse was first covered in 
cement; only then was it lowered to the ground’. For Mbembe, this manner of 
burial was to disfigure the corpse beyond recognition and robbing it all other 
forms of humanity and existence. This means, the total elimination of Nyobe in 
the face of human existence and also the projection of the disciplinary power of 
250 
 
the empire was to liquidate any form of dissent or resistance.  The form of this 
burial is to inaugurate the sense of order through censor, and this is also made a 
form of the spectacle to put such death publicly. 
Deathscapes are produced by what Mbembe (2003a) refers to as technologies of 
destruction where in that the destruction reduces a body into a mere thing—an 
object. The might of the empire with its tendency of war that has been under the 
code of regime change, employs these technologies of destruction as a form of 
disciplinary power. This is seen through the bombing of civilians, countless loss 
of lives, destruction of communities and infrastructure (Butler 2004). These acts 
of the empire, producing deathscapes are not regarded as criminal, and as stated 
earlier, the empire is the law unto itself. At the level of structural violence, the 
description of technologies lacks the explanatory factor. In their descriptive form 
there are powerful to describe the deathscapes. The explanatory power comes to 
being through the understanding of deathscapes by engaging the notion of 
structural violence.  
Explanatory power is not permitted in the deathscapes and it is even depleted—
hence the absence of the grammar of suffering. What is needed as Wilderson 
(2010) states ensemble of ontological questions that are foundation and 
accountable to accumulation and fungibility as a grammar of suffering as 
opposed to agency and contingency. This will expose the power relation and the 
genetic make-up of the structural violence, the very thing that makes the 
deathscapes alive. Coloniality of being makes itself normal as if it is not 
violence—that is, the violence with a human face. It therefore follows that 
structural violence renders deathscapes permissible. If then, the life of the body 
of the African subject is not in a humanised form since it is in the camp of the 
deathscapes its life cannot be in a real form. Butler makes this observation: 
If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of 
violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated. 
But they have a strange way of remaining animated and so must they must be 
negated again (and again). They cannot be mourned because they are already lost or, 
rather, never “were”, and they must be killed, since they seem to live on stubbornly, 
in this state of deadness (Butler 2004: 33). 
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In this state, the empire having to face the stubborn resurfacing and reemergence 
of the dead who are dead—the empire then mobilises forces to render dead what 
remains to die. Such motive to render dead is killing the dead body and to silence 
it in its very death. Butler (2004) argues that the enemy on the eyes of the empire 
is seen on the lens of spectral infinity’ that invites more and more violence, 
fuelled by infinite paranoia. The state of war qua coloniality of being creates 
deathscapes proliferates and entrenches them. The empire through is majestic 
might, Butler states that even if the empire were to eliminate 50 000 lives in the 
deathscapes this will not be seen as violence. According to Butler, the 50 000 are 
nameless and can therefore be obliterated. The one who is named is humanised 
and can therefore not be obliterated but must be protected. The empire for its 
subjects has a lot of ‘humanising effect’ that do establish the human, the subject 
not the nameless object. Deathscapes are a public affair and the difference is only 
that the agents of violence cannot be identified, except to say that their targets 
who are African subjects are easily identifiable. Coloniality of being is a form of 
violence that the empire claims not to be involved in, while indeed the empire is 
the source of this form of violence.   
The return of the colonial is does not necessarily require physical presence of the 
actual metropolitan centre, but the tentacles of the centre. That it, the colonial 
presence is through the presence is that of coloniality. Hogeveen (2010) deploys 
the concept of spectres of colonialism to engage the notion of structural violence 
that create the state of complicity. He argues that the spectres of the racialised, 
ex-colonised, subalternised, marginalised that are the very sites of deathscapes, 
continue to haunt the present. ‘That is the thing with spectres; they begin by 
coming back to re-dress unfinished business: they are relevant’ (Hogeveen 2010: 
116). This means that there is no way in that the deathscapes with their nature of 
elimination can silence death itself. Since they are deathscapes, they must be 
ghostly, he very nature of haunting. Spectres of colonialism touch the very raw 
nerve of the status quo that claims to remain blind to the injustices and failing to 
link them to imperial global designs—the architecture of the empire. Spectres are 
always negated or destructed completely for the mere fact that they expose the 
hypocrisy of the present and its complicit status quo. This means the present and 
status quo are ‘flawed, incomplete and unjust’ (Hogeveen 2010: 116).     
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There is no peace in the deathscapes, and the form of peace that is propagated by 
the empire is on the other hand, the advocacy for war. This is because the tone of 
such the propagation of peace is such that it is a command and it should be in the 
interests of the empire. As Maldonado-Torres (2008a) argues, the peace of the 
empire is not peace at all. The peace of the empire connotes and denotes the state 
of permanent war. What matters to the empire is its interest, so these interests 
cannot be realised if the deathscapes are eliminated. What should be eliminated 
are those who are trapped within the deathscapes and not the deathscapes 
themselves. Butler (2004: 31) has it that ‘[it] would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to understand how humans suffer from oppression without seeing 
how this primary condition is exploited and exploitable, thwarted and denied’.   
Mbembe (2003a) has stated how life is determined—that is, how to life, where 
and how, including survival and death. But then, this cannot be seen as the 
modern convention of the bio-political, but the existence that has continued to 
define the existential conditions of the African subject, the subject who is outside 
the realm of life. Maldonado-Torres (2008a) declares that what creates 
antagonism towards ordinary social life is that the social life in the deathscape is 
that of licensing of death. This means that there cannot be any social life where 
death is permissible, to the space that was created for death. It is known that 
social life should be the locus of peace, but death has superseded it. Drawing 
from Santos (2007), the articulation of the abyssal lines, is clear that deathscapes 
are a not a common place in the empire.  
The abyssal lines do even exists within the empire itself, where life and death 
reside side by side, but also divided cartographically. The metropolis at the 
centre is surrounded by life, while its peripheries are mere deathscapes. Certain 
lives that are that of the bodies of the empire are highly protected. The neglect of 
such bodies will mean the weakening of the empire. These are the bodies of 
imperial subjects and to be the imperial subject is ‘to be in power, near power, or 
simply identified with power’ (Mamdani 2001: 75). Butler (2004) amplifies this 
view to state that if such bodies are interfered with or destructed, this is sufficient 
for the empire to mobilise forces of violence. Coloniality of being is violence 
conducted in the deathscape because it is a space where there is absence of life. 
In other words, this is the violence against those who are already dead—and, 
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only humans can call for barbarity or massacre if they are faced by the cruel 
proportionality of violence. This violence is, many at times, carried out by war 
machines operating in the realm of warfare that is closely knotted to the illicit 
economy.  
War machines: the economy of violence unveiled  
Mbembe (2001a) deploys the concept of private indirect government to show 
how power is exercised and re-organised. Private indirect government has 
assumed multiplicity of forms, just like war machines. In is in the sphere of 
private indirect government as Mbembe (2003a) states, where war machines 
combine both the functions of a political organisations and mercantilist company. 
The concept, war machine(s) originates from Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 387) 
in an axiom form which is the ‘exterior to the [s]tate apparatus’. War machines 
are that of exteriority in the sense that their life is that the configuration of the 
sovereign. 
Mbembe (2003a) correctly argues that war machines combine a plurality of 
functions that makes them to be a metamorphosis of form and character. The 
existence of war machines is that of dynamism and complexity—for also that, 
war machines are interwoven in the contested political terrain where power has 
assumed multiplicity of forms. This is how Mbembe describes them: 
War machines are made up of segments of armed men that split up or merge with 
one another depending on the task to be carried out and the circumstances. 
Polymorphous and diffuse organisation, war machines are characteri[s]ed by their 
capacity for metamorphosis. Their relationship to space is mobile (Mbembe 2003a: 
32).   
The functionality of war machines is structural, the structure that is in a form of 
pieces that can be integrated and disintegrated. War machines are in a form of a 
multitude. Multitude as deployed by Negri (2008: 27) is ‘a multiplicity of 
singularities that cannot in any sense find a representative unity’. Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) point out that in terms of functionality, war machines are in a 
pair and in alteration assume the constitution of sovereign unity. According to 
Comaroff and Comaroff (2006a), banditry shades into low-level warfare 
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assuming amoebic form of political allegiance and also creating new 
cartographies of dis/order qua zones of accumulation.   
The state is about the distinction and legitimation of the governors and governed. 
The state apparatus is the unit of power, and the existence, constitution and 
function of the state is that of power. War machines contest the field of power. 
As Mbembe (2000: 264) notes, there are ‘various centres of power [who] might 
have authority over a single place’. The power of the state apparatus is only 
effective to such an extent that it can control. Since war machines are 
characterised by exteriority, this suggest the limit of the state power. Both the 
state apparatus and war machines are characterised by possession and projection 
of power that creates the condition of coloniality of being by reducing the life of 
the African subject to abstraction. War machines in theory constitutions and 
logic, suggest the counter-state mechanism. War machines in their exteriority do 
not even go with the solidarity or patriotism to the state. In short, they do not owe 
allegiance to the state. The state is that of the privatised nature. ‘Military 
functions and security services are simply the latest additions to the list of state 
functions that are increasingly being externalised and often privatised’ (Lock 
1999:19).     
The state in its function and projection of power creates dependency to it. ‘In 
every respect, the war machine is of another species, another nature, another 
origin of the [s]tate apparatus’ (Deleuze and Guattarri 1987: 388). War machines 
cannot be dependent on the state because of the nature of their exteriority. They 
include rebels, insurgents, privatees, ex-combatants, private security firms to 
name but a few, and these are units external to the state apparatus. They can also 
even take a guise form of the state apparatus and its monopoly of violence. But 
then, for the state to assume this form it must privatise its machinery—that is, 
war machines can be understood on the basis of the private security and army 
apparatus that serves and/or guards the interests of the state. What is clear on the 
nature of war machines is that their complexity can be understood on the basis of 
engaging their multiple genealogies. As Deleuze and Guattari note, the state has 
no war machine of its own. What the state has is the apparatus—that is, police 
and the army. Their power is that of centralising and having the monopoly of 
violence. Such a monopoly is to strengthen the state and to act in the interests of 
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the civilians. Even though the state can be in the interests of the civilians, 
coloniality of being suggests the problematic of the state as far as civilians are 
concerned. Civilians are at the receiving end of both legitimate and illegitimate 
violence. The state of being is that of permanent crisis for the mere fact that 
existence of civilians can easily be compromised and as a consequence, 
eliminated.   
The efficiency of war machines, and the extent through that they can be 
measured, is the state of war, and war machines always assume the character of 
the negative since they conduct is that of violence. Musah (2002) argues that the 
nexus of privatisation of security, the proliferation of arms and the worsening 
structural paralysis of the African weak state have been debilitation since it is 
prominent in the discourse of curse of resources. According to Musah, the 
phenomenon of privatised military has a long history in Africa, and he cites 
destabilising mission that have been carried out in the 1960s and 1970s. This 
then means the notion of war machine is not a new phenomenon in the African 
political scene. War machines only gained prominence towards the last quarter of 
the 20
th
 Century and the beginning of the 21
st 
Century—that is, the era of 
globalisation, the latter that is not a new phenomenon. The motive of war 
machines, like those mercenaries in the 1960s and 1970s was to benefit from 
cash rewards and having the privilege of being rented armies.  
They operated as lone wolves or were organi[s]ed into small bands to frustrate (or 
assassinate) nationalists, to support factions in internal power struggles, and to 
overthrow regimes that were unfriendly to a foreign power (Musah 2002: 912).  
Musah provides the typology of mercenaries in terms of private military 
companies who provide a multi-purpose security related products and services. 
The product and service of these mercenaries are rental in nature. Mbembe 
(2001a) makes reference to the regime of violence and brutality that is at the 
centre of war machines in a form of concessionary regimes. These regimes are 
privatised and they take the form of extraction of resources that then creates the 
circle of the war. It is in this context where war machines are organised into 
temporary armies who in their nature and function assume that of the state of 
permanent army. Their function and operation is centred on procurement of war 
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material and logistics, military advice and strategies, intelligence and act as force 
multipliers, and these depends on the needs of the clientele. The other type of the 
mercenary is the floating indigenous mercenaries who serve the local warlords, 
and they are composed of ex-combatants and ex-soldiers. Their operations and 
functions range from prosecution of factional wars, debt collection, resource 
extraction, rape and criminal activities. The observation made by Musah points 
out that: 
As a rule, these floating indigenous mercenaries are drawn from different 
nationalities within the conflict clusters. They are often ex-combatants who desert 
their warlords because of disillusionment or desert national armies because of 
deplorable service conditions, or demobili[s]ed soldiers who have not been properly 
reintegrated into society (Musah 2002: 914). 
Mbembe (2003a: 32) puts it forth that ‘the vast majority of armies are composed 
of citizen soldiers, child soldiers, mercenaries, and privateers’. The combination 
of these forces of destruction is indeed that of war machines both in the 
individualistic and in the collectivist sense. War machines operate in the 
industrial logic of making possible mass destruction. The political nature is that 
of civil wars that destroyed political order. Disorder then, by means of violence 
was seen then as a process that will restore political order. According to 
Mbembe, violence assumes the economic character in the sense those informal 
systems of taxation and taking control of the nodal points of the resources and 
minerals. 
Military manpower is bought and sold on a market in that the identity of suppliers 
and purchasers means almost nothing. Urban militias, private armies, armies of 
regional lords, private security firms, and state armies all claim the right to exercise 
violence or to kill. Neighbouring states or rebel movements lease armies to poor 
states (Mbembe 2003a: 32). 
War machines are predatory and driven by self-interest; nothing makes them 
different from the state apparatus they are fighting to recruit (Reno 2010).  
According to Reno (2010), the failed or collapsed state constitutes greedy 
warlords, angry combats and illicit economies. The postcolonial African 
condition has seen the presence and proliferation of war machines and their 
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presence perpetuates coloniality of being. Also, this proliferation is centred on 
the access and denial of access to the illicit economic networks. In what Pham 
(2004) calls a ‘warlord political economy’ where in that the logic of extraction is 
of excess through control and exploitation, this offers an opportunity for illicit 
economies to flourish. They take advantage of the flexibile international 
economic networks. According to Misra (2008), the nature of civil wars is linked 
with the nature of the state in its weak or collapsible sense since the state fails to 
hold the centre of monopoly of violence. It is within this realm of weak or 
collapsed states where insurgencies emerge.  
The postcolonial states on their make-up that is the systematic inheritance of the 
grafted and plundered colonial state that makes them not to have monopoly of 
exercising sovereign power. As stated, African postcolonial states are unable to 
control territories under their jurisdiction (De Kock 2010). The legitimacy of the 
state becomes that of crisis. War machines kill with impunity, and this is because 
the weapon as an object and phenomenon has been the symbol of power. 
Therefore, war machines as Pham (2004: 124) notes, ‘present a new and 
troubling reality in geopolitics’. As De Kock (2010: 24) argues, war machines 
expose and exploit the ‘institutional inability of states to maintain internal 
cohesion’. In such a situation, war machines as opposed to the state, assume the 
monopoly of violence. Then this gives power to war machines that operate 
outside the state sovereign machinery. Mbembe (2003a) is correct to state that 
war machines have made violence to be a form of aesthetic enterprise and it is 
deployed to cause and effect maximum destruction.  
Individuals can be easily co-opted to become active participants in the civil war 
by being on the rebel side, war machines. This is done through war machines use 
of or exploitation of fear, anxiety and grievance. Such is the means of making 
those who support rebellions to have trust in warlords (Misra 2008). Musah 
(2002) asserts that warlords to become important war machines, they should 
adopt authoritarian tactics for the rebel groups to be controlled. Violence is both 
collective and collectivised (Misra 2008). Violence assumes the state of grace for 
that it is pursued to reach a higher goal. But then, there is often an absence of a 
higher goal, except to say that there is an orgy of violence. Such is a condition of 
senseless killing of civilians where humanity is reduced to objecthood. The 
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violence of the higher goals has the vision of recreation and it does not target 
civilians. The violence of the contemporary is the opposite simply because it is 
led by warlords, who in a war machinery sense are antagonistic to the political 
system that ejected them. So, war machines attack unarmed civilians since their 
higher goal is an orgy of self-interests.      
Coloniality of being makes war machines feature greatly in the economy of 
violence and also the matrices of violence. The matrices of violence can be 
understood also in terms of directionality in that they are directed to civilians 
who often have nothing to do with the causes of the war. War machines assume 
the level of the political because of power relations that are not asymmetrical. 
Indeed, war machines and the industrial complex of the illicit economies create a 
hellish existence to the civilians. Their presence is supported or largely 
dependent on conflict—that is, conflict is the life support system of war 
machines and the industrial complex of illicit economies. According to 
Maldonado-Torres (2007), relations between subjects are based on superiority 
and inferiority. By extension, these relations are based on existence and non-
existence. Since the monopoly of violence is traditionally vested within the state 
apparatus, war machines undermine such a monopoly by exerting its power to be 
the monopoly of violence. Within that matrix of violence, civilians are trapped in 
the shadow of death, with the little changes of not being haunted by it. in this 
form, death is inevitable.  
The matrix of violence can be understood in relation to the notion of 
territoriality, but then not reducible to it. Mbembe (2000: 261) argues that ‘[n]ew 
forms of territoriality and unexpected forms of locality have appeared’. There is 
no accounting of these transforming discourses and that they are complex 
through the ways in which networks of power relations are constituted. As 
Mbembe (2000: 261) posits, ‘[n]ew internal and external actors, organi[s]ed into 
networks and nuclei, claim rights of these territories, often by force’. War 
machines challenge the postcolonial African state for that such a state is the 
embodiment of violence. According to De Kock (2010), the African postcolonial 
state is said to be plagued by illegitimate use of violence. This is simply because 
war machines emerge via the nature of the weak or collapsed African 
postcolonial state.  
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According to Mbembe (2003a), the African weak state cannot withhold the 
monopoly of violence or other measures to enforce coercion. This creates a 
condition where war machines become the locus of power, and this can also take 
the shape of a quasi-political power. They emerge at the moment of state fracture 
that produces many sites of power that are localised in nature. According to 
McCormick and Fritz (2009: 84), ‘former provincial military governors became 
the independent lords of their respective provinces, some even competing for 
control in the capital’. War machines are a product of weak states and they create 
a strong tradition of local government that contests with the central government 
(McCormick and Fritz 2009). As Musah (2002) argues, war machines gain 
potency for the mere fact that the military in Africa is a politicised phenomenon. 
This makes them through their power, to confront the state with a security 
dilemma. As such, the nature of the power of war machines is the proliferation of 
both new and used weapons that circulate through illicit economies.  
This process is the basis for the emergence of alternative spaces that structure the 
informal economy, contraband, and migratory movements. Far from being merely 
regional, these interstate exchanges are connected with international markets and 
their dynamics. The commerce for that they provide the moving force is favo[u]red 
by a fundamental characteristic of African states, namely the relative lack of 
congruence between the territory of a state and areas of exchange (Mbembe 2000: 
262). 
According to Mbembe (2000), the violence takes circulation forms, and it takes a 
form of destructing people and exploiting resources. In this logic, both people 
and resources are put in circulation, where there is connection and disconnection. 
The nature of the political is the state of violence, and in such a state, the weak or 
collapse state creates a vacuum that coloniality of being—a failure of the state to 
protect its own civilians. As De Kock (2010: 26) argues that ‘war machines that 
challenge state authority, sovereignty and legitimacy are therefore discordant 
elements (pieces) that confront the post-colonial state with its inconsistencies’. 
War machines draw battle lines and they are that of attacking the state and 
civilians, whom the state should protect. Civilians suffer a double jeopardy as 
they are suffering in the violence meted against them by both the state and war 
machines. The direction of war machines is war against the state, and the 
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civilians are attacked as they are the most constitutive unit of the state. Civilians 
get killed, displaced, decapitated, conscripted, tortured and raped. What matters 
in the economy of war is the logic of excess that finds itself through amassing 
with weapons. Human life does not matter but what matters is the weaponry 
might. This might is not for the war that is between states, but the war of both the 
state army and insurgents against the civilians. According to Parry: 
State violence thus raises the threat of—indeed, it actuali[s]es—tyranny and 
repression even as it holds out the possibility of protection and the tyranny of state 
violence could be more destructive than the anarchy of private violence (Parry 2002: 
2).  
State violence protects and threatens, and this means the conception of law that is 
often tied to the state largely depends on enforcement and control that are 
embedded in state control (Parry 2002). In other words, law relies on state 
violence and also on the other hand, state violence is derived from law. It follows 
then that the law is part and parcel of the state machinery it is not extended to 
it— ‘sometimes law is up to the task of mastering state violence’ (Parry 2002: 4). 
In the condition of violence  or war, civilians become the primary targets from 
war machines complicates the nature of violence in its absolute form, and this 
invited series considering with regards to the nature of violence in matrix form. 
According to Misra (2008), the cycle of development, decay and eventual demise 
is the feature that marks the state of violence. African states, for example Congo, 
Angola, Somalia and Ethiopia during the Cold War era have been a fertile battle 
ground as pawns. 
Mbembe (2003a) posits that the logic of violence assumed the mercantilist form 
since it is based on coercive resources of labour and minerals. The mercantilist 
form of extraction and excess is the one that is the epicentre of war machines. 
War machines are private instruments of violence who operate according to the 
whims of capital excess (Lock 1999). War machines want also the resources that 
are in the concentration of the state apparatus (De Kock 2010). This is not for the 
purpose of redistribution, but that of replacement and perpetuating coloniality of 
being. The character of war machines is criminal since their services and conduct 
is that of criminal character. War machines want to be at the commanding 
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heights of the resource and mineral extraction. The state of war in weak or 
collapsed states is the privatised war, where war machines assume the predatory 
character. As Mbembe argues that:  
Military power is brought and sold on a market in that the identity of suppliers and 
purchasers means almost nothing. Urban militias, private armies of regional lords, 
private security firms, and state armies all claim the right to exercise violence or to 
kill. Neighbouring states or rebel movements lease armies to poor states (Mbembe 
2003a: 32).   
‘People who loot and exploit rackets attract fighters faster and in great numbers 
than the ideologue or community organiser, who has to take time for political 
education’ (Reno 2010: 58). But added to this, war machines can use force to 
recruit. For Reno, the heart of the effective war machines is extensive and 
effective patronage network. It is clear that for their efficiency they assumes 
privatised politics to be able to move and manoeuvre with ease in this patronage 
network due to accountability to themselves and produce unrest that is influenced 
by self-interest and predation. War machines are not accountable, say like the 
state to citizens or citizens to the state.  
The types of resources that are being extracted also make a difference. Gems, 
minerals and timber, for example, are particularly attractive. They tend to be found in 
specific and often remote areas of the country, they are effectively anonymous and, 
therefore, easy to launder and they require little infrastructure or even knowledge to 
acquire and move into the market (McCormick and Fritz 2009: 87).    
According to Mbembe (2001a), illicit economy in its function is the market of 
the gangster mode. In this economy, what Mbembe (2001a: 72) calls ‘a regime 
based of murder’ is the order of existential reality. It in this existential reality 
where violence is commercialised through illicit economies where circulation 
remains uncontrollable due to the huge surplus of stock of weapons offered on 
the black market. 
The most complete figure of the world is presented from the monetary perspective. 
From here we can see a hori[s]on of values and a machine of distribution, a 
mechanism of accumulation and means of circulation, a power and a language (Hardt 
and Negri 2000: 32). 
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What keep war machines alive is illicit economies that Felbab-Brown (2010) 
defines as economies that operate outside trade regulation or political and 
economic regulation. Illicit economies by the nature of use of coercion and 
intimidation—the operation of this form of economy is through blackmail, 
racketeering and violence (Lock 1999). Illicit economies are where there is an 
exchange of arms and resources. For Reno (2010), the circulation and flow of 
resources produces and fuels violence. Mbembe has this to note: 
As explained above, the concentration of valuable resource extraction activities 
around these “reserves” has, in turn, transformed them into privileged spaces of 
conflict and war. War conditions are fed by the increasing commerciali[s]ation of 
extractable products. As a result of this ensemble of activities, new possible of 
linkage to the global economy have opened up (Mbembe 2006a: 304).   
Resources from illicit economies are the ones that are contested for the purpose 
of access and control. The state that is supposed to hold the monopoly of 
violence and to control the sphere of violence in the favour of the protection of 
civilians fails to make the centre hold and as a result experiences are that of 
intense fragmentation. The predatory nature of war machines creates an enabling 
environment of being the dictates of violence and exerting the forms of violence 
against the civilians in favour of accumulation and control of illicit economies. 
‘The great industrial and financial powers thus produce not only commodities but 
also subjectivities’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 32). The predatory nature of war 
machines is such that the human body is decapitated and brutalise it in such a 
way the projection of the power of war machines reproduces coloniality of being 
through the theatre of massacre and crisis.  
According to Mbembe (2001a), war machines are about exiting the formal 
international economy, with the preference to underground channels where 
illegality is institutionalised and normalised. Felbab-Brown (2010) puts it forth 
that the state may choose to co-opt or set up illicit economy. This clearly shows 
that the state is often the participant in the illicit economy. The same will have a 
connection of the state and non-state actors in civil war. Mbembe (2001:73) 
states that the dynamics happening within illicit economies should not be simply 
reduced to antagonism, but ‘contradictory dynamics at work, made up of time-
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lags, disjunctures, and different speeds’. War machines want access to these 
economies.  
As war machines want to be beneficiaries, and some even go to the extent of 
wanting to be co-opted or even colluding with these economies. Musah (2002: 
914) argues that war machines are infamous for ‘waging a predatory war to carve 
out territory and resources—diamonds, and the strategic mud, coltan—for their 
leaders’. Misra (2008) states that these are wars between greet-looting seeking 
rebels—that is, war machines and the predatory state that brings down the curse 
of resources. The state as the apparatus of force, repression and violence often 
refuses to concede to the demands of the rebels. In this antagonistic situation the 
response of war machines is that of confrontation by means of opposing the 
predatory state. According to Misra (2008), this opposition is used by engaging 
in violence and the cycle of retaliation is directed to civilians who become the 
most affected victims.  
Felbab-Brown (2010) points out two factors leading to the emergence of illicit 
economies that are the lack of governance and enforcing prohibition. The 
demand for commodities of the illicit economy makes them to proliferate to the 
point beyond governance and enforcement of prohibition. Illicit economies find 
their existence in the foreign patronage networks that need the existence of the 
weak state (Reno 1998). Illicit economies change shape, form, character and 
flow. They can adopt other forms of economy if they can be banned or 
criminalised. Illicit economies are preserved and it makes it difficult to curb and 
they do not need the state to facilitate their functions (Felbab-Brown 2010). If the 
state comes to a complete halt—that is, a failed state in the absolute sense, illicit 
economies will be affected too. Illicit economies need to function smoothly, 
hence the need for provision of services and extracting value for such provision.  
In most condition of conflict, war machines provide protection for illicit 
economies. War is a corporate affair and there are multi-linkages between 
violence and capital (Ruggiero 2010). It is in the condition of conflict where 
there the state ability to monopolise violence becomes vulnerable and this gives 
leeway for illicit economies to extract, plunder and collide with impunity. This 
state of affairs increases the political capital of war machines. However, the 
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situation may be on the contrary where illicit economies favour the state and the 
state may not criminalise these economies. As such, illicit economies are bound 
to be in opposition to war machines, if such machines are antagonistic to the 
state. This allows the perpetuation of the predatory state where plunder, graft, 
corruption, racketeering become legalised. ‘At this extreme, rulers and their 
associates resemble a mafia rather than a government if one thinks of the latter as 
necessary serving some collective interest, however faint and by whatever 
means, to be distinguished from the mafia’ (Reno 1998: 3). For Reno (2010), the 
suspension of law means using the state office for private accumulation and 
extraction from illicit economies. However, what political rulers accumulate and 
extract is nothing as compared to the illicit economy itself. The illicit economy in 
the private and military sense is tatamount to that of the industrial complex 
(Ruggiero 2010).  
Reno (1998) argues that the nature of the global capital and politics took a 
different dimension—that which is direct and violent with the sole aim of 
plundering resources and minerals. The logic of economic operation—that is, 
accumulating as much as possible, is now part of the political where stakes are 
high.  
Violence and military[s]ation of commerce were central to adapting the functions 
and forms of state sovereignty to the pressing task of building political authority in 
heavily divided postcolonial African societies. These methods were not new in 
Africa; they looked back to the colonial strategies that had manipulated markets to 
supply scarce revenues to finance the alien bureaucracies that local people regarded 
as an imposition (Reno 1998: 21). 
Illicit economies are operated by people who can have enough power to create 
dependent states. In this form, the state will be a market that will be funded and 
dictated to by the elite economy itself. War machines always position themselves 
to form part of these networks of patronage. This is because ‘accentuation of 
practices reflecting dual power are within the range of the possible’ (Mbembe 
2001a: 77). The client-patron politics are is the logic through that illicit 
economies operate, and patronage politics created a situation where patronage 
politics were converted into predatory warlord politics (Reno 1998). The state 
will be reduced to a mere clientele. For Mbembe (2001a) the undermining of the 
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state is that the logic of the market economy is such that rights against the state 
should be asserted, let alone people having duties and obligations towards the 
state. The material base of the state, as Mbembe states, has already been 
undermined. It is in this condition where the state is reduced to puppetry and 
such is the state implicated criminality due to the criminality of illicit economies. 
‘This, in popular consciousness, there was no need to demonstrate accountability 
or transparency towards this state and it was legitimate to plunder ad undermine 
it’ (Musah 2002: 915).  
According to Reno (2010), the dark networks that exist in pre-war situation are 
sites that link people and resources. This gives rise to what Reno refers to as 
political entrepreneurship where social capital and resources are co-opted for 
self-interest and predatory nature of war machines. The state machinery in the 
postcolonial Africa is infamous for turning into a predatory formation and 
engaging in dark networks by soliciting bribes and kickbacks—the very acts of 
corruption. The elite who are managing the postcolonial African state ensure 
maximal protection to their clientele who runs the dark networks. This creates a 
condition where capital flows in their direction. The mode of accumulation is an 
alternative form of theft where the law will be manipulated or suspended to 
protect their clients from prosecution (Reno 2010). This creates forms of political 
networking where the manipulation of law and its suspension is a priori since 
accumulation matters. The dark networks that are an arena for illicit economies 
can even go to the extent of replacing the state institutions (Reno 2010). This 
however, does not denote that the state institutions will disappear, but they will 
virtually be reduced to empty shells. They will exist, but impotent in their 
function and execution, hence the potency of war machines.  
On martyrdom: body on body war  
Mbembe (2006a) articulates the notion of politics as sacrificial act that denote the 
practices of war where there representation of life is also a relationship and 
affinity with death. This form of politics can be seen in the act of confronting 
death by means of suicide bombing. Mbembe (2003a) argues that suicide 
bombing will not be understood if it is seen in binaries. Terrorist acts, and suicide 
bombing in particular justified the discourse of self-defence through military 
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response (Butler 2004). It will be examined here, on how Mbembe treats the 
notion of suicide bombing in so far as it relates to the notion of martyrdom. 
Mbembe (2003a) refers to such politics in a form of body on body war, and such 
politics means death produces another form of life. That is, the life that is outside 
the body itself. It is giving the self at the level of the body to the higher cause and 
as a result getting the status of martyrdom, the afterlife.  
Ahluwalia (2004: 939) brings this to the attention, ‘[t]he phenomenon of suicide 
bombing is by no means new or unique to Islam, as it is often portrayed in the 
media’. Suicide bombing is not just a mindless act, but also a rather politically 
informed act with specific political goals (Murray 2006). The condition of 
suicide bombing is often reduced to singular, simplistic and comforting fictions 
of the empire. What the empire hides in these fictions is that suicide bombing is 
the response, not provocation, to the might of the empire. The political act of 
suicide bombing contributes to the notion of martyrdom and ‘suicide-bombing 
follows the sacrificial logic of the gift of terror’ (Birrell 2006: 14). The gift of 
terror is, for Birrel, intentional in that the subject, in the words of Mbembe 
(2006a) is engaged in ‘the works of death’—that is, ‘the prior event and 
knowledge of a death to come’ (Birrell 2006: 13). For Casquete (2009), the 
politics of martyrdom are practiced by the living and they are built in myths of 
the dead—that is, death becoming sacred.  Casquete (2009: 265) correctly notes 
that ‘a person is not born a martyr, he (sic) is made a martyr’. As Casquete 
hastens, the construction of the martyr is mythic-martyric construction where 
death is made the object of worship. As such, a martyr is a symbol not to be 
negativised and it is upon death that the human as a political subject gets purified 
after death.  
As Birrel (2006) notes, the logic at play is more than that of the rational choice, 
but that of the importance of upholding duty and obligation. For Birrel, suicide 
bombing is undertaken not as the individual choice but also a ritual obligation 
where in that the politics of giving, receiving, and repaying the gift of terror. The 
gift of terror is embedded in the politics of the subject resisting subjection. This 
is the capacity to agency, where in that actual death represents agency 
(Ahluwalia 2004). According to Birrel (2006), giving the gift of terror assumes 
the passing of some form of power since the act of suicide bombing is performed 
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as the public act, with the intention to shock those who are watching its effects. 
In amplification, Groys (2006: 89) points out that ‘[b]y pushing a button that 
makes a bomb to explode, a contemporary warrior or terrorist pushes a button 
that starts the media machine’. This is done with the intention of reinforcing the 
iconographic seduction and its desire in the form of ‘a pictorial strategy of 
intimidation’ (Groys 2006: 95).  
Indeed, Mbembe’s (2003a) perspective on suicide bombing accounts to how 
death loses its meaning  and how it transcends life. But then, this has no bearing 
on coloniality of being—except to locate violence not in gratuity but aesthetics. 
It then follows that death; therefore, suggest the form of what Raja (2005) refers 
to as imaginary of ‘non’ death from the Arab body—the body that is racialised 
like that of the African subject. Imaginary of ‘non’ death refers to ‘death from 
the eyes of the person who straps bombs to his/her body, and to walk into the so-
called valley of death’ (Raja 2005: 11). In short, in the eyes of the suicide 
bomber death has another meaning—it is not death, but a transcendental moment 
where there is another life after death.  
The employment of the past tense to describe a future event situating the living 
martyr between to death not, as might be expected, between the real death of the 
flesh and blood individual  and his (sic) symbolic death in martyrdom, but between 
his (sic) death in the symbolic (martyrdom) and the imaginary (Birrell 2006: 35).  
According to Mbembe (2003a), the body of the suicide bomber is that of a 
martyr. This is based on the logic that it is death in a form of becoming. It is in 
this logic that the politics of becoming are that of seeing and being destined to 
the future—the future as in, having another life. The conferring of such a life 
comes with the act of sacrificing ones life for the purpose of the higher ideal.  As 
Axinn (2009) adds, this being a moral duty, an individual is supposed not to be 
egoistic—that is, a subject who is not a sovereign subject. The logic of sacrifice 
in this regard demands a subject to have a non-egoistic position. ‘The non-
egoistic position insists that there is some entity more important than the 
individual, and therefore individuals ought to make sacrifices on its behalf’ 
(Axinn 2009: 11). If then this is what exists in the psyche of the suicide bomber, 
then the just cause is served. That is, the suicide bomber fulfils the mission 
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necessary for standing in the shoulder of martyrdom. The end assumes the 
politics of death of the other and satisfaction from that from that form of death. 
As Raja (2005: 21) states, ‘the romantici[s]ed notion of death’. This means death 
itself is what is given in life for that it is a quest for martyrdom.  
‘The power and value of the body result from a process of abstraction based on 
the desire for eternity’ (Mbembe 2003a: 37). The body project the politics of 
sacrifice, and Mbembe (2003a) states that the death of the suicide bomber is at 
the will of the suicide bomber. Death of the self by the self is the act of sacrifice. 
It is important to understand how the complexity of death and also Mbembe’s 
(2003a) singularising and multiplicity of it in the form of suicide bombing. 
Mbembe gives the exposition of death and it is important to understand how this 
form in a way, explains the causes of death. Thomas (2011) posits that ‘[s]uicide 
bombing, in all its diverse and terrible forms, is a phenomenon that vividly 
dramati[s]es the most destructive possibilities of this interface between global 
and local forces’. For Thomas, suicide bombing is the dangerous intersection 
between the personal and the political concerned with deep structures and 
destructive excesses. Raja (2005: 12) argues that the interpretation relevant to the 
notion of the suicide bomber ‘is the continuance of a martyr’s life after death’. 
Life after death as a form of excess gravitating to a meaningful desire, the one 
that death is confronted head-on, seems appealing for the status of the martyr. As 
Raja points out: 
While there may not be any material advantages to this movement, there are 
considerable advantages after death—a life after death being one of them, hence 
adding meaning to this kind of death. It is in this context of life beyond death that the 
actions of a suicide bomber are transformed from an excess to a meaningful action 
(Raja 2005: 14).   
The meaningfulness of death in the eyes of the suicide is that of dying for a 
cause, whether it is political or existential. The state of being a suicide bomber in 
the world is the state of death, but the death that presupposes the beginning of 
another form of life. The discursive method and the imaginary of the ideological 
also takes the dimension of the literal and that of the metaphorical to enter the 
place of death to die, and what matters is how honourably death takes place (Raja 
2005). The fictionalised discourse of the war in terror is the construction of the 
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empire.  Suicide attacks are not happening in isolation. They are the constitutive 
part of the response to the empire—that is, talking back to the empire. Suicide 
bombing at the level of the political is informed by resistance against the 
domination of the empire. It is in a way, a response. The war on terror on the 
other hand is not seen as a form of crime and a threat to the world. The empire is 
a terrorist. When the empire gets attacked it terrorises. Suicide bombing is 
regarded as declaration of war.  
According to Butler (2004), bombing of civilians, countless loss of life, 
destructive communities and infrastructure cannot be labelled as terror. 
Destruction of bodies and space they inhabit is not terror. These are the acts of 
sadism, where the empire just enjoys destructing human bodies. The life of the 
inhabitants of the empire matter the most for that they are humans. If they were 
to be captured or harmed in any form by the ex-colonised world, the empire will 
intervene with destructive force. The simple logic being that the humans cannot 
be violated and only non-humans can be violated. As Butler (2004) states, the 50 
000 people who are destructed by the empire, they are nonetheless and can 
therefore be obliterated. The one is easy humanised and cannot be obliterated. 
According to Butler (2004: 38), the empire for its subjects has a lot ‘humanising 
effect’ that establish ‘the human’—the subject rather than the object. Since the 
empire is omnipotent it should be no be challenged due to its possession of 
military might and the will to destruct with ease. The empire mobilises moral 
justification and moral superiority assuming the subject position of being a 
victim. The acts of the empire are placed at the noble cause of rooting out 
terrorism, a worst form of propaganda (Butler 2004). The might of the empire is 
such that its institution of death is that of eliminating as many as possible. This is 
informed by the self-arrogated power to confer and to liquidate as it chooses. The 
war on terror is a war declared against those who pose a threat to the hegemony 
of the empire, or simply, those the empire desires to conquer and does actually 
conquer.   
Despite common popular misconceptions, suicide terrorists today are not motivated 
exclusively or primarily by foreign occupation, they are not directed by a central 
organi[s]ation, and they are not nihilistic. Most suicide terrorists today are inspired 
by a global jihadism that, despite atavistic cultural elements, is a thoroughly modern 
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movement filling the popular political void in Islamic communities left in the wake 
of discredited Western ideologies co-opted by corrupt local governments (Atran 
2006: 139). 
For Atran, suicide bombing cannot be understood outside the empire. The 
hegemony of the empire is seen through its logic of operation centred on 
conquest, subjugation and control. According to Parry (2006), war on terror 
located its discourse in politics of necessity. For Parry (2006: 11), ‘[t]he 
necessity argument attains meaningful weight only when there are specific 
reason to fear an imminent attack’. The use of torture and murder by the empire 
create a spectacle, and through its modes of excessive violence is it serves as 
deterrent to the modes of resistance to those who are clutched in subjection. War 
on terror and assassinations equates to crime and violence of the empire (Iadicola 
2010). As Butler (2004) states, never will the empire itself admit that its acts are 
terrorist and at worse escalating. This means, the terrorist acts of the empire 
cannot be terrorism but a mere self-defence, and more so, war against terror.  
When the empire strikes civilians of its perceived enemy are at the receiving end 
of violence. War on terror is located within the discourse of politics of necessity. 
According to Parry (2006: 11), ‘[t]he necessity argument attains meaningful 
weight only when there is a specific reason for fear of an imminent attack’. Also, 
they are at the receiving end of suicide attacks, since the civilians are part of 
what the state should protect. It is, therefore, necessary to understanding the 
discourse of suicide bombing that involves the body taking the form of a 
ballistic. In other words, the body is a weapon and as stated earlier, the body 
assumes the category of difference in so far as coloniality of being is concerned. 
The body is a ballistic in that it engages in the battlefield by itself as a weaponry 
device (Baylis 2006). The body of the suicide bomber cannot be counted since it 
is not a body—but a weapon.  
According to Moghadam (2008), al-Qaida tenaciously inspired its most tactical 
arsenal that is suicide bombing to the point of becoming perfected and 
institutionalised. In addition to this, Baylis (2006: 111) states that ‘[s]uicide 
terrorism has virtually always been carried out by organi[s]ed rather than 
individuals, complicating the issue of impunity’. Thus this enabled the cult of 
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martyrdom in that the spirit of self-sacrifice was the one binding the group 
together. It has been one of the ethos of the members of al-Qaida. However, 
suicide bombing cannot be linked with being a member of al-Qaida. Atran 
(2006) posits that it is a fallacy that suicide bombers as contemporary martyrs are 
being directed and inspired by the al-Qaida, but rather, there are self-forming 
cells. The cult of martyrdom, as Thomas (2011) claims, is located on the 
existence of the suicide bomber who would rather live paradise in his/her head 
rather than to exist in hell.  
In this way, suicide bombing assumes the character of being both the symptom of 
weakness and as a theatre of resistance. In this mode of resistance, it resists as in 
life form and in death form. Suicide bombing impunity challenges the form of 
structure of law and also the hegemony of the state power upon the body. This 
form of death has made more others who aspire for martyrdom not to fear. Baylis 
(2006) argues that suicide bombing is the contempt to the legal system. In 
broader terms, law or legality defends and operates in the dictates and logic of 
the empire. As Parry (2006) argues, the doctrine of law changes in line with 
interests of the empire when the conception of justice and best legal rule will 
apply. Parry warns that legal rules should not be dependent upon for that they are 
mere tools and not solutions.  The empire with its juridical apparatus ‘assume 
[its] leading role in the definition of justice’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 38). This is 
supported by its moral, normative and institutional orders that are biased and 
favourable to it.  
The fate of the suicide bomber is death, so death is confronted head on (Mbembe 
2003a). According to Baylis (2006), the destruction is the body and property of 
the victims, including the body of the terrorist.  This is added to the essence of 
martyrdom of willing to enter the valley of death, and such entrance means death 
with others. This is public death, since the very act of suicide bombing attracts 
publicity. Suicide bombing is to exercise the worse form of punishable law—
death, at worse, death that also means the destruction of the body to pieces of 
flesh.  To the suicide bomber, the body is a matter that does not matter. The body 
is a mere flesh; it is therefore that which can be destructed in pursuit for 
martyrdom. As Mbembe (2003a: 37), ‘[t]he body has neither power nor value’. 
That is why the whole logic of destructing the body is relatively easy. ‘The body 
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duplicates itself and, in death, literally and metaphorically escapes the state of 
siege occupation’ (Mbembe 2003a: 38). It erases itself to mock the very act of 
justice and punishment. The body executes itself in the very act of commiting 
crime. That is, the act of crime is not that of survival after the crime has been 
committed, but the crime that is the complete end.  
The contempt is that it denies the legal system the object that it can use its 
instruments upon—the body. The body of the suicide bomber is reduced to 
pieces of flesh scattered and pasted everywhere—that is, the body that has even 
micro-mutilated its status beyond that of a corpse. Even the corpse can be 
attempted to be buried or incremented, already this is done. The body has been 
reduced to materialistic waste. Therefore, suicide bombers are regarded by 
Thomas (2011: 442) as ‘living weapons’ and ‘already therefore dead meat’. 
According to Baylis (2006), the suicide bomber robes the legal system—
apparatus of execution its functions. The suicide bomber cannot be captured and 
tried everything ends at the scene where suicide bombing took place. Baylis 
argument is that suicide bombers are of the view that they cannot be tried and 
prosecuted by the system that is illegal and terrorist. The enunciation of the 
suicide bomber wholly rejects and shows utter contempt to it by evading capture 
of the body. According to Hardt and Negri (2004: 54), ‘[t]he suicide bomber 
appears here once again as a symbol of inevitable limitation and vulnerability of 
sovereign power, refusing to accept a life of submission, the suicide bomber 
turns life itself into a horrible weapon’. The discourse of suicide bombing to 
some extent can be that of cycle of vengeance. If the body assumes the figure of 
a ballistic, it appropriates itself to the level of being a technology of destruction. 
For Mbembe (2003a), the body does not simply conceal a weapon for that it is a 
weapon. Mbembe highlights that the weaponry of the body assumes the state of 
being invisible. As such, ‘the suicide bomber is not wear[ing] no ordinary 
soldier’s uniform and displays no weapon’ (Mbembe 2003a: 36). Unlike the 
visible weapons and weaponry equipment, they can be seen. The body cannot be 
suspected as something that will explode and kill others and itself.  
As Mbembe notes in the sense of the suicide bomber, the body is transformed 
into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in a truly ballistic sense. The 
weapon is the body itself, since the weapon is not external to the body. Mbembe 
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(2003a: 30) states that war is in the level of the body that is informed by the 
nature of being ‘hit and run affairs’. This is because of the fact of mobility, the 
mobility of the body to a predetermined targeted location. As Hard and Negri 
(2004) point out, suicide bombers are unlocalised, dispersed and unknowable 
making them to be polycentric, horizontal and distributive. The body on body 
war is the destruction of other bodies, and the destruction of the body itself that is 
a ballistic. 
In this logic of “martyrdom”, the will to die is fused with the willingness to take the 
enemy with you, that is, with closing the door on the possibility of life for everyone. 
This logic seems contrary to another one, that consists in wishing to impose death on 
others while preserving one’s own life (Mbembe 2003a: 37).   
The operations of suicide bombing are in a form of martyrdom. To understand 
this, Thomas (2011: 430) states that particular attention be paid to ‘the delicate 
interplay between explosive fictions and explosive materialities’. Though this 
might be perceived as irrational or opaque, this from the geography of reason of 
those who are committed to the cause of politics of martyrdom is different. 
Suicide bombers are willing to die for their cause and this end is seen as the 
transcendal moment. For Atran (2006: 127), ‘[t]hey are increasingly willing and 
eager to die as they are to kill’. This means, there is another form of life that is 
more rewarding than that of the body and the soul combined.  
Most often, weapons assume the state of continuity, but the body as a weapon 
assumes the end. The death in the scene of body on body war is simultaneous. 
The killer does not see the death of its victims, simply the killer dies with them. 
In this instance the death of the killer goes hand in hand with the death of the 
victims (Mbembe 2003a). This is the elimination of other bodies in the process of 
the body eliminating itself. The body on body war is that of close proximity to 
effect possible destruction. ‘To kill, one has to come as close as possible to the 
body of the enemy. To detonate the bomb necessitates resolving the question of 
distance, through the work of proximity and concealment’ (Mbembe 2003a: 37). 
Mbembe makes a distinction between classical heroism and martyrdom to 
understand the work or proximity and concealment. Classical heroism is the fear 
of death and it is that which kills from the distance. The act of killing is not that 
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of suicide where the perpetrator and the victim experience simultaneous death. 
Here, the body is not a weapon, but the weapon is used and can be re-used to kill. 
The body itself cannot be concealed but the conventional weapon can be 
concealed. On the other hand, martyrdom is about gaining proximity, 
camouflaging and dissimulating (Raja 2005). Suicide bombing is to bear witness 
to fear, horror, pain, rage, despair and panic (Thomas 2011). According to Atran 
(2006), suicide bombers depend on the degrees of horror and also the amounts of 
collateral damage to innocent bystanders. 
For Atran, the state of becoming is that of introducing justice. The politics of gift 
and exchange are alien to the racialised body of the African subject due the fact 
that it is collapsed by subjection from the ontological scale. The politics of 
martyrdom, therefore, cannot be identified with the racialised body for that it 
exists as death—that is, subjection makes, as noted earlier, African subjects to be 
in the existential plane of social death. This is why politics of martyrdom cannot 
simply exist, because there cannot be existence to what does not exist. The body 
on body war that is understood as martyrdom is appropriate to the body that is 
not that of the ‘racialised Other’—the African subject. Focusing on the level of 
the body as a weapon of war, Moghadam (2008) argues that suicide bombing 
needs to be understood the following motivation: a strong commitment to the 
group, a desire for revenge, an expectation of benefits after death, and personal 
crisis.  
The politics of martyrdom become institutionalised and ‘their respective systems 
of beliefs, myths and dogmas that define the purpose and meaning of human 
existence’ (Casquete 2006: 266). Wilcox (2001) refers to ‘symbolic disruptive 
violence’ to articulate the extent of destruction of violence embedded in the 
politics of symbolism. According to Wilcox, terrorist turn their bodies to a source 
of betrayal—that is, the body being not being suspected as a weapon only to find 
out that it is. Politics of symbolism create the world in their own making through 
the acts of violence and the world becoming a symbolic form. This symbolism is 
built upon martyrdom and violence is the act of faith. Indeed, these are present 
existential crisis around the racialised body of the African subject. At worse, this 
existential crisis has been and continues to be an extra-ordinary affair. That is, 
the existential condition of the African subject is the life of permanent crisis.  
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Whether read from the perspective of slavery or of colonial occupation, death and 
freedom are irrevocably interwoven. As we have seen, terror is a defining feature of 
both slave and late-modern colonial regimes. Both regimes are also specific 
instances and experience of unfreedom (Mbembe 2003a: 38). 
Mbembe is correct but is not aware of coloniality of being in the era of 
coloniality. The condition of unfreedom exists. It will come only to end if the 
empire can be dismantled. Any reflection on the racialised body of the African 
subject is to see the extraordinary affair of unfreedom side by side with the 
illusion of freedom. Not only unfreedom as Mbembe suggests ended, but 
continues. There cannot be any form of martyrdom in a form of resistance, even 
by means of suicide bombing as performed by the racialised body of the African 
subject. This is the body that cannot transcend death—the end of life to another 
form of paradise. This is because coloniality of being abstracts the body of the 
African subject from any ontological stand-point to make it to have no 
ontological density. What has been the property of the empire cannot in itself and 
within the territory of the empire—the deathscape that is—be of any value if it 
were to be liquidated, this has already been and done. This, therefore, means that 
the African subject at the level of the suicide bomber, and also in the act of 
suicide bombing killing other bodies identical to its own will be not be labelled 
terrorism that will then invite counter-terrorist discourses. The body on body war 
at the level of the black body, upon other black bodies, and even in the periphery 
of the empire is just any other form of, or mere violence. This violence is that is 
seen as the existence of the black body, even though it results in death that 
cannot be accounted for.   
The ontological status of the African subject is so penetrated to such an extent 
that it is ‘wrapped in desire to frustrate desire’ (Gordon 1995: 104). And still, this 
reveals the state of understanding martyrdom, and martyrdom cannot originate 
even the black body were to kill itself. More troubling, what is death to what is 
already dead and what significance does that have or value perhaps? Coloniality 
of being is the state of non-ethics of war and it cannot produce the emergence of 
the martyr from the ontologically void racialised body of the African subject.  
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Death, then, to the African subject is something else—it is the death of the 
racialised object. Suicide bombing with its martyrdom seems to have a relational 
crisis at the level of the racialised body of the African subject—the racialised 
object cannot emerge because it is not a subject. The object is devoid of ontology 
and the subject has the ontology. In other words, to be a subject is to live and to 
be the object is to die. The destruction of the racialised body of the Africa subject 
has been a given, and it has been the possession of the empire. The ontological 
difference of the African subject differs from any other body and the existence of 
the African subject is the extraordinary affair. According to Gordon (1995), there 
is absence of being or ontology in the African subject. Suicide bombing of, 
and/or against that which does not exist or lacks human essence reaches another 
meaning of death. This is not the meaning of something emerging, but the 
amplification of what is being normalised—that is, the death of the black is 
normal and does not rouse any form of agency. This is the death of the already 
dead and this also implies—the martyr cannot be something or being that has not 
existed. The absence of ontology means—the condemned of the earth who are 
absent in the world. Suicide bombing in Africa has not been about politics of life 
as Mbembe (2003a) would implicitly highlight. The ontological resistance should 
exist, but auxiliary of the terrorist grounds who have planted cells that are 
proliferating. Also, their terrorist destruction will have no matter if it is directed 
to what is already dead.   
Direction of non-ethics of war has been the destruction of the racialised body of 
the African subject. This direction is to render the body dead and for that body to 
kill itself is no matter at all. However, of the black body was to launch a body on 
body war with the white body—the empire will amplify non-ethics of war—the 
very scandal of coloniality of being. The body on body war at the level of the 
racialised body of the African subject is normal, no matter the extent of 
destruction. The African subject at the level of the body is both denied and 
suppressed—its very own crisis being the demand for humanity. In doing so, this 
crisis is ignored and the state of death intensifies to affirm coloniality of being. 
This is the form of elimination and destruction. The ontological dynamic of 
obliteration pervades, and in no way can there be any form of martyrdom. To 
challenge Mbembe, the empire can remove the mask of coloniality of being and 
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really put in place absolute violence—non-ethics of war in a form of raw power. 
For the racialised body to resist in the form of death like a suicide bomber and 
bombing other racialised bodies of African subjects or even bodies of the 
subjects of empire, this not in pursuit of martyrdom. What remains clear is that 
the racialised body of the African subject presents a scandal when put in the 
realm of the politics of martyrdom, and thus the notion of the politics of 
martyrdom qua the African subject is an oxymoron. This is something that 
Mbembe does not account for, and it also implies the absence of the African 
subject from the realm of politics of martyrdom. It is clear that the problematic 
ontology of the African subject resides in coloniality of being. 
Conclusion   
This chapter through decolonial critical analysis has emphasised the necessity of 
understanding violence in Africa, through its genealogy and constitutive 
complexity rather than its symptoms to account for coloniality of being. This 
means, the tracing of violence, something that Mbembe does but seem to divorce 
from the continuities of colonial affinities of the empire—that is, coloniality of 
being. Violence is that of the libidinal and having reached sadistic proportions in 
postcolonial Africa, it is normalised. This is simply because it is mutating in 
form, character and shape, and to ignore such complexity is to absolve the 
colonial nature of violence that still haunts the present. Therefore, it is important 
to understand structural violence that hides behind the ‘normal way of life’.   
The notion of violence suggests that the empire is omnipotent, and sovereignty is 
not in the Westphalian sense, but the realm where there is a suspension of law. 
This clearly points to the arrogated position of the empire for being the law and 
the definer of what is legal and what is not. The violence that is committed by the 
empire is not regarded as violence, and the violence committed by ex-colonies 
will invite the wrath of the empire if it is the violence that threatens the interests 
of the empire. Though Mbembe condemns the actions of the empire with regards 
to its state of exception and the right confer life and warrant death, Mbembe does 
not directly implicate the empire of being a criminal for engaging in non-ethics 
of war.  
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The empire, for that it targets the racialised body of the African subject even to 
the point of death, still there is no consequence. Just like in the plantation system, 
as Mbembe has demonstrated, the racialised body of the African subject is a 
mere possession, an object, property—and also, an aberration from the norm. 
The racialised body of the African subject is located at the level where there is 
absence of ontology and that is the very that justifies the non-ethics of war. This 
permeates the existence of war machines that assume variety of functions, form 
and character exists in deathscapes. The predatory nature of war machines and 
even that of the state apparatus in the condition of war make the shadow of 
death—a deathscape to be impossible to escape.  
Mbembe is right that deathscapes even at the level of the politics of martyrdom 
by means of suicide bombing makes death impossible to escape. Most tellingly, 
death is not feared by the suicide bomber because it serves the higher purpose of 
martyrdom. The paradox is that death matters for the suicide bomber who is the 
African subject, and such a death will not serve the higher purpose of wanting 
martyrdom. The racialised body of the African subject is already dead and does 
not have any sense of agency and no martyrdom even if it can commit suicide 
bombing. The only problem will be that if such a body engages in body on body 
war with the bodies of the empire, white bodies, the empire will respond through 
its might of sovereignty. Violence suggests that in the contemporary Africa, it 
has multiply genealogies, and it cannot be understood outside from the empire 
and its tentacles of coloniality of being—something that is absent in Mbembe’s 
intervention. In the next chapter, Mbembe’s engagement with the political 
thought of Fanon will be examined to argue for the relevance of Fanon.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
MBEMBE ON FANON 
 
Introduction  
In this chapter, decolonial critical analysis is deployed to examine Mbembe’s 
engagement with the political thought of Fanon will be examined through de-
colonial turn. The main reason behind this is that Mbembe’s engagement of 
Fanon relation to existential conditions of black subjects is foregrounded in 
global imperial designs. Therefore, this kind of reading alienates Fanon from 
being a decolonial thinker and affirms him in the genealogy of postmodernism 
and postcolonial thought. As such, the main aim is to challenge Mbembe’s 
project of de-radicalising Fanon and crafting Fanon within the Euro-North 
American canon and sub-ordination of his thought. Fanon is engaged from the 
decolonial archive, and in the interregnum of the past, present and future, as 
mutually constitutive of one another instead of any epochal breaks.  
This chapter firstly engages the relevance of Fanon and Mbembe’s position on 
his relevance. It is argued that Fanon is still relevant and is of course, the spectre 
that still haunts the postcolony as subjection of black subjects continues. 
Secondly, the chapter argues that Fanon is a philosopher of existence and 
Mbembe does not see him as such, but a revolutionary, thinker, psychiatrist and 
so on. Fanon made the original philosophical contribution through existential 
phenomenology to investigate the existential conditions of black subjects. 
Thirdly, the chapter argues that for Mbembe, there is no anti-blackness, but just a 
colonial wound in need of healing. The contention here is that the colonial 
wound does exist, and so is anti-blackness, and these make up subjection to be 
structural systematised. Fourthly, the chapter engages the notion of structural 
violence where subjection is not explicit. The contention is that Mbembe sees 
subjection as characterised by what he refers to as the violence of death, and this 
leaves structural violence unexplained as a form of subjection. Fifthly, the 
concept of humanism that has been ascribed to Fanon’s thought is engaged. The 
chapter argues that humanism fails to account to existential conditions of black 
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subjects who are excluded from the whole project of humanity. The chapter 
finally engages the notion of the emergence of the black subject outside the 
politics of consent and politics of consensus. De-colonial turn affirms that the 
liberation of the black subject, the emergence that is, should be understood in 
terms of the end of the world, the anti-black world to be exact. 
Fanon and the now: the spectre still haunts 
The relevance of Fanon is still the spectre that haunts for the fact that subjection 
still continues. It is through de-colonial turn that Fanon’s project that was to 
diagnose and to antagonise subjection still forms part of the black subjectivity 
and this is essential in that subjection still continues to exist. Black subjectivity 
qua de-colonial turn for Fanon is still needed in order to make sense of what 
Fanon’s project was, and is really about.  Mbembe writes: 
To read Fanon today means to translate into the language of our times the major 
questions that forced him to stand up, to break away from the roots and to walk with 
others, companions on a new road the colonised had to trace on their own, by their 
own creativity, with indomitable will (Mbembe 2011c: 2). 
Fanon was informed by the need to engage in the political act, the political will 
to take a stand. What Mbembe calls for is the need to revisit and to engage the 
questions that were formidable in Fanon thought. Though there are many of them 
of course, Mbembe is concerned with the contemporary challenges that are akin 
to what preoccupied Fanons thought. In what Mbembe (2011c) refers to as 
Fanon’s nightmare, that is a crisis of the 21st century, Mbembe cites examples 
like warfare and occupation, counterinsurgents tactics and torture, secrete 
prisons, militarisation and plundering, that are a necropolitical force of politics. 
This is indeed true, and of course, at the global level. Therefore, the relevance of 
Fanon’s thought is the crisis, and this crisis ignites in the spirit of Fanon—that is, 
the oppositional force that still rooted in his political project.   
Therefore, it is essential for such political practice to prevail to develop Fanon’s 
project. The development of Fanon’s project as Mbembe (2012) asserts, is to take 
into account its exact measure. De-colonial turn contends that this measure 
should not be reduced to the ‘after-life’ of Fanon, which is the posthumous 
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positionality reducing Fanon to a mere text. The after-life of Fanon is defended 
by Alessandrini (2011: 55) who argues that it is ‘an active, unsparing, and 
sensitive (in the Fanonian sense) engagement with his work, that is the best way 
to address Fanon as “our contemporary”’. The reason that Alessandrini puts forth 
is that though Fanon is seen as the contemporary, particularities are important to 
take into account due to differing geo-politics—that is, being context sensitive. 
The thought of Fanon, according to Mbembe (2012), is metamorphic thought. 
Fanon ([1952] 2008: 1) declares that ‘[t]he explosion will not happen today. It is 
too soon … or too late’. This does not suggest the thought that is caught in 
uncertainty of the revolutionary rupture will ensure the emergence of black 
subject.  
The metamorphic thought of Fanon as Mbembe (2012) states, is the thought that 
is tenacious, and in perpetual continuity. It is the thought that is ‘animated by an 
indestructible will to live’ (Mbembe 2011: 3). By deploying de-colonial turn 
what emerges is that what is metamorphic cannot automatically be a spectre. The 
spectre on the other hand haunts, it is something that does not emerge from the 
state of being dead or declared so. The metamorphic thought will mean the 
thought that has undergone changes in the form of natural intervening action. 
Mbembe (2012: 20) rightly points out that ‘Fanon’s thinking was born of real, 
lived, unstable and changing experience’. Fanon’s thought is engaged with 
subjection that relegated the existential condition of the black subject to the 
margins and deathscapes.  
Fanon ([1952] 2008) writes, ‘[i]n the course of this essay we shall observe the 
development of an effort to understand the black-white relation’. This relation 
has never, even up until the present being that of mutual recognition or that 
which humanises the black subjection. It has been the relation of subjection. The 
thought of Fanon is then, that which haunts subjection, and the subjects that are 
entangled in it. Following de-colonial turn, it cannot therefore be the metaphoric 
thought, if subjection still continues. To amplify this, Fanon ([1952] 2008: 63) 
asserts that ‘[a] given society is racist or it is not’. Therefore, this demonstrates 
clearly the thought that has not mutated by being metamorphic, but that still 
carries the same weight in its interrogation density to unmask subjection is in its 
radical mutations.  
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In addition, this should provide a testimony that Fanon’s thought is the spectre 
that still haunts. As such, the thought of Fanon advocated here is rooted in de-
colonial turn that takes seriously the existential conditions of the black subjects 
who are at the receiving end of subjection. It therefore follows that, Mbembe’s 
focus on the thought of Fanon as metaphoric is not to make him to be 
accountable to those he is speaking and living for, that is, black subjects. Fanon’s 
thought is a sworn evidence that subjection by means of colonial oppression 
‘dehumani[s]es the native, or to speak plainly it turns him (sic) into an animal’ 
(Fanon [1961] 1990: 32). It is essential to take into account that Fanon’s thought 
encompasses the past, present and future and the three are the nodal points 
through that de-colonial turn it is based and they are essential to account for the 
existential condition to unravel subjection. The past, present and future is 
Fanon’s context. This is the thought of co-constitutionality meaning that the one 
cannot be understood without the other. The relevance of Fanon and in this case, 
his thought by Mbembe, suggests the search for the answer(s) to this question: 
which Fanon is being engaged and for what purpose exactly? This question is 
framed in the light of the more things being said about Fanon’s subjectivity and 
of course, to be specific, his thought in the 21
st
 Century. The matter of that Fanon 
is contextually specific is due to variety of the existential conditions of the black 
subjects.  
Mbembe’s (2012) ideas are also key in understanding which Fanon is he 
referring to. This will also determine Mbembe’s epistemic location qua Fanon 
relevance and positionality. The response of Mbembe (2012) to the question 
above will be zeroed into with regards to three aspects he puts forth: namely, 
colonial wounds, psychic damage and administration of pain. These aspects are 
essential in that Fanon’s thought has been and continues to be, in most cases, 
framed along these. However, de-colonial turn exposes Mbembe’s framing of the 
answer to the question is limited in the sense of explaining the aspects of the 
answer at the level of the internality of the existential conditions that signify the 
ontological externality of the black subject qua subjection. The limit to these 
existential questions can be largely attributed to Mbembe’s framing that suggests 
the minimalisation or absence of subjection as black subjects are said to have 
agency and not regarding subjection as a negative effect in relation to the 
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existential conditions of black subjects. The existential conditions of the black 
subjects seems not to matter in the contemporary sense, and that can be attributed 
to the notion that the colonial condition that Mbembe is concerned with is the 
one that is related to the historical moment, whereas there is a spectre. The 
spectre evokes fundamental questions emanating from the limits of being of the 
black subject. These are questions that are essential in the 21
st
 Century. 
Mbembe’s project is the attempt to make the moderate and radical Fanon to exist 
side by side. Of course, there is nothing wrong with this, but then, it is essential 
to point to what end or actual purpose. In a sense, it is important to locate 
Fanon’s relevance to a particular existential plane—that is, the existential plane 
of the damned of the earth (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). The purpose here is to 
locate Fanon within the existential conditions of the black subject and who 
engages in the form of critique that is foregrounded in de-colonial turn. To 
answer to that Fanon, it will be the Fanon in the intestines of the struggle against 
subjection, and to be exact—Fanon as a decolonial thinker. The political thought 
of Fanon then, will be the thought that is articulated and rearticulated within the 
course of the struggle against subjection. As such, Fanon’s political thought 
cannot be delinked from the struggle, but he is the product of it and also its 
greater advocate that is seen through revolutionary commitment to see the end of 
subjection. In those existential conditions that Fanon finds himself, Fanon will be 
speaking from the structural positionality of the black subject at the receiving end 
of subjection. To be a pacifist, of course, is a self-defeating purpose since 
pacificism does not confront subjection. Such positionality will mean remaining 
a shell and not emerge from the existential condition of being damned. Then, it is 
essential to interrogate Fanon’s project as done by Mbembe and not to negate the 
revolutionary spirit infused in Fanon’s thought that confronted subjection.  
Being in the existential condition of the damned is to exist in the hellish 
condition (Gordon 2007). The emphasis of Fanon’s project through de-colonial 
turn is informed by the commitment to bring the hellish condition into an end. 
Fanon’s interrogation and deeper understanding of the existential conditions of 
the black subject is the interrogation that is still relevant even today. The 
relevance of Fanon in the 21
st
 Century is still informed by the need to free the 
black subject from subjection. The revolutionary spirit of Fanon is still relevant 
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and it is still informed by the conviction that there is subjection and the change of 
the century does not mean the end of subject by the change of its modus 
operandi. For Mbembe, to regard the colonial condition as something of the past 
is to ignore the fact that the colonial condition is still with the black subject. To 
put Fanon alien to the existential conditions that affect the black subject in the 
contemporary is to deny Fanon the right to be a decolonial thinker.  
Fanon is, and has always been the figure of black subject. It then follows that he 
is still struggling against subjection that wages war against the humanity of the 
black subject whose humanity is always put into question. Subjection still 
continues to haunt the black subject and there has never been a radical break 
through de-colonial turn from its clutches that change to suite the contemporary 
conditions. For instance, during the era of colonialism black subjects were open 
to subjection in its raw and explicit form, but now, it has hidden itself through 
the everyday life and its structural constitutive is hard to explain in the realm of 
common sense, created by the very same subjection. Subjection has been well 
clarified as total oppression, ‘a form of domination that afflicts every aspect of a 
person’s life’ (Birt 1997: 206). Fanon’s relevance through de-colonial turn is to 
expose the scandal of subjection to explicate the fact that the old is the new, the 
new is the old. Fanon’s relevance as the spectre that still haunts should be 
understood on the basis of black subjects being the political agent who is striving 
towards the state of become, what Mbembe (2010) refers to as affirmative 
politics and the politics of life.  
The relevance of Fanon is still the spectre that haunts, and of course,  this does 
not stand outside controversy as there are Fanon detractors. Fanon detractors are 
engaged in the erasure of Fanon’s contribution and such erasure is deliberate 
(Robinson 1993; Gibson 2003; Maldonado-Torres 2008a). This erasure can be 
seen from Bhabha ([1986] 2008) who erases colonialism, a naked form of 
subjection, its absolute and systematic violence and of course, the hellish reality 
it creates to the existential conditions of black subjects. So, it is essential to state 
that Fanon is the contested figure, and beyond that, the figure of relevance to 
explain the existential condition of the black subject in the 21
st
 Century. 
Therefore, the examination of Fanon’s thought cannot only be metamorphic as 
Mbembe (2012) suggests, but also, Fanon’s thought being a spectre that haunts. 
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As such, this point to the need to examine Fanon’s thought in the manner that 
positions him as a philosopher of existence. 
Fanon as a philosopher of existence  
Mbembe does not regard Fanon as a philosopher of existence, let alone, a 
philosopher for that matter. To position Fanon as a philosopher is to put him 
squarely in de-colonial turn—something that Mbembe does not acknowledge. 
For Mbembe, Fanon can be anything from activist, thinker, prophet, theorists, 
psychiatrist but not a philosopher. This is indeed the common case in most of the 
studies in relation to Fanon, and the contention here is that Fanon is a 
philosopher, the philosopher of existence of black subjects to be exact. This is 
how Fanon ([1952] 2008: 91) defines himself ‘if I was asked for a definition of 
myself, I would say that I am one who waits; I investigate my surroundings, I 
interpret everything in terms of what I discover, I become sensitive’. This self-
definition is indeed of Fanon as a philosopher of existence, and this is the 
existence of those who have their existence continuously and systematically 
militated against—the black subjects. In amplification to this, Maldonado-Torres 
(2008a: 93) argues thus ‘[i]ndeed, Fanon’s extraordinary effort to describe and 
examine the lived experience of the black and the condemned gain him a title of 
a philosopher of existence’. So, for the mere fact that Fanon’s concern is the 
existential conditions of the black subject that makes him a philosopher of 
existence. The black subject to Fanon is a problem of thought in that this subject 
is critical in the ways that is being thought, and this only appears when such a 
subject starts taking de-colonial turn seriously. ‘Fanon pioneered the 
psychological, social and political investigation of anti-colonialism and what he 
took to be the ‘Negro’’ (Robinson 1993: 80). Fanon then considers, through 
existential phenomenology, the actual experience of being black in the anti-black 
world. This, according to I’Anson (2003: 4), can be referred to as ‘the life world 
as experienced’. This means that Fanon’s philosophical effort is indebted to his 
commitment and love for black subjects.  
According to Robinson (1993), Fanon used his existential phenomenology to 
engage in contradictions of colonialism. This contribution is influenced by 
Fanon’s own lived experience as a black subject in the anti-black world. It is 
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Fanon’s intent to address the existential questions, in a diagnostic manner to the 
black subject, who is in need of liberation as subjection holds such a subject 
down. Fanon’s philosophy of existence is seriously dedicated and devoted to 
getting to the roots of the phenomena and interrogating it while being located in 
it for it to emerge (Gordon 2010). Fanon is a philosopher of existence and this 
should be traced in the manner in which he diagnoses and exposes the colonial 
deception that has subjected black subject of the long dogmatic sleep of 
subjection. The long dogmatic sleep of subjection really explains the essence of 
existence in relation to the black subject. The existence is not the one desirable 
for the state of being, but it is the one that shows subjection in its sadistic 
proportions. So, the deployment of de-colonial turn means that Fanon as a 
philosopher of existence yearns for the awakening of the black subject from the 
ontological slumber that is created by subjection. 
De-colonial turn through Fanon as a philosopher of existence brought to being 
what Gordon (2010: 200) refers to as ‘the paradox of a method against method’. 
This is the paradox not just in a puzzling sense, but the paradox that takes the 
existential conditions of the black subjects seriously. According to Gordon 
(2010), this paradox of method against method is performed in any act of 
reflection. This means that Fanon in his moments of reflecting the existential 
conditions of the black subjects engaged the notion of the method through 
revealing its problems and its incapacity when it comes to the existential 
phenomenological aspects of the black subject.  So, the paradox of a method 
against method is actually the authorisation of the disruption of method. The 
disruption of the method in Fanon’s philosophy of existence is the means of 
introducing the black subject who has been an object to become a subject proper. 
That is, the black subject is the one that is in charge of method, and this is the 
crux of Fanon’s philosophy where in that antagonisms are created within method. 
According to Gordon (2010: 202), ‘Fanon advocated the position of embodied 
interrogatives, of human being re-entering a relationship of questioning’. Fanon 
as a philosopher of existence exposed colonial impositions that hide behind 
method, and that create the justification of subjection and the hellish existential 
conditions for the black subject.    
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The originality of Fanon is the systematic examination of the colonial condition 
and its aftermath makes him a philosopher of existence. Fanon as a philosopher 
of existence grounds his philosophy to existential phenomenology that qualifies 
the examination of the existential conditions of the black subject. In addition to 
this, Fanon applies the sociodiagnostic analysis to understand ‘the wider social 
situation’ (Gibson 2003: 46). The primary purpose of this philosophical blending 
is to understand how subjection filters through the lives of black subjects and 
making sure that they are ontologically void. It is clear from the above that the 
understanding of existential conditions needs to be grounded in Fanon’s 
existential phenomenology that is rooted in sociodiagnostic analysis to 
understand the existential conditions of the black subject. This indeed demands 
the philosophical effort not only of making sense of the condition, but being 
actional to facilitate the emergence of subjectivities that were ontologically 
closed off. This is the philosophical grounding that aims to bring the hidden into 
bare, and unmask the unreal of the so-called reality. The reality of Fanon is that 
‘his own suffering as a black other [is] scripted by a raciali[s]ed authoritative 
discourse’ (Nielsen 2011: 364). The philosophy of existence in the Fanonian 
sense is to expose what subjection is, and on the other hand, to diagnose options 
that the black subjects can engage in to facilitate emergence and the ontological 
quest. To expose subjection is to make it what it is, a scandal.    
Mbembe (2012) is concerned with therapeutic paradigms that black subjects 
must mobilise as they face dehumanising violence of colonialism that Fanon 
tried to heal. The therapeutic paradigm does not change anything since the black 
subject does not need any form of healing, but being anew in the new world free 
from subjection. Mbembe of course, does not account for Fanon’s philosophy of 
existence where in that therapeutic paradigms will be insufficient to explain or 
remedy the hellish existential conditions of black subjects. The existence of the 
black subject under the crushing weight of subjection demanded and still 
demands philosophical commitment to diagnose and unmask subjection, not 
prescribing therapeutic paradigms. Judy (1996) asserts that Fanon’s 
philosophical intervention is of necessity since there has been no philosophical 
thought of the black subject.  
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De-colonial turn as the philosophical intervention of Fanon is the exposé of 
subjection in its institutionalisation, naturalisation and normalisation of 
subjection that militates against the existence of the black subject. According to 
Maldonado-Torres (2008a), Fanon’s philosophy of existence was informed by 
the need to clarify the existence of pathologies that plagued the ordinary life of 
the black subject. These pathologies create hellish existential conditions that are 
seen as justifiable in relation to the black subject. The black subject being 
trapped in this hellish circle, to break it, ‘there is no genuine way out’ (Gibson 
2003: 42). Caught in the state of constant comparison, whiteness projects itself as 
the ego ideal. The life of the black subject signifies pathologies that serve as the 
standard marker in relation to white subjects. Fanon engaged the black subjects 
as problem of thought, and the philosophical manner that is assertive. The black 
subject was not only the problem, but subjection that makes the black subject to 
be a problem. ‘That is, to be black is to be already interfered with, violated by, a 
whiteness that comes from inside out. A whiteness that not only distrusts but 
hates’ (Marriot 2000: 79).  
Fanon, through the deployment of existential phenomenology engaged in what 
he titles ‘the fact of blackness’ (Fanon [1952] 2008). The existential conditions, 
the pathological and the hellish were closer to Fanon, as he himself, was the 
other, but the virtue of being raced. ‘Look a Negro’ the gaze that squeezes out 
the ontological essence of the subject, being ‘an object in the midst of other 
objects’ (Fanon ([1952] 2008: 82). According to Fuss (1999: 296) ‘Fanon implies 
that the black man (sic) under colonial rule finds himself relegated to a position 
of other than the other’. Fuss continues to assert that the implications for black 
exclusion are immediate and devastating. Not only the gaze excludes Fanon, it 
dehumanised him. ‘The racism phenomena has its root in the visual field of 
perception when the white other directs his/her gaze upon Fanon’ (Mahendran 
2007). This means the black subject is ‘degraded, polluted, diseased’ (Gibson 
1999: 345). The assertion of the black subject though it seems impossible is ‘to 
enjoin or reaffirm the opposition of actuality and possibility’ (Marriot 2007: 
231). This means, making the black experience to be visible and to account for 
‘the idea of race as “ontological”’ (Mills 1998: xvi).   
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This is the existence that militates for the emergence through de-colonial turn 
and as such, such a philosophical effort through existential phenomenology 
allows Fanon to philosophically meditate the form of life that is accorded to the 
black subject, and to demand the form of life that subjection is not willing to 
concede. For the mere fact that subjection still a pathological lie that still refuses 
to concede, it is clear that such conceding is the end of subjection itself, the end 
that mean that life will change in the form that is already is. This end of life will 
not mean the free and just world as the liberal propaganda has it, but the form of 
life that will be a nightmare for the oppressor. This not meaning subjection of the 
oppressor, but the situation where the oppressor is not imagining being alive with 
what is considered substitutedly dead. The philosophy of existence in Fanon’s 
thought really means taking ontology seriously since ‘[t]he black man (sic) has 
no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man’ (sic) (Fanon [1952] 2008: 
83). The philosophy of existence of Fanon means that there is a need to 
understand the structural positionality of the black subject, the relational capacity 
or the lack thereof, and the workings of subjection in denying the ontological 
significance that is due to the black subject. 
The ontology of the black subject is what already exists in Mbembe’s thinking, 
and as such, it needs to be asserted. So, it means that it is the responsibility of the 
black subject to emerge that is definitely true. In addition to that, Mbembe’s 
thinking suggests that an assertion means that black subjects can counter 
subjection with relatively ease, since black subjects have the ontological capacity 
that is inherent from within. But then, what de-colonial turn is concerned with is 
not ontology is per ser but the emergence of such an ontology since it does not 
exist in relation to the existentiality of the black subject. Fanon ([1952] 2008:82) 
affirms this to say ‘[o]ntology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence 
by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black subject 
since it is a subject that is devoid of ontological essence’ (emphasis added). The 
ontology of the black subject is that of the state of constant comparison, and the 
comparison that is asymmetrical in intent since the white subject is the possessor 
of ontology that is then denied to the black subject. The denial of ontology exists 
in the manner of inferiorising the black subject and as such, creating the 
existential crisis—the hellish existence of the black subject. Ontology, for Fanon, 
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as the philosophy of existence, is not the starting point, but subject formation is 
where black subjects will be in pursuit of ontology in order to emerge. So, for 
Mbembe, this is not of importance since he does not see subjection as the very 
thing that denies and strips the being of its ontological essence.   
According to Fuss (1999: 322), ‘Fanon’s work also draws our attention to the 
historical and social conditions of identification’. This being illuminated through 
existential phenomenological exponent of his thought, it means the proper 
grounding of the black subject for the purpose of emergence. Fanon’s role as a 
philosopher of existence is grounded on philosophy as, and being preoccupied 
with the notion of the existence of being—that is, being-in-the-world (Manganyi 
1973; Gordon 1995; More 2008). Amplifying this position, Maldonado-Torres 
(2008a: 130) states ‘[f]or Fanon, the examination of the colonial racial context in 
that he lived demanded an existential phenomenological approach’. The use of 
existential phenomenology approach was seen as necessity to examine 
subjection. This necessity is grounded on the pathologies that afflict black 
subjects. The philosophy of existence in Fanon’s thought is the will to fight for 
the emergence of the ethical for the emergence of the black subject as a political 
subject. As Gordon (1996: 77) states, ‘[a]t the heart of the existential 
phenomenological approach is the question of human studies in general’.  
The denial of ontology is the very essence of colonial deception that is the 
antithesis of liberation. Fanon ([1961]1990) argues that the dominant forms of 
criticisms do not expose the ethical limits that are inherent in subjection, and they 
are also not radical enough. According to Mbembe (2012: 20), ‘[f]or Fanon, the 
irrepressible and relentless pursuit of freedom enquired us to mobilise all life 
reserves. It drew the colonised into a fight into the death—a fight that they were 
called upon to assume as their duty and that could not be delegated to others’. 
De-colonial turn makes Fanon’s philosophy of existence, to have consciousness 
and it to be centred at the level of existence. This also tied to the nature of being 
that black subjects were structurally positioned at the receiving end of subjection. 
As the call for concern, consciousness is necessary and it is something that 
warrants a philosophical examination. As Judy (1996) states, ‘consciousness 
emerges with experience and it is not a consciousness of experience’. This 
means, Fanon’s philosophy of experience is the philosophy that is mediated 
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within experience. Fanon struggled as he wrote—he was at the receiving end of 
subjection when he unmasked it. Therefore, Fanon’s philosophy of existence 
means that Fanon wrote from the existential condition of a black subject, it is the 
philosophy from within. 
What does the black subject want? Put another way, why the black? This is the 
philosophical mode of questioning akin to Fanon to problematise the existential 
condition of the black subject in the world that intensifies subjection towards the 
existence of the black subject. The ultimate answer being that of wanting to be 
white, the black subject in assuming such positionality is the flight from 
responsibility; it is bad faith (Gordon 1995). In providing this answer in the 
affirmative form, it does not mean it is the end. The form of bad faith of wanting 
to be white was the inferiority complex of the black subject and that has made 
such a subject to be engaged in what Fanon ([1952] 2008) refers to as the state of 
‘constant comparison’. What does the black subject wants is the question that 
Mbembe (2012) does not pose. The challenge, therefore, comes to understand 
this question in light of what Mbembe assumes that black subjects have 
something in their possession, and there is agency. This is in the light of 
Mbembe’s thought that black subjects are the same with white subjects and 
colonisation was just an event. The black subject is said to have ontological 
essence and in the same light as with the white subjects. Therefore, the black 
subject in the Fanonian sense as Mbembe suggests should engage in the process 
of self-care, self-creation. In sum, black subjects have the opportunity, in the 21
st
 
Century, to heal itself. This is true, but then, when de-colonial turn is put at the 
centre Mbembe does not mention the necessity of the existential conditions that 
needs to change fundamentally.  
Mbembe’s engagement of Fanon is not that grounds Fanon in philosophical 
consciousness. That is why the existence of the black subject through the pursuit 
of liberation is not holding a radical break. For Mbembe, the black subject must 
engage in the creation of the self, self-care and this not being done through the 
proper accounting of subjection. Mbembe’s position on Fanon has some 
implication since it seems to leave subjection on the wayside essentially means 
that Fanon is not the philosopher of existence. But then, for the mere fact that 
Fanon was the philosopher of existence concerned with hellish existential 
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conditions that mechanistically and systematically constituted to tear the black 
flesh apart. This has led Fanon ([1952] 2008: 87) to say ‘I am laid bare’. The 
existence of the black subject has been that of being torn apart, and the task of 
Fanon as the philosopher of existence was not only about suturing but as Fanon 
([1952] 2008: 90) states ‘[w]ith enthusiasm I set cataloguing and probing my 
surroundings’.  
What does the black subject wants amidst the hellish existential conditions that 
eliminates and do not offer choices? It is clear that as the philosopher of 
liberation, Fanon probes for the understanding of this choiceless condition in 
order to make choices that are in the middle of subjection, hard to make. Fanon 
philosophy is existential phenomenology and it is concerned with the existential 
conditions of the black subject. In the choicessless condition, subjection has 
created the dispossession of choice. The choices that are of concern are choices 
of liberation. The choiceless condition means that the available ‘choices’ are 
those in favour of subjection. Black subjects are under the pressure of subjection 
that determines choices. Mbembe’s thought in relation to Fanon, suggests that 
choices have already been available, and Fanon did not as a black subject, exist 
in the choiceless situation. The choiceless situation that is the predicament of 
black subjects is always that of being rendered vulnerable. Their social lives are 
not the ones that are confronted by choices. In amplification to this, Fanon 
according to Sexton (2011:15) is concerned with ‘the social life of death’. This 
means that the hellish existential conditions of the black subjects are inescapable. 
To understand this choicelessness, Fanon’s philosophy of existence should be 
understood as ‘meta-political no less than it is metaphysical’ (Sexton 2011: 15).   
Drawing from Fanon, Gordon (2007) calls for the articulation of grammar of 
meaning; such that enables the articulation of the imaginary of the human 
subordination in the modern world. In the lived-reality, Gordon goes further to 
state that Fanon, in his thinking and articulation engaged the existential  
condition and the Manichean structure ‘speaking from that grammar of 
articulation’ (Gordon 2007: 10). This is precisely because, Fanon wrote of the 
disaster in all his works—a hellish zone. The black condition is that of being, or 
finding itself amongst other objects and the condition itself is a ‘sealed into that 
crushing objecthood’ (Fanon [1952] 2008: 82). Fanon rejects ontology in that it 
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does not help to understand the black condition in that: ‘the black man has no 
ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man’ (Fanon [1952] 2008: 82). 
Therefore, it is clear that to live for the black subject is simply also to die. The 
black subject even if it engages in the process of recreating the self as Mbembe 
(2012) suggests that will be useless as long as the existential conditions that are 
designed by subjection do not come to an end. It is, therefore, problematic to 
regard the black subject as having absolute choices for its existential conditions 
created and imposed in absence of choice. Mbembe is faulty in this instance 
precisely because being in the hellish existential conditions; subjection exists as 
the force that eliminates choices. According to JanMohamed (1983) the limited 
choice of black subjects is what has been imposed by subjection and lack of 
political power that makes the subjects more vulnerable. What is left in the 
existential condition is confusion and pathology that make it difficult for 
philosophical consciousness to emerge. Being human is the liberation of the 
black subject, and that is the emphasis of Fanon as the philosopher of existence. 
But then, as it was in Fanon’s context, and to the contemporary where his 
thought is a spectre, the problem of choice as the political is a serious 
philosophical challenge. 
The fact of (anti-)blackness 
In the engagement of Fanon Mbembe (2012) makes no mention to anti-
blackness, but just a colonial wound in need of healing. Not seeing anti-
blackness as structural systematisation of continuity of subjection is to ignore the 
positionality of the black subject in the anti-black world. De-colonial turn shows 
that the colonial wound does exist, and so is anti-blackness, and these make up 
subjection. According to Fanon ([1952] 2008), the black and white encounter 
suggests the black is in constant comparison to the white, and the thing is to 
massage the ego ideal. In confronting the inferior complex the black subject has 
been in the existential crisis in the world that is anti-black. As Gordon (1997) 
notes, anti-black racism espouses a world that is ultimately better off without 
blacks. Black subjects from such a world ‘“must” provide justification for their 
continued presence’ (Gordon 1997: 6). Mills (1998: 126) is correct to state that 
the fact of anti-blackness should be understood from ‘the idea of race as a global 
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system’. What informs this position is that ‘the planet as a whole is divided by a 
racial metaphysic that partitions persons from sub-persons, who are linked by a 
reciprocatory ontological engine’ (Mills 1998: 127).  
As Fanon ([1952] 2008: 165) points out, ‘[s]ince in all periods the Negro has 
been an inferior, he (sic) attempts to react with a superior complex’. Such a 
reaction is an oxymoron since that inferior complex is directed to those who are 
the weakest, and who happen to be in the same existential plane of subjection. 
So, the reaction of superior complex is the subjection of those who are at the 
receiving end of subjection, but those who are the victims of subjection itself. 
This means then that the subjection in this sense is by black anti-blacks towards 
black subjects, the black subjects oppressing their own. According to Mahendran 
(2007), black subjectivity is not concerned with race as a concept, but race as 
lived reality that creates the anti-black world where the existential conditions of 
black subjects cannot be reduced to concepts. The dehumanisation project of 
subjection has condemned the notion of race as lived experience by criminalising 
the black subject for articulating and asserting their own ontological density. For 
Mahendran, the existential condition of black subjects is not only the bodily 
experience but a concept/reality and cognition/psychology.   
This brings alienation, as Fanon ([1952] 2008) argues, something that means the 
condition is ‘pathological state’—and that is, illness. On the contrary, the body 
that sees itself as the subject, ‘it does not experience the body as something 
outside itself’ (Manganyi 1973: 30). Gordon (2007) engages with the condition 
of appearance, the black skin and it is through this condition of experience where 
the non-existence of black is unraveled. ‘There is a zone of nonbeing, an 
extraordinary sterile and arid region, an utterly naked declivity where an 
authentic upheaval can be born’ (Fanon [1952] 2008: 2). Since the Manichean 
structure is oppressive and uses race as the organising principle, Gordon (2007:5) 
argues that such a structure is the one embedded in anti-black racism and the 
problematic presence of the black’s subject. Gordon brings to the fore that the 
conditions of appearance, that the form of emergence; and that is, the black skin 
that reflects the ontology of non-being, and he points out to Fanon’s existential 
political thought in that the black subject appears as something. 
295 
 
Since the world is anti-black, the black subject cannot have the ‘ethical position 
in the world’ (Fanon [1952] 2008: 166). The structure of the world should be 
understood in terms of conceptual order. The anti-black world is characterised by 
‘the intensification of anti-blackness’ (Martinot and Sexton 2003: 176). The anti-
black world masks its sadistic elements through liberty, equality and justice, that 
the anti-black world, from the structural positionality of blackness, means their 
very antithesis. The anti-black world is the world of subjection that poses as 
reason and de-colonial turn exposes the anti-black world for what it is—the 
world of unreason (Gordon 2010). The manner in which blackness is 
conceptualised, or being-black-in-the-world is the figure that is the aberration of 
being. Being the other, simply explains that the world that the black subject 
inhabits is the anti-black world. Drawing from Fanon, Wilderson (2003a: 18) 
argues that ‘[b]lackness is a positionality of “absolute dereliction”’. So, the 
positionality of the world, that is anti-black, makes the black subject to be 
positioned in existential crisis—the state of permanent subjection. Fanon’s 
understanding of the world as anti-black is to get into the heart of ontology. 
I’Anson (2003), affirming Fanon’s view, argues that a feeling of inferiority is 
made to be a feeling of non-existence. The anti-black world is, according to 
Sexton (2011: 27), ‘a world structured by a negative categorical imperative’. 
This is the core of the category of the inferiority and superiority to keep 
subjection well intact.  
The anti-black world is also a structure of imposition of pathologised existence, 
and that it renders the black life to be non-existent. This then, explains the 
existential predicament of the black subject in the anti-black world. This world is 
tyrannical in form and character, and as such, it justifies itself by rendering the 
structural positionality of the black body is that which should be invaded. The 
black body then reduced to a tabula rasa, a razzmatazz in need of the disciplinary 
invasion. As such, the lawlessness that is in need of discipline makes the black 
body to be magnetic to bullets, the justification of subjection through its 
gratitious violence (Wilderson 2003a). The anti-black world is informed by the 
obsessive gaze and its fantasy, which transform themselves into sadistic elements 
of subjection. This then explains the extent through that the ontology of 
blackness is nonexistent, and being black being just a thing.      
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Fanon ([1952] 2008) argues that to be a black subject is to be a phobogenic 
object. To be such an object is to trigger all sorts of phobias that systematically 
attack the black body to make subjection justifiable. This makes the 
pathologisation of black subjects to be justifiable. Such pathologising originates 
from what Fanon refers to as neurotic reactions. They create hate and derogation 
of black subjects, thus justifying the unjustifiable. The unjustifiable is subjection 
and its victims are converted into stereotypical and mythical vices. Marriot 
(2000: 67) points out that these vices assume the “idea of exhibition” through 
‘the production and mediation of racist hatred’.    
 According to Gibson (2003), Fanon considers the possibility of another structure 
of feelings in that inferiority and inadequacy must be purged. The purge will not 
yield the desired results if there is no diagnosis of the social situation that will 
then unpack how subjection outplays itself to ensure that the structural 
positionality of the black subjects is that of hellish existential conditions. The 
existential conditions of the black subjects are hellish in that subjection creates 
the anti-black world that ‘expresses […] racism in an extreme [a]nti-black 
phobic’ (Gibson 2003: 51). In addition to this, the anti-black world possesses ‘the 
lens of racist re-presentation’ (Gordon 1996: 77). Subjection finds its expression 
from the base of racist assumptions that are supported by infrastructure of power 
as the base. As such, this means that Fanon having occupied the colonial anti-
black world, it was and still therefore necessary to bring such a world to an end 
through de-colonial turn so that the black subject can emerge.  
Mbembe (2011) has a different take by suggesting that Fanon was concerned 
with bringing the end to colonialism through absolute praxis and the goal being 
of course to produce life and free the world from the burden of race. Contrary to 
Mbembe, the world is not burdened by race, it is sustained by it, hence its anti-
black positionality. Race is not a burden to the world, but the organising tool 
(Gordon 2000). The struggle by the black subject is the one that should be 
formed along its own lines of defense and antagonism, and as such, the idea of 
the absolute praxis will not be sustainable if the demands of the black subjects 
are calling for the end of the world. The end of the world being the end of anti-
black world, and it is organised around anti-blackness as its source of life cannot 
survive without it.   
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Being in the anti-black world, the black subject is faced with being ontologically 
void. Being ontologically void, the black subject has no ontological density to 
determine, define and appropriate. The ontological status of blackness is void 
because the black subject is bared to define, frame and create the world as they 
see it and the world that the black subject inhabits is the inhospitable world—the 
anti-black world. The black subject cannot have a future since the anti-black 
world is made in the exclusion and elimination of blackness. This has led Gordon 
(1996: 79) to argue that ‘[b]lackness in an anti-black world is always 
superfluous’. This is what is attributed to the white subject who has ontological 
density and ability to do what the black subject cannot do, since the world is not 
anti-white, but anti-blacks. The world therefore, assumes not only the 
positionality of exclusion of the black, but subjection. Fanon’s ontological 
concern is the critical revision of the world.  
Blackness, however, cannot be defined as primarily empirical nor understood as the 
non/property of particular subject, but should be understood as an integral structuring 
assemblage of the politics that, rather than the succumbing to the brutal facticity of 
blackness, introduces invention into  existence, as Fanon argues (Weheliye 2008: 
324).   
Blackness is the problem of appearing in the world that renders it invisible at the 
ontological level. By way of militating against blackness, the world with its anti-
black position excludes blackness from the real of humanity. In this 
configuration, ‘blackness signifies something like the antithesis of being’ 
(Maldonado-Torres 2008a: 104). This makes the black subject to have a problem 
in terms of ontology. As Fanon ([1952] 2008) remarks, the ontology of the black 
subject exists by the way side. The nothingness of blackness officialises the 
hellish existential conditions as mechanistically orchestrated by the Manichean 
structure. Ontology without the lived existence in Fanon’s thought is problematic 
as blacks are ontologically void. The anti-black world is the rigified world that 
constitutes a panoptic surveillance that policies black bodies (Nielsen 2011). This 
is the world that is structured by asymmetric power relations that ensure that 
power militates against black subjects. As Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 106) 
asserts, ‘[t]he coloni[s]ed loses all the ontological weight in the eyes of the 
coloni[s]er’. The absence of ontology warrants subjection to operate in free 
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reign. Subjection maintains bondage; it also ensures that the black subject is a 
dehumanised entity. In no way can there be the emergence of the black subject 
while anti-blackness pervades the whole scene of the political. To Mbembe 
(2012), the idea of the anti-black world does not exist, and the sadistic 
proportions of subjection are relegated to the colonial period. For the mere fact 
that the anti-black world is still a lived reality, this means that subjection is 
ritualised to render the sadistic acts legitimate, hence the reign of impunity. As 
Wilderson (2003c) argues, the modalities of violence and empathy are that of 
subjection.  
Blackness is born and lives on the night, and this night is the long one and with a 
dogmatic sleep. The waking of the black subject from this night by means of de-
colonial turn is unwanted, since this will mean the end of subjection. The black 
body is criminalised and this means that it must be policed and militated against. 
The existential condition of the black subject is pervaded by violence and 
appropriation where death is permissible through the logic and justification of 
racism. Mbembe (2012) does not dwell on this uncomfortable positionality that 
in effect will ignite the revolt inherent in the being that is yet to explode. Though 
Mbembe highlights subjection but in nowhere in his thought where he engages 
the notion of anti-black racism. To Mbembe, subjection is and was a mere 
colonial practice. What is essential for Mbembe is the creation of another self, 
the black who is free from the burden of race, as if blacks impose the idea of race 
upon themselves, whereas they are racialised. The process of racialisation is the 
one that justifies subjection. Being racially conscious means that black subjects 
are taking stock of what contributes to their subjection.  
Mbembe (2012) calls for the creation of the self or self-creation, the self of the 
black subject that does not take subjection into account and blind to the world 
that practices anti-blackness is impossible. The subjectivity that can only prevail 
is that Fanon is in opposition to anti-blackness, this will even expose the scandal 
of having black subjects blaming themselves for the subjection that they did not 
cause. The creation of the self-discourse in relation to Fanon, if it does not 
include the ways in that to counter subjection and bring it to the complete end, it 
is a mere futuristic project devoid of any form and content in terms of how to 
counter subjection. The futuristic discourses negate or completely deny the past, 
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as if the past is not having any bearing in the present and also the future. 
Mbembe’s evoking of Fanon’s statement of not being the slave of the past is not 
expanded upon and not also linked to subjection. Such omissions leave the 
structures of anti-black world that must come to an end largely intact.  
To engage on Fanon in relation to anti-blackness points out the markers inherent 
structures of subjection concealing oppression, injustice, genocide, incarceration 
and so on. To be the black subject in the anti-black world is to be criminal and 
punishment even by the way of death is justified. Death is justified as blacks are 
dead while being alive. If these structures of the world are anti-black, to be black 
is to be structurally positioned in criminality. It is clear that Mbembe does not 
engage anti-blackness as his conception of blackness is the cause for celebration 
and the phenomena that is confronted with myriad possibilities to be outside the 
idea of race. Mbembe’s understanding of blackness is framed along the lines of 
politics of possibility, complexity, multiplicity and hybridity—their end of 
course being the pursuit of transcendence. The notion of transcendence exists 
while subjection is still largely intact, and how can there be transcendence is 
there is subjection. The making and design of the anti-black world points to the 
fact that racism that is hidden in structures that produce anti-blackness in 
multiple forms that are institutionalised, naturalised and normalised. The special 
design of the world is akin to the idea of race. This is amplified by JanMohamed 
who writes: 
I am emphasi[s]ing race as a pivotal to the relations in colonial society in order to 
provide a phenomenologically accurate description of the colonial experience and to 
avoid two types of distortions. One view misrepresents reality by pretending that 
racial differences are unimportant in colonial society and this need to embarrass or 
concern us; while the other view distorts the world by perceiving everything in terms 
of class conflict and this becomes callous to the complexity of lived human 
experience (JanMohamed 1983: 7-8).  
Geographical trends are tied to the racial trends. Space is racialised to facilitate 
the classification of populations. As such, race is the organising principle 
(Gordon 2000). The configuration of the world, in its anti-black positionality is 
to centre the idea of race. Anti-blackness then makes blackness to be relegated to 
the stage that is even worse than that of animality. The world is then informed by 
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sadistic elements that create the suspension of civility and life in the world with 
regards to black subjects. This is the world that is informed by suspension of 
ethics and non-ethics of war also do feature. The ethics that apply to white 
subjects who are considered humans change by means of being suspended when 
they are applied to the black subjects. The ethics in the logic of subjection that 
expresses itself through anti-blackness positionality creates a condition of black 
subject not only being criminalised, but their existence as crime itself. So, the 
anti-black world with its sadistic desires is there to do justice with putting the 
black subject under the continuous and systematic subjection.  
Overdetermination saturates consciousness in the flesh with the quality of being a 
thing, a form of being-in-itself. With such weight, the black body is confronted by 
the lived-experience of its absence. A binary world is imposed upon it that functions 
as a constant source of evasion (Gordon 1996: 78). 
This creates the invisibility of blacks in the ontological sense, and ‘[t]he body is 
surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty’ (Fanon [1952] 2008: 83). 
Being overdetermined means that to exist as the black subject is to be a problem. 
So, the black subject is made by the anti-black world to be a problem of 
existence. This is a form of self-justification of the anti-black world to absolve 
itself from responsibility, and also of being criminality implicated. So, this means 
that subjection with its devastation to the black existential condition cannot be a 
crime, since blacks are a crime by virtue of their existence. For Fanon, the anti-
black world needs to be understood in relation to being black in the anti-black 
world. Fanon, through de-colonial turn aims to find out how is it to be dead while 
being alive, and how life seems to differ to different people on the basis of their 
race. It is essential then to point out that the anti-black world is the created on 
non-existence of the black subject.  
The anti-black world guarantees nothing to the black subject who is unwanted in 
the configuration of this world. Anti-blackness clearly shows that the world is 
different when it comes to blacks and the violence that is meted to the black 
subject becomes self-justified. There is no anti-black world for Mbembe, but the 
universal that ‘all humans’ must gravitate towards. Blacknesss has to recognise 
itself and this should not be done as if it is asking or gravitating towards the 
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world as if the world must affirm its existence. Blackness has to do it, that is, to 
affirm existence in its own terms and to chart the configuration of the world, the 
change of the world as it is. To live in the anti-black world as the black subject is 
the structure of impossibility (Wilderson 2010). As Weheliye (2008: 322) notes, 
‘conditions of possibility lose their ontological thrust because, their limitations 
are rendered abundantly clear’.     
For the mere fact that blackness is overdetermined without, this means that to see 
the black is to see the black (Gordon 2000). That is, to see the black subject is 
not to see the human, but the representational figure of something, something in 
the limits of humanity and of course, there will be no means to take the 
existential conditions of a thing seriously. According to Wilderson (2010), 
blackness is an accumulated and fungible object that is outside any form of 
subjection that can be meted against human. This is to say that the suffering of 
blackness cannot be comprehended in that subjection is directed towards non-
humans and who of course, are experiencing violence in sadistic proportions and 
their hellish existence is turned normal. In addition to this, Hartman (1997) posits 
that ‘suffering must be materiali[s]ed and evidenced’. This is because blackness 
is entangled in subjection that meters out, as Wilderson (2010) says, the 
gratuitous violence. This affirms Fanon’s positionality of the absence of ontology 
of the black subject. It is in this absence that violence takes the routini[s]ed form 
‘the fashioning of identity, and the process of individuation and normali[s]ation’ 
(Hartman 1997: 4). As Wilderson (2010) states, blacks are openly vulnerable to 
the whims of the anti-black world with its sadistic and gratuitous violence.  
Fanon (1967: 36) has this to say, ‘[r]ather unexpectedly, the racist group points 
accusingly to a manifestation of racism among the oppressed’. For Tibbs and 
Woods (2008), the anti-black world is formulated in the form of a dual terror of 
violence and denialism that are constitutive elements of subjection. Race 
denialism creates a condition where ‘race is read off the base’ (Wilderson 2003b: 
225). The construction of anti-blackness is to render black subjects blameworthy, 
while absolving anti-blackness of responsibility. Anti-blackness is said not to 
exist since there is no subjection. Subjection in this case being understood in the 
explicit form and the failure to locate it in structures that perpetuate a condition 
where blacks are still a problem and have themselves to blame by engaging in 
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continued victimhood. This creates race denialism that keeps the invisibility of 
subjection, rendering subjection being a myth since there is liberty, equality and 
justice as the ideals that the world is striving towards.  
According to Wilderson, race denialism is the act of crowding out the ensemble 
of questions relevant for the ontological base of black subjects. Its main purpose 
is to silence the calls that point to sadism and despotic terror of accumulation and 
fungibility (Wilderson 2003a). Race denialism that finds its origin and rise in the 
intestines of the anti-black world create a claim as Appiah (1992) has said that 
there are no races, and that also implying that there is no racism. According to 
Martinot and Sexton (2003: 178), ‘[t]he liberal ethos looks at racism as social 
ignorance, something characteristic of the individual that can be solved at a 
social level through education and democratic procedure’. Race denialism sees 
race and racism in terms of the individual acts and not it being a structural issue 
that sustains subjection. This being the logic of the anti-black world, race 
denialism is the pedagogy of racial violence with a human face, the one that is 
structurally constituted at best. For the mere fact that the anti-black world is a 
concern for the existential condition so of the black subject it means that this 
world should not be reformed. The anti-black world ‘is saturated by anti-[b]lack 
solidarity’ (Wilderson 2010: 58). Mbembe does not hold such a view in terms of 
the existential conditions of the black subject, since the existential crisis, though 
colonial in making cannot be attributed to colonialism or any form of subjection.  
The long night of structural violence  
Mbembe (2001a) traces the conception of the long night of subjection, its causes 
and actuality in the colonial era. The concept of the long night of subjection in 
the postcolony suggests its end, and Mbembe in this regard affirms the position 
that the concept of the long night as ‘that night devoid of consciousness’ and that 
‘has penetrated almost everywhere and virtually nothings escapes it, since to a 
large extent, it has become the normal state of things’ (Mbembe 2001a: 173).  
Mbembe sees this night being characterised by what he refers to as the violence 
of death, but then, this is not the reference to structural violence as a form of 
subjection, but absolute violence.  It is Fanon ([1961] 1990) who foresaw that the 
long night is still yet to be in continuity in the postcolony. Mbembe (2001a) is 
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correct to point the origin of the long night of subjection to colonialism and by 
extension in the existential condititions that are said not to be subjection, and 
hence ignoring structural violence. Mbembe does however point the continuities 
of the long night of subjection in the postcolony, but that are not structural 
violence. The long night of subjection with regards to the structural positionality 
of the black subject is subjection by means of structural violence. If subjection is 
the long night, it follows then that there is a dogmatic sleep where the awakening 
of the black subject is denied.  
Subjection of the black subjects should not be understood as something that 
merely occurs at the levels of the psyche as Mbembe does. The long night is the 
existential predicament to the black subject and it means that there has never 
been any light of the day or any other form of light during the night. Mbembe 
correctly poses existential questions thus: 
How is it possible to live while going to death, while being somehow already dead? 
And how can one live in death, be already dead, while being-there—while having 
not necessarily left the world or being part of the spectre—and when the shadow that 
overhangs existence has not disappeared, but on the contrary weighs ever more 
heavily? (Mbembe 2001a: 201). 
This night constitutes the shadow of death, and this is tatamount to what Farmer 
(2002) call a ‘deadly monotony’. This means, the existential condition of black 
subjects is the state of predictability. As such, death is expected, since existence 
is survival and not life. Structural violence is also Patterson (1982) notion of 
‘social death’, where the subject is dead while being alive. For Patterson, the 
desocialisation and depersonalisation of black subjects render them dead. This 
death is in the form of the death of the subject and the death of subjectivity, all 
that are reinforced by subjection that determines the forms of life. Wilderson 
(2003b), drawing from Patterson, defines social death as a metaphor that comes 
into being through violence that kills the thing that is the black subject such that 
the concept might live. For Wilderson, social death is a scandal that is hard to 
articulate in the absence of structures that should support the positionality of the 
black subject. The positionality of the black subject is the spectre that still haunts 
due to its disarticulated historical groundings. Mbembe regards this form of death 
as violent death where everything ends up badly. The capacity of subjection to 
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determine the form of life stems from the fact that life can be liquidated without 
any form of consequence if it relates to black subjects.   
Colonialism renders invisible the lines of power and control both within the colony 
and especially—through the spatial and administrative technologies of distancing 
between absent coloni[s]ing power and people and their coloni[s]ed counterparts. 
This sadistic invisibility makes possible the partial hiding from the view of the 
source of characteristic control, domination, degration, and oppression that is the 
mark of the colonial condition (Goldberg 1996: 187). 
From the standpoint of de-colonial turn, the long night is still the part and parcel 
of subjection, and it takes the form of structural violence. According to Farmer 
(2002), structural violence is a force that is mechanistically inherent in social 
forces raging from poverty to racism and death. Structural violence is the 
violence that is not visible and it is hidden in structures. For Farmer, structural 
violence negates the capacity to see, name, describe and explain. It creates the 
absence of grammar of suffering and the state of noncommunicability (Wilderson 
2010).  What makes the night of subjection to be long is structural violence that 
hides the sources and coordinates of subjection. The notion of the long night of 
subjection means that there has never been any form of historical break from 
subjection, but its continuity. The long night of subjection creates a dogmatic 
sleep and this incapacitates the ability to see the horisons that are essential to 
break from structural violence. In order to understand this, it is essential to 
provide this existential predicament posed by Martinot and Sexton (2003: 170): 
‘[w]hy do things get worse after each hard fought revelation? Where do we 
locate the genius of the system? Something is left out of the account; it runs 
through our fingers, escaping our grasp’.  
De-colonial turn makes subjection to be understood at the level of existential 
conditions and from the vantage point of black subjects who life it day-by-day. 
This will provide diagnosis of structural violence and how it is directed to those 
who are at the receiving end of subjection. The colonial experience, that is the 
long night of subjection, carries with it both the trauma and confusion and it is 
essential ‘to begin with a description of the generic colonial situation’ 
(JanMohamed 1983: 2). For Fanon ([1961]1990), the colonial situation is over 
determined by violence. The existential dimension of the black subject equates to 
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perpetual violence. This remains so as subjection continues to exist. It is not clear 
from Mbembe’s (2012) position whether he takes cognisance of how subjection 
still continues to haunt the existential condition of the black subject, that is by all 
means, is defined by structural violence.   
Mbembe (2012) identifies three dimensions of colonial violence. The first 
dimension of violence was institutional that was the entrenchment of subjugation 
by force, dependent on force and maintained by force. This is the form of 
violence that was visible and it was permissible and morally justified by those 
executing it. The second dimension of colonial violence is empirical and as 
Mbembe (2012: 22) notes ‘[i]t inmeshed the daily life of the native in nodes, 
network and detail’. This is the form of violence that was existential since it 
determined, in arbitrary fashion, the subjected life of the black subject. The third 
and the last dimension of colonial violence is a phenomena that touches on ‘both 
the senses, the psychic and affective domains’ (Mbembe 2012: 22). This is the 
form of violence that led to what Fanon ([1961] 1990) refers to as war 
psychiatric phenomena that creates and pepertuates disorders affecting behaviour 
and thought. The main aim of this violence was to render the subjectivity of the 
black subject sterile, and also to pacify the black subject to liquidate all sites of 
imagination and the possibility to resists or to become conscious. As Fanon 
testifies: 
Because it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to 
deny the other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces people it 
dominates to ask themselves the question constantly: ‘In reality, who am I?’ (Fanon 
[1961] 1990: 200). 
According to Mbembe (2012) the choice of the colonised subject, who happens 
to choose violence rather than being subjected to it, this enables the restoration of 
the self. The subject is said to know the self and in answering the ‘who am I’ 
question through what Mbembe’s notion of ‘self-creation’ discussed earlier. For 
Mbembe, violence of the black subject is always a response, and it is not 
violence for its own sake but self-creation. The negation of being, in part, of 
those who are at the receiving end of subjection breeds aggressiveness. What is 
of concern though is the direction through which such aggressiveness takes, and 
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by and large, through structural violence, the aggressiveness of the back subjects 
is directed to other black subjects. It means then, the black subject engages in 
self-inhalation as, while seeing it as if it is the means to exorcise violence. So 
those who at the receiving end of subjection engage in the process of self-
inhalation. They are aggressive towards each other and they cannot point the 
source of their own oppression. Structural violence is the source of the existential 
conditions of the black subject pits black subjects against each other. In the 
process the black subject who exists in the long night of colonial oppression, 
prevent other from pursuing and obtaining liberation.   
De-colonial turn reveals that structural violence is war and war is structural 
violence. Structural violence makes the logic of disorder and death not only at 
the level of the symbolic, but that of the real (Wilderson 2010). According to 
Maldonado-Torres (2008a: 75), ‘[t]he opposition between ethics and politics is 
mirrored in the opposition between peace and war, and between ordinary social 
life of an elitist exceptionalism’. The elimination of the opposite between the 
ethics and politics can come into being if structural violence does not exist. In 
such a condition, then there will be justice (Maldonado-Torres 2008a). Structural 
violence being not symbolic but real suggests that structural violence is absolute 
violence against the structural positionality of blackness. Being at the level of the 
real, Wilderson (2010: 75) argues that ‘the grammar of suffering of the [b]lack 
itself is on the level of the real’. Structural violence produces the pathologised 
form of life that is not far from death, the death that cannot be accounted for. In 
support of Wilderson, Maldonado-Torres (2008a) argues that what takes place at 
the level of the ordinary pathologies at the level of the real is the absolute 
expression of violence and misrecognition of the black subject. The black subject 
who is damned at the level of signification is ontologically depleted. The 
ontological weight of the black subject disappears and as a result, the ontological 
void takes a centre stage.  
What does it mean to suffer? This is the existential question posed by Wilderson 
(2010) and this question is the one that concerned Fanon and his ongoing critique 
of subjection was to search for answers for this question. This is the question that 
Mbembe does not pose and even not answering when it comes to the black 
subject in the anti-black world. Farmer (2002: 424) asks this existential question 
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thus: ‘[c]an we identify those most at risk of great suffering?’ This is the 
existential question concerning black subjects, who to Fanon, they are of concern 
since these are the subjects structural violence is made to be in the shadow of 
death. In amplifying Fanon and to explicate the answer Weheliye has this to say: 
Suffering has long functioned alternatingly as the hallmark of human satience and of 
human brutality. Suffering becomes the defining feature of those subjects excluded  
from the law, national community, the human etc. due to the political violence 
inflicted upon them, while paradoxically also granting them access to the sphere of 
inclusion and equality in various manifestations of human rights discourse (Weheliye 
2008: 324-325)  
The suffering of the black subject cannot be accounted for since structural 
violence hides itself through emancipatory discourses of human rights, justice 
and equality—the very tenants of subjection as they are just cosmetic in the 
relation to the black subject under the existential crisis of subjection. What is 
often the case is that the suffering of the black subject is solely blamed on the 
African subject. To suffer, for Mbembe (2001a) is something that needs agency 
in that they should face up to themselves. Farmer (2002) argues that the 
existential condition of black subjects under structural violence amount to the life 
of familiarity with death. Suffering under structural violence is ‘certainty [that is] 
a recurrent and expected condition’ (Farmer 2002: 245). The suffering brought 
by structural violence is not accounted for since it affects those who are outside 
the realm of the human. As such, there are no affective dimensions that call for 
making sense of the suffering of the black subject since it does not matter. But 
then, for Fanon, the black subject mattered and still matter hence he dedicated his 
revolutionary commitment to understand the existential conditions of the black 
subjects.  
For Fanon, the intervention is informed by the fact that structural violence that 
attacks black subjects is not explained, and its explanation will expose the 
historical and contemporary scandal, that is subjection. The existential conditions 
of the black subjects are explained in patchy manner by those who subject black 
subjects to subjection and closing spaces for black subjects in order not to make 
legitimate claims. As Fanon intervention explicates, structural violence, to be 
properly understood, there should be a constant interrogation and mechanisms 
308 
 
that are inherent in the suffering of black subjects. The hellish existential 
conditions of black subject cannot be understood outside structural violence. If 
that is indeed the practice, the intention is therefore, making black subjects to 
suffer in perpetual continuity.  
Departing from Mbembe (2010) who regards the night as the matter of 
articulating the language, Fanon ([1952] 2008) from the standpoint of de-colonial 
turn position goes further to articulate the night in the realm of existential 
conditions of the black subjects. These are existential conditions that are 
governed by what Maldonado-Torres (2008a) refers to as non-ethics of war or 
the paradigm of war and violence. According to Maldonado-Torres, the non-
ethics of war or the paradigm of war and violence have pervasive influence and 
violence is concrete in ordinary social life of the black subject. This is informed 
by the logic of suspension of ethics, since the life of the black subject does not 
matter. This should not only be looked in the colonial context, but also in the 
contemporary when taking the thought of Fanon into account qua structural 
violence. Structural violence is informed by subjection, and in this form, it 
assumes the role of being hidden for the fact that it becomes difficult to identify. 
Structural violence assumes the role of the banal that becomes institutionalised, 
naturalised and normalised. The banality of structural violence makes it to 
function through what JanMohamed (1983) refers to as structural amnesia, where 
in that people forget the structures that are putting them under perpetual 
subjection. Structural amnesia makes people not to be aware of what puts them 
under subjection.    
The understanding of structural violence can be understood in relation to Fanon’s 
conception of the Manichean structure that Mbembe does not focus on, and 
condemns it for its binarism rather advocates for hybridity, the latter that cannot 
account for structural violence. According to Fanon ([1961] 1990: 31), ‘[t]he 
colonial world is a Manichaean world’. Fanon in understanding the colonial 
situation has structural violence in mind when he writes: ‘[t]he colonial world is 
a world cut in two’ (Fanon [1961] 1990: 29). This Manichean division is simply 
there to demarcate and catographically map the space of life and death.  It is in 
the Manichean world that the black subject is displaced and also excluded. The 
foremost contenders of the Manichean world are Bhabha (1994) and Nuttall 
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(2009) who argue for hybridity and entanglement respectively. According to 
Bhabha (1994:43), hybridity ‘informs the political space of its enunciation’. This, 
as Bhabha states, is not self-contradictory since there is a contribution to the ‘in-
between’. JanMohamed (1985) argues that Bhabha ignores conditions within that 
the coloniser and the colonised operate in the nexus of the Manicheanism. 
JanMohamed takes Bhabha to task arguing that he reduces the colonial discourse 
to something that occurred in a vacuum. Fanon ([1962]1990: 30) argues that in 
the Manichean order of things the ‘belly of the coloni[s]er is always full’.  Also 
in opposition to binarism that is said to be inherent in Manicheanism and not 
being able to account for relations in domination is Nuttall (2009) in articulating 
the notion of entanglement in that social relations are complicated in the sense 
that humanity is in its foldedness.  
In relation to race, that is the organising principle that informs the Manichean 
zoning, Nuttall deploys the notion of ‘racial entanglement’ and also links it to 
ways of being, modes of identity-making and material life. Similar to Bhabha, 
Nuttall states that entanglement unravels binaries like coloniser and colonised, 
black and white, declaring these binaries simplistic. Nuttall (2009:30) goes on to 
argue that theorists, who engage these binaries, in the socio-political reality, 
mainly focus on ‘conflict, violence, social hierarchy and inequality’. She 
proposes that the more racial boundaries are erected; the more should be a 
continued search for transcendence. Both Bhabha and Nuttall regard race as a 
burden if it dominates the discourse—so, they call for its erasure under the guise 
of diluting it, while reality expresses its concreteness as far as the black condition 
is concerned. Both theorists call for living together through difference to produce 
or in search of sameness.  
Nuttall (2009) goes further to argue that the social is mutually entangled and it is 
in its constant search of definition in that sameness and difference are entangled. 
Even though entanglement is ‘becoming something you were not in the 
beginning’ (Nuttall 2009:58). It will be argued here that copulation with 
blackness does not necessarily mean all racial formations are equal and the same 
since such copulation occurs outside the subjection. The in-between, that Bhabha 
(1994) regards as the ‘liminal space’ and ‘symbolic interaction’, presents a 
situation where the existential conditions of subjects are still a contested terrain. 
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The in-between provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood—
singular or communal ‘that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of 
collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself’ 
(Bhabha 1994:2). The argument concurs with the view of JanMohamed (1985), 
that indeed Bhabha plays in the in-between that is the ambivalence and the 
confusion of the discourse not taking the hellish existential conditions of blacks 
into account.  
According to Bulhan (1985:142), ‘[t]he Manichean psychology is hard to 
counteract once it takes root in people, the environment, and the culture’. Those 
who live in it depend on its continuity and they benefit from it. This is found on 
wreckage and dehumanisation of others. Gibson (2001:107) posits that the 
‘[c]olonial society appears as the Manichean one, whose superstructure is its 
structure’. Manicheanism is pervasive as it is found in all forms and spheres of 
life. As such, this shows that structural violence will be rejected, since there is no 
subjection. JanMohamed (1985) deploys the notion of Manichean allegory that is 
not a fixed binary, but rather a diverse and yet, interchangeable opposition 
between black and white, good and evil, civilised and savage—black subjects, 
being not human and worthy to be at the receiving end of subjection. According 
to JanMohamed (1985:64), Manichean allegory ‘functions as the currency, the 
medium of exchange, for the entire colonialist discursive system’. Maldonado-
Torres (2008a:142) argues that ‘[t]he Manichean logic of the colonial system 
operates in favo[u]r of the truncation of the possibility of generous interhuman 
contact’.   
Fanon states: 
When we examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what 
parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a 
given race, a given species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also a 
superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, 
you are white because you are rich (Fanon [1961] 1990: 30-31).        
Bringing to bear the logic of structural violence in its formulation of the 
Manichean structure, Fanon provides the description of the town of the settler 
and that of the native. Fanon, to quote in extensio writes: 
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The town of the settler’s town is a strongly-built town, all made in stone and 
steel. It is a brightly-lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the 
garbage-cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown and hardly thought 
about […] The settler’s town is a well-fed town, an easy going town; its belly is 
always full of good things. The settler’s town is a town of white people, or 
foreigners.  
The town belonging to the coloni[s]ed people, or at least the native town, the Negro 
village, the medina, the reservation, is a place of ill fame, people by men of evil 
repute. They are born there, it matters little where and how; they die there, it matters 
not where, nor how. It is a world without spaciousness; men live on top of each 
other, and their hurts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a hungry 
town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a 
croaching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire (Fanon [1961] 
1990: 30). 
It still remains a concern that Mbembe does not mention the notion of the 
Manichean structure that is foundational and constitute in structural violence. 
Fanon’s expose of the Manichean structure is to render such a structure 
scandalous and to really affirm the necessity of de-colonial turn. According to 
Tibbs and Woods (2008), Fanon is concerned with the sadistic aggression of 
subjection that is structural. It is the creation of the Manichean world that allows 
subjection to operate, from absolute violence in colonial times and through 
structural violence in the postcolony. The Manichean scandal is what Fanon 
exposes, and something that is not explicated by Mbembe. To serve as testimony 
to Fanon’s claim, Tibbs and Woods (2008) posit that the Manichean structure 
does not create the hierarchy of humanity—but a divide between the human and 
non-human. This being the state continuity, Mbembe suggests a radical break, 
hence the absence of structural violence.    
Structural violence ‘depend[s] on ontological violence at the level of imaginary 
and the real and also, antagonism, prior and foundational to their emergence’ 
(Agathangelou 2009: 3 emphasis added). Structural violence structures the 
positionality of the black subject and negates any form of total realisation of 
what creates the hellish existential condition in that such subjects find 
themselves.  As I’Anson (2003) points out, for the relations in the colony, there 
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is an oppressor and the oppressed, and what govern them are the relations of 
subjects. Since these relations are asymmetrical by the virtue of being articulated 
in differences, and the ones of superiority and inferiority, and those who are 
inferior position being the possessor of evil, and hence deserving the hellish 
existential conditions, it is enough to point that the notion of Manichean structure 
is hard not to be mentioned by Mbembe in engaging Fanon.  
It is not enough for Mbembe to call for both the elimination of the oppressor and 
the oppressed, where in that the cause is ‘struggling for racial justice or for new 
psychiatric practices’ (Mbembe 2012: 20). Fanon detects and unmasks 
Manicheanism at the psychological and social level where human oppression and 
oppression resides. Structural violence creates and sustains the hellish existential 
conditions of the black subjects who often tormented and troubled psyches. 
Bulhan (1985) argues that the hellish existential condition of the black subjects 
should be rid of because it is constituted by inferiority complex, loss of identity 
and identity is something that should be retained. Also, it is not enough for 
Mbembe (2012) to claim that black subjects through emancipatory violence that 
is loaded with value, reason and truth should break away from bondage and take 
control of their destiny while they are trapped in the hellish existential conditions 
where agency is crushed from the moment of its creation. For Mbembe to also 
argue for Fanon in the language of work, violent praxis that is a response to 
subjection, is something that cannot be actualised without engaging structural 
violence and the hellish existential conditions it creates and sustains for the black 
subjects.   
The structural positionality of the black subject that puts it vulnerably in the 
whims of impunity is simply because of the idea of race that ‘has enormous 
social currency’ (Farmer 200: 433). It is not enough to call for such elimination 
of subjection relation without really diagnosing and therefore, prescribing what is 
subjection and how to engage in its destruction. Of course, what exists is 
antagonistic defense of subjection, the defense that is informed by structures that 
keep it intact. Mbembe correctly notes: 
The fact is that power in the postcolony, is carnivorous. It grips its subjects by the 
throat and squeezes them to the point of breaking their bones, making their eyes pop 
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out of their sockets, making them weep blood. It cuts them in pieces and, sometimes, 
eats them raw (Mbembe 2001a: 201).   
Mbembe being correct on the form of power in the postcolony, by the manner of 
its violent proportionality, he is not making reference to structural violence, but 
absolute violence. Sexton and Copeland (2003) introduce the notion of raw 
power qua structural violence in opposition to it being largely understood as 
absolute violence. Raw power is structural violence, and as such, raw power is 
inherent in subjection. Structural violence qua raw power ‘require[s] and 
depend[s] on a gratuitous violence on [black] bodies’ (Agathangelou 2009: 6). 
Raw power is the mechanism in that black bodies are explicated as sites of 
accumulation and fungibility as Wilderson (2003b; 2010). Structural violence 
with its capacity to mask makes this a normal way of existence of the black 
subject. No matter the masking, raw power is still exposed and the hellish 
existential conditions of the black subjects serve as testimony to this. Raw power 
cannot be mistaken to explicit forms of subjection, Mbembe’s (2001) conception 
of the carnivorous power that is absolute violence; but those violence hidden in 
structures. Raw power when directed to black subjects cannot be criminalised, 
since the black subjects are crimininalised. Raw power instead, is 
institutionalised, naturalised and normalised. So, structural violence as a typical 
raw power—a form of subjection—renders the positionality of the black subjects 
at the exteriority of humanity, something that Fanon’s work is indebted to. 
To understand the exteriority of the black subject qua humanity, it is essential to 
introduce the form of life that raw power produces—raw life. Raw life in relation 
to the hellish existential conditions of the black subject is what Fanon ([1952] 
2008: 82) refers to being ‘an object in the midst of other objects’. According to 
Wilderson (2003c), raw life is informed by the logic of having the death of the 
black subject as the precondition to sustain structural violence. This means then, 
raw life takes place when raw power, a form of despotism against black subjects 
becomes a regime that determines the life and death of the black subjects. 
Structural violence is raw power that consumes black subjects and this defines 
the raw life of these subjects. For Fanon ([1952] 2008), raw life can be related to 
the burden of corporeal meladiction that points out the positionality of the black 
subject being woven in stories, anecdotes and claims of blackness being outside 
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the realm of humanity. Fanon ([1952] 2008: 84-85) writes, ‘I was battered down 
by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-
ships’. Sexton (2011) asserts Fanon’s view that the notion of blackness is been 
associated with decay. The idiom of power in its raw form, assumes the real, and 
this is testified by the raw life black subjects live.  
Under raw life ‘the human body becomes a defenseless target for rape and 
veneration, and the body, in its material and abstract phase, a resource for 
metaphor’ (Spillers 1987: 66). Raw life simply put means that there is no value 
attached to the black subjects and as such absolute destruction is justifiable 
(Wilderson 2003c). In amplification of this, Tibbs and Woods (2008) posit that 
raw life symbolises the capacity of structural violence to render the life of black 
subject as that which can be made to disappear with relatively ease. For Tibbs 
and Woods, raw life registers terror and black subjects can be made to live and 
die at will. It is under raw life that structural violence expresses its violent 
aspects as the life that has been designated for black subject is lived in hellish 
existential conditions that permit lawlessness. For the fact that there is 
lawlessness, structural violence sees itself through the working of institutions and 
its conception of reality of the state of affairs, black subjects are turned into 
‘stigmati[s]ed, policed, and degraded Others’ (Tibbs and Woods 2008: 237). 
These existential conditions for the black subjects create what Martinot and 
Sexton (2003: 171) call ‘inarticulable evil of banality’ that is a ‘duty bound by 
impunity itself’. Those who put black subjects under subjection are banal 
functionaries informed by the ethical pronouncement that is a scandal at best, 
against lawless subjects. What masquerades as ethical pronouncement is actually 
gratuitous violence.  
The dichotomy between a white ethical dimension and its irrelevance to violence 
of police profiling is the very structure of racialisation today. It is a twin 
structure, a regime of violence that operates in two registers, terror and the 
seduction into the fraudulent ethics of social order, a double economy of terror, 
structured by a ritual of incessant performance. And into the gap between them, 
common sense, that cannot account for the double register or twin structure of 
the ritual, disappears into incomprehensibility (Martinot and Sexton 2003: 172).   
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De-colonial turn clearly shows that structural violence imposes raw life and then 
lawlessness is imposed and then as a result there is no law or laws that protect 
black subjects and that is by virtue of their lawlessness. So, what is lawless 
should be subjected to law, and as such, it cannot be the law in itself. As 
Wilderson (2010) notes, there are no institutions that are made to protect the 
black subject, and as such, structural violence reigns the existential conditions of 
the black subjects with impunity. The conceptions of justice, equality and liberty 
collapse when it comes to the black subject as its existence is raw life. These are 
the ideals created in absence of the black subject as living subjects; subjection 
comes from the existential site where these ideals are upheld. So, there is no 
justice, equality and liberty when structural violence by means of raw power 
creates raw life for the black subject. Justice, equality and liberty are ideals of 
raw power informed by the racial project and their liberal bent seems to evade 
the question of race and racism as the constitutive part of the political project. 
They are, as Tibbs and Woods (2008) argue the rules of race and power that feed 
into the mechanistical constitution of structural violence to be institutionalised, 
naturalised and normalised.  
The proposition of Tibbs and Woods (2008: 243) is that ‘[f]rom the analytical 
vantage point of raw life, the racial violence of legal doctrine is alive and well’. 
In amplification, Martinot and Sexton (2003) argue that structural violence 
creates the double economy in the Manichean sense, and of course, being in the 
exteriority, black subjects at the receiving end of not only the economy of 
injustice—but hyper-injustice. Martinot and Sexton (2003: 117) refer to hyper-
injustice as ‘the rule and the banal as excess’. They argue that hyper-injustice the 
state of the banal and the excess is the real of life for black subjects. Indeed, this 
is how raw life is lived under subjection that produces raw power in the realm of 
structural violence. This, of course, occurs through the suspension of law and 
ethics that permeate infuse pervade the structural positionality of the black 
subject. The reason behind raw life, as de-colonial turn shows is that Mbembe 
does not engage, its symbolic economy that produces racialised bodies (Tibbs 
and Woods 2008). The dehumanisation of the black subject is linked with direct 
relatives of raw life—slavery, colonisation and apartheid—the very things that 
Mbembe (2002) demonises when it comes to the subjectivity of the black 
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subject. It needs to be stated that subjection in its forms of mutations remains 
banal, a ‘standard operating procedure’ (Martinot and Sexton 2003: 174).  
Fanon as Mbembe (2012) articulates is the figure who is concerned with 
restoring the ontological density of the black subject—that is, the awakening 
from the long night. Mbembe is correct on this one, and it can be further argued 
that the long night of subjection is the one that Fanon provocatively diagnosed in 
order to ensure the infinite awakening of the black subject. What Fanon calls for 
is de-colonial turn and it is contrary to Mbembe, in that to understand structural 
violence and to ensure that the proper diagnosis will lead to deal with it and 
bringing it to a complete end. Fanon’s forceful intervention is informed by what 
Maldonado-Torres (2008a) refers to as ‘phenomenology of the cry’. This is the 
cry of revolt and it takes form and shape through Fanon’s psychopolitics 
opposing structural violence that makes the bodies of the black subject the sites 
of extraction of value and even life itseft creates the possibility of awakening 
from subjection. This form of awaking from the long night changes the 
conception and imaginary of the night; it brings it to an end. The coming of the 
night to an end means the end of subjection, its creation that is raw power that 
then also produces raw life, the life that institutionalises, naturalises, and 
normalises the existential conditions of the black subject. 
The mask of humanism 
Mbembe and Posel (2004) argue for the notion of critical humanism that makes a 
radical break to essentialised notions of difference and advocating for critical 
cosmopolitanism. Both state that critical humanism is informed by politics of 
hope. These are politics that embrace the idea of humanity for all, since their 
premise is that of sameness of humanity. The ideal of sameness is regarded as the 
possibility, and that being said, the idea of sameness still affirms that there is no 
subjection. That is why Mbembe and Posel invoke the notion of ‘all’ that is the 
one grounded on the notion that humans are equal, whereas the racial logic that is 
made pervasive by subjection still prevails. Mbembe and Posel (2004: 2) write: 
‘[a] new humanism is inseparable from a cosmopolitan spirit, premised on the 
politics of hospitality—that recognises the humanity of the alien’. The hope 
therein lies with the notion of sameness, as if there is no subjection that marks 
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differences of the existential conditions. The notion of humanism seems to have 
no black subjects in mind, the very ones Fanon was concerned with. And, the 
manner in which Mbembe and Posel (2004) seem not to take into account that 
Fanon is located in the area where humanity is denied, and does not make an 
appeal to be accommodationist project of humanism that excludes the black 
subject.  
The problem of this ‘new humanism’ inevitably opens the question of a non-
humanistic opening to humanism, where, almost by definition, the real interest 
lies: Fanon’s persistent location of blackness as a necessary contamination of 
traditional political thinking and ontology is proof enough of that. If we are right 
to suggest that racism interrupts the movement towards the human, and 
paradoxically makes ontology irrelevant for understanding black existence, then 
clearly ethics and politics (insofar as they are grounded on this humanism) 
cannot simply be invoked, even negatively, as a model for thinking black 
existence. But this puzzle is not insurmountable if philosophical thought can 
come up with an anthropological description of black experience that is both 
idiomatic and singular, even if the radical singularity of that description remains 
bound to colonialism as context (Marriot 2011: 36). 
De-colonial turn reveals that the project of humanism is not pronounced in clear 
terms on how can that which is not human can become human when subjection 
has not been dismantled from the base. Wilderson (2003b: 235) argues that 
blackness ‘throws the notion of humanity itself into crisis’. This is because there 
is no record valuing the black life, therefore, the project of humanism cannot 
hold when it comes to the life of the black subject. Gordon (2010: 198) provides 
three reasons on the problematic nature of humanism in relation to what he refers 
to the theory of the black: firstly, the black is a site of questionable humanity. 
Secondly, the black emerged as a site whose freedom is challenged. Thirdly and 
lastly, the black is a site without reason or worse—a threat to reason. This three 
problematic reasons by Gordon mean that project of humanism qua Fanon in 
relation to the existential conditions of the black subject is an oxymoron. Fanon 
when he looks at humanism, he sees the constant denial of humanity 
(Maldonado-Torres 2008a). Put in a mode of a question: how can there be critical 
humanism in the hellish existential conditions that deny black subjects humanity? 
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Put in another way: how then is it possible that which dispossesses humanity 
confere humanity in good faith or even act as the moral advocacy of humanity?  
The question of humanism in Fanon’s thought is essential, and it is fundamental 
to unmask the discourses that impose the notion of humanity by not 
problematising it in relation to it being a mere deception if the existential 
conditions of the black subject are not taken into account. The notion of 
hospitality that is said to be central to this critical humanism informed by the 
cosmopolitan spirit, no matter how projectionist it is towards the future, it cannot 
take the responsibility of engaging subjection that falsifies its intentions. For the 
fact that subjection exists, it negated humanism.  Fanon called for humanism, but 
this is not humanism or critical humanism as Mbembe and Posel (2004) call it, 
but humanism that meant the construction of the human from subjection. 
According to Nielsen (2011), ‘Fanon found himself in the midst of a community 
perceived with racial strife’. This was the very community that propagated the 
ideals of humanism, with subjection in practice. Nothing featured in humanism 
that takes the question of subjection seriously, since the discourse of humanist is 
utopian and visionary. The positionality of the black subject is ‘the oppressed 
within the already existing strictures of liberal humanism’ (Weheliye 2008). So, 
the utopia and vision will of course not be meant for those who are in the 
clutches of subjection. Nielson argues for the alternative meaning that Fanon’s 
project of the new humanism was that of carving for the new identity that is 
informed by the experiences encountered through subjection. 
From de-colonial turn, Fanon’s project exposes the inhuman conditions that 
were, and are still pervading the existential conditions of the black subject. This 
is alien to Mbembe and Posel’s (2004) critical humanism, the latter which 
emphasises that humanism is underpinned by the ideas and debates on 
democracy. It is not clear which form of democracy that emphasises questions of 
obligations. What is being argued by Mbembe and Posel is the form of 
obligations that move beyond the idea of rights, that they also acknowledge their 
importance. In this scheme of things, obligations should outweigh rights. 
Appealing as it is, this is not nearer to Fanon since his conception of humanism 
calls for the end of the world. This call is rejected by those who claim to have the 
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high moral ground on humanism, and there can be no humanism where 
subjection exists, that in effect denies others their humanity because of their 
difference. For Mbembe (2011c) though, Fanon’s commitment can be seen from 
the cause of the oppressed or fight for racial justice. This racial justice is linked 
to the idea of critical humanism, but then, it is not clear what kind of racial 
justice did Fanon pursue. Gilroy (2011) notes that Fanon’s humanism has proven 
to be a tricky subject in light of the fact that it is something rarely discussed. 
Gilroy (2011: 7) calls for reparative humanism that is ‘configured by overcoming 
of colonial statecraft and its racial orders’. Reparative humanism, for Gilroy, is 
suitable in solving the contemporary problems. But Mbembe also states 
something to maybe provide a clue: 
Indeed, to Fanon we owe the idea that in every human being there is something 
indomitable that no domination—no matter in what form—can eliminate, contain or 
suppress, or at least do it completely (Mbembe 2011c: 2).    
It seems to Mbembe that the positionality of the black subject is not that is 
standing face-to-face with the antagonism of subjection with its gratuitous 
violence. To simply suggest that something indomitable is potent in every 
humanity—is to downplay the existential conditions of the black subject, where 
in that subjection reigns at will due to its institutionalisation, naturalisation and 
normalisation. De-colonial turn shows that non-ontological positionality of 
blackness is not accounted for by the discourse of critical humanism as espoused 
by Mbembe and Posel (2004). The humanism that Fanon calls for is the 
humanism that is articulated by those who have been excluded as human—it is 
the humanity that emergences in the intestines of subjection, and that can be 
humanism only if that subjection has been depleted. The humanism of Fanon 
seeks to humanise what has been dehumanised. It seems then, to Mbembe 
(2011c) that Fanon did not engage the constitutiveness of subjection that was 
informed by the sole purpose of leading the black subject into depletion.  
Humanism is articulated and imposed by those who are not in the intestines of 
subjections, but those who are executing subjection and making humanism in bad 
faith as if applies to all humanity, while in reality it does not. Maldonado-Torres 
(2008a) notes that by virtue of justice being asymmetric, no humanism can apply 
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for all. The notion of the ‘all’ cannot be the same in the conditions that are 
asymmetric. The notion of ‘all’ therefore, can be replaced by ‘some’. That is to 
say humanism applies to some, those who are human and not to those who are 
considered not human. Fanon’s engagement with humanism on one hand is to 
expose the limits of the humanism that is indeed subjection, and on the other, 
calling for the humanism that will fill the ontological density of the black subject. 
The humanism that Fanon revolts against is the one that dehumanises and that 
denies the emergence of the African subject. Humanism if it is transplanted into 
the existential conditions of the black subject, will turn out to be hypocritical and 
unethical par excellence due to the spectre of subjection. Fanon’s intervention 
through his politics of antagonism exposes the hypocrisy of humanism. Such 
antagonism being clearly directed towards humanism means that humanism is 
subjection. De-colonial turn exposes humanism as the source of Western 
civilisation with ‘its persistence of a paradigm of war, or way of thinking that 
privileges conflict and violence and that finds its climax in racism and genocide’ 
(Maldonado-Torres 2008a: 83).  
Fanon exposed the hypocrisy of humanism with its conception of human rights. 
Blackness was and is still excluded in the enterprise of humanity, or becoming 
human. Dehumanisation, through the paradigm of violence makes the existential 
conditions of the black subjects to be the antithesis of humanity. Therefore, the 
gesture of critical humanism is not in good faith, but in bad faith. Fanon is not 
concerned with humanism with its emancipator gesture; but the consistent effort 
to unmask its dehumanising aspects. What takes precedence  in Fanon’s thought 
then is the love for the black subjects ‘aiming to help them overcome the effects 
of extended systematic colonial violence’ (Maldonado-Torres 2008a: 97). From 
the affirmation of de-colonial turn, the existential conditions of the black subjects 
do not have humanism that produces the damne—that is, the damned of the 
earth. The damne are products of the hellish existential conditions that are 
produced by subjection. In no way, does Mbembe interrogate subjection and its 
over lasting impact or its technological mutation hiding itself to become 
institutionalised, normalised and naturalised. Humanism in this scheme of things, 
and being an oxymoron, means in Fanon’s thought that it is bad faith if imposed 
via Fanon’s thought. In exposing the limits of humanism Wilderson (2010: 54) 
321 
 
argues that ‘[h]umanist discourse can only think a subject’s relations to violence 
as a contingency and not a matrix that positions the subject’. According to this 
perspective, humanism has no relational capacity towards the black subject. It is 
in this line that Wilderson (2010: 55) still contends that humanism cannot answer 
the ‘ensemble of ontological questions that has it as its foundation accumulation 
and fungibility as a grammar of suffering’. For the black subject’s structural 
positionality, there is the impossibility of formulating ontological questions. This 
is, akin to Fanon (2010) thought on ontology that blacks are substitutedly dead.  
Gibson (2003) argues that Fanon argued for a new humanism where the black 
subject becomes the self-determining subject, and not determined by the other. 
According to Maldonado-Torres (2008a), the discourse of humanism, if it was 
what Fanon engaged it would be about the politics of love grounded on the 
notion of bringing subjection to liquidation. The option of humanism of course, 
is the one that directs its force which is informed by the political intent of 
realising the emergence of the black subject. Such emergence, as the result of 
political intent, is informed by the ethical practice of bring subjection to the end. 
Humanism then, should be the political and ethical practice that is informed by 
antagonistic forces of bringing subjection to an end. This end should not mean 
the one of the state as the politico-juridicial formation that claims the end of 
subjection when it is still hidden in institutions and socio-political practices. For 
the mere fact that subjection is structural as stated before, it means, from de-
colonial turn, that there should be the total destruction of structures that are 
producing it. For this to materialise, Maldonado-Torres (2008a) argues for the 
ethical suspension where the idea of the universal is suspended and this will 
allow the emergence of the consistent expression that prefers the humanisation of 
black subjects. The suspension of the universal is to argue for the fact that 
humanism is not applicable to all, and there is a need to re-contextualise it to the 
existential conditions of the black subjections. This is not what humanism is in 
its universal applicability—the scant or no attention to the existential conditions 
of the black subjects. This means they are not important, hence their exclusion. 
For Gibson (2003: 123), this new humanism ‘requires the nurturing of creative, 
inventive and thoughtful activity’. According to this perspective, humanism is 
not abstraction that is a mere miraculous gesture, but a political practice 
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informed by politics of criticism. The politics of constant criticism, Gibson 
argues, are what inform Fanon’s idea of new humanism that should be 
understood in relation to anti-colonial action. According to Bernasconi (1996: 
114), ‘Fanon recogni[s]ed that the disappearance of colonialism necessitated the 
disappearance not only of the coloni[s]er, but also of the coloni[s]ed’. Though 
this might be a true assertion, it is however, militated by reality that points to the 
continuity of subjection. Since there is subjection, the coloniser and the colonised 
cannot simply disappear. Their presence and disappearance will be determined 
by the presence or disappearance of subjection itself. So, subjection is the 
determining factor. What Bernasconi, asserts though is that new humanism will 
liberate both the coloniser and the colonised. If this is put in another picture, 
subjection is the denial of liberation of the colonised, and if there is liberation 
how will the coloniser be liberated as a subjection who has had liberation. 
Though Bernasconi insists that for there to be liberation in this scheme of things, 
new humanism does not emerge from the site of the coloniser. The contention is 
still that subjection still continues, in that the emergence of new humanism seems 
to be under constrains of not having diagnosed subjection in its tenacious nature. 
The declaration of liberation is not useful then, since liberation cannot exist 
where there is subjection.    
According to Mbembe and Posel (2004: 2), critical humanism ‘calls into question 
the minimum entitlements of a human existence’. What this essentially means is 
that the idea of human existence is key, and therefore, critical humanism holds it 
seriously. It seems then to suggest that the entitlement of the human existence is 
something that also takes ontology seriously. What is then, needed is to account 
for Fanon’s engagement with the ontological questions relating to the black 
subjects and the criticism of humanism as a project that conceals dehumanisation 
of subjection. Mbembe and Posel’s project is refuted by Wilderson (2010: 55) 
who argues that ‘the explanatory power of Humanist discourse is bankrupt in the 
face of the black’. It is clear from this de-colonial turn that humanism does not 
let the recognition and humanisation of the black subject to emerge, even to 
exist.     
 
323 
 
The end of the world 
The emergence of the black subject poses a threat to subjection, since this will 
mean the existence to that world that has been ontologically void and the life that 
is dead while being alive. De-colonial turn is essential in that it points out that to 
be liberated is to emerge, and that is the creation of another world. Mbembe 
(2012) does not engage the idea of having another world or it having to emerge 
as the work of liberation by the black subject as Fanon affirms. Contrary to 
Mbembe’s stance, the emergence of the black subject is necessary to afford 
humanity to what has been dehumanised. This cannot of course be actualised in 
the world that militates against the existence of the black subject. It needs to be 
stated that the emergence of the black subject is cannot be reduced to subjectivity 
or psychic forms of exorcising subjection. This emergence is not accountable to 
forms that are transplanted outside the existential conditions of the black 
subjects. The emergence of the black subject should be self-initiated through de-
colonial turn and Fanon counsels thus: 
The settler makes history and is conscious of making it. And because he constantly 
refers to the history of his mother country, he clearly indicates that he himself is the 
extension of that mother country. Thus the history that he writes is not the history of 
the country that he plunders but the history of his own nation in regard to all that she 
skims off, all that she violates and starves (Fanon [1961] 1990: 40).        
Mbembe (2012) argues the black subject should realise self-determination and 
work towards restoring themselves. This restoration is therapy to psychic damage 
created by colonialism. This of course, is not seen by Mbembe as structural 
continuity, where in that the notion of liberation falls short. Mbembe sees the 
liberation of the subject originating from revolutionary violence. Mbembe writes: 
But Fanon shows that, although it is a key phase in the becoming subject of the 
colonised, violence is in turn, at the very moment of its occurrence, the cause of deep 
psychic damage. If truly subjective violence at the time of a liberation struggle can 
be articulated as speech, it is also capable of weighing on language and producing, in 
those who survive war, mutism, hallucinations and trauma (Mbembe 2012: 21). 
The becoming of being a subject also goes beyond psychic damage being cured 
and having the capacity to articulate speech, is not enough if the black subject 
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does not emerge in relation to insatiable demands. Fanon brings to the attention 
the fact that the will to liberation is the creation of new forms of life, and by 
black subjects themselves. For Fanon, it is simply because everything that has to 
do with the liberation of black subjects wholly depends on them. 
Fanon’s political writings are well known. What is less known, or better yet, less 
articulated, is the existential phenomenological basis of Fanon’s approach to what 
supports his revolutionary humanistic conclusions, particularly those premised upon 
constructing new values and a new humanity (Gordon 1996: 75).  
The end of the world—that is, the anti-black world that militates against the 
existence of the black subject due to its sadistic impulses of elimination is not 
and will never be a just world. Indeed, the end of the anti-black world means that 
there needs to be the all-over starting again. The structures and psychic economy 
that runs them needs to be unthought. Black subjects are the ones that should 
become human since the confirguration of the world as it is has been something 
that did not allow the black subject any sense of being. The contention here is 
that another world is possible where the black subject can rise as a being, and be 
in the state of being in permissible existential conditions. Fanon’s conception of 
the end of the world should be seen in light of the quest for search for another 
world. The end of the world, as something that Mbembe did not consider as the 
act of liberation is because of the fact that the anti-black world cannot be 
transformed, it must be destroyed. This is what the alarmist from progressive, 
reformist and reactionaries alike. They are benefiting from subjection hence they 
are not affected by it.   
According to Mbembe (2011c), Fanon believed that the liberation struggle had 
not healed the colonial injuries and trauma that were the legacy of colonialism. 
This is what Mbembe has to say:  
In Black Skin [,] White Masks, Fanon suggests that because both the black body and 
psyche have been profoundly been damaged by racism, freedom should be 
fundamentally understood as cure, the aim of that is to endow oneself and the 
immanent world with a new meaning, a new moral law, created or laid down by 
oneself (Mbembe 2005: 297).   
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As de-colonial-turn contends this world cannot be created in the world as it is—
the anti-black world. This is how Fanon articulates the anti-black world: ‘I had 
rationali[s]ed the world and the world had rejected me on the basis of colo[u[r 
prejudice’ (Fanon [1952] 2008: 93). The challenge that Fanon poses is to 
understand the black subject, since this is the undertaking that constitutes 
political demands that cannot be met or remedied. The emergence of the black 
subject is akin to existence and requires the ‘relationship with human being[s], 
freedom, and reason’ (Gordon 2010: 198). These are things outside the 
existential conditions of the black subject, and they are not something that must 
be repossessed or returned, but things that are created, but the creation that 
changes the configuration of the world. For the fact that there have been some 
sites of liberation, that took a form of what constitutional emancipation, the real 
liberation has not yet been born. There has never been the moment of rupture in 
terms of liberation, and how can that be actualised when the configuration of the 
world is the plague of anti-black solidarity.  For the mere fact that what Fanon 
prescribed did not transpire, this can be explained to kind of liberation that 
pervades the postcolony, that is, liberation in the intestines of subjection. For 
there to be liberation, Fanon pointed out the difficult task of re-appropriating the 
dispossession of choice and making choices out of it. The liberation that Fanon is 
concerned about is the black subject becoming human. This is denied and it is 
not a matter of choosing to be human or not. Subjection denies the black subject 
to become human but infra-human. 
According to Wilderson (2003c), blackness as a structural positionality of 
emergence disarticulates the politics of consent that is pervasive in coalition 
politics propagating the positionality of the unraced subject. The liberation of the 
black subject in the state of emergence disarticulates the scandal hidden in the 
politics of consent and politics of coalitions. The positionality of the emergence 
of the black subject disarticulates because, blackness is ‘possessed, accumulated 
and, fungible object’ (Wilderson 2003c: 186). For the mere fact that there is this 
disarticulation, the positionality of the unraced subjects behind the flag of politics 
of consensus and coalition collapses and therein lies a scandal that is the spectre 
of the racialised subject, the black. Wilderson has this to say about politics of 
consent and coalition: 
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In short, whereas such coalitions and social movements cannot be called the outright 
handmaidens of white supremacy, their rhetorical structures and political desire are 
underwritten by a supplemented anti-[b]lackness (Wilderson 2003a:18). 
Using Fanon explanation that not everyone is an ally, Wilderson amplifies it thus 
through two reasons. The first is that the movements, that are based in politics of 
consensus and coalitions are ontologically manifesting from Europe and the zone 
of the settler in the colony. The second is that black positionality is the state of 
emergency and no rhetorical structure and political desire can rescue the black 
subject from anti-black solidarity of the world. So the positionality of the 
unthought in Fanon is this one ‘the settler never ceases to be the enemy, the 
opponent, the foe that must be overthrown’ (Fanon [1961] 2008: 39). This is the 
end of politics of consent and politics of coalition since the emergence of the 
black subject is creating the world anew. So, there is no synthesis available, but 
the insatiable demands by the black subject that the world must come to an end 
(Wilderson 2003a). The positionality of the unthought destabilises the unraced 
positionality of the anti-black world since the ontological articulation of the 
black subject exposes the scandal of subjection. According to Sexton and 
Copeland (2003: 53), the positionality of the unthought position can only be 
imagined through its affective dimension by those who are at the receiving end 
of subjection. It is against the notion of politics of consensus and politics of 
coalitions, since the existential questions pertaining to the black subject are not in 
the register of these politics. In adopting this form of subjectivity, the black 
subject is charting a new terrain of struggle for liberation.  
Things are not the way they were and as Fanon (1965) warning stands, there 
must be refusal on the part of the black subject to engage in politics of consensus 
and politics of coalition where their insatiable demands will be denied or 
structurally adjusted. The positionality of the unthought presents a scandal 
because the ontological weight of the black subjects come with insatiable 
demands, that are resisted openly by the unraced subjects who have claimed to be 
allies of black subjects through politics of consent and politics of coalitions. The 
reaction to these insatiable demands rests on the excuse of politics of 
impossibility and unraced subjects as allies having everything to lose, and the 
most potent being their racial privilege that absolves them from subjection. So, 
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the politics of impossibility is legitimated with the unraced subjects as stern 
advocates, and the demands of black subjects, being insatiable are, ultimately 
denied. The denial comes through rendering these demands illogical, senseless, 
racist, and destructive. So, these reactions by the unraced subjects clearly 
confirm that the demands of black subjects are insatiable.  
The politics of impossibility mask this scandalous affair by claiming that these 
demands are not insatiable but they are not of any public good hence legitimising 
denial. If they are not denied, they are structurally adjusted in line with the 
conditions that will keep subjection intact (Wilderson 2003b). These structural 
adjustments come through constitutions, conventions, treaties and so forth, and 
the rhetoric of transformation, reform and restructuring and so on sets it, and yet 
liquidating the demands of the black subject. But then again, this is denial as 
aspirations of black subjects are not what they are supposed to be. To understand 
the notion of liberation is to understand it in that realm the scandal of liberation 
in the anti-black world, that came of course through the assistance of the 
positionality of the unraced subjects who dictated the terms of the struggle for 
liberation. For de-colonial turn, the liberation that exists is the liberation in the 
anti-black world—an oxymoron! Fanon has this to say: 
But the Negro knows nothing of the cost of freedom, for he has not fought for it. 
From time to time he has fought for Liberty and Justice, but these where always 
white liberty and white justice; that is, values secreted by his masters (Fanon [1952] 
2008: 172).  
Fanon’s concern that the black subject did not fight for his or her liberation stems 
from the fact that the reconciliatory gesture pacified the black subject, hence the 
failure to emerge. Also, the judicial freedom confound by the master are outside 
the subjectivity of the black subjects. Fanon attests that there cannot be any 
freedom as a form of gift, black subjects must fight for it and emerge in their 
own terms. There cannot be elimination of subjection that of course, is structural 
and foundational at the free will of the master. Subjection must be ended by 
black subjects themselves. Fanon ([1952] 2008: 172) states, ‘we can be sure that 
nothing is going to be given free’.  Honenberger (2007: 157) echoing Fanon 
states that the black subject ‘(1) has been set free, (2) without a struggle, (3) into 
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a racist social world’ (emphasis original). For this state of affairs, black subjects 
are made to be thankful and indebted to the white master who has given them 
freedom and even the unraced subjects who ‘assisted’ in the struggle. As such, 
initiatives of black subjects seeking freedom in their own terms are quickly 
dissolved (Honenberger (2007).  Fanon (1967) fundamentally opposes freedom 
as gift because it is a flag freedom.  He also argues freedom of gift does leads to 
flag independence (Fanon [1961]1990) and also ‘one way of life to another, but 
not from one life to another’ (Fanon [1952] 2008: 171).  
De-colonial turn exposes the scandal of liberation that comes through the politics 
of negotiation and constitutional conventions. In this realm, the existential 
conditions of black subjects are not accounted for and subjection wears a human 
face. So Fanon ([1952] 2008: 171) notes that this liberation is an oxymoron as it 
‘produced psychoses and sudden deaths’. In it is in this state of affairs where 
there will be a condemnation of subjection, but not calling for the destruction of 
the structures that create and sustain it. This leads Wilderson (2003a: 229) to 
declare that ‘blacks are fair game’. For the black subject not to be a fair game, it 
means that it must emerge, the emergence that Wilderson refers not only as 
articulation but disarticulation. Disarticulation resides in the realm of threatening 
reason, methods and common sense to say the least. This is the positionality of 
the black subject that is the spectre that haunts the hidden forms of subjection. 
The positionality of black subjects qua disarticulation means the articulation of 
grammar of suffering with its insatiable demands. According to Wilderson, the 
remedies that are offered by politics of consensus and politics coalitions are not 
suitable as they cannot, and are not willing to end the anti-black world. The 
politics of consensus and coalitions are informed by hegemonic tendencies that 
are there to pacify black subjects. As such, their main aim is to turn the blind eye 
to the anti-black world, and as their mode of pacification or resistance is there to 
frustrate black subjects.  
This scandal rests in the banal tendency where unraced subjects always speak on 
behalf of the black subject and also censuring the elementary critique inherent in 
the positionality of the black subject as it raises the politics of antagonism 
predicated on liberation. According to Fanon (1967), ‘liberation must be the 
work of the oppressed people’. It means then, black subjects must liberate 
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themselves as they are the ones who are trapped in the clutches of subjection. 
The act of liberation is not escaping subjection, but destroying it from its roots.  
Liberation is the ‘existence of oppression, alienation and immiseration… [and] 
the joy of existence in the liberated life that is open field of possibilities’ (Birt 
1997: 206). The unraced subject as an ally in the cause of the struggle for the 
liberation of the black subjects acts on behalf of the black subject. Fanon ([1952] 
2008: 171) critique still stands: ‘[t]he black man was acted upon’. This shows the 
betrayal of the politics of allies, who are not in the same existential condition 
with black subjects. There cannot be any politics of consent and politics of 
coalition the black subject is always outside the realm of solidarity. So, 
Wilderson (2003c) makes the proposition that the emergence of the black subject 
should be thought from the positionality of the unthought. Introducing the black 
subject through de-colonial turn as the point of emergence is the positionality 
that disrupts the anti-black world. Fanon thinks from the positionality of the 
unthought, black subjects emerging and shifting the geography of reason to 
create the possibility of another world. The positionality of the unthought, 
therefore, means that black subjects affirm their positionality by making 
unsuitable demands that include the demand to have subjectivity, ontology and 
existential conditions outside and in absence of hell.  
It is in this political condition where even the notion of an ally, emerging outside 
the existential condition and the structural positionality of the black subject will 
even collapse. Fanon asks ontological questions in his quest for liberation, he 
questions that hit at the centre of subjection and not allowing subjection to 
redeem, transform or reform, but to be ultimately destroyed. Since the world is 
subjection, by its configuration of anti-black solidarity directed to black subjects, 
answers to Fanon’s existential questions will mean the end of the world. It is this 
end of the world where there will be a totality of being, and the black subject of 
course, having the necessary fulfillment of attaining humanity.   
The logical end of this will to struggle is the total liberation of the national territory. 
In order to achieve this liberation, the inferiori[s]ed man (sic) brings all his resources 
into play, all his (sic) acquisitions, the old and the new, his own and those of the 
occupant (Fanon 1967: 43). 
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Adding to Fanon, Parris states that: 
This totality of being, according to Fanon, creates a new race of humans capable of 
creating a world that is free of oppression, exploitation, and hegemonic domination. 
Idealistically, yes, but Fanon locates the idealism in the complete eradication of the 
empire, a seemingly impossible fear that, if achieved, would necessitate that freedom 
be reali[s]ed by all. (Parris 2011: 19) 
The black subject, as the subject who wants to emerge outside the pathologies of 
subjection, must follow the route of liberation. Liberation is a continued political 
practice, and it is opposed to Mbembe’s (2005) proposition that it is a practice of  
cure and not about restoration. The route to liberation is pursued after all avenues 
of consciousness have been exhausted, and this pursuit is seen as that of 
necessity. This necessity follows from the fact that the black subject is hard 
pressed with subjection that denies the very essence of being that ontology is. So 
then, the concern is to fight for the emergence of the being as the liberated 
subject. This fight is pursued in relation to the construction of the ethical and 
political subject. Fanon has this to say: 
The struggle of the inferiorised is situated on a markedly more human level. The 
perspectives are radically new. The opposition is the henceforth classical one of the 
struggles of conquest and liberation (Fanon 1967: 43). 
For Sexton (2011: 37), ‘[t]he most radical negation of the anti[-]black world is 
the most radical affirmation of blackened world’. The blackened world is the 
creation of the narratives of certain impossibility to engage the narratives that are 
in the space of incommunicability (Wilderson 2003c). Such a world can only 
come into being if subjection in destroyed in all its forms and content. It is here 
where the unraced narratives, that mask subjection, are rejected. Blackness 
should be understood ‘as a structural position of noncommunicability because, 
again and again, as a position, [b]lackness is predicated on modalities of 
accumulation and fungibility, not exploitation and alienation’ (Wilderson 2010: 
59). The positionality of the unraced subject, the one that is an oxymoron as it 
avoids subjection and simplifies the hellish existential condition of black subjects 
as that which should be escaped, falls out when the black subject emerges. The 
existential condition of the black subject cannot be articulated and explained 
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outside subjection. The foundational nature of the anti-black world due to its 
systematic and continuous subjection needs to come to an end. This is a political 
demand higher that Mbembe who calls for abolition, accommodation and 
transcendence. These do nothing as they mask the aspects of subjection that are 
aimed at keeping the existential conditions of the black subjects in the manner 
that they are—that is, hellish existence.      
The liberation of the black subject, the emergence that is, should be understood 
in terms of the end of the world, the anti-black world to be exact through de-
colonial turn. Fanon ([1952] 2008) charts the route to liberation in the form of 
the emergence of the subject who questions. The emergence of the black subject 
is the mode of a question: ‘who speaks?’ (Sexton and Copeland 2003: 59). The 
capacity to ask a question is subjectivity. Indeed, those who question in the quest 
for liberation are at the centre are black subjects as subjection that they question 
affects them directly by means of affective and psychic economies. The capacity 
to ask is to emerge and to bring an end to subjection. The mode of questioning 
authorises the silenced, marginalised and dehumanised. As Memmi (1965: 91) 
notes ‘[t]o be deceived to some extent already, to endorse the myth and then 
adapt to it, is to be acted upon by it’. Those who are in opposition of being acted 
upon are marching towards the route to liberation. The capacity of black subjects 
to question is ‘the fleshy figuration of blackness both within and beyond’ (Sexton 
and Copeland 2003: 59). As Fanon (1965: 80) counsels ‘[t]he revolutionary 
instruction on the struggle for liberation must normally be replaced by 
revolutionary instruction on the building of the nation’. This can also be 
actualised when black subjects are at the centre of the struggle to liberation, their 
own liberation.  
It is through the effort to recapture the self and to scrutiny[s]e the self, it is through 
the lasting tension of their freedom that black subjects will be able to create the ideal 
condition of existence for a human world (Fanon [1952] 2008: 181). 
Fanon also elsewhere writes: 
This community in action, renovated and free of any psychological, emotional or 
legal subjection, is prepared today to assume modern and democratic responsibilities 
of exceptional moment (Fanon 1965: 159). 
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Fanon continues: 
The thesis of the launching of a new society is possible only within the framework of 
national independence here finds its corollary. The same time that the coloni[s]ed 
man braces himself to reject oppression, a radical transformation takes place within 
him that makes any attempt to maintain the colonial system impossible and shocking 
(Fanon 1965: 159). 
De-colonial turn tenaciously insists that the emergence of the black subject is in 
pursuit of liberation through de-colonial turn. It is the act, that makes the black 
subject to declare Fanon’s ([1952] 2008: 180) words ‘I am my own foundation. 
And it is by going beyond the historical, instrumental hypothesis that I will 
initiate the cycle of my freedom’. Mbembe (2005) on the other hand, argues that 
‘[f]or liberation to come, there comes a time when freedom has to be 
disentangled from histories of spilled blood and sacrificial cruelty’. This then 
implies whatever pursuit of liberation by black subjects is about violence and 
bloodbath—barbarity at its best. Contrary to Mbembe, de-colonial turn shows 
that Fanon is concerned about the positionality of black subjects becoming 
political agents in their own right. Their emergence in this formulation present a 
nightmare as ‘the dream of black accumulation and death’ (Wilderson 2003b: 
233) becomes nodal in the quest for liberation. The spilling of blood and 
sacrifices derive from subjection itself with its sadistic elements of accumulating 
the black body and making it a site of extraction. This is the ontological base 
through that the grammar of suffering should emerge. With these words, Fanon 
was engaging in the process of liberation, to emerge as a black subject. His 
prayer, ‘O my body, make me always the man who questions!’ (Fanon [1952] 
2008: 181) is grounded in existential phenomenological meditations. The 
capacity to always question is to have the spirit of critique in the world where 
subjection mutates into various forms and also putting a mask of dehumanisation. 
This is not just a prayer to ask question, but to ask existential questions that are 
of concern to the black subject in a form of de-colonial turn. The prayer is never 
to stop questions, and it is essential to ask: what fundamentally is liberation in the 
anti-black world? There are no easy answers, since the questioning embedded in 
Fanon’s prayer indicts.   
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Conclusion 
This chapter, through decolonial critical analysis, serves as the call for the Fanon 
of the past, present and the future from the standpoint of de-colonial turn. This 
suggests, departing from Mbembe’s reading that suggests that the colonial 
situation by means of subjection still befalls black subjects who happen to 
receive subjection by the virtue of their race, and also being raced. Fanon has 
become the figure of contestation, and in the 21
st
 century, it is essential to really 
interrogate the relevance of Fanon and to claim him from the de-radicalisation 
project conducted by Mbembe. The relevance of Fanon indeed should take into 
account the context in that he lived, but that does not suggest freezing Fanon to 
the historical moment, but interrogating the relevance of his ideas in the 21
st
 
Century.  
The interrogation of Fanon’s project that Mbembe calls for is the therapeutic 
reading that reduces the potency of Fanon’s thorny existential questions to 
unmask subjection. The therapeutic reading of Fanon is informed by healing of 
psychic damage and the very thing black subjects are accused of creating 
themselves, whereas this stems from subjection. The contention in this chapter is 
that there is relevance of Fanon rather than his resurrection. Fanon has been a 
spectre in the postcolony and as such, Fanon’s project has never died, therefore, 
the notion of resurrection is not relevant. The spectre of Fanon started in the 20
th
 
Century and still penetrates the 21st Century.  
Fanon’s project has been the politics of love of the damné—those who are 
misrecognised and dehumanised by subjection. So, Fanon’s project in this 
chapter is read from the positionality of the limits of being—that is, the 
existential conditions of those who are at the receiving end of subjection. This is 
to ensure the reading that signals the possibility that ensures the emergence of the 
figure of the black subject. This reading suggests the politics that are infused 
with the potential of liberation, the liberation that will only come through the 
ontologising of the deontologised subjection crushed in objecthood. Such 
interrogation is primarily essential for understanding Fanon in relation to the 
humanity that was, and is still of concern to him, that which is excluded, 
marginalised and oppressed, in short, humanity under the surveillance of 
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subjection. So, the liberation of black subjects, their emergence, is what can 
bring them to humanity, but the anti-black world must come to an end for this to 
be actualised. In the next chapter, Mbembe’s thinking on the idea of South Africa 
will be examined from de-colonial turn as a rallying point of critique.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MBEMBE AND THE IDEA OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Introduction 
This chapter, decolonial critical analysis is deployed in order to examine 
Mbembe’s engagement with South African political reality in the post-1994 
through de-colonial turn. As an idea, South Africa should belong somewhere, 
there needs to be a nodal point through which it revolves. The contention this 
chapter makes is that Mbembe is not critical of the neo-liberal reality that the 
post-1994 South Africa on —that is, false freedom where emancipation is 
mistaken for liberation, the continued racism and structures of white supremacy, 
inequalities, injustice and oppression. Mbembe sees South Africa as a postcolony 
rather than a neo-apartheid state. Contrary to Mbembe, this chapter sees South 
Africa as a state that is still in need for decolonisation as it constitutes 
colonialism and coloniality. Mbembe’s idea of South Africa will be engaged 
from de-colonial turn.   
Firstly, the chapter challenges the notion of Nongqawuse syndrome as articulated 
by Mbembe, and also how the story has been part of the frontier historiography 
where black subjects are objects and white subjects being the agents of history. 
Secondly, the chapter problematises Mbembes thinking on what is dubbed the 
‘1994 Miracle’ and the post 1994 political reality with regards to the existential 
conditions of the black subjects. Thirdly, the chapter engage the notion of 
frontier accumulation as articulated by Mbembe and argues that the role of black 
capitalist cannot be understood outside them being in service of white oligarchy. 
Fourthly, the chapter reconsiders the Native Club debate and argues that the 
critics of this initiative, and Mbembe being part of them as well, were engaged in 
the silent scandal as they do not criticise Afri-Forum and Solidarity which are 
white suprematist and radically right-wing. Finally, the chapter  argues that race 
is an issue and black subjects should not be dictated to in terms of how they must 
engage it, and it also challenges Mbembe’s project of non-racialism, the notion 
of mutual ressentiment, freedom from race, and politics of sameness.  
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Nongqawuse as an alibi 
Mbembe (2006d) made a remark that South Africa politically is said to be 
leading to a hopeless and dangerous dungeon of history repeating itself, by 
alarming what he refers to Nongqawuse syndrome. Mbembe (2006c: 20) defines 
Nongqawuse syndrome as ‘the name of a political disorder and cultural 
dislocation South Africa seem to be experiencing’. Mbembe compared this with 
the regression effect that has pervaded the postcolony where everything is 
stereotyped as being in the brink of collapse, or already having collapsed. This of 
course, is made through comparing the political situation with Nongqawuse who 
is said to be a prophet who led the millenarian movement of cattle killing that 
eventually led to national suicide where most Xhosa’s died of self-imposed 
starvation while waiting for the miraculous of the resurrection of cattle they 
destructed themselves. Mbembe’s deployment of Nongqawuse has not been 
without controversy. 
For instance, Masondo (2006) charged Mbembe of pushing the imperialist 
cosmopolitan agenda and his analogy of Nongqawuse’s as a false prophet similar 
to Jacob Zuma as a faulty analogy. On the other, Mangcu (2006a) charged 
Mbembe of deploying historical fiction and the portrayal of Zuma in the negative 
light and Mbeki in the positive light. The argument here goes a step further to 
these controversies that seem not to interrogate the Nongqawuse story itself. 
These criticisms lie on Mbembe alone, who is the purveyor of the story, and not 
the story in its entirety. This is essential in a country where black subjects are 
said to have no history themselves, but that of white subjects as agents of history.   
De-colonial turn problematises the historiography in South Africa as the story of 
the colonised other. Davis (1992) articulates the notion of history in the light of 
other histories to suggest non-linearity of history and one meta-narrative. 
Chakrabarty (2000: 98) punctuates that ‘[h]istory is a subject primarily 
concerned with the crafting of narratives’. The black subject from the standpoint 
of de-colonial turn is engaged in the manner in which it is denied its own 
histories in a plural sense of the term. It seems then, that Mbembe’s account of 
history, in specific reference to what the story of Nongqawuse is, remains what it 
is—that is, history fashioned from the colonial imaginary and sensibility. The 
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history is that of those who record and the record of history is that of absolute 
truth, for that it serves as evidence. The story goes that a young prophet, 
Nongqawuse came with the prophesy of seeing two strange figures calling her 
from the bush and ordered her to convey a message to her uncle Mhlakaza and 
the message is said to read thus: 
Tell that the whole community will rise from the dead, and that all cattle now living 
must be slaughtered, for they have been reared by contaminated hands because there 
are people about who deal in witchcraft. There should be no cultivation, but great 
new grain pits must be dug, new homes built, and great strong cattle enclosures must 
be erected. Cut out new milk sacks and weave many doors from boka roots. So says 
the chief Nepakade, the descendant of Sifuba-sibanzi. The people must leave their 
witchcraft, for soon they will be examined by diviners (Peires 1989: 99). 
According to this story, Nongqawuse narrated this account to the elders and 
could not be believed, but to be ridiculed and dismissed. It is imperative then to 
argue that this story should be understood on the basis that the problem of 
historiography is the confusion between narration and signification. Charkrabarty 
(2000: 98) asks a compelling question: ‘Can the story be told /crafted?’  De-
colonial turn makes the intervention to understand the signification of the story 
of Nongqawuse. The story of Nongqawuse cannot be read as a mere chronology 
of events. The question that is not answered and the one worth asking is—what 
does the story of Nongqawuse signify? The empirical historiography, the one that 
Peires is embedded in as he narrates the story, emphasises the piercing together 
the story as the catalogue of events. This generally misses the signification, and 
stories on their own cannot tell anything if there is no signification. The presence 
of signification will mean new interpretations of events, and will reveal more 
why the story is told in the way that it is being told by Peires.    
As the narrative goes, Nongqawuse is said to be playing in the bush and chasing 
birds and she head two strange voices who gave her prophetic orders. As the 
story goes, told and detailed by Peires (1989) a sixteen year old prophet is said to 
have ordered Xhosas to kill their cattle, destroy their corn and all other important 
amenities, and as a result, white colonialists will be driven to the sea. Then, the 
new life will begin and what has been destroyed will come anew and purified. It 
is said that strangers continued to persist and gave Nongqawuse orders to, 
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eventually the instruction was that Mhlakaza to kill a beast, wash the body clean 
appear in of strangers in four days time. Strangers are said to have stated that 
Xhosa people will be assisted by the great ancestral spirits. So, the Xhosa should 
act in line with the anscentral commands. As Peires (1989) notes, the old cattle 
were tainted and polluted; they had to be killed so that the new cattle would not 
be contaminated by them. So, the living cattle should be slaughtered as they are 
contaminated, and of course, they are said to have been suffering from a lung-
disease that was widespread. Peires notes the following with regards to the 
prophetic injunction: 
For this reason, all cattle had to be killed, all corn destroyed, and all magical charm 
given up. All their copper rings, all their clothes, all their cooking pots, all their hoes 
and other implements, everything they had, was contaminated and should be 
destroyed or sold. They themselves were impure and they should purify themselves 
for three days and offering up certain sacrifices (Peires 1989: 100). 
This was said to be a sacrifice necessary for the upcoming paradise, the life of 
unlimited plenty and excess. This life, as Peires notes, is comparable to that of 
white colonial settlers. However, as Peires notes, this did not amuse all the 
Xhosas. For the mere fact that Nongqawuse was dismissed as ridiculous, as it 
would have been expected, does this not debunk the colonial stereotype of black 
subject as mere objects who cannot think?  Also then, the mass slaughter is said 
to have continued even when other people were convinced by this prophesy. 
According to Peires, the sceptical Xhosas are said to have initiated mass 
slaughter but tentatively, up until the hysteria prevailed when mass slaughter 
accelerated. The killing was not the performance of rituals but getting rid of 
cattle that are cursed beasts. Not all Xhosa’s were convinced even those who 
came to be the first witness accounts during their witnessing in Gxarha that is a 
village where Nongqawuse and Mhlakazi resided. According to Peires (1989), 
Nongqawuse’s prophesy is said to be prominent, but there were still doubts and 
even dismissals. It is stated that the voices of the two strangers could only be 
heard by Nongqawuse even Mhlakazi did not hear them, since she was the only 
one who can understand them. So then, she relayed the message to Mhlakazi, 
who then relayed it to various Xhosa chiefs. The popularity of the prophecy to 
those who believed it resulted in this description: 
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Hundreds of cattle were killed every day. The believers were ordered not to eat the 
meat of any cattle killed the previous day, so everyday fresh cattle were slaughtered 
and yesterday’s remaining meat thrown away. Rotten flesh lay putrefying around the 
homesteads (Peires 1989: 117). 
The resurrection of new cattle and people did not happen, only disappointment 
prevailed. Peires inists that mass slaughter continued despite doubt and ever 
disappointment. So, doubt has to be suppressed so that the practice can go on. 
According to Peires, Nongqawuse’s prophesy—the ideology of cattle-killing 
movement—combined old and new ideas, both of that were equally necessary to 
its credibility. Nongqawuse’s prophesy is said to be the combination of ancestral 
belief and Christianity. Peires rightfully argues that the ancestral beliefs of the 
Xhosa Cattle-Killing were neither irrational nor atavistic. Ironically, it was 
probably because they were so rational and so appropriate that they ultimately 
proved to be so fatal (Peires 1989: 164).  So it means that the Nongqawuse story 
is that of the figure with divine possession and connectivity that can be translated 
to reality—that is, to engage in the miraculous. This engagement means that the 
message of the prophet must be actualised in reality—but self-destruction by 
mean of self-imposed starvation, deception, disillusionment and disaster.  
The story of Nongqawuse, and to be exact, its signification, not empirical history, 
is of interest and this lies in the fact of wanting to understand Nongqawuse being 
positioned as an alibi to exonerate subjection. De-colonial turn shows how the 
story of Nongqawuse is told, through the act of empirical historiography where 
in that Peires (1989), narrates about the young prophet and her uncle Mhlakazi 
who initiated the cattle-killing in pursuit of the paradise where the new form of 
life will emerge, replacing  the old ones as they are cursed. The argument here is 
not about the (in)validity of the narration of Nongqawuse, but to argue for 
another interpretation that constitutes of signification. That is, that which has 
some potential to unmask the hidden power relations amongst subjects, where 
black subjects are at the receiving end of subjection. To be specific, among 
subjects who narrate (white subjects) and those who are narrated (black subjects), 
mute subjects who cannot have their own narrative because of the absence of the 
record. Kesteloot (1992) argues that the extensiveness of the narrative, its depth 
and breadth of detail gives it much weight. This is even intensified with the 
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existence of the written record. For Kesteloot, it is not clear if its credibility will 
be challenged. Therefore, history begins with white subjects and black subjects 
are on the negative. 
The problematic is the African normali[s]ed as object of European history and 
culture, that lost desire for creating African cultural objectives, often producing 
“anti-agency” or dysfunctional behavio[u]r, that negates recognition of the African 
as actor and of positive projections of the African self in the future (Modupe 2003: 
65). 
The interest is what Davis (1992) refers as the ‘thought about the past’. The 
thought about the past should not be confused with, the thought of the past, the 
latter that is more about signification. Davis provides four kinds of thought about 
the past. The first is autobiography or biography the life and times of a person, 
and if necessary death of the person. The second is the precedent where the 
abstract serves as a particular context where someone can be remembered or 
others silenced. The third is myth that is something that is often distanced from 
the truth. Myth is regarded as not truth and they are evoked in present terms as 
something archaic in order to delegitimise them. The fourth and the final one is 
history that is linear and plotted and that is regarded as the true accounts about 
the past.  
The type of history is a linear account of unfolding of a story, suffused with notions 
of linear development from origins, of following the traces, even uncovering process. 
But the practises of historians are more complex than the type (Davis 1992: 20).   
The thought about the past as Davis argues, is not the monopoly of historians, 
since history is a type of thought about the past. Therefore, the past is not also, 
that which is known by historians, or what is solely in the domain of historians. 
Indeed, history is regarded as the most authoritative of them all simply because 
of the claim of being empirical—the narration of true accounts or events. But 
then, this poses a challenge when one thinks of the history that is done on the 
people whose histories are said not to exist, but they only exist when those who 
the executioners of subjection claim it as such. As Jewsiewicki (1992: 97) puts 
forth, ‘[t]he falsification of history is a crime against its people’. The practice of 
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history is alien to black subjects and as such, it renders them alien to their own 
form of consciousness.  
African history, throughout its epic vehicle, does not escape the rule: each national 
entity has its own point of the events, each pressure group in this nation also has its 
own champions, its choices, its interests that modify its judgements of history, that 
condition its interpretation of the facts, that bend the manner in which these are told, 
deformed, disguised (Kesteloot 1992: 143).  
In the South African context, the opposite is true, as historians and the 
historiography rests from the lens of racial power relations, white subjects being 
the ones who have history. De-colonial turn shows how subjection has more to 
account to the fact that the story that is hegemonic is that the conqueror and not 
of the subjugated. The subjectivity of the latter is made not to exist since 
subjection pervades. The Nongqawuse story emerged from the climax of 
subjection and this has an impact of who tells the story and why there is an 
agency to tell that story. It is also important to state that the history of black 
subjects was kick-started by white subjects and as such, black subjects have no 
history. De-colonial turn seeks to open way for different perspectives to account 
for different ways in that events are interpreted and represented; and the manner 
in which they will be narrated or explained. The purpose here is not to argue 
about the merits or demerits of the story, or whether it existed or not—but to 
problematise knowledge practices that emerge in the height of subjection and to 
understand what is their locus of enunciation qua black subjects. As Kesteloot 
(1992) states, there is the existence and the possibility of historians having to 
face the version and contradictory opinions.  
But if the beneficiaries of a colonial system suffer from selective amnesia, then for 
the victims of such a brutal system memory is a weapon. The injustices of the 
colonial experience and our present condition make it imperative that we remember 
that our situation was not an act of nature. Our present condition was brought about 
the actions not of ignorant but of learned men, some of whom had high reputations 
in imperial countries (Magubane 1996: 369 - 370; emphasis original).     
Mbembe (2006d) coins the story of Nongqawuse as a syndrome that is said to be 
atavistic, destructive, superstitious and anachronistic—the form of self-
destruction and national suicide. Mbembe linked the story of Nongqawuse as 
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something akin to the South African political discourse, more especially the role 
of Jacob Zuma (the current president of South Africa and ANC) as the tamed 
native. Black subjects are often reduced to masses waiting for the messiah to 
save them. Black subjects are seen as objects in waiting and without any sense of 
agency and dependable to the miraculous. It means the historical representation 
and the contemporary is still the same—that is, black subjects are objects. Does 
this mean that Mbembe treats black subject like the colonial subjection has done 
and is still continuing through coloniality? So, in waiting, national suicide—the 
form of fatalism at best, this also shows the representation of black subjects, the 
representation that borders on stupidity and absence of reason that Mbembe 
parades. As such, black subjects are those who are barred from the realm of 
humanity as they have no form of reason, truth and reality. Black subjects are 
said to be caught in profound stupidity, and they are said not to have subjectivity, 
hence the historical representation of black subjects has not been the act of black 
subjects themselves.  
The telling of the past is said to be embedded in historical facts and evidence. 
This does not tell anything with regards to the fundamental question that is: who 
tells the story and why? The nature of power relations, asymmetric relations of 
course, as de-colonial turn exposes, it is informed by subjection. It is during the 
colonial contact that the dispossession and resistance ensured. The Nongqawuse 
story can be said, to amplify Magubane (1996: 371) that ‘the story itself remains 
incomplete and partial’. This is so simply because the South African historical 
landscape has been that of the frontier. That is, the South African society has 
been the frontier from the pre-colonial and the colonial. The frontier is the 
interregnum of the colonial encounter where black subjects are caught in the state 
of change and resistance. The frontier of history signifies the white subject as the 
agent of history and blacks as the objects of history. White subjects are agents of 
history in the barbaric situation as they record those events, and claiming to 
narrate them as they are. It is in this barbaric situation where black subjects are to 
blame and them being the main cause of their existential crisis. Hence, the 
representation of the black subject borders on negativity. The frontier historical 
tradition is in short, the re-inscription of white history and displacement of the 
history of black subjects.   
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The frontier historiography is the colonial project that has created the sense in 
which black subjects are atomised and as such, they need are in need of civility. 
Such atomisation of representation can be seen from Conrad (1999: 21) who 
writes, ‘[a] lot of people, mostly black and naked, moved about like ants’. For 
Conrad, black subject were not enemies or even criminals, but they were nothing 
earthly—but unhappy savages who were dying slowly. Black subjects under the 
colonial project are what they are, savages and people outside the realm of 
humanity. Here is the famous ontological and epistemological violence against 
Africa and its black subjects and of course, the usual perpetrator being Hegel 
whom Mbembe seems to have close affinity with. In detailing the world history 
he writes: 
At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of 
the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in 
it—that is in its northern part—belong to Asiatic or European World (Hegel 1956: 
99).  
Hegel in his racist ontological and epistemological violence continues: 
What we properly understand by Africa, is UnHistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still 
involved in the conditions of mere nature, and that had to be presented here only as 
on the threshold of the World’s History (Hegel 1956: 99). 
De-colonial turn seeks to resurrect the black subject that has been outside the 
realm of thought. Subjection that denied the black subject the capacity of speech, 
thought and of course, the sense of the self is challenged when the black subject 
resurrects. The denial for the resurrection of the black subject has given the 
colonial functionaries the prerogative of defining the black subject 
stereotypically belonging to people without record—written history to be exact. 
The subject of history, with its portrayal of the past as empirically factual, has 
been the alien subject when it comes to black subjects. So, the study of ‘societies 
without written record’ (Hastrup 1992: 4) and societies that are only enough to 
be understood in terms of history ‘a mere narrative rather than a comprehensive 
description’ (Coetzee 2007: 16) is the common practice found in the 
representation of the black subject. Having no record and any form of 
subjectivity, this means there is a free reign over the black subject as subjection 
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through colonisation meant dispossession of labour, humanity and land 
(Mngxitama 2010). Those who are dispossessed are also dispossessed of any 
means to tell their story. So the act of history is indeed the historian and not the 
subjects. Having free reign over black subjects, the narration of events, accounts, 
stories, testimonies to name but a few, are in the monopoly of those who reign 
over black subjects since the interpretation is theirs and also, their own means of 
validation to render the historic even as truth. 
According to Mbembe (2006c), the Nongqawuse syndrome can be seen through 
the emergence of the false prophet from humble beginnings. The prophet, as 
Mbembe says, is backed with hysteria in that the claim of resurrection is made, 
and for it to materialise there must be sacrifice. Mbembe goes on to continue that 
this prophecy also justifies violence. From de-colonial turn, it is clear to Mbembe 
that the figure of the prophet whether imaginary or really, possess to him the 
problem of uncivility, where political disorder is prevalent as the existential 
conditions are lax. The Nongqawuse syndrome is said to be advocated by 
nativism that Mbembe rails against. As Mbembe charges: 
[I]t is stirring the dark brew of South African culture, its addiction to prophecy, 
consumption and small miracles, its deeply held phallocratric ethos shared by blacks 
and whites, the corrosive violence that is tearing apart its social fabric, its 
xenophobia among blacks especially, its rooted belief in witchcraft and evil forces 
(Mbembe 2006c: 20).  
It then seems to Mbembe (2006c: 20) that the panacea for South Africa and its 
idea is the ‘attempt to build a truly non-racial, modern and cosmopolitan society’. 
So it means that Nongqawuse syndrome is driven by blacks who are still in the 
dark brew and in need for some melanin of modernity. The idea of South Africa 
that Mbembe wants is the building of the Afropolitan dream. Masondo (2006) 
captures Mbembe’s notion of Nongqawuse syndrome as a faulty analogy. And he 
adds that Mbembe suggests that black subjects are the way they are because of 
the failure of not following the cosmopolitan project. Masondo regards this 
project as imperialists, and it cannot be seen as panacea. Masondo (2006) charges 
Mbembe of regarding black subjects as masses that are craving for a messiah and 
they are portrayed as people who cannot think for themselves. Cosmopolitanism 
is regarded by Mbembe as the panacea against barbarism that is brought by 
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Nongqawuse syndrome. Mbembe seems to agree with Peires, hence his 
civility/barbarity dichotomy that political mobilisation by black subjects is a 
recipe for disaster. This is even the comparison that suggests that black subjects 
on their own, cannot effect any form of political sensibility, and for there to be 
such, white paternalism is needed. 
Furthermore, the comparison of civility/barbarity outplayed itself in the colonial 
history among the native who were socialised and institutionalised to refer to 
each other in terms of the colonialist constructions. The amakholwa (believers 
who are Christianised and considered themselves modern) and amaqaba 
(traditionalists who were said to be backward) distinctions serves as testimony to 
this. It is clear that for the former, heaven was awaiting for them, while hell was 
waiting for the latter, unless they convert. To the distinction that Mbembe 
(2006c) makes with reference to Nongqawuse syndrome, though Mbembe does 
not mention names, it is clear that Zuma is a typical native who is barbaric 
because of his traditionalist posture, lack of formal education and a polygamist of 
note, while Thabo Mbeki (Zuma’s predecessor) constituted civility, his urbane, 
cosmopolitan and English man posture, the modernist at best. As Mangcu 
(2006a: 10) puts it, Mbembe ‘paints a picture of Zuma the anti-modern, anti-
Christ, threatening the cosmopolitan embodiment of modernity, Thabo Mbeki’. 
Jacobs and Zuern (2006) argue that Mbembe is wrong to suggest that South 
Africa lacks capacity to generate moral vision of the world. It means the world is 
the bench mark that sets up standards for morality, and it is questionable whether 
is there something, as far as the positionality of the black subjects is concerned, 
that can be looked up to the world and to show the world. This is the world that 
has projected Africa with many of its stereotypes that are rooted in the colonial 
project (Jacobs and Zuern 2006).  
In the terrain of de-colonial turn the Nongqawuse story creates a condition that 
allows ‘moral equivalence between the position of the oppressor and the 
oppressed’ (Magubane 1996: 376). This means, subjection is read from the base. 
So, Peires (1989), by means of narration, implies that the white subjects who are 
settler colonialists did not dispossess the Xhosas and they were decimated by the 
false prophesy of Nongqawuse. What then prevail are narratives of the oppressor, 
and the oppressed disappears in terms of subjectivity. Xhosas killed their cattle 
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and they died out of self-imposed starvation. As such, white settler colonialists 
had nothing to do with their colonisation and the false prophecy being attempted 
to be spread by Mhlakazi to convince whites to do the same sacrifice. This means 
that the oppressor is exonerated and there is nothing to account for, since 
subjection existed and black subjects participated in it or at worse, exacerbated it 
to the point of their total destruction qua national suicide. Black subjects are 
actors who are said to be wrongful, and can be implicated to the existential crisis 
they find themselves. The thought about the past is that which counters the 
source of subjection that uses Nongqawuse as an alibi and claiming that black 
subjects have the propensity of self-destruction. 
This says a lot about Africa and its black subjects. Not to exist is to be outside 
the bounds of humanity—the exteriority worse than that of animality—an object. 
Nongqawuse is the object of history, not a subject, hence this history not being 
located within black subjectivity. From foregrounding de-colonial turn what 
emerges is that the story of Nongqawuse is indeed an alibi that justifies the 
idiocy of the black subject. Nongqawuse’s false prophesy, though it persistently 
failed to actualised itself into reality, black subjects believed in it, even if they 
doubted since no actualisation took place. Mbembe’s taking of the story at face 
value and without probing the nature of historiography—the frontier history of 
the white subject—borders on the justification that the black subjects, due to the 
so-called false prophesy, dispossessed themselves and no white subjects were 
involved. To amplify this, Mbembe (2006d) argues that the addiction to prophesy 
and the expectancy of small miracles, have led to a national suicide of black 
subjects. It means to Mbembe that black subjects are always in the brink of self-
destruction and they are to blame for their existential conditions. Furthermore, 
Mbembe reinscribes the frontier tradition by adopting a simplistic approach of 
accepting the narrative of Peires (1989) as gospel truth. Mbembe used this Peires 
myth to warn South Africans of the Nongqawuse syndrome, and this makes 
Mbembe to fall neatly in the colonial narrative of history and not the thought 
about the past, that is something in need of re-interpretation and interrogating the 
source of history. This still shows that race matters and it has been a historical 
and continues to be a scandal.  
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The falsity of the radical break 
The falsity of the radical break from apartheid is engaged from de-colonial turn. 
In so doing, it is important to locate Mbembe in the post-1994 South African 
trajectory in order to really account for the idea of South Africa. The idea of 
South Africa to Mbembe cannot be singular, but it changes constantly. Being as 
it may, there are ways in that it can be accounted for to really point out 
Mbembe’s subjectivity seems to border of the myth of exceptionalism. South 
Africa is an African country whose national identity should be African. 
Mbembe’s idea of South Africa puts emphasis on the politics of hope, and also, 
possibility it is informed by neo-liberal thinking that leaves existential question 
by the wayside. This can be seen when Mbembe argues that South Africa after 
the formal abolition of apartheid is not what it used to be (Mbembe 2008). This is 
how he captures South Africa in the post-1994 moment:  
It is coming out of the dark age of white supremacy. Whether by design or not, the 
country is undergoing multiple and systematic transitions, at different paces and 
rhythms. In an age that has witnessed an exacerbation of historically entrenched 
racial hierarchies, it is involved in one of the few contemporary global experiments 
with a view of creating the first credible non-racial society on the planet (Mbembe 
2008: 5). 
The legislative end of apartheid in 1994, with blacks assuming the helms of 
power under the African National Congress (ANC), Nelson Mandela paraded as 
its symbol as the first black subject to be a president after a colonialist, 
imperialist and apartheid state, is said to be a ‘victory for all’. This is propagated 
as the ‘rainbow nation’ that is said to be blessed with non-racialism, a 
‘progressive Constitution’, free and fair elections, unity, diversity, non-sexism, 
freedom and equality. So, in the light of these, the end of apartheid is said to be a 
radical break and the state that exists is a ‘new South Africa’. This should be 
traced from the release of Mandela from his long-life imprisonments, after that of 
the late Jafta Masemola of Pan Africanist Congress who is the longest serving 
political prisoner than Mandela. It is at this time that liberation movements were 
unbanned and anti-apartheid activists returning from exile. This is before 1994, 
but in 1990 and this was a condition to ensure a smooth transition to democracy 
and not liberation. From the standpoint of de-colonial turn, South Africa gave 
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birth to democracy and the claim that this is liberation is a mere propaganda of 
the ANC and its racist processor—the National Party (NP). According to More 
(2011), the last apartheid president, Frederick Willem de Klerk and his NP acted 
on behalf of black subjects by telling Nelson Mandela and black people that ‘you 
are now free’. Terreblanche captures this moment and period thus: 
On 2 February 1990, FW de Klerk—who had succeeded a faltering Botha as state 
president in August 1989—stunned the world with his announcement that the 
liberation organisations would be unbanned, that Nelson Mandela and other political 
prisoners would be set free, and that the NP government is prepared to enter into 
negotiations with all political parties to seek a peaceful transition to a democratic 
political system (Terreblanche 2002: 311). 
In addition to the above, More has this to say: 
Given the disparity in land ownership, property, citizenship, voting rights, and so on 
that came with the oppressive apartheid regime, we need to ask the question: Was 
there any significant transformation after Mandela became the president on April 27, 
1994? I think the initial appropriate question to be asked in order to put things into 
perspective is: What kind of means led to Mandela’s presidency? It is well known 
that the transition from apartheid to Mandela came about not through a revolutionary 
break or complete discontinuity with the past, but through a negotiated settlement 
commonly dubbed the “South African Miracle” (More 2011: 181).  
Mbembe (2007) sees the post-1994 era political project as the democratic 
experiment, one that is about the politics of affirmation and politics of life. It is 
in this politics that Mbembe (2011b) centralises the notion of witnessing as a 
form of critique, where in that the role of the democratic experiment is to build 
the community of life. This is seen as essential to the post-1994 South Africa, 
where in that, unresolved questions do remain, and also, the time where in that 
some of these questions are ridiculed and dismissed. De-colonial turn is essential 
here to critique Mbembe’s notion of the idea of South Africa as a democratic 
experiment since South Africa is still in need of decolonisation. Mbembe faults 
South Africa as a postcolony whereas South Africa is still the settler colonial 
state under the management of the black ANC government.  
349 
 
De-colonial turn affirms the position that South Africa still keeps the black 
subject at the receiving end of subjection even when political power is still in the 
hands of the ANC. This is important to stand in opposition to Mbembe who 
seems to suggest that democracy or its experiment is the panacea to the 
existential predicament that faces the black subject. The argument by Mngxitama 
(2010) that the accommodation of betrayal is normalised and, it is in fact the 
backbone of the post-1994 domain, instead of penetrating deeper into the 
existential question and the conditions facing the black subjects is something that 
is dismissed in the post-1994 political discourse. The post-1994 is gloomy with 
blatant denial of historical injustices and accommodation betrayal with the 
impression that all possible gains have been made. Mngxitama posits that the 
propagators of the integrationist programmes of the post-1994 era are not 
concerned with the existential conditions of black subjects. So the black subjects 
are always compromised on, and those how are propagators of the ahistorical and 
denialist projects deny black subjects justice. Mbembe (2008) emphasised that 
the democratic experiment of the post-1994 should be taken seriously. ‘This 
experiment’s chances of success cannot be ruled out’ (Mbembe 2008: 5). 
It is after the negotiated settlement and a political compromise that the 1994 
moment came with euphoria, and black subjects under the banner of the ANC 
were in the commanding heights of political office, but with no economic power. 
As Terreblanche (2002: 371) points out, ‘[p]olitical compromises [were] formed 
between the ANC leaders and corporate sector in the early 1990’s’. From de-
colonial turn, this is the brief exposing of the end of apartheid, and the moment 
that the ANC claims as liberation and that it is the party that brought liberation. 
This in short, is said to be the radical break and of course, the building of a new 
South Africa. It is not clear from Mbembe (2008) how does he articulate the end 
of apartheid, or the circumstances that led to its demise, except to say that 
Mbembe articulates its formal abolition. It is therefore critical to note that the 
abolition of apartheid was the legislative and moral act, and as such, its 
continuity through various means is something that continues to haunt the 
existential reality of black subjects, especially those who yearn for genuine 
liberation. According to Mbembe (2011b: 2), ‘South Africa became a model of 
how to dismantle a racial mode of rule, strike down race-based frameworks of 
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citizenship and the law while striving to create racial equality through positive 
[s]tate action’.  
The falsity of the radical break, or to say in Mbembe’s terms the abolition of 
apartheid is problematic on the following grounds. First, apartheid was on its 
brink of collapse anyway and it was very expensive to maintain. Secondly, the 
end of Cold War had a knock-on-effect in changing the geo-political situation 
globally, hence the spread of liberal democracy as the model of regime. Thirdly, 
what is referred to as the end of apartheid is a result of negotiated settlement 
where a compromise was made in order to have a peaceful transition to 
democracy for all, the ANC as the manager of this political project. The fourth 
and final is that the structures of apartheid embedded in the economy, judiciary 
and state apparatus were not radically transformed when the ANC took power. In 
amplification to the aforementioned grounds, Terreblanche (2002) argues that 
apartheid was already in crisis and these are the factors to take into account. 
Firstly, it was the failure of apartheid to mobilise power needed to maintain the 
status quo. Secondly, it was its inability to restore stability and also the absence 
of legitimacy. Thirdly, apartheid failed to maintain conditions conductive for 
accumulation. And fourthly, sanctions were a very heavy burden.  As More 
(2011) precisely points out, ‘[e]conomic, sports, or cultural sanctions, together 
with the initial negotiations between the Afrikaner intellectuals and the ANC in 
exile on the other hand, pressured the apartheid regime into agreeing to negotiate 
with the ANC structures’. 
For institutional power relations and ideological apparatus to be understood, 
there needs to be an understanding of the totality of power. In other words, 
various manifestations, locations, expressions and effects of power should be 
understood in terms of how they operate in isolation and in tandem to create 
subjection in its complex form. De-colonial turn explicates that it is the 
institutional power that the apartheid regime did not concede, but only political 
power, that is symbolic if it is not tied with totality of power. The spirit of 
negotiated settlement predicated on the apartheid power structure did not give 
away its economic power and hegemony. This is not something that Mbembe 
diagnoses and explains, for perhaps to say the least, he sees challenges that fail to 
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bring the 1994 possibility as resting on the shoulder of the subjects, black and 
white.  
There is, for Mbembe (2008), a need to foreclose the gaps that exist between 
black and white subjects, and of course, desisting from any form of vengeance 
but transformation. With regards to transformation Mbembe (2008: 18) writes, 
‘[i]t will be a justified claim so long as South Africa can establish that it is not 
pursuing the good by violating the basic requirement of justice itself’. It is in this 
complexity that the totality of power where subjection is constituted and lived; 
and that hegemonises itself for it not to be recognisable between the relations that 
form part of the subjected and objectified, for that the notion of transformation 
and justice find themselves in the post-1994 that is of course, antithetical to both. 
At this level of this complexity, the existential crisis of the black subject having 
only one directed effect, subjection that is now hidden in structures that 
invisibilises themselves, and there is no accounting as there has not been any 
conceptual shift of what transformation and justice is for black subjects. The 
problem arises when Mbembe indicates the status quo of justice, that, its 
principle should not be violated. The concern is raised because of the lack of 
clarity in terms of justice according to whose terms since justice as it is 
institutionalised is not the formulation of black subjects.  From the perspective of 
de-colonial turn, there has not been any justice in the post-1994, but politics 
precipitated on reconciliation.  
Mbembe (2006c: 1) commends South Africa ‘from coming out of the dark age of 
white supremacy and entering, willfully or not, into a new age of diversity, 
pluralism and inclusion’. On the contrary, the symbolic order, the dominant 
narratives in the post-1994 political discourse suggest that the 1994 moment in 
South Africa was a time of realisation of liberation. The point here is that it is not 
and the clear terms should be that South Africa is a negotiated settlement. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) exposes the myths and illusion of ‘juridical freedom’ 
that is the freedom that is bottlenecked and does not translate to itself people’s 
liberation. That is to say, juridical freedom leaves the black condition the way it 
is, as the injustice are unaccounted for. It is important in relation to the 
aforementioned that there was emancipation and not liberation.  
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The society that should prevail is where liberation is lived instead of it being 
reduced to black faces in government, slogans, flags, national anthems, symbols, 
national holidays, monuments just to name but a few. De-colonial turn unmasks 
the pretention that creates the national project has been resolved, or at worse 
there are new forms of life as there is no burden of the past. This is far from the 
truth as the post-1994 ANC leadership is not informed by the national project 
that is informed by true liberation. The post-1994 is emancipation because its 
logic of operation is reformist—that is, reforming apartheid with the aim of 
creating a rainbow nation, but without dismantling the apartheid infrastructure. 
The existential crisis of the black subject for it to change, there should be 
economic rights, justice and reparations where the black majority are at the 
commanding heights of the economy and ownership of wealth. If there is a call 
for economic rights under the era that propagates civil rights, the economic rights 
will be considered radical. This means the black condition should be reformed 
with piecemeal changes while the status quo remains.  
Further still, de-colonial turn posits that the problematic presence of post-1994 
liberation, is still a plague since the illusion of emancipation has diluted the core 
ethos of liberation as the post-1994 is just a reformist initiative (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2013b). As such, it is clear that deracialisation of the economy was central rather 
than a total recreation of the new being as part of resolution of subjection of 
black subjects. Mbembe (2008: 5) agrees to say that ‘[t]o a large extent, this 
involves deraciali[s]ing the ownership of assets and cultural capital while 
reconciling the principles of equal protection, affirmative action, and 
nondiscrimination’. This is the act of emancipation as the change of the political 
situation has conditions attached to it, and as such, conditions that will not be a 
threat to the status quo. Emancipation is a child of Euro-North American 
modernity and it is about attaining civil political rights only, and devoid of 
reparations. This includes the right to vote, human rights, equality, freedom and 
justice. Though these rights are fundamental, they have the challenge of being 
translated to reality more especially in the existential condition that were, or are 
still pervaded by subjection. These are rights that are born out from the elite 
project that its end is only reformism and they do not resolve the black existential 
crisis. This is related to class not the conditions of radicalised black oppression 
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and that is why the black condition is given a scant attention or it is ignored in 
total. Emancipation can be said to be a symbolic order that is antithetical to 
fundamental change and it tolerates change at the cosmetic and symbolic level. It 
does not clarify how the subjection will be done away with; it only presents the 
sets of rights. What often occurs is the ritual of condemnation where the acts of 
subjection are declared unlawful. But then, this does not mean they will not 
occur, or form the fibre of political subjectivity by taking the hidden dimensions 
that stand beyond the legal test.  
The first priority of liberation movements should be a commitment to return the 
dignity to those who have being excluded, exploited, humiliated and 
dehumanised. This is a necessary condition to create new possibilities of a new 
society to emerge (Nursey-Bray 1980). For this society to emerge, new forms of 
life that must be lived by black subjects are the ones that do not need an elite 
project, but the liberation that is fermented and managed by the people 
themselves to realise justice and reparations. For such a liberation, ‘[t]he social 
revolution must distribute the fruits of national liberation struggle to the nation’ 
(Wright 1992:432). The post-1994 launched an elitist project of emancipation 
and that is why it haunted by the existential crisis of the black subject and the 
plague of subjection that is structural and rendering itself invisible. The post-
1994 was produced by the anti-apartheid struggle—a discourse that was 
emancipating not liberating since the end was to reform apartheid. Slaves, serfs 
and other oppressed sectors in the parts of the world were emancipated since the 
structures that were keeping them in bondage remained intact and change was 
only cosmetic.  
It is not clear from Mbembe whether the liberation movement in charge now of 
political power (the ANC) did take the right path in order to bring an absolute 
end to subjection of black subjects. This is because, since the post-1994 is, or 
was a political experiment, it can be speculated then, that the results of the 
experiments are overdue and the experiment was supposed to yield chances of 
success. If then, the experiment regards itself as a liberation project coming from 
the ‘defeat’ of apartheid it is important to briefly highlight the following in 
relation to liberation. Liberation centres on fundamental question like addressing 
the economic injustices inflicted in the black condition. It is multifaceted and 
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engages issues like land and psychological liberation. The bourgeois imagined 
liberation does not have the capacity to imagine the total overhauling of anti-
black structures that perpetuate the black condition. It is such a lack of 
imagination that makes liberation to be an illusion since it intends to only reform 
the colonial infrastructure instead of dismantling it. It is this repetition that signal 
and brings to bear the betrayal of liberation that is managed by the black 
comprador bourgeois who capture the state power, manage it and fail to 
fundamentally change it in line with the aspirations that informed liberation.  
De-colonial turn exposes a scandal that it is the oppressor who must always 
emancipate, for that liberation is considered too radical if it brings the colonial 
infrastructure to a total collapse. It is for this reason that liberation is the 
invention of the new self and as far as the black condition is concerned it means 
the end of it. Mbembe (2011b) advocates emancipation where in which the 
subjects are said to possess agency and as such, being morally obligated in the 
political transaction of responsibility to avoid the repetition of violent acts and 
events. For Mbembe, what matters in the emancipator possibility is the 
generative force of life propelled by the possibility of ‘the pursuit of truth as a 
form of struggle in and of itself’ (Mbembe 2011b: 1).  
The post-1994 has not yet produced a new being and the existence of the black 
subject in the mould of liberation is not the one that must be given life by 
whiteness, for that liberation cannot be given. The post-1994 is a reform since 
there is no start towards genuine liberation; and the notion that there is no 
alternative pervades the neoliberal emancipatory pretensions of the 1994 
‘victory’. It is this victory that does not speak to the aspiration and the content of 
liberation in that it aims to reform the racial and exploitative apartheid 
infrastructure. This is where there is a tendency of a regression effect that means 
to move from better to worse and enriching the few, while leaving many in 
perpetual state of suffering—the existential crisis of the black subject. The post-
1994 with its absence of the liberation project failed to open the vistas of creating 
a new being out of the ashes of the existential crisis of the black subjects.  
Although the black subject in South Africa have been given political rights, these 
rights do not translate into a means for dismantling the legacy of apartheid, 
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which remains evident in the black existential conditions, which are a scandal if 
they are to be put squarely with liberation that the post-1994 propagates. As an 
elite project, the national liberation struggle underwent an embourgeoisement 
that culminated in a negotiated settlement that is now equated with liberation. In 
the post-1994 era democratisation, black depoliticisation and pacification has led 
to liberation becoming a mere illusion. Although South Africa celebrates the 
post-1994 era as a triumph of democracy, its history is still too closely bound up 
with colonialism, racial segregation and apartheid (Pillay 2004). Liberation 
cannot occur when those who are in the black condition are brutally crushed by 
the state apparatus when they demand conditions of a better life and basic needs 
notwithstanding. It has become normalised in the post-1994 era for the police to 
shoot and even kill unarmed protesters who demand basic services such as water, 
electricity, RDP houses (free  houses provided by government), wage increases, 
and even toilets. 
The idea of South Africa in the context of post-1994 settlement brought hope and 
expectations of fundamental change, suffered the regression of euphoria like any 
other form of cosmetic change. This repetition of past patterns signals and brings 
to the fore the betrayal of liberation that is managed by a black comprador elite, 
whose sole aspiration is to capture state power and manage it, and in doing so fail 
to fundamentally change it in line with the aspirations that informed liberation. 
For de-colonial turn to be effected the black condition must not only 
symbolically disappear, but must also disappear in realistic terms. Economic 
freedom, reparations and justice must ensure that collective goods benefit all 
people, not only small black elites. Thus far in South Africa, there has been a 
consistent failure to bring about a total end to subjection suffered by the black 
majority trapped in subjection that creates the existential crisis.   
By contrast, the post-1994 is the elite project where liberation is that of the few at 
the exclusion of black subjects and society has been the way it is. The post-1994 
era is fraught with the existential crisis of the black subject which is the 
predicament and something that is inherited from apartheid. The latter of course, 
by being inherited is given a human face through neo-apartheid with the ANC as 
the managers of the project. The post-1994 has a romantic view that is premised 
on the notion that diverse people unite to create a rainbow nation. This will not 
356 
 
continue indefinitely and for the rainbow to transform there should be incentives 
to think in unitary terms. The black existential condition must not symbolically 
vanish, but vanish in realistic terms. Economic freedom, reparations and justice 
must ensure that collective goods by people to benefit not a few black elite. 
There has been a consistent failure to bring a total end to the black condition.   
If this can be applied to the ANC, it can be argued that it typifies the masses as 
people who cannot exist without them, but while in power the ANC leaders 
neglect the masses. This can be related to a situation where the ANC knows that 
it negotiated for emancipation and it will be hard for it to be toppled by other 
political parties since it has the majority of support from the masses. In relation 
to the existential crisis of black subjects in the post-1994, who are dispossessed 
and excluded, they are caught in the political reality where they often ask 
peripheral questions. These questions relate to service delivery, human rights, 
wages among others and most of the black subjects rarely articulate questions in 
relation to their condition and demand answers to them (Maldonado-Torres 
2008a). Maldonado-Torres points out different attitudes of blacks in relation to 
their condition. These include the silent subjugation of the black subjects. Firstly, 
the black subject will see their black condition as normal and having nothing to 
do with the structures that seek to dehumanise them. Secondly, there will be 
those black who will formulate the project of assimilation and they will be quick 
to condemn those who point out at racism or other forms of discrimination. In 
this sense, liberation means absence of racism and nothing should be mentioned 
about it. Lastly, there are seemingly revolutionary black subjects who affirm the 
value of blackness in categorical terms. Such black subjects will use the 
seductive language of race to gain inclusion in the white economy at the 
exclusion of the black majority. The accommodationists always assume the 
contradictory position and it always haunts them, but they suppress it—a form of 
stoicism—bad faith par excellence (Kamara and Van der Meer 2007).  
Liberation as a tenant point of de-colonial turn means that the violence structured 
and justified to attack the black body becomes obsolete. If this is not the case, 
freedom and liberty can be non-existent and the slave cannot be non-existent. 
Freire (1972) argues that the precondition for liberation is that the oppressed 
must confront their reality by objecting it and acting upon that reality. This is 
357 
 
only possible if the oppressed only agitate for genuine liberation become the 
antithesis of the black condition. This means that the oppressed should be part of 
the process of liberation and it should not be something that is mediated on their 
behalf. Exclusions mean their objection because they are acted upon. In this state 
of affairs they will be led into ‘the populist pitfall and transform them into 
masses that can be manipulated’ (Freire 1972:41). Kamara and Van der Meer 
(2007:384) argue that ‘[o]nce the slave resist or refuses to accept his (or her) 
condition the relationship is forever transformed’.  
In the post-1994 era, blacks are a political majority, but in economic terms, they 
are marginalised, with only a few members of a black elite included in the 
mainstream of the economy. If the post-1994 era is plagued by the black 
existential crisis, it means that apartheid was reformed on the basis of continuing 
its legacy by means of this pseudo-liberation. For Mbembe there is no pseudo-
liberation, but rather, the democratic experiment gone wrong, but with the hope 
of it producing the politics of possibility (Mbembe 2011b). The post-1994 South 
Africa is yet to give birth to liberation beyond the fake flag freedoms that do not 
address the lived experience of the black majority who are still trapped in the 
hellish black condition. To them liberation is just a rumour. Mbembe (2011b: 4) 
correctly notes that ‘the self-understanding of South African society should also 
be read against a long history of black dispossession’. This, therefore, serves as 
testimony to the fact that there needs to be liberation not emancipation that is 
symbolic as it only gives reconciliatory gestures that cannot change the 
concealed structures of subjection that are the antithesis of black humanity. But 
then, de-colonial turn still shows that it still remains a challenge for Mbembe to 
spell out how the black subject can be liberated, by itself and for itself.  
The racial phase of ‘frontier accumulation’  
The idea of South African should be understood in terms of dispossession and 
accumulation. Mbembe (2011a) argues that ‘frontier accumulation’, in its new 
phase, is made possible by the 1994 negotiated settlement. Both of them are 
engaged in the excessive mode of mobility, where in that the rich are getting 
richer and the poor getting destitute. Mbembe remarks thus: 
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Although a lot remains to be done, blacks are visible in positions of leadership, 
affluence, and influence in almost every sector of South African life (government, 
business, industry, banking and commerce, higher education, health, media and so 
on) (Mbembe 2008: 5). 
Mbembe also concedes to say that: 
Black South Africans still command less than 5 percent of the national economy of 
South Africa. Racial and gender imbalances in the distribution of wealth, income, 
and opportunity are still the rule. Too many poor blacks are still not in a position to 
create something meaningful for their lives (Mbembe 2008: 6).  
The latter statement point to the reality of South Africa, and how black subjects, 
though the ruling party is possessing political power that it can use to effect 
change, are still at the negative receiving end. Its existential crisis still exists, and 
that is, the dispossession of land, labour and humanity. The ANC with is political 
power can change the situation, but then, it chooses not to do so. Though  there 
are said to be exceptions, with some few blacks in the commanding heights of 
the economy, with little or no capital power at all to a lesser extent, this possess 
the limit of them being the representatives of the black subjects as a whole, but 
only themselves. This is because, the sphere of life that black subjects have part 
and access in, are far from being from justice since the logic of subjection is till 
the moral fibre that informs these sectors of the South Africa life. It is in these 
sectors where black aspirations are denied, contested and where the logic of 
power resides, though implicit, but also expressive.  
Mbembe does not explicitly point out to subjection, and de-colonial turn exposes 
it as something that comes through hegemony and domination, since these 
sectors are the spaces where white power is felt. It is clear that black subjects 
who are in the commanding heights of these sectors do not have power as 
Mbembe would like us to believe. The change that is said to be is there, falls 
short if it is the change that has to be looked in relation to the existential 
conditions of the black subjects. In other words, the nature of that change does 
not make a greater proportion in relation to black subjects who are trapped in 
dispossession. Even at the political level, the ANC does not wield that much 
power in term of it doing justice to the majority of black subjects. Its political 
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power is limited in so far as it must ensure to keep the status quo intact. In other 
words, the change that can be charted as far as black subjects are concerned is yet 
to come and it is not the one that informs the logic of the post-1994 political 
reality.   
De-colonial turn is essential in that the black condition persists indefinitely even 
when liberation is claimed to be in place, with some occasional cosmetic 
changes. The black subject is placed in the existential condition where difficult 
questions that centre on historical injustice, reparations and the demand for land 
are necessary to ask. Post-1994 South Africa under ANC rule does not have the 
political will or imagination to bring about fundamental changes, for fear that 
this will disturb the status quo. In the post-1994 political discourse, the curses of 
racism, land dispossession and the monopoly of capital are not engaged directly. 
There is silence, or in absence of it, self-censorship on these fundamental 
questions, that are considered sensitive. As a result, this pretence is a mere 
sleight of hand, claiming to defend one of the most progressive Constitution and 
deepening democracies in the world, whilst in fact, there is existential crisis of 
the black subjects. 
The contention here is to understand the idea of South Africa as the racial 
industrial complex of frontier accumulation. This industrial complex explains 
how South Africa is racially embedded in terms what it means to have and to 
have less or at worse, to have nothing at all. To have nothing at all is of course, 
the life of being clutched by subjection, where the poor are black subjects who, 
as Mbembe (2011b) notes, are turned into waste. This can be described as like 
the human system where black are consumed through the economy of extraction, 
exploitation, accumulation, labour to name a few, and then be digested and then 
excreted as waste. These pathologies affect blacks who are trapped in squalid 
conditions and they are condemned to the life of non-existence in the hell-holes 
like townships, shacks and free houses referred to as RDP houses. When the 
black majority rise and protest to make legitimate and basic demands such as 
demanding basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation and housing, they 
are met with police brutality. This clearly shows that the legacy of the past is still 
haunting those at the bottom of society.   
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The revolution or liberation is betrayed, since there is absence of those ideas that 
were the driving force. Therefore, another language, the language of capital is 
engaged upon. Nevertheless, this is an antithesis to overcoming the black 
condition since these very same black elites do not understand in clear terms the 
language of capital since they are not the creators of capital or its forces of 
production. The racial complex of frontier accumulation is parasitic to black 
subjects, who are deprived of life and who, in their search of life, render their life 
as a commodity in order to survive.  
But that wealth, poverty and property have become essential to the self-
understanding of South African society after liberation should also be read against a 
long history of black dispossession. In the new phase of “frontier” accumulation 
made possible by the 1994 negotiated settlement, the have become the new idioms 
for political and normative arguments about what should be the proper relation of 
people to things; what should be the proper relation of people to each other with 
respects to things; how much property is enough for one person and how much is too 
much; how much is justifiable especially for the opulent in an environment where 
hunger and debasement are all too real for many  (Mbembe 2011b: 4). 
The racial industrial complex of frontier accumulation is informed by 
unstoppable excess. The regulation and absence of excess is regarded as that 
which renders it unworkable. So, this industrial complex has no sense of 
accountability and distribution as Mbembe correctly notes. The dramatic sites of 
contestation, as Mbembe (2011b) argues are fractures around those who have 
property and those who do not. The latter are of course, the black majority whom 
subjection has rendered them dispossessed and as such in lack of being. This 
fracture is racially embedded, and that is something that explains the presence of 
the past in the present that is likely to remain unaltered in the future. In  this 
form, subjection is still with the black subjects who are mostly dispossessed and 
their forms of life being the one clouded with anger, for that the hope of the 
euphoria is something that did not materialise as the existential conditions 
remained the same.  
If anything, these whites are doing better today, economically speaking, than ever 
before. To be sure, they lost political power. But they did not die as a class. In most 
instances, they can still use their economic muscle and social capital to co-opt an 
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increasingly predatory elite, therefore gaining the upper hand, to the point of turning 
the “transformation project” to their own advantage (Mbembe 2008: 15). 
De-colonial turn brings to the fore that the racial industrial complex of frontier 
accumulation should be explained in terms of who are the functionaries of it, 
who benefits and through what form of relations between those who are 
privileged and those who are dispossessed. Apartheid was racist and so as 
capital, and this is facilitated the reality of privilege and dispossession. The post-
1994 era that is said to be the radical break from apartheid has not delinked itself 
from capital. According to Mbembe (2008: 15), ‘[t]he end of apartheid, however, 
has not affected the structural positions the white propertied class enjoyed during 
the period of white supremacy’. It then produced its form of small group of black 
elites who are in service of white elite, since the logic of accumulation is 
beneficial to the latter. Both the black elite and the white elites are grounded on 
the logic of using the body of black subjects as sites for extraction. This is how 
the racial industrial complex of frontier accumulation is constituted. The same 
results of accumulation by and/or dispossession exist. 
 
The black elite class arose in a situation where the white oligarchy was willing to 
make some concession to open their capital caste a bit for black capitalist to eat, 
but the condition that they leave the white economic power intact. Since the 
black elites are parasitic to the state and white capital, the two that are their 
material bases for accumulation, it is essential therefore, to render these black 
subjects a cog in the machine. They are the appendages of the racial industrial 
complex of frontier accumulation. It is in this configuration that black subjects 
are understood as having been active participants through complicity and 
collaboration through subjection; and this therefore, absolves whites from 
responsibility of accumulation and dispossession. The path to accumulation is the 
one that should extract from the very same black subjects, by white subjects and 
their black collaborators alike. The path of black accumulation has been 
somehow similar to some extent to that of the English and Afrikaner elite, who 
were assisted by the state that played a very interventionist role to exclude the 
black majority in the playing field. They would always take the easy option of 
leaving the structures of the white capital untransformed. ‘In other words, the 
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fundamental logic of the apartheid and colonial economy would remain intact as 
few blacks were allowed to accumulate and consume at the rate of old white 
capital’ (Mngxitama 2010: 1). The ANC, of course, serves as the protector of 
these interests by making a few to blunder and excluding the majority of black 
subjects. This serves the interests of the white oligarchy and ‘it is a method 
perfected by the [white] oligarchy to placate the political elites and to by 
protection’ (Mbembe 2008: 11). Mbembe is correct to note that this creates 
inequality among blacks and reproduces similar structures to that of apartheid.  
 
From the standpoint of de-colonial turn, the positionality of the black subject in 
the post-1994 is subjection. Being in the coal-face of struggling against 
subjection and struggling to have a right to exist, the material conditions of the 
black subject are indeed, the state of depletion. Mbembe makes this observation: 
I was struck by the extent to that, here, capitalist forms of accumulation have reached 
deep in society, and prominent place given to structures of private property and to 
the legal regimes set up to ensure permanence (Mbembe 2007: 165).  
The form of life is divided between those who have good life and those who are 
in the state of permanent existential crisis. It is essential to state that black 
subjects are not better from subjection by the virtue of their material status. For 
Mbembe, this could have not come as a surprise knowing the extent through that 
subjection masks itself in order to ensure continuity and the state of permanence. 
Therefore, Mbembe could have just stated how, if necessary, this logic of 
accumulation and dispossession can come to an end, not only in symbolic terms 
as it were, but in real terms. De-colonial turn shows that existential conditions 
should fundamentally change and the material status does not guarantee that 
there will be no subjection. Subjection is racialised, and if it is looked in relation 
to the racial industrial complex of frontier accumulation, whether driven by black 
or whites, those who suffer are only the black majority. So it is clear that even 
though there is proliferation of vulgar capitalism, and the speedy accumulative 
excess from blacks who are in the private sector and the public sector, this does 
not mean the improvement of the dispossessed and deprived black majority. This 
mobility widens the forms of life, and that is why South Africa is regarded as the 
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most unequal society in the world. The politics of plenty and the politics of 
scarcity or nothingness exist side by side. Mbembe writes: 
It is this tension between what looks like an unstoppable logic of unproductive 
excess on the one hand and on the other hand, a logic of scarcity and depletion that is 
turning wealth and property into dramatic sites of contestation (Mbembe 2011b: 4). 
Mbembe (2007: 164) remarks that ‘the gradual consumption of the life of the 
poorest served as the kindling to the plenitude of the wealthy’. For Mbembe this 
is caused by the material inequalities that exists, and that by the manner of the 
constitution and expression, pander on the logic of apartheid accumulation and 
dispossession. As such, this mean that black subjects who are part of this crusade 
that consumes the black poor, through exploitation and plunder, do in fact 
conduct a form of violence that perpetuates the state of material inequality. 
Mbembe (2006a) refers to this logic as ‘radical predation’ where extraction, 
consumption and excretion are part of the political.  
 
However, the post-1994 state with a black political administration has not 
dethroned white capital, because here white capitalists have not been overtaken 
by black elites who even fear to antagonise it. This clearly shows that the post-
1994 is complex in that the black elite are inclusionary, while the English and 
Afrikaner capitalists were exclusionary. The paradox is, the black elite have no 
capital since they were given birth by white capital that they cannot destroy. This 
makes them weak and they will be in the same post-colonial conundrum that 
pervades the African continent where they are unproductive, parasitic and 
exhibitionist. Alexander (2004) argues that the black elite do not reflect 
blackness and they cannot change white capital, but the latter is the force that 
masticates and swallows them. She argues that this creates a situation where 
blacks have no space and they must function in the manner that warrants white 
guidance and supervision.  De-colonial turn reveals how the lives of the black 
elites are a fiction since they are embedded in a fashion parade and prestigious 
luncheon. The lifestyle of the black elite is an embodiment of consumption 
characterised by a lifestyle of opulence and greasy political wealth that has no 
foundation since it is dependent on political power and parasitic to white capital 
by systematically excluding the black majority. This accumulation was facilitated 
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through structural violence, systematic exclusion, dispossession and exploitation. 
It is on this basis that race was used as the organising principle, with the state 
playing a maximal and interventionist role to create and sustain the white elite.  
 
In the post-1994 era, white capital is immune, since the discourse of this era 
focuses on forgiveness of the past, as opposed to a claim to justice and 
reparations due to blacks. The discourse of corruption is racialised and selective, 
in that it institutionalises, naturalises and normalises the corruption of white 
capital. It is considered almost blasphemous to question the past and present 
accumulation of white capital. The present accumulation is criminalised, whereas 
the previous accumulation is immune from scrutiny. It is not only whites who 
monitor the moves of the black elite. The black majority who are trapped in the 
black condition also monitor the emergence of the black elite. The predicament 
of the black elite is the question of nearness to white capital. Any black person 
emerging from the black condition or means of accumulation is placed under 
severe scrutiny by the media. When they try to move out of the hellish black 
condition, they are constantly questioned. The discourse of corruption is similar 
to a speed trap that aims to regulate black mobility.   
It is important to note that corruption is not condoned. The discourse of 
corruption should not be racialised towards black subjects, and since apartheid 
was a grand project of white corruption there is nothing said about it, and also the 
beneficiaries of that project. Modes of accumulation, both before and after 1994, 
should be criminalised if evidence of corruption is found. The notion of primitive 
accumulation should, therefore, however be criminalised as a whole, since it is, 
by its very nature, corrupt. Furthermore, it is also embedded in capitalism that is 
ontologically corrupt. If South Africa is a capitalist system, the logic of primitive 
accumulation will always operate. It is also essential to note that capitalism is 
racist, and therefore, ontologically corrupt. Is there any other path to 
accumulation rather than primitive accumulation in the capitalist system? The 
issue is structures such as white capital were not dislodged during the transition, 
but were rather entrenched. These structures perpetuate primitive accumulation, a 
process that in itself produces similar results of corruption and inequality. The 
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debate that is not present and that is needed in South Africa is one on ethical 
modes of accumulation.   
However, the neglect of the poor black majority and them being made invisible 
in the projection of wealth is the reality that exists. According to Mbeki (2009), 
the detachment of the black elite from the black majority is indeed the 
detachment from the economy itself since their role and presence preserves white 
capital. According to Mbembe (2011b), there are moral questions around the 
notion of lifestyle and accountability. These are informed by the relations of 
defining life itself, and including the value of life, something that should account 
to the existential conditions of the black subjects. It is clear that in the post-1994 
era, the relationship between the black subject, property and privilege is 
something that border of complexity and moral blackmail. The frontier of 
accumulation is not something that began in the post-1994, or made possible by 
it, even during the apartheid era. The majority of blacks were excluded from 
economy, politics and social life. The domain exclusiveness of whiteness, that 
created privilege that is not accounted for, but defended through race denialism, 
and the Constitutional moral arguments, is something that needs to be explained. 
The Constitution is not for all, and in particular for black subjects as they are 
under subjection that is said to have a vibrant democracy while they are under 
subjection.  
Wealth is something that is criminalised when it comes to black subjects and 
normalised when it comes to white subjects. White capitalists are not seen as a 
site of decay, greed, corruption and those of the darker hue are. The logic behind 
this is that white capitalists by the virtue of being white can be trusted with 
power, wealth and property. As Steyn and Foster (2008: 42) argue, ‘[t]he 
insistence that wealth and power are unsafe in the hands of black people carries 
the subtext that these were one in more trustworthy hands, and should be left 
there’. The apartheid infrastructure remains intact and nothing was done to 
overhaul it, except to bring few blacks to eat the crumbs of the wealth generated 
from exploitation and denigration of black subjects. The accumulation of wealth 
in the post-1994 follows the very same path of dispossessing, exploiting black 
subjects. The legacy of the apartheid, through structural and institutional 
arrangements remains intact since the spatial settlement patterns remain the same 
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with few blacks gaining the point of access. This is made possible by the 
presence and the establishment of the oligarchs who have been, and who are still 
in control of the economy. Terreblanche has this to say: 
The democratic part of the system (controlled by the leadership are of the ANC) is 
too weak, too constrained, too underdeveloped, too hesitant, and too uncertain of 
itself when compared with the capitalist part (controlled by the managerial elite of 
the corporate sector), that is too strong, too developed, too modern and sophisticated, 
too globalised, and too dominant (Terreblanche 2002: 456). 
Terreblanche presses on to add that: 
This system cannot rectify the repression, social destruction, exploitation, and 
maladministration of the past 350 years. It cannot bring about the sorely needed 
socio-economic transformation, and cannot guarantee the long term stability and 
legitimacy of South Africa’s new democracy (Terreblanche 2002: 456). 
The political power of the ANC, as Mbembe (2008) posits, is not the one that 
penetrates the nucleus of the economy. As such, such political power even lacks 
the capacity to have an impact on the economic power in the sense that it is the 
power corrupted by it. As such, the logic of subjection, with black subjects as 
victims is perpetuated and the economic power is still not in the hands of black 
subjects who are in majority. The ANC does not have the political imagination to 
have a situation where black subjects who are its main supporters are indeed in 
charge of the economy. The ANC lacks the audacity to transform and to expand 
political imagination beyond their negotiated liberation that settles only in 
political freedom. Mbeki (2009) points to the establishment of New Africa 
Investment Limited that was formed before the ANC won political power in 
1994. This formation was not seen as the broader project where the black 
majority will have access to the economy, but a few black wanting inclusions in 
the racial industrial complex of accumulation. The initiatives like Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) were also made part of the post-1994 political 
reality, but it only saw itself as beneficial for few blacks. According to Mbeki:  
The object[ive] of BEE was to co-opt leaders of the black resistance movement by 
literally buying them off with what looked like a transfer to them of massive asserts 
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at no cost. To the oligarchs, of course, these assets were small change (Mbeki 2009: 
67). 
The black elite in the post-1994 era run what Mitrovic (2010: 4) refers to as 
‘bandit economy’, that is politically, structurally and developmentally 
untransformed. Mitrovic states that this stems from the fact that these neo-elites 
accept their former oppressors to be their mentors. As a result, instead of 
bringing about radical reform, this transitional state results in ‘mass 
unemployment, enormous exploitation, social inequalities, [and] the rise in social 
contradiction’ (Mitrovic 2010: 4). The apartheid state was a form of racial 
capitalism since the economic arrangements benefit the white life and few blacks 
at the exclusion of the black majority. The ‘trickledown effect’ of capitalism is 
something that is justified, while in fact there is opulent consumption. The desire 
to accumulate more wealth at the expense of the poor is the moral code of 
primitive accumulation that is embedded in capitalism. So the capitalist mode of 
production must always be present to create an enabling environment for 
primitive accumulation. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues:  
A few black people were able to take advantage of favourable state policies such as 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Affirmative Action (AA) to climb up the 
social and economic ladder into the middle stratum/middle class status. Examples 
include Cyril Ramaphosa, Patrice Motsepe, Irvin Khoza and others termed the ‘black 
diamonds’. These people were used by dominant white groups as showcases to 
counter accusations of racial discrimination and to hide continuations of racial 
discrimination (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b: 142). 
De-colonial turn clearly illustrates how and  why a few trusted natives who are 
not a threat to the white capital will be co-opted to run the untransformed 
economy and eating the leftovers of the capital since they do not drive the 
economy and producing the capital. The spatial economy that breeds and 
perpetuates inequalities between black and whites and among blacks is 
something that leaves majority of blacks at a disadvantage. The logic behind the 
co-optation of a few black into white capital is to create parasitic black elite. The 
ANC are gatekeepers and body guards of white privilege and they serve white 
interests. Fanon amplifies this view thus: 
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Seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it 
consists, prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and a 
capitalism, rampant through camouflaged, that today puts on the masque of neo-
colonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the 
Western bourgeoisie’s business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes 
in a most dignified manner (Fanon 1990 [1961]: 122).  
Mbeki (2009) agrees with this outlook and states that the wrongdoer will not pay 
reparations while still maintaining a privileged position. Mbeki raises a red flag 
for a brief moment when it comes to reparations issuing a sterling warning in the 
problematic relationship that the black elite have with the state. The black elite 
will see themselves as sole beneficiaries at the expense of the black majority. The 
questions of property, wealth and accumulation run in the logic of accumulating 
by dispossession. According to Mbembe (2011b: 4) ‘[w]ealth and property also 
operate as means of regulating access to resources that are scares for some and 
plentiful for others’. Being reduced to mere managers, they have no control or 
ownership of the economy. The black elites are indebted to, and parasitic to 
white capital, as such; they are not liberated from its logic of accumulation as 
dispossession (Bonefeld 2001). What is present in the post-1994 then is the black 
elite, who benefit from capitalism by perpetuating the exclusions of the black 
majority the same way with colonialism, segregation and apartheid. The rise and 
consolidation of the black elite is not a threat to white capital. It is the black elite 
who often display their wealth from only a fraction in the larger context of the 
excluded black majority. To gain access to white capital, the manipulation of 
tenders and cutting deals is means through which the majority of black elites 
become part of the economy. Mbeki (2009: 61) argues that the ‘BEE creates a 
small class of unproductive but wealthy black crony capitalists made up of ANC 
politicians’.        
The interests of the white capital in the post-1994 era were and are guaranteed in 
apartheid and that even in the post-1994 era white privilege remains untouched. 
However, this is far from articulating how structures of white capital should be 
dismantled, for the economy to benefit and work in favour of addressing the 
black majority. The black elite will continue to be an oxymoron as long as they 
do not produce, redistribute and own capital. The black elite serve white 
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economic interests, and it is in these terms that they are a buffer zone that 
effectively blocks black aspirations. Nevertheless, when it comes to its 
enjoyment, this should be done in a just and equitable manner. The black elite are 
not concerned with the well-being of the black majority; the latter who are 
excluded and marginalised. The black elite are ashamed of the black majority 
and thus, they seek inclusion into whiteness. It is in this inclusion where the 
black elite will project their success on behalf of the whole black majority whom 
they are ashamed to relate with. The black elite, therefore, become exhibitionist, 
and as a result, this situation allows for the downplaying of the serious condition 
of neglect and for exclusions that are part of the black misery to lose effect.  
They cannot create a condition where there are new ways of life that are 
necessary to bring fundamental change to the oppressed. As a result, they will 
end up as oppressors and will witch-hunt those who question their self-interested 
and contradictory lives. That is, the colonial world will be reinforced and what is 
regarded as liberation will be a mere illusion as things will remain the same for 
those who are oppressed. Mbembe (2011b) argues that the notion of wealth and 
property is intrinsically linked to bodily life. It is not clear from Mbembe’s view 
whether this is the positionality of the body of the black subjects. The emergence 
of the black elite in the post-1994 happened in tandem with the exacerbation of 
the injustices inflicted upon the black subjects. The continued structures of 
oppression, exploitation and exclusion are part of the legacy of apartheid, and the 
post-1994 is the neo-apartheid that is managed by black elites at the political 
level. These structures have their form of life in property and in wealth.  
 
The white oligarchy, the possessor of white capital, has been commanding the 
South African economy during and after apartheid and who are not mentioned 
when there is an outcry about the rise or the existence of the black elite who 
plunder and steal. There is silence about the white rich who live in a safe heaven, 
where in that their accumulation and possession of plenty is not questioned. This 
is not seen as corruption, but meritocracy. To remedy corruption in the post-1994 
one of the popularised intervention introduced by Congress of South African 
Trade Union (COSATU) was that of the ‘lifestyle audits’. The motive behind this 
call was to ensure accountability, transparency and clean governance among 
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political leaders and black elites alike. This was in the wake of continuous 
awarding of tenders to a politically connected few and the culture of graft and 
corruption that has taken root in the ANC. Thus lifestyle audit is seen as an 
antidote to graft and corruption, and this call was welcomed by various section of 
society. The focus is how much do the black elite consume, loot, and spend—and 
far perhaps, how they impoverish those who are excluded and dispossessed. The 
concern of COSATU is that then black elite who are parasitic engage in 
corruption to maintain their lifestyles.  
The discourse of the lifestyle audit is limited in the sense that it does not audit 
cross-sectionally. The white elites seem to be left out and their modes of 
accumulation and lifestyles are not interrogated or will not be subjected to 
lifestyle audits. The historical mapping of South Africa clearly shows the role of 
the state played in helping English and Afrikaner races respectively to 
accumulate capital whilst simultaneously excluding, exploiting and dispossessing 
black blacks. The creation and the consolidation of white elites happened on the 
basis of maximal state intervention with capitalism as the economic logic. The 
state played a maximal role, both in Anglican and Afrikaner elite formation and 
consolidation and the state was a means of accumulation. The South African 
state of the past was used to advance, protect and entrench white privilege 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b).    
 
It is clear as de-colonial turn unmasks the fact that under the former white 
regimes, capital accumulation and consolidation of white elites was not regarded 
as corruption. Nor does Mbembe come out to condemn white corruption that is 
being normalised and having the connotation that white elites are immune from 
corruption. However, in the post-1994 era, the discourse of corruption has 
become racialised since numerous senior figures of the ruling party have been 
implicated in corrupt practices that  resemble that of  the white elite, the 
difference being that the black elites are, at worse, parasitic. The discourse of 
corruption is located only in the post-1994 era and creates an impression that 
corruption is a recent phenomenon. The English and the Afrikaner South African 
states and the emergence and conduct of the white elites are not regarded as 
corrupt. Even those who were advocating apartheid have changed the terms of 
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the debate in the post-1994 era claiming that the past should be forgotten and 
there should not be any discussion about race and white privilege. This can be 
seen as a deliberate to create a midst or even to erect walls to trace the roots of 
white capital and how it is being allowed to operate in the contemporary.  
The Native Club and the silent scandal 
According to Mbembe (2006d: 4), ‘[a] real danger for South Africa today is that 
the country may be sliding back into a situation where, once again, the language 
of racial destiny becomes so all-encompassing as to render impossible other 
ways of connecting the various fragments of the nation’. The formation of the 
Native Club in 2006 elicited controversy regarding its role and relevance post-
1994 constitutional democracy. The formation occurred in a country that is 
claimed to be democratic—but the reaction to this formation being that of calling 
it to come to an end. Mbembe (2006d) in outright dismissal of the Native Club 
argues that it is never attached to any concrete social and political programme of 
reform; it can never be a progressive force. Nowhere in the discourse of the post-
1994 era has the idea of black intellectuals in wanting to define themselves 
emerged as strongly as in the politics of the Native Club that was housed in the 
Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA). This is how Maloka (2006: 1) frames it, 
‘the Native Club is simply a movement, or rather a network, of a section of our 
country's intelligentsia that is “gatvol” with the dominance that whites continue 
to enjoy in our knowledge production sector’. The contribution was that posits a 
key role not only in the realm of ideas, ‘but also in the many struggles against 
inequality, exploitation and oppression’ (Maloka 2006: 1).  
As already mentioned, the formation of the Native Club arose out of a belief that 
there were no organised black intellectuals, based on the fact that although there 
are black intellectuals in some intellectual circles, their agenda was not in line 
with the aspirations of black subjects. So, the formation of the Native Club was 
indeed de-colonial turn in that black subjects created their own platform to 
deliberate on their own issues and in their own terms. Seepe (2007a) also adds 
that the formation of the Native Club was a sharp relief in the environment where 
political engagement, more especially that of black subjects has suffered a 
withdrawal. According to Seepe, the formation created a meaningful dialogue 
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between and among black intellectuals. Mamdani (1999) amplifies this view by 
noting that black intellectuals should engage in a re-awakening of thought, and 
be drivers of social change. The Native Club as Adebajo (2006: 13) amplifies 
this, to say, the Native Club is the generative force of that mobilises and 
consolidates the intelligentsia as a social forces to promote the ideas of 
transformation, networking and researching. Adebajo states that these are all 
unobjectionable goals that one would assume most reasonable people readily 
embrace.  
Mbembe (2006d) contends that the Native Club is dangerous project as it ‘shifts 
away from the project of non-racialism to a re-segregation of the public sphere’. 
For Mbembe to argue that the Native Club will never be a progressive force, 
while it has not been given a chance to exist, and also to ignore its objectives, 
that concretise social and political programmes, this means Mbembe engages in 
sheer criminalisation of the Native Club. Though Mbembe states that the South 
African landscape is caught between white denialism and black victimhood, the 
Native Club should also be understood as the necessary agent for change in its 
own terms, and the existence of subjection. So, for the Native Club not to exist 
while there is subjection, and also, various forms of grievances, this amounts to 
injustice. For Mbembe (2006d) to even suggest that the Native Club will always 
repeat the sorry state history it pretends to redress is suggest that there will be no 
change and repetition, whereas there has never been such a formative or initiative 
in post-1994 South Africa is to put the cart before the horse.  
The Native Club that was accused of reverse racism, arose out of the belief that 
there was no black intellectualism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). This chorus of 
reverse racism is not concerned about the objectives of the Native Club, but 
rather, the concern of black subjects meeting on their own and in their own 
terms. The engagement of the discourse of the Native Club that arose among 
other think-tanks that were formed both before and after 1994 and is necessary to 
establish why there was such an uproar concerning the founding of the Native 
Club. According to Masango (2009:2), the source of the furore surrounding the 
formation of the Native Club was ‘its perceived link to the ruling party and the 
office of then President Thabo Mbeki’. This link is because of the chairman of 
the Native Club and the advisor to Thabo Mbeki, Titus Mafolo. Masango states 
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that much of the commentary concerned the motives and the relevance of the 
Native Club. This might also imply that, the Native Club was supposed to 
explain itself and justify its existence. This is typical, and as de-colonial turn 
explicates, in the oppressive milieu the black subject must always justify itself. 
No wonder the response to it has been unnecessarily vitriolic, and the 
popularised liberal sentiment that black subjects are already in power and 
therefore, they do not need the racially exclusive organisation (Adebajo 2006).  
One of the things that is said to be a controversy surrounding the Native Club is 
that Thabo Mbeki was seen as the brain behind its formation that allowed it to 
operate as the alleged presidential initiative and as an ANC project. Seepe 
(2006:9) explains that the ‘Native Club is a presidential project that aims to 
realise a vibrant critical consciousness among Africans’. Seepe (2000) states that 
when Mbeki raised the question about the whereabouts of black intellectuals, he 
was searching for those who shared his views and not for critics. It will be argued 
here that Mbeki challenged black intellectuals to define themselves, and called 
on them to engage in critical issues facing society. The popularised warning has 
been that the Native Club could be reduced to a mere apologetic platform, loyal 
to the president, instead of being a robust intellectual platform. Although Mbeki 
made it publicly known that everyone was welcome to join the Native Club, 
there was still resistance from whites that can be attributed to the word ‘native’. 
Roberts (2007) argues that Mbeki corrected the inaccurate perception that the 
Native Club was subordinate to him, as exemplified by Gumede (2007), who 
regarded the Native Club as an invitation-only club of black intellectuals and 
argues that everything was ‘presidentialised’, as the office of the president was 
given more powers. 
It is evident that what was of concern and what Mbeki raised in particular, was 
the absence of black intellectuals in determining and shaping the agenda of the 
political discourse and the direction of the country (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). In 
amplifying this view, Masango writes: 
In many speeches he had presented at various forums, former President Thabo 
Mbeki, consistently asked the black intelligentsia to be more visible and vocal in the 
socio-political arena. Mbeki had not only made the call in South Africa, but 
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throughout the continent as well. In one of his earliest attempts to call for the 
vigorous participation of intellectuals, Mbeki used the forum of [the] Z.K. Matthews 
Memorial Lecture held at the University of Fort Hare on the 12
th
 October 2001 
(Masango 2009:3). 
Masango (2009) argues that this call appeared to influence some of the 
intellectuals, since the intellectual discourse had previously been white-
dominated. However, although this was a genuine call, it was received with 
scepticism in some circles, because Mbeki was infamous for dismissing and 
labelling those who criticised his government as if they were enemies of the state 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008; Ndebele 2007; Daniels 2006; Kadalie 2001). Seepe 
(2000) argues that Mbeki was calling for praise singers, since those who 
criticised the government were demonised. For Kadalie (2001), independent and 
critical views were marginalised and the use of the race card was deployed 
whenever suitable in the Mbeki era. Kadalie (2001) highlighted the fact that 
political power might be consolidated and abused in subtle ways in what she 
called ‘Democracy of a Special Type’, that she argued was prevalent in post-
independent eras where those in power are sensitive to criticism, and such 
criticism will also be silenced in subtle ways. ‘People do not speak as easily for 
fear of being called racist, right-wing, sell-out, disloyal and unpatriotic’ (Kadalie 
2001:224). Mangcu (2007) states that black subjects were supposed to rally 
behind the Native Club and those who differed with the views of Mbeki are often 
labelled. The contention for Mangcu is that the Native Club exists in the 
intellectual sphere that was on retreat and decline, something that gave Mbeki the 
power to claim absolute truth immune from intellectual challenge and criticism. 
This is regarded as something that stems from political intolerance. Mbembe 
compares white nativism and black nativism thus: 
If, historically, white nativism has always been about racial supremacy and the 
defence of immoral privilege, black nativism has always been a by-product of 
dispossession. As a form of cultural and political protest, the task of nativism is 
generally to create a common language of grievance (Mbembe 2006d: 4). 
Mbembe seems to suggest that white nativism is a historical phenomenon, and it 
is in the contemporary, due to the presence of constitutional democracy, that 
white nativism does not exist, or to say the least, that is not a potent force. It then 
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implies that black nativism, and the formation of the Native Club in this regard, 
is irrelevant and detrimental to constitutional democracy. Does it mean then, that 
black subjects according to Mbembe, should not galvanise their grievances? And 
why then, such grievances are criminalised and labelled as victimhood but then 
such a state is not created and perpetuated by the black subjects themselves? The 
problem centres on the fact that those critical of the Native Club are not equally 
critical of longstanding white racism, and how it has hidden itself. According to 
Mangcu (2006b), new forms of political life should not be based on racial 
nativism that is said to be the fibre of the Native Club. For Mangcu, racial 
nativism comes with a culture of political intolerance.  
As a political project informed by de-colonial turn, the Native Club was meant to 
provide impetus to his ideas concerning the African Renaissance and those 
reflecting the black existential conditions, and also, Africa’s pressing issues writ 
large. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) argues that the Native Club was in fact a call to 
focus on the issues that are of concern to the African society. This even included 
a call to ‘produce ideas that drive African society’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008:70). 
According to Roberts (2007:266), ‘the Native Club was an attempt at bringing 
blacks and whites together for deconstruction of some racial legacy’. Contrary to 
Roberts, it will be argued here that his stance is just a defensive position that to 
some extent, borders on the apologia and political correctness. This is clear when 
Roberts states that the members of the Native Club made an error in suggesting 
that there are only black indigenous Africans. Roberts’s claim is refuted by the 
reaction and resistance that came from most whites, and some blacks, who had a 
problem with the word ‘native’, while others went further in suggesting that this 
was a ‘blacks only’ initiative. So, it means that the concern of the word ‘native’ 
suggests that this is exclusive, as if there are no white natives. The argument here 
is that there would be no need for the Native Club if there was no concern about 
the legacy of the apartheid. The formation of the Native Club was informed by 
an ethos of being resistant in the mode of operation against the institutionalised 
and normalised legacy of apartheid. Ndlovu-Gatsheni points out the following: 
The supporters and the critics of the Native Club focused their attention on the 
murky present with a view to prescribing the mysterious future. No one 
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historicised and contextualised the Native Club in the complex history of the 
South African liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008:54). 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni draws attention to the fact that the Native Club should be 
understood in relation to black political thought rooted in the tradition of 
resistance that has informed and still informs the ideologies and the politics of 
most black liberation movements. These traditions stand in opposition to the idea 
of the rainbow nation, since they advocate for the ideas of radicalism that can be 
labelled racial nativism, although not always in essentialist terms. Thus, the 
injection of black populist thought into political discourse, though it often fits 
more into the marginal discourse, is part of a black intellectual political tradition. 
The liberal consensus is founded on the logic of having black subject who are 
keen to defend the hegemonic post-1994 social script and the status quo. In other 
words, black subject who will not raise views that are contrary to the dominant 
ideas, or the institution(s) they serve. As Steyn and Foster (2008) argue, liberal 
consensus constitutes and perpetuates amnesia, silencing and distortion. Mbembe 
(2006d) can be seen as advocating the liberal consensus that is clear in its motive 
to criminalise any form of black racial initiatives. The racial nature of this 
initiative, the Native Club, is not, as stated before about being a racist 
organisation, but a space where black subjects can engage in the matters that 
concern them and that of course, they treat as a matter of importance. But 
Mbembe sees this is detrimental to the non-racial project, and the Native Club, as 
a racially exclusive project. 
De-colonial turn explicates the fact that the Native Club suffered the wrath of 
liberal consensus that calls for equality, liberty and justice—stemming from the 
Constitution that is lauded as one of the best in the world. The Native Club was 
seen as the threat to the democratic project—the victory for all with its non-
racialism where subjects who are clutched in the configuration of race and its 
manifestation, racism, are said to be unraced subjects who do not see race. 
Contrary to this alarmist position, Adebajo (2006: 13) posits that ‘[t]he real 
danger to South Africa’s democracy is not as some critics have hysterically 
claimed, the Native Club, but the stubborn lack of transformation of the 
country’s intellectual, cultural and socioeconomic life’. The liberal consensus is 
done by ‘resistant whiteness that does not hesitate to present itself as the 
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conscience of the nation’ (Steyn and Foster 2008: 33). The banning of racial 
subject is only applicable to blacks, as they cannot be trusted on their own, hence 
the need of white subjects to make sure that black subjects are policed properly.  
It follows then that it is only blacks who have the potential of ruining the 
democratic project—the defence of the status quo—that is, through the 
superiority of the Constitution as the highest law of the land, white privilege 
affirms itself. Such affirmation is done as if things are normal, and indeed, what 
post-1994 brought is the hegemony of white supremacy through the liberal 
consensus. This consensus exists under the pretext of vibrant debate, freedom of 
expression, freedom of movement, association and the like. But then, the right 
for black subjects to associate, or to practice freedom of association is something 
that must adhere to this consensus where in which black associations based on 
means to fight subjection are declared unconstitutional and detrimental to nation 
building. It is in this democratic project that white racism still persists and it is 
denied. Behind the liberal consensus that calls for the forgetting of the past and 
moving on, there is hypocrisy of wanting the status quo to remain. White 
aspirations exist in so far as the post-1994 era works for them, and not for the 
black subjects.  
It is important to point out that whether the Native Club was the presidential 
project or not, it had the right to exist. Some of the black subjects who saw its 
relevance could have not supported it willy-nilly, there were reasons why. The 
blacks who supported in did not see themselves as part of the chorus of liberal 
consensus. Thus, the project of the rainbow nation and non-racialism that faded 
at the time was used as an alibi to bring the Native Club to a halt. The idea of the 
rainbow nation that is theological, and alien to the existential conditions of the 
black subjects is a mere carnivalistic politics and cannot be the corner stone of 
the nation where political power of blacks is ran by blacks who are in full service 
of white supremacy and who are against black subjects.  
The liberal consensus imposes the myth of non-racialism that is used as a 
mechanism to tame and police black subjects. The liberal consensus makes sure 
that the issues that are outside the hegemonic psyche of non-racialism are not 
raised and the discourse of race should pander to white sensibilities. As Mbembe 
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(2006d) affirms the importance of non-racialism, he sees the shifting away from 
it as a dangerous project. Then, it means that non-racialism should be a project 
that all subjects adhere to, or contribute towards it, and the opposite to that is a 
danger to democracy and the Constitution. The ANC is in service of white 
supremacy and is managing subjection on behalf of white supremacy. The ANC 
is used as a buffer zone to block the aspirations of black subjects, and if it forgets 
this role, as it is closely watched, the liberal consensus with the apparatus of the 
Constitution disciplines the ANC to do what is supposed to do—to keep the 
status quo intact. No matter the content of the Native Club, that is not the point 
here, but rather the Native Club that was the elite intellectual initiative to engage 
in matter that affect them, that of course, are not of concern to white subjects and 
some blacks. Blacks are not allowed, in a democracy that advocates tolerance, to 
operate on their own —that is, and black subjects cannot be on their own and 
cannot be trusted. The liberal consensus regards black solidarity as 
unconstitutional, as if the Constitution holds a biblical stature  and is suffused 
with blasphemous clauses.  
Mbembe’s railing against the Native Club is purely for the repetition and 
reproducing of injustices, and thus dampening the spirit of the Constitution and 
also the hard worn freedoms. So, this means that black subjects must be happy to 
exist in the post-1994 where they are enjoying constitutional protections. So, the 
resistance of black subjects, as Mbembe refers to it as nativism, that borders on 
victimhood, should not, in any way, form part of the political reality. Since South 
Africa belongs to all as Mbembe would agree, why there should be no solidarity 
among black subjects. Mbembe’s reason of course is that solidarity that does not 
challenge the liberal consensus, but to deliberate it from within. Those who 
solidify with the aim of understanding themselves as black subjects in the 
country where they feel the thorns of subjection, they are said to be a threat. 
They are a threat as they will expose the scandal hidden in the liberal consensus, 
where those who are dominant dictate the terms of engagement.  
De-colonial turn shows that the liberal consensus represents a silent scandal. 
Mbembe (2006b) in railing against the Native Club did not do that to the racist 
and right-wing formations like Afri-Forum and Solidarity. These organisations 
are nativists and they are not seen as a threat to the project of non-racialism, 
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democracy and also the Constitution. Afri-Forum and Solidarity are seen as 
normal, as they have in recent times claimed to be the custodians of the 
Constitution. They are using the very Constitution to litigate against all forms of 
black aspirations under the shield of minority rights, or if not, in the defence of 
the Constitution. It is clearly known that these are movements that in their 
proverbial minority rights, want to the volkstad, and wanting the apartheid 
machinery not to be threatened. The interests of these movements are only for 
Afrikaners and no mention is made about them being racist. So, it means the 
racialised group formations of Afrikaners are not a threat and that of black 
subjects are a threat.  
Therefore, it is of importance to clearly note that white supremacy is alive and 
well. Contrary to Mbembe (2006b), white nativism is not only a historical 
phenomenon, but a contemporary reality that presents a danger as it advocates 
the preserving of the status quo and perpetuating injustice. This is seen through 
the expression of white arrogance displayed by Afri-Forum and Solidarity as 
they criminalise black aspiration and even the project of transformation. For the 
mere fact that Mbembe is aware of white group formations like Democratic 
Alliance (the prominent opposition party with a liberal bent safeguarding white 
interests while masking behind non-racialism), Afri-Forum and Solidarity in 
terms of their agenda of being in fierce opposition to the project of 
transformation. Why they are not condemned for nativism, but simply being 
those who are loud to cry unfairness and reverse racism, or put simply, being the 
victims of the post-1994 project, that of course, is serving them in many ways. 
When these arguments are made, nothing is mentioned when it comes to 
subjection and the existential condition of black subjects, but only white subjects 
as if they are endangered species. For Mbembe (2006b: 3), they are ‘[t]hose who 
cannot leave have but a fleeting attachment to the new democratic order’.   
The liberal consensus has not called for the end of these organisations, and it 
seems then, they are constitutional and those that are black only are 
unconstitutional. It is this scheme of things that those who are in support of the 
Native Club or its advocates were literally seen and represented as bad blacks 
versus good blacks who railed against the Native Club. The good blacks are 
those who are said to be caring about the rainbow nation and who are the 
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defenders of the Constitution. As Steyn and Foster (2008: 34) argue that ‘[u]pon 
closer scrutiny, however, this often turns out to be a specific example of the 
strategy that pits “good blacks” against “bad blacks’”. This is done to absolve 
white subject from responsibility and as such, this is used as a tool to discipline 
black subjects who dare to confront subjection and the scandal of white 
supremacy. So, good blacks are those who perpetuate liberal consensus and do 
not want anything that confronts white supremacy. The criticism stemming from 
black subjects who are fierce opponents of the Native Club was seen as 
important to be used as a scapegoat and to couch for the demise of the Native 
Club.  
The railing against of the Native Club is interesting to understand in the context 
of the post-1994 where most often, because of the liberal consensus, black 
subjects will be structurally positioned to be its spokespersons. For Mbembe 
(2006d), to criminalise grievances of black subjects and calling the project of 
non-racialism as important than to unmask whiteness that pervades is really to 
ignore the extent through that black subject are denied their right for self-
determination. They must be determined for, and they must not be on the 
offensive of white privilege, and their dispossession should not be articulated 
since this is tantamount to what Mbembe criminalises, victimhood.  For the mere 
fact that they are black subject, this racial positioning was seen as something that 
elevates Mbembe and some of critics of the Native Club who are black subjects 
as spokespersons of all blacks. This does not mean all black critics of the Native 
Club are on the wrong, but the concern is those black critics who criminalised 
grievances of black subjects, who deny the extent of racism, who overlook white 
nativism, who forces the myth of non-racialism, who are against any form of 
black racial formation and the like. These black subjects are instrumentally used 
as standard model that black subjects must follow. In their positionality, they are 
denying, of course, that subjection is still the order of the day. They are quick to 
attack and condemn all those who call it what it is as those who are suffering 
from victimhood. The notion of victimhood is seen as desperate and detrimental 
to democracy as it is filled with the sense of entitlement.  
Nothing is being said to that effect in relation to Afri-Forum and Solidarity who 
are projecting themselves as the victims of the post-1994 era. These formations 
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use what Mangcu (2008: 103) calls ‘a racialised mobilisation of sympathy’ that is 
said to exists both on white subjects and black subjects. The silent scandal that is 
perpetuated by the liberal consensus is not legitimate in calling an end of to the 
Native Club, whereas it does not do the same to Afri-Forum and Solidarity. The 
Native Club has the right to exist and black subjects should not be dictated to 
how they should form themselves. So, the Native Club was of, and is still 
necessary and relevant to the post-1994 era where black subjects who are 
concerned about subjection still need their own space and own terms of 
engagement. But then, the spectre of the silent scandal remains qua banning of 
the Native Club and Mbembe’s silence on the white suprematist formations like 
Afri-Forum and Solidarity, both that are antithetical to non-racial project, seeing 
beyond nativism, defending the Constitution, progressive social and political 
projects, transformation and self-determination of black subjects.      
Race still matters: on two defensive logics of race 
The issue of race is the one that is still relevant, and a contentious issue that is 
often evaded by those who do not want to confront and evoked by those who are 
affected by it. The race issue is a bane in the post-1994 South Africa, that claims 
to be non-racial, and race is here to stay as the racist reality continues to be 
perpetuated, though in the implicit form. The contention here is that the race 
issue does not sit well with the South African liberal constitutional state that 
propagates non-racialism and even transcending race by embracing humanity in 
its diversity. Mbembe (2008) acknowledges that race is still a problem in South 
Africa and it is here to stay for a long time. Mbembe (2008: 5) also affirms that 
the post-1994 is ‘undergoing multiple and systematic transitions, at different 
paces and rhythms’. Mbembe justifies this reality by pointing to black sense of 
upward mobility, the declining segregation, owning a car and a house, access to 
education and the like. While mentioning these, Mbembe concedes that a lot has 
to be done. But then, these are the changes, if one has to take the proportionality 
of black subjects in the post-1994 reality, something that can be regarded as 
cosmetic as structural relations have not changed. Indeed, Mbembe also point out 
structural inequality of blacks and whites co-exist with legal equality and, that in 
fact, is of a lesser weight since the legality does not translate to the existential 
conditions of the black subjects. The post-1994 with its progressive Constitution 
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cannot guarantee the constitutional life for black subjects. The Constitution does 
not outlaw the hellish life of black subjects that is the post-1994 reality and this 
necessitates the need for de-colonial turn.  
Although depending on each other for daily existence, Blacks and Whites were cut 
off from all human closeness, so much that the biggest obstacle to the project of non-
racialism was the difficult—experience both by Blacks and Whites—of seeing in the 
other face of a fellow human, or of merely imagining what it would mean to be in the 
other’s place; to have, somewhere, any commonality (Mbembe 2007a:  162). 
According to Mbembe’s perspective, the fibre has been torn and experiences of 
both races are not the same. This even calls for the interests and aspirations of 
both races being a matter of confusion. Their stance, it is argued here, is that of 
diametrical opposition. But to Mbembe, what is essential is finding commonality 
as the possible politics—that is, non-racialism where race no longer matters. But 
then, the post-1994 reality that is fundamentally racist disrupts this possibility 
since race still matters and it is part of the post-1994 reality. It is in this context 
that blacks who are concerned about race and the racist nature of the post-1994 
are denied the language to articulate it. Mbembe (2007b) raises a concern on two 
defensive logics of race that he sees as white race denialism that is predicated on 
white persistent denial of privilege on one hand, and on the other, black assertion 
of identity that is predicated on the idea of victimhood. Mangcu (2008: 102) 
amplifies Mbembe stating that ‘[t]he culture of denial and racial solidarity among 
whites provides the backdrop for understanding why black nativist leaders are 
able to entrench themselves further in power’. According to Mangcu, this can be 
understood also to be the racial mobilisation of sympathy where each race is 
concerned and sympathetic with the issues of their own race. Mbembe (2007b) 
argues that both these two defensive logics of race create ‘a culture of mutual 
ressentiment that, in turn, isolates freedom from responsibility and seriously 
undermine the prospect of a truly non-racial future’ (Mbembe 2007b:2).  
It means, therefore, the blame of the unworkable post-1994 miracle is the 
responsibility of both white subjects and black subjects. It seems to the latter, 
who maybe making legitimate claims in relation to how white privilege that is 
founded on the dispossession and the exclusion of the latter is criminalised. This 
criminalisation comes through the discursive practice of black subjects been 
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portrayed as stubborn, paranoid and even melancholic, as if they are holding on 
to whiteness (Ahmed 2007).  So then, black subjects are not supposed to 
articulate their demands and even how racism affects them. Black communal 
victimhood for Mbembe (2008) stems from the promise that blacks claim that 
nothing has changed and all is still the same, and this is internalised by blacks 
who convince themselves as such. As Manganyi (1977) puts succinctly puts it 
‘[t]he situation of the racist and his (sic) victim(s) are characteristics by different 
types of inauthenticity’. 
The contention here is that mutual ressentiment is not a symbiosis and this rules 
out Mbembe’s thesis that there is collision and collusion in tandem. Mbembe 
seeks to equalise both subjectivities whereas they are not equal. In fact, there is 
collision in so far as the interests of both races, and the fault of the post-1994 
being to project them as if they are from the same existential plane whereas they 
are not. As Hudson (2012: 4) argues, ‘there is asymmetry— “whiteness” is the 
master signifier and it has both white and black subjects in its grip’. For Hudson, 
whiteness possesses wholeness, self-control and sufficiency and it has something 
to hold on to, the black subject. The black subject as a result of having nothing to 
hold on to still remains without any forms of existence. The lived experience of 
white subjects is informed by privilege and that of black subjects by 
dispossession. This is the reality of the post-1994 where there is absence of 
political imagination on how to bring new forms of life where there will be a true 
freedom. But then, what is couched is moving forward and forgetting the past 
and evoking non-racialism as if it is a solution to the racist reality of the post-
1994. So, the notion of mutual ressentiment as articulated by Mbembe is 
problematic largely for being in denial of the post-1994 existential realities, and 
to call for the end of this notion will not automatically bring the non-racial future 
or make the non-racial project to work if the structures informing the racist 
reality of the post-1994 are not destroyed.  
De-colonial turn affirms that there is nowhere Mbembe mentions the need to 
destroy the structures that reproduce the racist reality of the post-1994. White 
privilege benefits from black dispossession, and it is in the condition of 
dispossession where black subjects will depend on whiteness for survival. 
Therefore, even if there is some sort of dependability between white subjects and 
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black subjects what must be made clear is that this dependability is 
asymmetrical. The racist logic of white privilege and black dispossession 
remains profound. This should also include the need for Mbembe to probe why 
both positionalities of white denial of privilege and the so-called black 
communal victimhood keeps resurfacing and also still persisting in the post-1994 
South Africa. Hudson (2012) notes that the post-1994 is the liberal democratic 
constitutional state, that is informed by the colonial unconscious, where white 
subjects are the master signifier and the consciousness on whiteness is colonial 
unconscious.   
Race is not only an issue in the post-1994, it matters and those who are affected 
are black subjects as the logic and the ethos of race was just to dehumanise, 
exclude and subjugate them. So, race is not only a psychological affair where 
black subjects must just embrace non-racialism and then as a result this making 
race to disappear. Race is also existential in that it affects the everyday life of 
black subjects who are concerned about it as it even affects their material 
conditions. The project of non-racialism is on the shaky foundation since the 
post-1994 is a racialised reality, and the visible markers of race are evident. The 
project of non-racialism is often silent on what Mngxitama (2009) calls the 
interrelated moves that are connected to black dispossession—that is,  the 
dispossession of land, dispossession of labour and dispossession of the African 
being. The logic of dispossession is what informs the existential conditions of 
black subjects who are at the receiving end of dispossession. Whiteness is an 
issue in the post-1994 era of non-racialism. According to Mbembe: 
They [whites] continued to embrace the privileges of white skin and devoted an 
extraordinary amount of energy to restoring the normalcy of these privileges. Not 
only did racism become subtle and often unconsciously practiced, many whites 
went as far as declaring that racism was a thing of the past; that in fact, white 
men were now suffering from reverse discrimination (Mbembe 2007b).   
The dominant narrative that is informed by the liberal consensus is that race is 
not relevant and the race issue is a mere obsession that does not take the country 
forward. This race denialist positionality is so profound that it has found black 
subjects who are supporting it investing a whole energy condemning and even 
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censuring the insurgent black voices that expose the post-1994 scandal of trying 
to hide race whereas it exists. From the stance of de-colonial turn, white privilege 
is something tied to whiteness as an identity, and white privilege should be 
understood, from the positionality of black subjects, side by side with their own 
dispossession. The issue of whiteness has been taken by whites themselves and 
in no way it is suggested here that it will remedy the existential conditions of the 
black subjects. As such, whiteness should be on its own, where in that whiteness 
speaks for itself. If it does not speak for itself, whiteness will be caught in what 
Alcoff (1991) coins as the problem of speaking for others. As Alcoff (1991: 6) 
warns, ‘speaking for others is arrogant, vain, unethical, and politically 
illegitimate’. So, the positionality of whiteness is not in any other way, fit to 
speak on behalf of black subjects and dictating to them how they should and 
should not engage the issue of race. This even includes how black subjects 
should engage the post-1994 reality, since the reality of white subjects and that of 
black subjects is not the same. The premise made by Alcoff is essential in this 
regard: 
Rituals of speaking are politically constituted by power relations of domination, 
exploitation, and subordination. Who is speaking, who is spoken of, and who listens 
is a result, as well as an act, of political struggle. To the extent that this context bears 
on meaning, and meaning in some sense the object of truth, we cannot make an 
epistemic evaluation of the claim without simultaneously assessing the politics of the 
situation (Alcoff 1991: 15). 
Therefore, it is important to emphasise that whiteness must speak of itself and for 
itself. If whiteness speaks for black subjects, then it entrenches itself and negates 
the lived experiences of black subjects by manner of imposing its own distortions 
on what is fair and just to black subjects. Whiteness by its very nature is the 
antithesis to blackness. The phenomenology of blackness is collapsed by 
whiteness. Mbembe does not account for the fact that whiteness is the state of 
invisibility, and that it does not have to justify its existence. Whiteness exists in 
the state of invisibility because it is has the capacity of choice, and to choose 
whether to be visible or not. Whiteness visibilises itself when its interests are 
threatened or when the demands of black subjects are articulated in such a way 
that they pose a threat to white privilege. In amplifying this perspective Ahmed 
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(2007) argues that whiteness is ‘a category of experience that disappears as a 
category though experience’. For Ahmed, this disappearance makes whiteness 
institutionalised, naturalised and normalised, where in that whiteness reifies itself 
and of course, coming into coalition with the idea that race does not exist or it is 
not an issue.  So then, black subjects cannot determine for themselves what is fair 
and just to, and for them. This is because whiteness is accountable and 
responsible for itself and in no way it can be expected to rid itself off the 
privileges it has accumulated for the benefit of black subjects. According to 
Mbembe: 
There was a very ancient guilt they wanted to forget because it was giving rise to 
strange emotional events. Others had no desire to know anything. Not even the name 
of the place they currently inhabited—and even less who their new rulers were 
(Mbembe 2007a: 163). 
It is essential to briefly engage the whiteness debate as Vice (2010) asked a 
question on how white live in South Africa, that she refers as a strange place 
where whites are products of apartheid and still benefiting from it. Vice (2010: 
331) claims that ‘[t]he problem in white South Africa is not just being with being 
white, but being white South African’. But then, the opposite is true in that being 
white is being structurally positioned in the relation to accumulation and 
preserving of privilege. This cannot be seen as something problematic since this 
is the betterment and protection of white privilege. White subject do not feel bad 
that privilege is bend in their favour and blacks are left wanting, and their 
existential conditions is a crisis. Vice is faulty to assume that privilege is 
something that contaminates whites and they must have the sense of shame and 
guilt. White privilege is not a moral burden, hence the reaction of white subjects 
when it is threatened. According to Vice, white privilege is nonvoluntary in its 
origins, and it creates a situation where white subjects choose to embrace or 
reject it. This is what Vice proposes as the way in that whiteness can rehabilitate 
itself from its contamination of white privilege: 
One of the task of white people is to engage with their selves, and if the theses of 
habitual white privilege and moral damage are correct there is certainly enough work 
to do. Our thoughts are heavy with whitely assumptions, and so they would be 
morally risky, at best, to utter publicly in as racially charged a space as South Africa. 
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Given the necessary self-vigilance and double thinking imposed by knowledge of 
whiteliness, being careful in this context does not seem cowardly or disengaged. 
Rather, the care stems from a recognition of the moral complexities and potential for 
mistakes, that would entrench the very habits from that one is trying to become 
disentangled. We would, instead, express our attachment to justice though a 
commitment to a private project o self-improvement, recogni[s]ing the moral damage 
done to the self by being in the position of oppressor (Vice 334-335).  
What Vice proposes does not engage how privilege is dismantled, but it is the 
moral exercise of making whiteness to be more humane. It does not matter 
whether whiteness engages or disengages, but then, it is important to stress that 
this does not say anything about how the privilege should be destroyed. For Vice 
to call for whites to refrain from airing their views and withdrawing from the 
political discourse is something that absolves whites from responsibility. The 
form of life that Vice is proposing for white subjects is to live quietly and 
decently as possible. The white privilege that informs part of the existence of 
whiteness is left largely intact, so that it reproduces itself. McKaiser (2011) 
contends that white subjects should feel shame and regret, but not guilt for their 
whiteliness. McKaiser also argues that whites should not withdraw from the 
political discourse as they are moral agents, citizens, and persons with prudential 
interests. McKaiser also makes the argument that Vice should have put emphasis 
on whiteliness, rather than being white.  
According to McKaiser (2011: 457) ‘whites should engage politically in a way 
that does not perpetuate unearned privileges, qua whiteliness, and in a way that 
allows other interlocutors to engage them—whites— fully, as moral equals’. So, 
it means that whites must continue to engage politically and the issue of them 
being morally implicated should not be used against them. Futter (2011) states 
that the propositions of Vice can invite anger and that the conclusions of her 
arguments will be rejected out rightly. Futter raises the concern of Vice making a 
political recommendation that white subjects should remain in silence and not 
engage in the political discourse. Even Wanderer (2011) supports Futter, and 
argues that the proposition that white should have humility and modesty as part 
of their political silence is something that faces objection. Wanderer goes further 
to suggest that there should be self-examination, self-concern, self-perfection and 
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self-care as the core of ethico-political. Ethical politics blocks the possibility of 
black subjects to destruct their own existential reality.  
Bailey (2011) is also in opposition to Vice as she argues that the whithdrawal of 
whites from the political discourse and calls for the white anti-racists project. 
According to this perspective, ‘[c]conscientious whites might work toward 
reparations, redistribute resources (including their own) along more equitable 
lines, or become politically active in organi[s]ations supporting Black South 
African’s political efforts’ (Bailey 2011: 475). This is problematic in the sense 
that whiteness for what it is, cannot give away its privileges, and this seems to 
suggest that the act of white subjects assisting black subjects as something of 
doing well. As Hook (2011: 497) states, ‘many moral and political projects are 
driven by the ego-needs of a given subject’. White subjects often want to appear 
that they have been involved in the cause of the black struggle, and most of the 
whites claim not to have supported apartheid. Even those who are still holding 
racist and right-wing views do not want to be associated with apartheid. Again, 
this does not explain how to destroy white privilege, and whatever efforts white 
subjects make means that they will dictate the terms of engagement for black 
subjects.  
The rehabilitation of whiteness should not be for the sake of black subjects, but 
for whites themselves. This is also linked to the idea of Vice asking white 
subjects to be civil, since this will automatically stem from their humility and 
silence. Hurst (2011) is advocating for politics of forgiveness that are typical in 
the post-1994 as forgiveness is the political mantra in the face of injustices. Hurst 
argues that white subjects exist in complicit and being at the receiving end of 
unfair advantages that come with white privilege. So the complicity of white 
subjects can be explained by the structures of privilege and oppression remaining 
intact. Coupled with forgiveness, Hurst (2011: 486) call for politics of justice 
where in that ‘[justice requires everyone to accept responsibility for wrongs, even 
when chances places one unwittingly and unwillingly in the wrong’. It is 
important to note that in the post-1994 the gesture of forgiveness did not deliver 
any form of justice, and forgiveness can exist or prevail while masking injustices 
that are of course given a human phase to adapt with the contemporary political 
reality. Whites in the post-1994 did not ask for forgiveness only blacks are 
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pushing that crusade that is of no help to them since white privilege as it is does 
not need to apologise for its existence. As Janz clearly puts it: 
There are, of course, plenty of whites who might not feel shame for a variety of 
reasons—they do not feel personally responsible for social injustices, they do not 
feel as if the inequalities are really unjust, they feel as if whites have worked harder 
or smarter and so deserve their privilege, or perhaps they feel as if social conflict is 
the way of the world, and some people win and others lose (Janz 2011: 465).  
This is the post-1994 reality where the arguments of meritocracy are raised and 
whites claiming that they cannot be punished for the past that they were not part 
of. Indeed this is generally accepted in the sense that it goes with the moral 
equivalence where the concern should not be about the past, but building a non-
racial future that Mbembe (2007b; 2008) emphasises. Mills (2011) raises 
fundamental issues in the Vice debate to put forth that white responsibility and 
moral self-reform is informed and shaped by the legacy of white domination. 
White privilege cannot dismantle itself; it should be the responsibility of black 
subjects in doing so. Whiteness cannot be expected to commit class suicide. 
Vice, according to Mills, creates unrealistic virtues of whiteness constructing 
itself. Mills has this to say: 
Apartheid South Africa was, of course, an extreme example of an oppressive society 
in various ways: the overt and routine reliance on force, the formally 
institutionali[s]ed differentiation of status, the huge difference in living standards 
between the privileged and the subordinated, the sharpness and blatancy of social 
division in everyday life, the very high ration of the numbers of the oppressed to the 
oppressors, and the literally black-and-white hypervisibility of the key social marker, 
race (Mills 2011: 429). 
The concerted effort for race to be forgotten and moving on to the non-racial 
future is not adequate to really address the injustice in that white privileged is 
founded on. As Leonardo (2004: 141) correctly notes, ‘[t]hey frequently serve to 
perpetuate white racial supremacy through colo[u]r blindness, ahistorical 
justifications, and sleights-of-mind’. The post-1994 reality is that whiteness 
exists in the favoured location that exempts it from what is a burden to black 
subjects. Whiteness in its location is does benefit a lot from privilege that goes in 
tandem with dispossession. It then essential also to add another important 
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element to whiteness that Mbembe does not call it what it is, white supremacy 
and this opposes Mbembe’ argument that ‘the operation of white privilege and 
supremacy cannot proceed as before’ (Mbembe 2008: 8). White supremacy and 
privilege have changed their character and structure to continue, and this is not 
the reality in the United States only as Mbembe suggests, but even in the post-
1994 South Africa. What seems to emerge in the narrative of Vice is delinking 
privilege from subjection, as white privilege is inherently subjection. Doing away 
with subjection simply means destroying white privilege. Of course, this is often 
rejected even by those who claim to advocate the white anti-racist discourse. 
Whiteness in the post-1994 South Africa will always fail to moralise itself 
credibly for that the scandal of black subjectivity, where black speak for 
themselves is its collapsibility. This is because, the situation where in that black 
subjects speak for themselves and calling for the destroying of white privilege is 
seen as problematic. As Mills (2011: 438) argues, ‘[t]he ideals to that [Vice] is 
appealing are not realistic ones, given the facts about our doxastic and conative 
makeup’. So then, these ideals cannot be actualised to the existential conditions 
of the post-1994 in concrete terms they will be symbolic and rhetoric gestures. 
Also, it is important to note that Vice does not engage the notion of white 
supremacy by calling it what it is.  
What is fundamentally important from the standpoint of de-colonial turn is that 
white subjects should not; in the anti-racist effort join black subjects in the 
struggle. This may sound separatist, and in fact it is due to the opposition to 
integrationist tendencies where the demands of the black subjects should not be 
negotiated and mediated on their behalf. What is essential is that the anti-racist 
efforts of white subjects should be fought by whites subjects themselves in 
recognising their own privilege and injustices. But then, this should not be the 
moral crusade in that doing so will mean that they are doing it on behalf of black 
subjects. If they continue to do so, they will realise that they are fighting on the 
wrong side as they have been doing (Alcoff 1998). White subjects are made not 
to recognise their privilege and as such seeing them as the normal part of being 
white-in-the-world. Mngxitama notes: 
But even recognising privileges of whiteness serves to self perpetuate the inherent 
goodness of whiteness. It enacts self-critical evaluations that lull blacks into a 
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meaningless celebration of the self-revealed evils of whiteness. This says, “Look, we 
know we are benefiting from your oppression but at least we are kind enough to 
admit to it”. It assuages the consciences of (liberal) whites as they continue to enjoy 
the privileges that come with white skin (Mngxitama 2009: 15). 
This means that whiteness has the power to silence, and it means in doing the 
anti-racist work it absolves itself and also to silence the demands of black 
subjects. As Leonardo (2004: 137) posits, ‘the conditions of white supremacy 
make white privilege possible’. So, without engaging the total make up of what 
constitutes whiteness of what Vice calls whiteliness, this will be of no help, even 
if it means making whites subjects to be aware of their privileges. This is what 
Ahmed (2006) refers to as the nonperformativity of antiracism. According to 
Ahmed (2006: 105), ‘[p]erfomatives succeed when they are uttered by the right 
person, to the right people, and in a way that takes the right form’. Therefore, it is 
clear from this perspective that white anti-racist efforts should be for whites and 
in no way they should be advocated as if they are serving the interests of black 
subjects. ‘White support for antiracism is often similarly flawed: riven with 
supremacist pretensions and an extension at times of the coloni[s]er’s privilege to 
decide the true, the just, and the culturally valuable’ (Alcoff 1998: 7). Matthews 
(2012) encourages white antiracist work in the recognition of the past injustices 
and persisting inequalities and also encouraging whites to joining the struggle to 
achieve social justice. Matthews (2012: 172) also warns thus, ‘anti-racist work 
may actually result in the perpetuation rather than the erosion of white privilege’. 
De-colonial turn affirms the position that race is in the post-1994 a burden that is 
carried by blacks, whom race is structuring them in the state of permanent 
negativity. Race in the post-1994 as the reality that is denied, is something that 
does not serve blacks but that is against them. Blacks being the victims of racism 
are criminalised for pointing it for what it is, and they are out on the defensive 
hence they are the only ones who are raced and race is used as a tool of 
criminalisation. Mbembe’s call for facing up to race and engaging in affirmative 
politics do little to alter the racist post-1994 reality where race and racism have 
taken the melanin of blackness for the purpose of their reproduction.    
If South Africa effectively belongs to all who live here, then one can no longer be 
defined by race, and the latter should no longer carry any privilege. But this would 
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mean that privileges previously accumulated precisely on the basis of race must be 
shared and extended to everyone (Mbembe 2007a: 169). 
Mbembe actually knows that this is something that was not in the negotiated 
settled post-1994, and it is something that is wholly resisted. As such, it does not 
feature in the political imagination of the post-1994, where demands by black 
subjects who are at the receiving end of subjection are insatiable. Even the ANC 
does not have such a bold political imagination hence it is something that does 
not feature in their rhetoric. The land question is a crude example of this, and the 
concern of course is to make sure that white privilege exists untouched. Even 
though Mbembe evokes de-racialisation and distributive politics, it is not clear 
where should this begin. In no way is Mbembe calling for the dismantling of 
white privilege, but its distributive logic that is something impossible. Mbembe 
knows very well the defence of whiteness to its privilege and its silence on how 
these privileges were and are earned. So then, it seems problematic to deracialise 
privilege and not dismantling it.  
Mbembe (2007a) sentiment of transcending race can only be possible if the post-
1994 reality is shaped in line with the aspiration and interests of the black 
subjects outside the schema of the ANC that reproduce the racist reality of the 
post-1994. Mbembe’s idea of freedom is not the one where black subject exist in 
the condition where there is no any form of subjection, and the one of racism in 
particular. But then, Mbembe advocates for what he call freedom from race that 
he sees as the real freedom. Freedom from race is embedded on the politics of 
sameness that are silent on white supremacy, white privilege, and the injustices 
that come with subjection. The politics of sameness are even silent on the 
existential crisis of black subjects. They use few blacks for the purpose of racial 
showcasing and such blacks, often in minority as they have been given access to 
the benefits of white privilege will criminalise other blacks who are making 
demands for white supremacy and privilege to come to an end. The politics of 
sameness are based on a few black subject and white subjects in totality and the 
claim will be that those few blacks are representatives of all black subjects. 
Mbembe writes: 
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Real freedom means “freedom from race”—the kind of freedom that South Africa is 
likely to enjoy because this nation will have built, for the very first time in history of 
human kind, a society, culture, and civili[s]ation in that, for once, the colo[u]r of 
one’s skin will be superfluous in the overall calculus of status, dignity, opportunities, 
rights and obligations. This freedom will originate purely and simply from our being 
human. And this relation between race, freedom, and democracy might come to 
constitute South Africa’s unique gift to humanity (Mbembe 2008: 18). 
The post-1994 as it is far from this reality that is projected by Mbembe, even if 
this is predicated on the politics of hope and possibility. The idea of freedom 
from race cannot hold if the structures of racism that are managed by the ruling 
ANC are not destroyed. To call for the idea of freedom of race as something in 
that black subjects and white subjects must advocate, or volunteer themselves in 
doing will not resolve the post-1994 reality that is informed by the racist ethos 
that have moved from public to private. Mbembe (2008) even concedes that the 
non-racial reality is far from being realised since prejudice keeps breaking wide 
open, though this is kept secret and hidden as no one would like to be seen as 
racist, what is usual is often the guise of debates about things that have nothing to 
do with race.  
Whiteness is so pervasive it has become invisible, that is to say normalised—the 
“normative state of existence”. This normative state of existence is also a powerful 
tool of silencing. “Why can’t we all just get along?” someone asks innocently, while 
another claim that “colour is just skin deep, we are all human beings ultimately”. 
Blacks are under pressure to accept this, in fact we are heroic when we accept our 
common humanity, and thereby fail to bracket off whiteness and make obvious what 
it actually is. Mandela is loved precisely because he is so effective in shielding 
whiteness from view. (Mngxitama 2009: 16)  
But then, Mbembe still insists the pursuing of freedom from race where the 
project of non-racialism should form part of the political imagination. So, it 
means then that the racist ethos that informs the existential reality of the black 
subjects must be ignored, and the dirty little secret of prejudice originates from 
white subjects who occupy the South Africa that works well. So this mean that 
Mbembe does not challenge the normative state of existence, since the non-racial 
project that is predicated on freedom from race reifies it. Freedom from race 
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seems to be problematic in the sense that black subjects who are raced cannot 
just claim to be free from race whereas their lived experience and existential 
conditions are informed by the racist ethos. So, race is still part of the post-1994 
reality, black subjects who are concerned with race should not be demonised 
when they are engaging it.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the idea of South Africa has been demonstrated, and this does not 
mean it is a complete one and it was engaged from the standpoint of de-colonial 
turn. It is essential to restate that the historical narrative and the historiography 
has been that of the frontier history that is told by whites about blacks and for 
whites. Mbembe in articulating the post-1994 political phenomena adopted the 
role of the purveyor of the Nongqawuse story that he refers as the Nongqawuse 
syndrome. The concern is that Mbembe seems to have taken the historical 
narrative as it is, and deploying it without any effort of problematisation and the 
contention is that the story of Nongqawuse cannot be read as a chronological 
story. The story should rather, be read in the mode of diagnosing its signification. 
It is clear that the idea of South Africa as articulated by Mbembe is situated in 
the neo-liberal stratum where the issue of race is often obscured, since non-
racialism is advocated through the politics of sameness. Mbembe regards this as 
a positive state action where in that racial equality is created. It is therefore 
critical to note that the abolition of apartheid was the legislative and moral act, 
and as such, its continuity through various means finding some sites of 
continuity. On a further note in what Mbembe refers to the phase of ‘frontier 
accumulation’, he correctly notes how the logic of extraction and accumulation 
still continues in South Africa, with few black subjects playing a major role as 
well. What is not often stated by Mbembe is how and why the black elite are in 
service of the white oligarchy and them also being buffer zone closing of the 
majority of blacks. This is the arrangement that is even legitimated by the ANC 
who are the ruling class, but claiming to be in opposition of the white oligarchy 
who are in the commanding heights of the economy. Since the black capitalist 
are parasitic to the state and white capital, the two that are their material bases for 
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accumulation, it is essential there to render these black subjects a cog in the 
machine.  
The chapter has even demonstrated how politics of black solidarity are opposed 
and also criminalised. Mbembe is infamous for railing against the Native Club, 
and arguing that it is not tied to any progressive political programme and devoid 
of any content of reform. What is of concern is that Mbembe and the whole 
liberal consensus chorus alike, are silent on white supremacist and right-wing 
politics of Afri-Forum and Solidarity. The latter that are right wing and racist are 
not seen as a threat even to nation building and non-racialism, and it has been 
demonstrated in this chapter that this is a silent scandal of the liberal consensus.  
The issue of race is indeed a bane in the post-1994 South Africa and it cannot be 
wished away by the politics of sameness, non-racialism and race-transcendence, 
and this shows that it does not sit well with the liberal constitutional democracy. 
Though Mbembe agrees that race is here to stay, but his proposition of two 
defensive logics of race, freedom from race, and politics of sameness are 
problematic in the era where there is race denialism to mask white supremacy, 
privilege and all forms of subjections that come with it. What was problematised 
in this chapter is the notion of white anti-racism efforts, and the suggestion being 
made that whiteness must fight its own struggles for itself-by-itself. The white 
anti-racist efforts should not be seen as the ones serving the interests of black 
subjects since this will mean that the interests and demands of the black subjects 
will be sanctioned and censured.  To conclude then, the idea of South Africa as 
advanced by Mbembe is of importance but in needs further interrogation, and the 
attempt made here is to engage some of the aspects Mbembe put forward. The 
idea of South Africa is engaged here from the positionality of black subjectivity 
that takes subjection into account rather than relegating it to the abstract margins, 
but concretising it for its importance of the existential conditions of black 
subjects.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
 
On reflective restatements 
In this thesis, the understanding of who is Mbembe is not a biographical sketch, 
but the location of the subject qua persona—understanding Mbembe as an 
intellectual and his contribution to African politics from the standpoint of 
decolonial epistemic perspective in general and methodologically, through 
decolonial critical analysis in particular. The political thought of Mbembe has 
been studied outside his own canon of the Euro-North American tradition but 
from decolonial epistemic perspective. This has proven to be essential in order to 
understand the political thought of Mbembe, and thus forming a political critique 
of how Mbembe engages the African subject, its subjection, and subjectivity. 
This was done by asking who Mbembe is, and this was framed along the lines of 
the emergence of the subject, the African subject in particular. The question of 
who is Mbembe was to try to explore his subject formation and the conception of 
the Western subject and that of the African subject were examined in order to 
locate Mbembe’s positionality, even though he did not claim to be the African 
subject and of course, he cannot even regard himself as the Western subject—
that is, the Cartesian subject. Mbembe here is the political subject engaged in the 
political act of the subject in the making, but the one indifferent to African 
subjectivity that he reduces to mere footnotes.  
So, it has been established that Mbembe regards himself as a subject of free 
choice asserting itself to the world. What was demonstrated, and contrary to 
Mbembe’s notion of the subject, there has been the notion of identity that is tied 
to the figure of the subject. Identity for the basis of this thesis can be understood 
in at least three aspects: the first being identity in the form of the self that has the 
free choice, the self that makes itself a subject. Second, identity can be 
understood in the form of imposition, the very thing of creating the dehumanised 
figure of being who the exteriori of life. And third, identity can be understood in 
the form of social engagement rules. These aspects of identity are essential when 
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it comes to the African subject and also when it comes to the understanding of 
Mbembe as the self-defining subject. The self-defining subject is that of self-
creation and subject in the making. The educational voyage of Mbembe and the 
conical texts that influenced him, and also, how influential are they to the 
political thought of Mbembe. Also, the movement of Mbembe from Cameroon, 
to France, to the United States and back to Africa—the tri-continental move was 
important to examine to understand how his intellectual thought developed. It has 
been stated that Mbembe’s political thought tradition is rooted in French political 
thought with other political thought traditions—and that of the Euro-North 
America also taking a profound shape. This then gives Mbembe much arsenal to 
project, represent and articulate Africa in the manner that is external to its locale 
and even going to the extent of ridiculing Africa, thus denying it any form of 
subjectivity and to blame it when it resists subjection. 
Furthermore, what this thesis has sought to do, in the manner of contributing to 
the body of knowledge is to engage the works and the political thought of 
Mbembe from decolonial epistemic perspective. Decolonial epistemic 
perspective enables the foundation of understanding, interrogating and 
challenging subjection, and as a result point to the possibilities of re-articulating 
the positionality of the African subject. Decolonial epistemic perspective enables 
the foundation of understanding, interrogating and challenging subjection, and as 
a result, pointing to the possibilities of re-articulating the positionality of the 
African subject. As a theoretical intervention in this thesis, it explored the 
understanding coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of 
being. By engaging these three conceptual pillars of decolonial epistemic 
perspective, the aim was to give an exposition to coloniality which puts the 
African subject in the structural positionality vulnerable to the industrial complex 
of subjection. This means coloniality continues to hide colonial relations by 
naturalising, institutionalising and normalising the industrial complex of 
subjection.  
This thesis, sought to demonstrate that coloniality emerges from the contact 
points or the colonial encounter that articulates the modes of operation and 
appropriation of restructuring the world to give the same effect as colonialism 
did, and make way for modernity to be strengthened. Decolonial epistemic 
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perspective is in the same line of the political, social and theoretical interventions 
that sought to challenge injustices and inhumanity of the African subject, just 
like other anti-colonial struggles, placing the African subject at the centre, to 
understand its subjectivity and subjection. Therefore, the African subject 
becomes the agent of research instead of being an object. As such, this is what 
informs the subjectivity of the African subject. It means that the African subject 
as the agent of history and contemporality of his or her own subjectivity where in 
that the African subject thinks of itself, rather than being thought for. This is 
done through the highlighting of subjection that is a technology reproducing 
itself in many ways. The subjectivity of the African subject considers the 
importance of the definitive subject calling for the possibility of another world. 
Thus, the geography of reason determines the positionality of the African 
subject. It is in this condition that the terms of engagement are not dictated 
outside the realm of thought and the existential conditions of the African subject. 
Also, the African subject’s subjectivity is the one that combats subjection.  
From this theoretical intervention of decolonial epistemic perspective, the 
political thought of Mbembe was examined on the works he has written. This has 
been done through examination of Mbembe’s political thought on the modes of 
self-writing, power in the postcolony, the politics of violence in Africa, the 
political thought of Frantz Fanon, and the idea of South Africa. The subject 
position of Mbembe has been informed by the knowledge claims he makes, and 
that in effect has a bearing on the positionality of the African subject, its 
subjection, and subjectivity. The existential conditions of the African subject 
should be understood on these lines—that is, how the subject exists in the 
clutches of subjection that denies it the potential of becoming the subject in the 
full sense as opposed to the subject of lack that is ontologically void, and of 
course, how the African subject in the act of subjectivity creates its own state of 
emergence. It has been demonstrated in the thesis that Mbembe’s relation to the 
African subject has been the one fraught with complexities, and this can also be 
extended to the subjection that affects the African subject and of course, its 
subjectivities. The understanding of the African subject in relation to Mbembe 
should also be understood in relation to how he engages the existential conditions 
of the African subject. Mbembe’s engagement in this regard acknowledges the 
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existence of subjection, but the great contention has been however, how he does 
not untangle subjection. 
The mode of self-writing has been a contentious issue more in relation to how the 
African subject must write the self. Mbembe has railed against what he refers to 
faked philosophies and modes of writing emphasising the metaphysics of 
difference predicated on populism. This is the mode of writing that Mbembe sees 
as problematic as it creates caged epistemologies. In this thesis, the opposition to 
Mbembe is based on the grounds that populism that has many genealogies, 
trajectories and horisons is the epistemological intervention that is defended 
because it is the act of the political—that is, it is the subjectivity of the African 
subject to counter subjection. And by extension, populism is the construction of 
the political. It is the affirmation of the political that informs the basis of African 
subjectivity. What was highlighted as problematic in Mbembe’s thought is the 
politics of naming and vulgarity that are seen as a tool of censure to those who 
dare to raise subjection and subverting the status quo. As such, it has been 
demonstrated that they are of no importance if their role is to criminalise 
populism without explaining it, and this is seen as if Mbembe absolves 
subjection and criminalises resistance to it. The mode of writing that Mbembe 
advocates namely, Afropolitanism is seen as the mode of writing that seeks 
accommodation within the world system that continuously marginalises and 
excludes the African subject. Mbembe (2006b) insists that there is a possibility 
of rearranging the new ways of writing Africa and African as a name, idea and 
subject should not be fraught. Africa is always in-the-making as it has ‘unstable 
consistency including in the midst of shifts, volatility and velocity’ (Mbembe 
2006b: 148). It is on this reasons that Afropolitanism is advanced by Mbembe as 
the mode of writing. The examination of the content of Afropolitanism clearly 
indicated that it is a transplant of cosmopolitanism, but now provincialised in 
Africa.   
In this thesis, the mode of writing that has been advocated as relevant is 
Africanity. This is the mode of writing embedded in and drawn from the anti-
colonial critique, and that is concerned about the existential conditions of the 
African subject, where in that subjectivity of the African subject is thought and 
writing from within. This was to show the importance of existential conditions 
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being articulated are part of the lived experience of the African subject and the 
necessity of them articulating those conditions in their own terms for the purpose 
of their own liberation. Therefore, Africanity responds to the things that do exist, 
and there is no reason why there should be silence, when the existential condition 
breeds the mode of writing that is fuelled with anger. Mbembe’s attack on 
Africanity as the mode of writing is akin to denying Africans to be angry of 
abuse and censuring them not to engage in any form of critique to the subjection 
that defines, names, categorises, and objectifies them. It is on this basis that 
Africanity is of necessity as the mode of writing by African subjects, and of 
course, those who are concerned about subjection and the existential conditions 
that alienate them from humanity. 
One of the important contributions Mbembe made is the development of the 
concept of the postcolony. Mbembe does not see it as the era after colonialism 
but the entanglement of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods into one. 
This thesis has sought to map out how power is exercised in the postcolony, and 
it argued for it to be understood in terms of its perfomativity. The performativity 
of power in the postcolony is that of mimesis of the colonial regime, and this is 
improvised by the making such power to have much potency. Such potency and 
extravagance of performativity comes through what was referred to as 
commadement, as one of the technologies of subjectivation that was mimed also 
from colonialism. The potency of power in the postcolony is a shallow form of 
power—a projection of power without power. 
The figure of the autocrat was examined in the whole act of perfomativity of 
power and it is entangled by the very same power that can entrench and even 
reject the autocrat. This then suggest the postcolony in the sense of the autocrat is 
not absolute in terms of power in that the postcolony cannot assert its power to 
the global. The power of the autocrat is then a fetish, since it is like power in the 
postcolony, power without power. The power of the autocrat is limited to the 
postcolony, and such absoluteness is that which means the narrow way of 
sovereignty which is understanding power within. The postcolony being an 
entangled space and time suggests the limitation of the power of the autocrat. 
The arbitrariness of such power is only in the postcolony, not in the global scale 
where coloniality of power presides and the power of the autocrat is just that—a 
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fetish. In terms of politics of eatery, the scandal of fortune that in many times 
originates through theft, plunder and exploitation just like in colonial epoch does 
continue. The difference in the postcolony is that the autocrat, the aristocracy and 
appendages of power in the postcolony have assumed a place in the zone of 
accumulation.  The politics of eatery in the postcolony co-exist with violence and 
brutality for that they are pursued in whatever means necessary, as long as such 
pursuits yield material gains. 
Moreover, the character of the African state in the postcolony highlights the 
betrayal of the national project. The national project had the content of aspiration 
and expectation of the subjects of the postcolony being met, and the post-
independence period with its euphoria, embarking in the fundamental change. 
The opposite is what happened, and the postcolony being what the subjects are 
caught with. The national project did not succeed since the character of the 
African state was entangled by affinities of colonial power that reduced the 
content and form of the national project to a mere pipe dream. This indeed 
proved to be right as the national project was left in charge of the hands of the 
comprador bourgeoisie class that saw the national project as a mere rhetoric to be 
preached while the state is used as a machinery of oppression to facilitate 
accumulation. The national project suffered from the conundrum of being 
something that is reduced to repetition without difference. What the character of 
the African state showed in the sense of the postcolony is the indebtedness to the 
colonial metropolis. Though the reading of Mbembe might suggest that 
commandement is the potent form of subjection—well it is in the sense of the 
postcolony. What is then missing in Mbembe is to mention any other form of 
power that creates commandement. Perfomativity of power qua colonial affinities 
of power is such form of power—subjection par excellence. 
The thesis also argued that the politics of violence should not be understood in 
terms of symptoms, but rather through the genealogy and constitutive 
complexity. This means that the genealogy of violence is not complex to the 
extent that it can be reduced to the level of abstraction, and violence as Mbembe 
noted, is the economy of language is at the level of the real. The colonial 
encounter inaugurated the language of violence, and this is what has been 
improvised in the postcolonial moment. Violence should not in the postcolonial 
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era as Mbembe suggests be de-linked from colonialism. This is simply because it 
is mutating in form, character and shape, and to ignore such complexity is to 
absolve the colonial nature of violence that still haunts the present. It has been 
examined that Mbembe’s concept of technology of destruction, the technology of 
the empire, is important but seems to be problematic at the level of the black 
body. At the level of the black body there is absence of ontology and that is the 
very thing that justifies the non-ethics of war. The black body cannot be 
accounted for because its ontology is at the level obsolete. The existence of the 
black body means the black life is not a human life. The existence is at the 
wayside that then creates the necessary condition for deathscapes to come into 
effect by assuming the character of the plantation system, where the black body 
lives in what Mbembe refers to as a shadow of death. In this shadow of death war 
machines assumes a variety of functions, form and character exists in 
deathscapes where the economy of war is volatile. The predatory nature of war 
machines and even that of the state apparatus in the conditions of war create the 
shadow of death—a deathscape impossible to escape. Though death is not feared 
by the suicide bomber, this does not suppose that the African subject qua slave, 
possessing the racialised body that is defying through death. The paradox is that 
death matters for the suicide bomber who is not a slave, and death then serves the 
higher purpose of wanting martyrdom. The black body cannot claim the politics 
of the sacred since there is no higher purpose to be served. The black body is 
already dead and does not have any sense of ontological virtue and no 
martyrdom even if it can commit suicide bombing. The only problem will be that 
if such a body engages in body on body war with the bodies of the empire, white 
bodies, the empire will respond through its might of sovereignty informed by the 
genocidal and non-ethics of war in the guise of the war against terror. Violence 
suggests that in the contemporary Africa, it has multiply genealogies, and it 
cannot be understood outside from the empire and its tentacles of coloniality.   
Moving further, this thesis examined Mbembe’s ideas on Fanon who is still a 
contested figure in the 21
st
 Century, and more importantly, the relevant figure of 
course. The interrogation of Fanon’s project that Mbembe calls for is the 
therapeutic reading that tames Fanon’s thorny existential questions to unmask 
subjection. The therapeutic reading of Fanon is informed by healing of psychic 
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damage and black subjects creating themselves. The contention in this thesis is 
that there is relevance of Fanon rather than his resurrection. Fanon’s has been a 
spectre in the postcolony and as such, Fanon’s project has never died, therefore, 
the notion of resurrection is not relevant. The spectre of Fanon started in the 20
th
 
Century and still penetrates the 21
st
 Century in various forms and degrees, and 
this resonates of course with Mbembe that Fanon’s thought is indeed 
metamorphic. This is to ensure the reading that signals the possibility that 
ensures the emergence of the figure of the black subject from the belly of 
subjection. This reading suggests the politics that are infused with the potential 
of liberation, the liberation that will only come through the ontologising of the 
deontologised subjection crushed in objecthood. It was argued that such 
interrogation is primarily essential for understanding Fanon in relation to the 
humanity that was, and is still of concern to him, that which is excluded, 
marginalised and oppressed, in short, humanity under the surveillance of 
subjection. So, the liberation of black subjects, their emergence, is what can 
bring them to humanity, but the anti-black world must come to an end for this to 
be actualised, and this is something that Mbembe did not engage.  
The thesis has also tried demonstrating Mbembe’s notion of Nongqawuse 
syndrome through re-considering the historical narrative itself of Nongqawuse by 
showing that whites were the agents of history and black subjects were objects of 
history. By using de-colonial turn as a rallying point of critique, the contention is 
emphasising the signification of Nongqawuse’s narrative, and to call for other 
histories. This proved essential since the historical narrative and the 
historiography has been that of the frontier history that is told by whites about 
blacks. The concern raised with Mbembe’s notion—that is, Nongqawuse 
syndrome made him a purveyor instead of the subject rethinking history. The 
subject of history, with its portrayal of the past as empirically factual, has been 
the alien subject when it comes to black subjects and the concern is that Mbembe 
does not see this as problematic, hence the application of the Nongqawuse, that it 
is argued here that it is an alibi. Also, radical break that is propagated in the post-
1994 South Africa is falsity if it is predicated on the idea that this has led to 
fundamental change. What is essential to restate is that the 1994 moment was a 
negotiated settlements that had terms and conditions that led to a compromise. 
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Mbembe regards this as a positive state action where in that racial equality is 
created, but also having to acknowledge structural inequalities and a lot that has 
to be done to address the injustices of the apartheid past.  
On another note, since the black capitalist are parasitic to the state and white 
capital, the two that are their material bases for accumulation, it is essential there 
to render these black subjects a cog in the machine. They are the appendages of 
the racial industrial complex of frontier accumulation. Mbembe does not 
explicitly point out to subjection that comes through hegemony and domination, 
since these sectors are the spaces where white power is felt. It is clear that black 
subjects who are in the commanding heights of these sectors do not have power 
as Mbembe would like us to believe. This thesis even raises a concern on why 
Mbembe railed against the Native Club, but is quite on the white suprematist 
formations like Afri-Forum and Solidarity. The silent scandal that is perpetuated 
by the liberal consensus is not legitimate in calling an end of to the Native Club, 
whereas it does not do the same to Afri-Forum and Solidarity. The argument 
raised here is that the Native Club has the right to exist and black subjects should 
not be dictated to how they should form themselves. So, the Native Club was and 
is still necessary and relevant to the post-1994 era where black subjects who are 
concerned about subjection still need their own space and own terms of 
engagement. But then, the spectre of the silent scandal remains qua banning of 
the Native Club and Mbembe’s silence on Afri-Forum and Solidarity, both that 
are antithetical to non-racial project, seeing beyond nativism, defending the 
Constitution, progressive social and political projects, transformation and self-
determination of black subjects.      
Mbembe acknowledges that race still matters in the post-1994 South Africa and 
it will be here for a long time. What was contended in this thesis is Mbembe’s 
stance of two defensive logics of race to argue that race denialism is an issue, and 
it should not be correlated with black experiences that Mbembe refers to as 
communal victimhood. It means therefore, the blame of the unworkable post-
1994 miracle is the responsibility of both white subjects and black subjects. It 
seems to the latter, who maybe making legitimate claims in relation to how white 
privilege that is founded on the dispossession and the exclusion of the latter is 
criminalised. What was also of emphasis was the role of white anti-racist work. 
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The white anti-racist efforts should not be seen as the ones serving the interests 
of black subjects since this will mean that the interests and demands of the black 
subjects will be sanctioned and censured. To conclude then, the idea of South 
Africa as advanced by Mbembe is of importance but in needs further 
interrogation, and the attempt made here is to engage some of the aspects 
Mbembe put forward. The idea of South Africa is engaged here from the 
positionality of black subjectivity that takes subjection into account rather than 
relegating it to the abstract margins, but concretising it for its importance of the 
existential conditions of black subjects.  
Restatement of contribution and future research inroads  
To conclude, this thesis necessitates the shifting of the geography of reason of 
the African subject and also the biography of knowledge of the African scholars. 
It is necessary to move away from the decadent Euro-North American canon if 
African subjectivity is to be taken seriously. The shifting of the geography of 
reason is the reading of the African archive and resurrecting African 
subjectivities from subjection that comes in the image of epistemic violence, 
epistemic ignorance, epistemic erasure, epistemicide and epistemic deafness. The 
shifting of the geography of reason has been carried out through decolonial 
critical analysis as a method of studying Mbembe and from the theory of 
decolonial epistemic perspective to unmask coloniality of power, coloniality of 
knowledge, and coloniality of being as forms of subjection inherent in Mbembe’s 
work.  
Also, these forms of subjection makes Mbembe’s analysis to be inadequate to 
African subjectivity and contributing to the misreading of Africa—therefore, 
having the implications of leaving Africa to the whims of being read from the 
Euro-North American ways of doing and thinking.  This thesis has affirmed the 
ways of doing and thinking rooted in Africa as the geography of reason. The 
suppressed, criminalised and erased epistemologies of the African subject are 
resurrected if the geography of reason is shifted and they do become African 
subjectivity proper. The shifting of the geography of reason is reading Africa 
from —to name just a few—from Aimé Césaire than George Hegel; from WED 
Du Bois than Jacques Derrida; from Frantz Fanon than Michel Foucault. This is 
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essential in order to cast light into de-colonial horisons that provide the 
possibility of the liberation of the African subject.  
The shifting of the geography of reason is a practical shift. Once there is a shift, 
new subjectivities come into being. The shifting of the geography of reason has 
demonstrated the originality of thought to engage Mbembe from the existential 
and epistemological base of African subjectivity. What this thesis has explained 
through decolonial critical analysis and de-colonial turn to the modes of self-
writing, power in the postcolony, the politics of violence, Frantz Fanon and the 
idea of South Africa is that Mbembe is still on the side of coloniality. This has 
led Mbembe’s insights to be alienated to the existential condition of the African 
subject; hence he dismisses African subjectivity and seems to absolve the 
presence of subjection. The geography of reason of Mbembe has not shifted from 
the Euro-North American archive and the colonial library. This thesis shows why 
Mbembe does not treat African scholars seriously by reducing them to a footnote 
and not treating them as the body of the text. This makes Mbembe to have the 
attitude of the imperial subject who maintains coloniality by treating Africa as a 
mere abstraction.   
The possible future research projects are essential since the thematic areas 
featured in this study are not Mbembe’s oeuvre in toto, but a capita selecta 
corpus. It has to be noted that Mbembe is an eclectic and illustrious scholar as he 
engages in philosophy, photography, African modernity, postcolonial theory, 
history, aesthetics, art, political theory, political thought, urban/area studies, 
anthropology and literature to name but a few. The possible themes, that are 
pertinent and worthy of future research on Mbembe particularly on African 
politics as a subject area should be his theoretical inventions, African philosophy, 
African political thought and trends in the postcolonial Africa—and this being 
done outside the realm of Euro-North American episteme. Since there is a crisis 
of modernity and the Euro-North American episteme, there is a need of modes of 
theorisation and epistemological intervention in studying Mbembe. Essentially, 
what is encouraged for future research is the shifting of the geography of reason. 
This serves well as part proof of understanding the African condition from its 
existential location. In summation, this thesis has looked at some thematic 
apparatus pertinent to Mbembe’s complexity of thought and his overarching 
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positionality. This thesis ends with a note that it has attempted to make the 
epistemological intervention from the geography of reason of decolonial 
epistemic perspective with the contribution of opening and inaugurating the 
possibility of another forms of lives, knowledges, worlds and utopias. Aluta 
continua!  
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